Mujtaba Rahman is the head of Eurasia Group’s Europe practice. He posts at @Mij_Europe. 2026 is here, and Europe is under siege. External pressure from Russia is mounting in Ukraine, China is undermining the EU’s industrial base, and the U.S. — now effectively threatening to annex the territory of a NATO ally — is undermining the EU’s multilateral rule book, which appears increasingly outdated in a far more transactional and less cooperative world. And none of this shows signs of slowing down. In fact, in the year ahead, the steady erosion of the norms Europe has come to rely on will only be compounded by the bloc’s weak leadership — especially in the so-called “E3” nations of Germany, France and the U.K. Looking forward, the greatest existential risks for Europe will flow from the transatlantic relationship. For the bloc’s leaders, keeping the U.S. invested in the war in Ukraine was the key goal for 2025. And the best possible outcome for 2026 will be a continuation of the ad-hoc diplomacy and transactionalism that has defined the last 12 months. However, if new threats emerge in this relationship — especially regarding Greenland — this balancing act may be impossible. The year also starts with no sign of any concessions from Russia when it comes to its ceasefire demands, or any willingness to accept the terms of the 20-point U.S.-EU-Ukraine plan. This is because Russian President Vladimir Putin is calculating that Ukraine’s military situation will further deteriorate, forcing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to capitulate to territorial demands. I believe Putin is wrong — that backed by Europe, Zelenskyy will continue to resist U.S. pressure on territorial concessions, and instead, increasingly target Russian energy production and exports in addition to resisting along the frontline. Of course, this means Russian aerial attacks against Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure will also increase in kind. Nonetheless, Europe’s growing military spending, purchase of U.S. weapons, financing for Kyiv and sanctions against Russia — which also target sources of energy revenue — could help maintain last year’s status quo. But this is perhaps the best case scenario. Activists protest outside Downing street against the recent policies of Donald Trump. | Guy Smallman/Getty Images Meanwhile, European leaders will be forced to publicly ignore Washington’s support for far-right parties, which was clearly spelled out in the new U.S. national security strategy, while privately doing all they can to counter any antiestablishment backlash at the polls. Specifically, the upcoming election in Hungary will be a bellwether for whether the MAGA movement can tip the balance for its ideological affiliates in Europe, as populist, euroskeptic Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is currently poised to lose for the first time in 15 years. Orbán, for his part, has been frantically campaigning to boost voter support, signaling that he and his inner circle actually view defeat as a possibility. His charismatic rival Péter Magyar, who shares his conservative-nationalist political origins but lacks any taint of corruption poses a real challenge, as does the country’s stagnating economy and rising prices. While traditional electoral strategies — financial giveaways, smear campaigns and war fearmongering — have so far proven ineffective for Orbán, a military spillover from Ukraine that directly affects Hungary could reignite voter fears and shift the dynamic. To top it all off, these challenges will be compounded by the E3’s weakness. The hollowing out of Europe’s political center has already been a decade in the making. But France, Germany and the U.K. each entered 2026 with weak, unpopular governments besieged by the populist right and left, as well as a U.S. administration rooting for their collapse. While none face scheduled general elections, all three risk paralysis at best and destabilization at worst. And at least one leader — namely, Britain’s Keir Starmer — could fall because of an internal party revolt. The year’s pivotal event in the U.K. will be the midterm elections in May. As it stands, the Labour Party faces the humiliation of coming third in the Welsh parliament, failing to oust the Scottish National Party in the Scottish parliament and losing seats to both the Greens and ReformUK in English local elections. Labour MPs already expect a formal challenge to Starmer as party leader, and his chances of surviving seem slight. France, meanwhile, entered 2026 without a budget for the second consecutive year. The good news for President Emmanuel Macron is that his Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s minority government will probably achieve a budget deal targeting a modest deficit reduction by late February or March. And with the presidential election only 16 months away and local elections due to be held in March, the opposition’s appetite for a snap parliamentary election has abated. However, this is the best he can hope for, as a splintered National Assembly will sustain a mood of slow-motion crisis until the 2027 race. Finally, while Germany’s economy looks like it will slightly recover this year, it still won’t overcome its structural malaise. Largely consumed by ideological divisions, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government will struggle to implement far-reaching reforms. And with the five upcoming state elections expected to see increased vote shares for the far-right Alternative for Germany party, pressure on the government in Berlin will only mount A historic truth — one often forgotten in the quiet times — will reassert itself in 2026: that liberty, stability, prosperity and peace in Europe are always brittle. The holiday from history, provided by Pax Americana and exceptional post-World War II cooperation and integration, has officially come to an end. Moving forward, Europe’s relevance in the new global order will be defined by its response to Russia’s increased hybrid aggression, its influence on diplomacy regarding the Ukraine war and its ability to improve competitiveness, all while managing an increasingly ascendant far right and addressing the existential threats to its economy and security posed by Russia, China and the U.S. This is what will decide whether Europe can survive.

