BRUSSELS — European governments are pressuring the EU to appoint a negotiator to represent their interests on Ukraine, fearing the United States will stitch up a deal with Russia behind their backs. Supporters of the plan — including France and Italy — have secured support in the European Commission and among a handful of other countries for the post, according to three diplomats and officials with direct knowledge of the talks who were granted anonymity to speak to POLITICO. They say Europe can only maintain its red lines, such as Ukraine’s potential future membership in NATO, if the EU has a seat at the table. The unprecedented move would mark a major shift in how Europe engages with the string of bilateral talks brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump, and comes as the continent works to demonstrate it is ready to play a major role in any settlement to end the four-year war. French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have joined forces in recent weeks to call for the opening of diplomatic channels to Russian leader Vladimir Putin and his inner circle, even as White House peace talks falter. “Macron has been advocating in the last days that, in view of the bilateral discussions between the Americans and the Russians, it is important to play at least a role in the discussion,” a senior French official said. “Meloni very much supported that … they’re not naive about what can be reached through these discussions, but on the balance between not engaging and engaging, there’s a growing appreciation [of the merits of engaging] in some capitals.” Major disagreements remain over the details of the position. Critics say appointing a negotiator would imply that Russia is ready to negotiate in good faith and would accept anything other than Ukraine’s total subjugation. Trump’s efforts to broker a deal have failed so far, with the Kremlin refusing to budge from its demand that Ukraine hand over swaths of territory that Russian troops have been unable to conquer. MESSAGE TO MOSCOW Discussions have been taking place in Brussels about what the bloc would contribute to any talks, and how they could be used to ensure Trump doesn’t sideline its concerns. “There are some issues which cannot be discussed with [only] the U.S. when they have direct implications on our security as Europeans,” the official said. “The message to Washington is as important as [the message] to Moscow.” Kurt Volker, who served as U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations in Trump’s first term and as ambassador to NATO in 2008-2009 under then-President George W. Bush, told POLITICO that Brussels has to be more assertive if it wants to be included in the talks. “It’s been made clear Trump is going to keep up his dialog with Putin both directly and through [U.S. envoy Steve] Witkoff,” he said. “That’s not going away. So you have to have your own communication if it’s going on — it’s not about being in the same room as the Americans and the Russians, it’s about having any kind of communication.” JOB CREATION European leaders first discussed the idea of a special envoy at an EU summit last March, a senior EU official confirmed. Despite getting broad backing, no decision was taken and the proposals were left out of the subsequent joint statement. The role would have been narrowly focused on representing Brussels in talks alongside Kyiv — an altogether different proposition to Meloni’s suggestion of an interlocutor for Moscow. “Countries that were supportive of a Ukraine envoy may not be supportive of an envoy to speak with Russia,” the official said. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, has consistently positioned herself as the only candidate for any role in negotiations over Ukraine’s future. | Filip Singer/EPA Kaja Kallas, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, has consistently positioned herself as the only candidate for any role in negotiations over Ukraine’s future. The former Estonian prime minister has been a steadfast ally of Kyiv and has used her role to corral capitals into backing stronger sanctions designed to force Russia to end its war of aggression. “If Europe were to name a special envoy, the question is who does that person represent? Who do they report to?” Volker asked. “If it were [Commission President Ursula]von der Leyen, that sidelines Kaja Kallas and the External Action Service [the EU’s diplomatic corps] — most envoys have typically been within the action service, but then that would be at such a low level when they need to talk to Putin directly, it wouldn’t work. “But then I can just imagine the discussions in the Commission if it were to be the Council who had an envoy. That would never fly.” Officials confirmed that key aspects of the job — such as whether it would represent just the EU or the entire “coalition of the willing,” including the U.K. and others — have yet to be worked out. Ditto the diplomatic rank, and whether to formally appoint a bureaucrat or informally delegate the role to a current national leader. Italian government minister Giovanbattista Fazzolari — an influential ally of Meloni whose Ukrainian wife is credited with building support for Kyiv within Rome’s governing coalition — said over the weekend that former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi should be offered the special envoy job. Another four diplomats, meanwhile, noted that Finnish President Alexander Stubb has often been considered a potential representative for Europe in any talks with Washington and Moscow. The center-right veteran diplomat has struck up friendly relations with Trump while playing golf, while his country shares a border with Russia and has been on the receiving end of hybrid campaigns from the Kremlin. According to one of them, relying on “a sitting leader” means they could be “a bit more free in what they say.” However, “another question is figuring out what is the moment to speak with Putin. Is there a risk that if you do so, you’re also in a way legitimizing his positions?” Two EU officials underlined to POLITICO that no special envoy role exists and that any talk of candidates was premature. That said, a third noted, “none of these jobs exist until they do.” Jacopo Barigazzi contributed reporting. 