BRUSSELS — If you ordered Christmas presents from a Chinese web shop, they are likely to be toxic, unsafe or undervalued. Or all of the above. The EU is trying to do something about the flood but is tripping over itself 27 times to get there. “It’s absolutely crazy…” sighs one EU official. The official, granted anonymity to discuss preparations to tackle the problem, said that at some airport freight hubs, an estimated 80 percent of such inbound packages don’t comply with EU safety rules. The numbers are dizzying. In 2024, 4.6 billion small packages with contents worth less than €150 entered the EU. That all-time record was broken in September of this year. Because these individual air-mail packages replace whole containers shipping the same product, the workload for customs officials has increased exponentially over recent years. Non-compliant, cheaply-made products — such as dangerous toys or kitchen items — bring health risks. And a growing pile of garbage. It’s a problem for everyone along the chain. Customs officers can’t keep up; buyers end up with useless products; children are put at risk; and EU makers of similar items are undercut by unfair and untaxed competition. With the situation on the ground becoming unmanageable, the EU agreed this month to charge a €3 fixed fee on all such packages. This will effectively remove a tax-free exemption on packages worth €150 — but only from July of next year. It’s a crude, and temporary, fix because existing customs IT systems can’t yet tax items according to their actual value. ALL I WANT … Which is why all European lawmaker Anna Cavazzini wants for next year’s holiday season is “better rules.” Cavazzini is a key player in a push to harmonize the EU’s 27 national customs regimes. A proposed reform, now being discussed by the EU institutions, would create a central data hub and an EU Customs Agency, or EUCA, with oversight powers. As is so often the case in the EU, though, the customs reform is only progressing slowly. The EUCA will be operational only from late 2026. And the data hub probably won’t be up and running until the next decade. “We need a fundamental discussion on the Europeanization of customs,” Cavazzini told POLITICO. As chair of the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO), the lawmaker from the German Greens has been pushing the Council, the EU’s intergovernmental branch, to allow the customs reform to make the bloc’s single market more of a unified reality. European lawmaker Anna Cavazzini. | Martin Bertrand and Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images EU capitals worry — as always — about handing over too much power to the eurocrats in Brussels. But the main outstanding issue where negotiators disagree is more prosaic: it’s about whether the law should include an explicit list of offences, such making false declarations to customs officers. While the last round of negotiations in early December brought some progress on other areas, the unsolved penalties question has kicked the reform into 2026. With the millions of boxes, packages and parcels inbound, regardless, individual countries are also considering handling fees, beside the €3 tax that all have agreed on. France has already proposed a solo fee with revenues flowing into its national budget, and Belgium and the Netherlands will probably follow suit. RACE TO THE BOTTOM Customs reform is what’s needed, not another round of fragmented fees and a race to the bottom, said Dirk Gotink, the European Parliament’s lead negotiator on the customs reform. “Right now, the ideas launched by France and others are not meant to stem the flow of packages. They are just meant to earn money,” the Dutch center-right lawmaker told a recent briefing. To inspect the myriad ways in which they are a risk, Gotink’s team bought a few items from dubious-looking web shops. “With this one, the eyes are coming off right away,” he warned before handing a plush toy to a reporter. The reporter almost succeeded in separating the head from the creature’s body without too much effort. And thin, plastic eyes trailed the toy as it was passed around the room. “On the box it says it’s meant for people over 15 years old…” one reporter commented. But the cute creature is clearly targeted at far younger audiences. Adding to the craze, K-pop stars excitedly unbox new characters in online promotional videos. The troubles aren’t limited to toys. A jar of cosmetics showed by Gotink had inscriptions on its label that didn’t resemble any known alphabet. Individual products aside, the deluge of cheap merchandise also creates unfair competition, said Cavazzini: “A lot of European companies of course also fulfill the environmental obligations and the imports don’t,” she said. “This is also creating a huge unlevel playing field.” After the holidays, Gotink and Cavazzini will pick up negotiations on the customs reform with Cyprus, which from Jan. 1 takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU from Denmark. “This file will be a priority during our presidency,” a Cypriot official told POLITICO, adding that Denmark had completed most of the technical work. “We aim to conclude this important file, hoping to reach a deal with the Parliament during the first months of the Cyprus Presidency.” Despite the delays, an EU diplomat working on customs policy told POLITICO that the current speed of the policy process is unprecedented: “This huge ecommerce pressure has really made all the difference. A year ago, this would have been unimaginable.”

PARIS — French lawmakers formally approved the country’s 2026 social security budget on Tuesday, handing Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu an important political victory and offering some optimism to skittish markets worried France isn’t serious about getting its public finances in check. The bill, which covers state health care and pensions spending, was expected to pass after having already been approved by the National Assembly, France’s more powerful lower legislative chamber, last week, but its rejection by the Senate over the weekend forced another vote. The conservative Senate rejected the measure in part over concerns the legislation does not sufficiently bring down the budget deficit. As part of a compromise to ensure his government’s survival, Lecornu approved a measure in the law that suspends until 2027 the controversial law passed in 2023 that raised the retirement age for most workers from 62 to 64. The government now faces the more arduous task of passing a state budget for next year, which is a separate piece of legislation. The National Assembly’s first attempt to pass a state budget ended with all but one MP voting against the bill, which MPs had saddled with untenable and sometimes conflicting amendments. Lawmakers from both branches of parliament will on Friday attempt to forge a compromise text during a U.S.-style conference committee in what one National Assembly official described as a “make or break” moment. France is highly unlikely to face a government shutdown similar to what happened in the United States earlier this year as lawmakers can approve a measure carrying the 2025 budget over into next year. But such a stopgap would exacerbate the worrying financial outlook in the European Union’s second-largest economy. France’s current fiscal plans for 2026 are now projected to carry a budget deficit to 5.3 percent of gross domestic product, significantly higher than the 4.7 percent of GDP deficit initially proposed by the government and welcomed by the European Commission. Lecornu said in October that whatever fiscal plans lawmakers agree on should not carry a budget deficit for 2026 that exceeds 5 percent of GDP.

Mujtaba Rahman is the head of Eurasia Group’s Europe practice. He posts at @Mij_Europe. It all looked rather bleak for France a little over a week ago, as President Emmanuel Macron’s former Prime Minister Edouard Philippe seemingly wrecked his successor’s deficit-cutting strategy. While Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu was working toward a deal with the Socialists in his country’s fractured National Assembly, the 34 centrist lawmakers of Philippe’s Horizons party unceremoniously announced they would abstain or oppose the government in a key vote on the social security budget set to be held Tuesday evening. The eventual narrow win in favor of a relatively generous social security budget, covering pensions, health and welfare, is thus a godsend for Macron’s embattled prime minister — turns out, he may just survive. However, it doesn’t guarantee an agreement on the main state budget before the Dec. 23 deadline, and Lecornu will likely struggle to deliver another surprise victory over the next two weeks. Ahead of Tuesday evening’s final tally, the prime minister made a string of last-minute concessions to the Socialists and the Greens on health spending to get their votes or abstentions. And he eventually succeeded in securing a small majority by 247 to 234 votes. However, to keep next year’s welfare deficit below €20 billion — already up from the €17.5 billion originally proposed — Lecornu transferred an extra subsidy of at least €4.5 billion from the main budget, which covers everything from education to defense. And it remains unclear where exactly this money will be found, while still meeting the government’s promise to reduce France’s overall deficit from 5.4 percent of gross domestic product to “below 5 percent” next year. Still, Lecornu hopes his unlikely success with the social security budget in the National Assembly will create momentum for a deal on the main budget. Moreover, Tuesday’s victory — though limited and hard fought — is without precedent. No previous budget in France’s Fifth Republic has been negotiated and agreed on by an ad hoc coalition of government and opposition. So, as attention now turns to the main state budget, Lecornu’s balancing act will prove even trickier. | Julien De Rosa/AFP via Getty Images The problem is, the prime minister’s concessions to the moderate left — abolishing a planned freeze on pensions and welfare payments, boosting a 2 percent planned increase in health spending to 3 percent, and suspending pension reform — infuriated two of the four parties in his fragile centrist coalition. So, as attention now turns to the main state budget, Lecornu’s balancing act will prove even trickier. Upon its