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Russia’s reaction to America’s gunboat diplomacy in Venezuela has been rather tame by the Kremlin’s standards, with a pro forma feel to it. The foreign ministry has come out with standard language, issuing statements about “blatant neocolonial threats and external armed aggression.” To be sure, it demanded the U.S. release the captured Nicolás Maduro, and the Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev dubbed the whole business “unlawful” — but his remarks also contained a hint of admiration. Medvedev talked of U.S. President Donald Trump’s consistency and how he is forthrightly defending America’s national interests. Significantly, too, Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to comment directly on the snatching of his erstwhile ally. Nor did the Kremlin miss a beat in endorsing former Vice President Delcy Rodriguez as Venezuela’s interim leader, doing so just two days after Maduro was whisked off to a jail cell in New York. Overall, one would have expected a much bigger reaction. After all, Putin’s alliance with Venezuela stretches back to 2005, when he embraced Maduro’s boss Hugo Chávez. The two countries signed a series of cooperation agreements in 2018; Russia sold Venezuela military equipment worth billions of dollars; and the relationship warmed up with provocative joint military exercises. “The unipolar world is collapsing and finishing in all aspects, and the alliance with Russia is part of that effort to build a multipolar world,” Maduro announced at the time. From 2006 to 2019, Moscow extended $17 billion in loans and credit to Venezuela. So why the current rhetorical restraint? Seems it may all be about bargaining — at least for the Kremlin. Moscow likely has no wish to rock the boat with Washington over Venezuela while it’s actively competing with Kyiv for Trump’s good graces. Better he lose patience with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and toss him out of the boat rather than Putin. Plus, Russia probably has zero interest in advertising a hitherto successful armed intervention in Ukraine that would only highlight its own impotence in Latin America and its inability to protect its erstwhile ally. Indeed, there are grounds to suspect the Kremlin must have found Maduro’s surgically executed removal and its stunning display of U.S. hard power quite galling. As POLITICO reported last week, Russia’s ultranationalists and hard-line militarists certainly did: “All of Russia is asking itself why we don’t deal with our enemies in a similar way,” posted neo-imperialist philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, counseling Russia to do it “like Trump, do it better than Trump. And faster.” Even Kremlin mouthpiece Margarita Simonyan conceded there was reason to “be jealous.” Indeed, there are grounds to suspect the Kremlin must have found Maduro’s surgically executed removal and its stunning display of U.S. hard power quite galling. | Boris Vergara/EPA From Russia’s perspective, this is an understandable sentiment — especially considering that Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine was likely conceived as a quick decapitation mission aimed at removing Zelenskyy and installing a pro-Kremlin satrap in his place. Four years on, however, there’s no end in sight. It’s essentially a demonstration of America’s military might that highlights the limits of Russia’s military effectiveness. So, why draw attention to it? However, according to Bobo Lo — former deputy head of the Australia mission in Moscow and author of “Russia and the New World Disorder” — there are other explanations for the rhetorical restraint. “Maduro’s removal is quite embarrassing but, let’s be honest, Latin America is the least important area for Russian foreign policy,” he said. Besides, the U.S. operation has “a number of unintended but generally positive consequences for the Kremlin. It takes the attention away from the conflict in Ukraine and reduces the pressure on Putin to make any concessions whatsoever. It legitimizes the use of force in the pursuit of vital national interests or spheres of influence. And it delegitimizes the liberal notion of a rules-based international order,” he explained. Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institute who oversaw European and Russian affairs at the White House for part of Trump’s first term, echoed these thoughts: “Russia will simply exploit Trump’s use of force in Venezuela — and his determination to rule the country from afar — to argue that if America can be aggressive in its backyard, likewise for Russia in its ‘near abroad.’” Indeed, as far back as 2019, Hill told a congressional panel the Kremlin had signaled that when it comes to Venezuela and Ukraine, it would be ready to do a swap. This all sounds like two mob bosses indirectly haggling over the division of territory through their henchmen and actions. For the Kremlin, the key result of Venezuela is “not the loss of an ally but the consolidation of a new logic in U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration — one that prioritizes force and national interests over international law,” noted longtime Putin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s New Eurasian Strategies Center. “For all the reputational damage and some minor immediate economic losses, the Kremlin has reason, on balance, to be satisfied with recent developments: Through his actions, Trump has, in effect, endorsed a model of world order in which force takes precedence over international law.” And since Maduro’s ouster, Trump’s aides have only made that clearer. While explaining why the U.S. needs to own Greenland, regardless of what Greenlanders, Denmark or anyone else thinks, influential White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller told CNN: “We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.” Now that’s language Putin understands. Let the bargaining begin — starting with Iran.