first reading in the National Assembly, this budget was rejected by 404 votes to one. And the French leader will be hard-pressed to find concessions for the moderate left, appease his coalition and keep his promise to reduce the deficit. As France’s third prime minister in the last 12 months, Lecornu has no majority in a National Assembly that’s currently split into 11 groups. In order to avoid a censure motion, he has also promised not to use his government’s special constitutional powers (Article 49.3) to impose legislation without a parliamentary vote, and has so far rejected pressure from within his own camp to reverse that decision. Simply put, using this power and facing censure is not a risk Lecornu is likely to take — especially since he wouldn’t resign if he lost the upcoming budget vote. He would instead argue the rejected budget deal was an attempted compromise and not his responsibility alone. Paradoxically, part of Lecornu’s problem is that he’s now expected to survive. Previously, the center, center right and Socialists agreed to abstain from voting, as they feared a government collapse and snap parliamentary elections in January, right before the important municipal elections in March. But now that this fear has subsided, Philippe and the center right can take the risk of wrecking the budget deal. To that end, Lecornu and his government are now preparing emergency legislation to roll over this year’s budget to keep the French state operational, and lawmakers have been warned they may be called in for a special session to pass such a stopgap budget in late December. According to the ministry of finance, though, if a rolled-over 2025 budget were to last throughout next year, it would push France’s deficit beyond 6 percent of GDP. In fact, even a delay of two or three months could, in theory, significantly weaken efforts to reduce the budget deficit, as under French law, authorities can’t retroactively apply any tax increases that lawmakers eventually approve. Still, it would at least allow Lecornu to hang on and fight another day. But the outlook for France is looking no brighter than before.

John Kampfner is a British author, broadcaster and commentator. His latest book “In Search of Berlin” is published by Atlantic. He is a regular POLITICO columnist. When it comes to the war in Ukraine, predictions don’t last long. One minute U.S. President Donald Trump’s acting like his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin’s emissary, the next he’s giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a reasonable hearing, and then it’s back again to the Kremlin camp. With the U.S. administration increasingly taking on the role of unreliable broker over a staunch ally, Europe is in a parlous position. And what has struck me most during a series of security briefings and conferences I’ve attended in Berlin and elsewhere this autumn, is the extent of the alarm. Yet, much of the time, this remains hidden behind closed doors. One of the few crumbs of comfort is that the E3 nations of Germany, France and Britain are seeking to confront this cold reality in unison. After the trauma of Brexit, and all the bickering between former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron in recent years, the mood has changed — because it had to. If Europe is to survive a future attack by Russia — and that is the kind of language being used — its big players must behave in a way they haven’t done before. They must be joined at the hip. As more than a dozen officials have made clear in a series of discussions, the cost of inaction would be far greater than the cost of supporting Ukraine has been so far. Not only would Putin be emboldened to go even further, Europe would also be engulfed by a wave of Ukrainian refugees far greater than anything experienced before. And this realignment was visible amid the pomp and circumstance of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s state visit to the U.K. last week, as both he and King Charles affirmed what they described as a deep bond between the two countries — one that’s been reinforced by the shared threat of Russian expansionism. Meanwhile, the real business taking place at the government level is intense. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have developed a genuine affinity, stemming from a shared view of current foreign-policy perils and their domestic-policy troubles. A British prime minister of the center-left and German chancellor of the center-right are finding common cause in their double adversity. The loss of the U.S. as a friend in need is what’s forcing this realignment for both countries. Of course, neither publicly dares admit the situation is as bad as it is, but the optics say everything that needs to be said. Just compare Trump’s state visit in September — with its high security, taut smiles and desperate obsequies by his hosts – and the relaxed conviviality of Steinmeier’s. And dominating everything is security — though it’s less a “coalition of the willing” and more a “coalition of the surrounded.” Or, as one German security official, granted anonymity to speak freely, explained: “If the Americans are now acting as mediators between Russia and Europe, they no longer see themselves as partners within NATO.” In practical terms, the U.S. is still the driving force behind the alliance, notionally at least. As another German military figure, also granted anonymity to express their views, put it: “The harsh truth is that Europe’s readiness level to combat any Russian aggression doesn’t yet exist. Until that time, we are reliant on the U.S. to act as a backstop.” But that penny should have dropped last February, when U.S. Vice President JD Vance dropped his various bombshells at the Munich Security Conference, attacking European democracies, praising the far-right Alternative for Germany party and serving notice that the U.S. no longer felt beholden to past allegiances. The real surprise is that anyone’s been surprised by the Trump administration’s actions since then. Even now, some are continuing to cling to the hope that this isn’t the united view in Washington, and that others within the administration still wield a certain influence. This isn’t how security planners in Germany or the U.K. see things, but it seems many politicians — and much of the public — are yet to be convinced of just how serious the situation has become. One minute U.S. President Donald Trump’s acting like his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin’s emissary, the next he’s giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a reasonable hearing. | Pool Photo by Will Oliver via EPA Their alarm will have been reinforced by the second Trump administration’s first National Security Strategy. Published only a few days ago, it condemns many of the liberal values underpinning European democracy, while praising the nativist, nationalist rhetoric of the far-right — and implicitly of Putin.  Previously, the dominant narrative around Europe was about German reluctance, whether brought about by postwar guilt and pacificism or complacency. But while that has been replaced by a new determination, exactly how deeply is it entrenched? The commitment across NATO to increase defense spending to 5 percent of national GDP — 1.5 percent of which can be spent on “critical infrastructure” — certainly allows for much budgetary dexterity. But Berlin’s borrowing power gives it a freedom its neighbors can only envy. Britain’s financial travails are considerably more acute, and for all his tough talk, several defense contractors suspect Starmer is going slow on defense orders. As it stands, Germany is expected to spend €153 billion a year on defense by 2029. France, by comparison, plans to reach about €80 billion by 2030, and the U.K. currently spends £60 billion — a figure set to rise to £87 billion by 2030 — but looking at current predictions, will only hit its 3.5 percent target in 2035. For the governments in London and Paris, budgets are so tight and public service spending requirements so great — not to mention debt interest payments — the push-and-pull with security needs will only become more intense. And while opinion polls vary from country to country and depending on how questions are phrased, the growing concern among many defense officials is that if Ukraine is pressured enough to accept some form of Trump-Putin dirty deal, public support for military spending will decrease. “Job done” will be the sentiment — except, of course, it won’t be. For Putin, it can’t be. The Russian leader has tied his political survival, his power infrastructure and his country’s economy to the notion of an encircling Western “threat.” Hence his recent remarks about Russia being “ready” for war if Europe wants to start one — he simply can’t afford to stop invoking threats. But the original 28-point plan for Ukraine — which the U.S. initially denied came directly from the Kremlin — represents Europe’s worst nightmare. And if a spurious “peace” is imposed by any deal approximating that one, Germany, the U.K., France and their other European allies, including Poland, Finland, the Baltics, Nordics and (more cautiously) Italy, will know they’re out on their own. It would mark the return of big-power politics, a Yalta 2.0. It would enshrine NATO’s de-Americanization, a structural incapacity for Ukraine to defend itself, and confirm that, as far as the U.S. is concerned, Russia enjoys a veto on European security. “We say it’s existential, but we don’t yet act as if it is,” said one British defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity. The task for Merz, Starmer and Macron is then to accept — and admit to their publics — that they only have each other to rely on.