Josep Borrell is the former high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former vice-president of the European Commission. In too many corners of the world — including our own — democracy is losing oxygen. Disinformation is poisoning debate, authoritarian leaders are staging “elections” without real choice, and citizens are losing faith that their vote counts. Even as recently as the Jan. 3 U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, we have seen opposition leaders who are internationally recognized as having the democratic support of their people be sidelined. None of this is new. Having devoted much of his work to critiquing the absolute concentration of power in dictatorial figures, the long-exiled Paraguayan writer Augusto Roa Bastos found that when democracy loses ground, gradually and inexorably a singular and unquestionable end takes its place: power. And it shapes the leader as a supreme being, one who needs no higher democratic processes to curb their will. This is the true peril of the backsliding we’re witnessing in the world today. A few decades ago, the tide of democracy seemed unstoppable, bringing freedom and prosperity to an ever-greater number of countries. And as that democratic wave spread, so too did the practice of sending impartial international observers to elections as a way of supporting democratic development. In both boosting voter confidence and assuring the international community of democratic progress, election observation has been one of the EU’s quiet success stories for decades. However, as international development budgets shrink, some are questioning whether this practice still matters. I believe this is a grave mistake. Today, attacks on the integrity of electoral processes, the subtle — or brazen — manipulation of votes and narratives, and the absolute answers given to complex problems are allowing Roa Basto’s concept of power to infiltrate our democratic societies. And as the foundations of pluralism continue to erode, autocrats and autocratic practices are rising unchecked. By contrast, ensuring competitive, transparent and fair elections is the antidote to authoritarianism. To that end, the bloc has so far deployed missions to observe more than 200 elections in 75 countries. And determining EU cooperation and support for those countries based on the conclusions of these missions has, in turn, incentivized them to strengthen democratic practices. The impact is tangible. Our 2023 mission in Guatemala, for example, which was undertaken alongside the Organization of American States and other observer groups, supported the credibility of the country’s presidential election and helped scupper malicious attempts to undermine the result. And yet, many now argue that in a world of hybrid regimes, cyber threats and political polarization, international observers can do little to restore confidence in flawed processes — and that other areas, such as defense, should take priority. In both boosting voter confidence and assuring the international community of democratic progress, election observation has been one of the EU’s quiet success stories for decades. | Robert Ghement/EPA I don’t agree. Now, more than ever, is the time to stick up for democracy — the most fundamental of EU values. As many of the independent citizen observer groups we view as partners lose crucial funding, it is vital we continue to send missions. In fact, cutting back support would be a false economy, amounting to silence precisely when truth and transparency are being drowned out. I myself observed elections as chair of the European Parliament’s Development Committee. I saw firsthand how EU observation has developed well beyond spotting overt ballot stuffing to detecting the subtleties of unfair candidate exclusions, tampering with the tabulation of results behind closed doors and, more recently, the impact of online manipulation and disinformation. In my capacity as high representative I also decided to send observation missions to controversial countries, including Venezuela. Despite opposition from some, our presence there during the 2021 local elections was greatly appreciated by the opposition. Our findings sparked national and international discussions over electoral conditions, democratic standards and necessary changes. And when the time comes for new elections once more — as it surely must — the presence of impartial international observers will be critical to restoring the confidence of Venezuelans in the electoral process. At the same time, election observation is being actively threatened by powers like Russia, which promote narratives opposed to electoral observations carried out by the organizations that endorse the Declaration of Principles on International Election Observation (DoP) — a landmark document that set the global standard for impartial monitoring. A few years