PARIS — A generational reckoning is brewing in Paris and Berlin, where a new wave of younger politicians is putting pensioners on notice: The system is buckling and can’t hold unless retirees do more to help fix it. Culture, language and local politics may add a distinct flavor to each debate, but the European Union’s two biggest economies are dealing with the same issue — how to pay for the soaring costs associated with the retirement of baby boomers.   The problem is both demographic and financial. Declining birthrates mean there aren’t enough young people to offset the boom in retirees at a time when economic growth is sluggish, salaries have stagnated and purchasing power isn’t evolving at the same rate as it did for previous generations. And with the cost of real estate skyrocketing, young people feel that buying a home and other opportunities afforded to their parents’ generation are increasingly out of reach.  With budgets already strapped thanks to priorities such as rearmament in the face of Russian aggression, reindustrialization and the green transition, a growing number of young politicians from the center to the right of the political spectrum are calling out retirees for not contributing to the solution.  Some lawmakers in Germany, like 34-year-old Johannes Winkel, are calling for greater “intergenerational justice.” The 38-year-old French MP Guillaume Kasbarian is going a step further, arguing France should rethink its pay-as-you-go system — similar to Germany’s — in which current workers fund retirees’ pensions through taxes. The 38-year-old French MP Guillaume Kasbarian is going a step further, arguing France should rethink its pay-as-you-go system — similar to Germany’s — in which current workers fund retirees’ pensions through taxes. | Amaury Cornu/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images Targeting pensioners is a politically dangerous proposition. They are a reliable voting constituency, heading to the ballot box in greater numbers than younger generations — and they lean centrist. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservative bloc got an estimated 43 percent of the vote among people aged 70 and above in February’s general election, and older voters helped Macron secure reelection in 2022.  French Budget Minister Amélie de Montchalin told lawmakers last month that she didn’t “want to trigger a generation war” over the government’s fiscal plans for next year.  But she — and her counterparts across the Rhine — may not have a choice. ‘FAIR TO ALL GENERATIONS’ Lawmakers in France are sparring this week over a highly contentious plan to freeze inflation adjustments on pension payments next year, part of a wide-ranging effort to trim billions of euros from the budget and get the deficit below 5 percent of gross domestic product. The debate in France echoes similar conversations in Germany, where Winkel is among a group of young conservatives who rebelled against a pension reform package put forth by Merz’s government, saying current benefits for older people are too generous and asking for a plan that is “fair to all generations.”   A group of leading economists argued in an op-ed in German newspaper Handelsblatt that Merz’s proposed pension package would be “to the detriment of the younger generation, who are already under increasing financial pressure.”   The leaders of Germany’s coalition set out to resolve the dispute last week, with Merz vowing to take on a second, more far-reaching set of pension reforms as early as next year.   Winkel is among a group of young conservatives who rebelled against a pension reform package put forth by Merz’s government, saying current benefits for older people are too generous and asking for a plan that is “fair to all generations.”  | Photo by Nadja Wohlleben/Getty Images But it’s unclear whether that proposal has appeased all young conservatives. In a letter this week, the group said its 18 lawmakers would decide individually how they will vote on the immediate pension package, which is set to go for a vote on Friday. Every vote will matter, as Merz’s fragile coalition has a majority of only 12 parliamentarians. On Tuesday, Merz’s center-right bloc held a test vote to see if there was enough conservative support to pass the pension reform package. The results of the internal vote were unclear. Opinion surveys in Germany and France show that much of the public favors protecting existing pension systems and benefits. Leftist parties in both countries have also strongly pushed back against measures that would freeze or lower pension benefits, arguing that the public pension system is a core element of social cohesion. But intergenerational cracks are emerging.  “Measures on pensions show a generational cleavage: They are massively rejected by pensioners but supported by nearly one out of two in the younger generation (18-24),” according to an analysis from French pollster Elabe published in October.  In another poll from Odoxa, a small majority of working-age people in France agreed that current pensioners are “better off because they were able to leave earlier than those still working.” KEY DIFFERENCES There are key differences between France and Germany, however. Pension benefits in France are far more generous than in Germany, and help keep the poverty rate among people aged 65 and above lower than that of the general population.  The opposite is true in Germany, where the over-65 population is worse off than those younger than 65, in part because public pensions became comparatively lower after pension reforms passed in the 2000s.  Ultimately, however, demographics and economics vary so much from one generation to another that it’s almost impossible to make a pension system “fair,” according to Arnaud Lechevalier, an economist at the Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. The idea that each generation can have the same return on investment on their working-aged contributions is, in Lechevalier’s words, “a deeply stupid idea.”

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Washington–Moscow peace maneuvers caught Europe off guard this week — raising questions about the EU’s continued relevance and readiness at a pivotal moment for Ukraine. Nick Vinocur, one of our regular guests, takes the host seat this time to speak with Veronika Melkozerova in Kyiv about how these peace talks look from inside a country still under attack. Then POLITICO’s finance reporter Bjarke Smith-Meyer and Wouter Verschelden, author of Belgium’s influential political newsletter W16, break down the EU’s internal fight over Russia’s frozen assets — arguably Europe’s strongest political and financial leverage in the peace-talk moment — and examine why Belgium continues to block the reparations loan Ukraine urgently needs.

BRUSSELS — Frustrated EU countries are ramping up pressure on Belgium to release €140 billion of frozen Russian reserves held in Brussels by accusing Bart De Wever’s government of failing to fully disclose what it does with the tax income from those immobilized assets. The European Commission wants the 27 EU countries to agree to send the Russian reserves as a reparations loan to Kyiv at a crunch European Council meeting on Dec. 18, in a drive to bail out the Ukrainian economy. But Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever is resisting — and ratcheted up his opposition on Thursday evening — arguing Belgium will be on the hook if Moscow claws back the billions. Five diplomats from various European countries, however, complained that Belgium appears to have a secondary agenda in holding onto Russia’s money thanks to the tax generated. They noted Belgium was breaking an international commitment — made last year — to disclose what it was doing with tax from the frozen reserves, which is supposed to go to Ukraine. The diplomats said the money was still being folded into the Belgian national budget, making it impossible to determine whether Belgium is fully living up to its commitments to Kyiv. The diplomats spoke on condition that they — and the countries they represent — remain anonymous. Belgium strenuously denies it is doing anything wrong. If Belgium continues to push back on sending the frozen funds to Kyiv, the diplomats said, EU member countries will increasingly use meetings in the run-up to the European Council summit to question whether Belgium is profiting from the tax income or delaying payments to Ukraine. They also query whether Belgium is using regular tax revenue to support Ukraine — as other European countries are — or is simply relying on tax from the Russian reserves. “In light of this ongoing foot-dragging behavior, one wonders whether it has actually been understood that it’s Europe’s security which is at stake here,” a senior EU diplomat told POLITICO.  “And in view of the data, there are doubts as to whether Belgium is delivering on its promise to sent its windfall tax gains to Ukraine.” The money is hard to track, but diplomats questioning the numbers use sources such as the Kiel Institute, which pegs Belgium’s total commitment to Ukraine at €3.44 billion between the start of the war and Aug. 31, 2025. To put that in context, the tax from the Russian assets totaled €1.7 billion in 2024 alone. The Belgian government rejected the criticism of the diplomats, saying that all the tax earned from the Russian reserves held in the Euroclear bank in Brussels was “earmarked” to Kyiv. It did not directly answer a question on whether all of it had already been paid. “The Belgian government has committed to allocating all corporate tax revenue from the interest income on Russia’s immobilized assets at Euroclear to support Ukraine,” said a Belgian official. “For 2025, this revenue is currently estimated at around €1 billion.” The Belgian government also insisted that the money paid to Ukraine came from Belgian federal government sources beyond the tax on assets. “In addition to the full use of the corporate tax on the windfall profits, which is fully used for military support to Ukraine, the Belgian federal government has provided since 2022 roughly just under 1 billion euros in military and other support to Ukraine,” the Belgian official wrote in a statement. Since the Russian assets are held by the Brussels-based depository Euroclear, the Belgian government levies a 25 percent corporate tax on profits generated from the interest on the holdings. “[This] funding is entirely earmarked for Ukraine and goes toward the provision of military-related support (military hardware, training, etc.) as well as limited civilian items such as ambulances,” the Belgian official continued. Part of the frustration among Belgium’s EU allies is that this lack of transparency was meant to be resolved last year. In 2024, several Western countries accused the Belgian government of using part of the tax revenues from assets to cover ordinary budgetary needs. In response to that criticism, the previous Belgian government pledged to transfer the tax revenues to an EU and G7 financial instrument for Ukraine. But Belgium never delivered on that promise. When asked why it was not using the special instrument to be transparent about the funds, the Belgian government did not reply. A second senior EU diplomat critical of Belgium had an explanation. “The tax revenue was already part of their domestic budget, and they didn’t want to give it up,” the envoy said.