ago, for instance, a Russian parliamentary commission sharply criticized our observation efforts, pushing for the creation of alternative monitoring bodies that, quite evidently, fuel disinformation and legitimize authoritarian regimes — something that has also happened in Azerbaijan and Belarus. When a credible international observation mission publishes a measured and facts-based assessment, it becomes a reference point for citizens and institutions alike. It provides an anchor for dialogue, a benchmark against which all actors can measure their conduct. Above all, it signals to citizens that the international community is watching — not to interfere but to support their right to a meaningful choice. Of course, observation must evolve as well. We now monitor not only ballot boxes but also algorithms, online narratives and the influence of artificial intelligence. We are strengthening post-electoral follow-up and developing new tools to verify data and detect manipulation, exploring the ways in which AI can be a force for good. In line with this, last month I lent my support to the DoP’s endorsers — including the EU, the United Nations, the African Union, the Organization of American States and dozens of international organizations and NGOs — as they met at the U.N. in Geneva to mark the declaration’s 20th anniversary, and to reaffirm their commitment to strengthen election observation in the face of new threats and critical funding challenges. Just days later we learned of the detention of Dr. Sarah Bireete, a leading non-partisan citizen observer, ahead of the Jan. 15 elections in Uganda. These recent events are a wake-up call to renew this purpose. Election observation is only worthwhile if we’re willing to defend the principle of democracy itself. As someone born into a dictatorship, I know all too well that democratic freedoms cannot be taken for granted. In a world of contested truths and ever-greater power plays, democracy needs both witnesses and champions. The EU, I hope, will continue to be among them.

ROME — Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on Friday called on Europe to appoint a special envoy to talk to Russia, as efforts continue to end the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. Meloni said that she agreed with French President Emmanuel Macron, who last month called for new dialogue with the Kremlin. Russian President Vladimir Putin “expressed readiness to engage in dialogue” with Macron, Moscow said in response. “I believe the time has come for Europe to also speak with Russia,” Meloni told a press conference in Rome on Friday. “If Europe speaks to only one of the two sides on the field, I fear that the contribution it can make will be limited.” Meloni warned that Europe needs a coordinated approach or “risks doing Putin a favor.” Since the beginning of negotiations over a potential ceasefire in Ukraine, “many voices have been speaking out, and that’s why I’ve always been in favor of appointing a European special envoy on the Ukrainian issue,” Meloni said. Peace talks aimed at ending the all-out conflict, which Russia launched in February 2022, have accelerated with U.S. President Donald Trump back in the White House, but Moscow has not indicated that it is willing to make concessions. The U.S. in November proposed that Russia be readmitted to the Group of Seven leading nations. But Meloni said it was “absolutely premature” to talk about welcoming Russia back to the G7 fold. Meloni also emphasized that Italy would not join France and the U.K. in sending troops to Ukraine to guarantee a potential peace deal, because it was “not necessary” if Ukraine signed a collective defense agreement with Western allies modeled on NATO’s Article 5 collective-defense provision. She suggested that a small contingent of foreign troops would not be a serious deterrent against a much larger Russian force. Reacting to Trump’s recent aggressive rhetoric toward Greenland, Meloni said that she “would not approve” of a U.S. military takeover of the vast Arctic island. “I don’t believe that the USA will carry out military action on Greenland, which I would not approve of and would not do anyone any good,” she told reporters. Meloni said she believed the Trump administration was using “very assertive methods” to draw attention to the strategic importance of Greenland for U.S. interests and security. “It’s an area where many foreign actors are carrying out activity and I think that the message of the USA is that they will not accept excessive interference by foreign actors,” she said.   Meloni also countered Trump’s remarks Thursday that he does not need international law, stressing that “international law must be defended.” But she added that it was normal to disagree with allies, “as national interests are not perfectly aligned.” “When I don’t agree with Trump, I say so — I say it to him.”

LONDON — Nigel Farage said Wednesday that he rejects Britain’s plans to put U.K. troops on the ground in a postwar Ukraine. The leader of Reform UK, who opinion polls put on track to succeed Keir Starmer in 2029, accused the Labour prime minister of pledging “a modern day British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) without the facilities to do it.” Farage, a populist right-winger, was referring to British forces that maintained a presence in Germany long after World War II, finally ceasing to exist under the BAOR name in 1994. He spoke at a press conference after the U.K. and France signed a declaration of intent to deploy peacekeeping troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal. Asked if the U.K. was right to commit troops to Ukraine, Farage replied: “Boots on the ground with kit — what boots? What kit?  “We might be able to go for six or eight weeks, but if you’re talking about a modern-day reincarnation of the British Army of the Rhine, forget it. We are in no position to do it.”  Farage said that while he was “not a pacifist,” he could not support the plan without a clearer exit strategy, higher defense spending and more European allies contributing troops. Asked by POLITICO if there are any circumstances in which he’d support putting boots on the ground in Ukraine, the Reform leader replied: “Would I be prepared to be part of an international peacekeeping force? Yes.  “But our own engagement with it would be time-restricted and on rotation — then you might think seriously about saying yes. In these circumstances, no, I don’t believe this has been properly thought through.”  He added: “If lots and lots of countries were involved, great, but the Germans aren’t going to send anybody. Giorgia Meloni was having a cigarette outside, and the Americans are saying, ‘Jolly good chaps, off you go.’” Starmer said later on Wednesday that the U.K. parliament would vote on any deployment before it takes place, and promised a statement with further details in the near future. The prime minister also said he would continue appealing to other allies. Farage has significantly toughened his language against the Kremlin in recent months. | Henry Nicholls/AFP via Getty Images Farage has significantly toughened his language against the Kremlin in recent months after the ruling Labour Party accused him of being too soft on Russian President Vladimir Putin. He called Putin “a very bad dude” in an October interview with Bloomberg. However, Farage has repeatedly voiced doubts about the idea of sending British troops to Kyiv. In 2023 he criticized plans for British troops to train Ukrainian counterparts, posting on X: “We should not be deploying British troops to Ukraine.”

With his lightning raid to snatch Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, U.S. President Donald Trump has shown that President Vladimir Putin’s self-proclaimed “multipolar” world of anti-Western dictatorial alliances from Caracas to Tehran is essentially toothless. Beyond the humiliation of the world seeing that Putin isn’t a dependable ally when the chips are down — something already witnessed in Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria and Iran — there’s now also the added insult that Trump appears more effective and bolder in pulling off the sort of maverick superpower interventions the Kremlin wishes it could achieve. In short, Putin has been upstaged at being a law unto himself. While the Russian leader would presumably have loved to remove Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a blitz attack, he’s instead been locked in a brutal war for four years, suffering over 1 million Russian dead and wounded. “Putin must be unbearably jealous [of Trump],” political analyst and former Kremlin speechwriter Abbas Gallyamov told POLITICO. “What Putin promised to do in Ukraine, Trump did in half an hour [in Venezuela].” The sense that Moscow has lost face was one of the few things independent analysts and Russia’s ultranationalists seemed to agree on.    Discussing the Caracas raid on his Telegram account, the nationalist spy-turned-soldier and war blogger Igor Girkin, now jailed in a penal colony, wrote: “We’ve suffered another blow to our image. Another country that was counting on Russia’s help hasn’t received it.” UNRELIABLE ALLY For years, Russia has sought to project itself as the main force resisting American-led Western hegemony, pioneering an alliance loosely united by the idea of a common enemy in Washington. Under Putin, Russia presented itself as the chief proponent of this “multipolar” world, which like the Soviet Union would help defend those in its camp.  Invading Ukraine in 2022, Moscow called upon its allies to rally to its side.  They largely heeded the call. Iran sold Russia drones. China and India bought its oil. The leaders of those countries in Latin America and Africa, with less to offer economically and militarily, gave symbolic support that lent credence to Moscow’s claim it wasn’t an international pariah and in fact had plenty of friends.  Recent events, however, have shown those to be a one-way friendships to the benefit of Moscow. Russia, it appears, won’t be riding to the rescue. The first to realise that cozying up to Russia had been a waste of time were the Armenians. Distracted by the Ukraine war, Moscow didn’t lift a finger to stop Azerbaijan from seizing the ethnic-Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh in a lightning war in 2023. Russian peacekeepers just stood by.   