Czechia — one of Ukraine’s staunchest allies — is considering cutting the flow of much-needed arms and ammunition to Kyiv’s forces when its new government takes control in the coming weeks, according to a key leader of the incoming coalition. Filip Turek, the president of the right-wing populist Motorists party that this week signed an agreement to help form a national government, said that his country will “maintain NATO commitments and adherence to international law.” However, he went on, “it will prioritize diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine and mitigate risks of conflict in Europe, shifting from military aid funded by the national budget to humanitarian support and focusing on Czech security needs.” The Motorists party was founded in 2022, and clinched six seats in parliament during last month’s nationwide election, making it a pivotal kingmaker in efforts by prime minister-designate Andrej Babiš and his populist ANO faction to form a government. Turek is under consideration to take on the role of foreign minister in the new administration. Babiš has previously publicly cast doubt on the future of a major program led by the current Czech government to provide tens of thousands of artillery shells to Ukraine, but has avoided publicly committing to a position since the election. Responding to the comments, first reported in POLITICO’s Brussels Playbook, outgoing Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský said, “the limitation of Czech military aid to Ukraine is news that will surely bring great joy to Russian soldiers on the front line. Let’s consider it a Christmas gift from Babiš to Vladimir Putin.” According to Lipavský, whose broad center-right platform suffered defeat in October’s election, the new coalition’s policy statements “do not mention the word Russia even once,” and fail to face up to the Kremlin’s aggression. “The new government will be undermining the security of the Czech Republic,” Lipavský said. Turek added that the new Czech government would deal with Moscow in a manner “guided by pragmatic protection of national interests” and avoid “escalation that could endanger Czechia’s energy security or economic stability.” A “broader focus on sovereignty and non-intervention suggests a cautious, interest-based approach,” he said. While the Czech government may change the types of aid it provides to Ukraine, the EU’s main plan to finance Kyiv next year hinges on the use of Russian frozen assets currently held in Belgium. Brussels is in the process of deciding whether to support those measures, and it’s unclear whether Prague would oppose such a move. Babiš, tasked with forming a government within the next month, may face opposition from President Petr Pavel over Turek’s nomination. The likely next foreign minister has faced police investigation over inflammatory social media posts, some of which he has apologized for and others of which he has denied authorship. EU STANCE At the same time, Turek said Prague would prioritize being “a sovereign, confident member of the EU and a firm ally in NATO,” but simultaneously “resist further transfers of powers to Brussels and advocate for a union based on unanimity, mutual respect, and pragmatic policies that avoid overburdening citizens with regulations.” The former racing car driver, who until last month served as a member of the European Parliament and campaigned on an anti-Green Deal platform, branded eco-conscious policies “unsustainable,” calling for a reversal of the 2035 ban on the sale of cars with combustion engines and for emissions trading systems to be dropped altogether. “Real change requires Brussels to prioritize factory floors and family budgets over ideological agendas that only accelerate the offshoring of sophisticated European production to China,” Turek said, “where less efficient plants and long-distance shipping generate higher global emissions, paradoxically contradicting the very climate objectives Brussels claims to pursue.” Babiš will have to present his proposed list of ministers to Czech President Petr Pavel in the coming days before a vote of confidence in the new government can be held.

PARIS — France’s National Assembly is expected to miss a deadline to vote on the first part of the country’s 2026 budget. Lawmakers from the lower chamber of France’s parliament were due to vote Tuesday on the part of the budget that deals with raising revenue. But they are unlikely to have enough time to work through the more than 2,400 amendments that still need to be discussed and voted on. “We will not have time to vote on the revenue side of the budget on Tuesday,” Philippe Juvin, the top lawmaker in charge of the budget at the National Assembly, said in an interview with broadcaster LCI on Sunday. Two government officials, both of whom were granted anonymity as they were not authorized to speak to the press, confirmed the delay to POLITICO. The delay is likely to raise doubts about whether lawmakers can stick to the tight schedule needed to pass a budget. Legislative work must be wrapped up shortly before Christmas so any bills passed have the requisite time to be reviewed by the constitutional court before being enacted by President Emmanuel Macron. If no vote takes place on Tuesday, the National Assembly will pause debating the revenue part of the text until November 13. They will then have 10 more days to wrap up discussions before the text goes to the Senate. In the meantime, they will start discussing the social security budget, a distinct piece of legislation which covers pension and health care spending. Last week, the National Assembly passed amendments that raised corporate taxes to the government’s dismay, but it failed to adopt a new wealth tax inspired by economist Gabriel Zucman, which was one of the key demands made by the Socialist Party.