A year later, the Kremlin was similarly helpless as it watched the collapse of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, which it had propped up for years. Russia even had to abandon Tartous, its vital port on the Mediterranean. Moscow didn’t lift a finger to stop Azerbaijan from seizing the ethnic-Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh in a lightning war in 2023. | Anthony Pizzoferrato/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images Further undermining its status in the Middle East, Russia was unable to help Iran when Israel and the U.S. last year bombed the Islamic Republic at will. Russia has long been an important strategic partner to Iran in nuclear technology, but it had no answer to the overwhelming display of military aviation used to strike Iran’s atomic facilities. Now, Venezuela, another of Putin’s longtime allies, has been humiliated, eliciting haughty condemnation (but no action) from Moscow. GREEN WITH ENVY Moscow’s energy and military ties to Caracas run deep. Since 1999 Russia has supplied more than $20 billion in military equipment — financed through loans and secured in part by control over Venezuela’s oil industry — investments that will now be of little avail to Moscow. Maduro’s capture is particularly galling for the Russians, as in the past they have managed to whisk their man to safety — securing a dacha after your escape being among the attractions of any dictator’s pact with Russia. But while ousted Ukrainian leader Viktor Yakunovych and Assad secured refuge in Russia, Maduro on Monday appeared in a New York court dressed in prison garb. Russian officials, predictably, have denounced the American attack. Russia’s foreign ministry described it as “an unacceptable violation of the sovereignty of an independent state,” while senator Alexei Puskov said Trump’s actions heralded a return to the “wild imperialism of the 19th century.” Sovereignty violations and anachronistic imperialism, of course, are exactly what the Russians themselves are accused of in Ukraine.   There has also been the usual saber-rattling.  “All of Russia is asking itself why we don’t deal with our enemies in a similar way,” wrote Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent ultranationalist | Matt Cardy/Getty Images Alexei Zhuravlev, deputy chairman of Russia’s parliamentary defense committee, said Russia should consider providing Venezuela with a nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile.  And the military-themed channel ‘Two Majors,’ which has more than 1.2 million followers, posted on Telegram that “Washington’s actions have effectively given Moscow free rein to resolve its own issues by any means necessary.” (As if Moscow had not been doing so already.) The more optimistic quarters of the Russian camp argue that Trump’s actions in Caracas show international law has been jettisoned, allowing Moscow to justify its own behavior. Others suggest, despite evidence to the contrary in the Middle East, that Trump is adhering to the 19th century Monroe Doctrine and will be content to focus on dominance of the Americas, leaving Russia to its old European and Central Asian spheres of influence. In truth, however, Putin has followed the might-is-right model for years. What’s embarrassing is that he hasn’t proving as successful at it as Trump. Indeed, the dominant emotion among Russia’s nationalists appears to be envy, both veiled and undisguised.  “All of Russia is asking itself why we don’t deal with our enemies in a similar way,” wrote Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent ultranationalist. Russia, he continued, should take a leaf out of Trump’s playbook. “Do like Trump, do it better than Trump. And faster.” Pro-Kremlin mouthpiece Margarita Simonyan was even more explicit, saying there was reason to “be jealous.” Various pro-Kremlin commentators also noted tartly that, unlike Russia, the U.S. was unlikely to face repercussions in the form of international sanctions or being “cancelled.”  To many in Russia, Trump’s audacious move is likely to confirm, rather than upend their world view, said Gallyamov, the analyst. Russian officials and state media have long proclaimed that the world is ruled by strength rather than laws. The irony, though, is that Trump is showing himself to be more skillful at navigating the law of the jungle than Putin. “Putin himself created a world where the only thing that matters is success,” Gallyamov added. “And now the Americans have shown how it’s done, while Putin’s humiliation is obvious for everyone to see.” 

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Ukraine’s poker-faced Kyrylo Budanov, who was the country’s military spy chief until Friday, had an excellent start to the new year. On Dec. 27, Budanov faked the frontline death of Denis Kapustin — the commander of a pro-Ukraine Russian militia — and with that, tricked Russian spooks into handing over half a million dollars in bounty money for the feigned assassination. Then, on Thursday, he openly celebrated the theatrical ruse by posting a video of himself smiling broadly alongside the rebel commander. “I congratulate you, as they say, on your return to life,” chimed the 39-year-old spy chief. And then the next day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appointed him chief of staff, as the much-awaited replacement for his longtime aide and friend Andriy Yermak. Yermak, who was virtually operating as a co-president by the end of his tenure, was forced to resign in November, following an anti-corruption raid on his apartment as part of a ballooning graft investigation into Ukraine’s energy sector and presidential insiders. A characteristically stubborn Zelenskyy had initially shunned the calls for Yermak to go, but he heeded them in the end, when even lawmakers from his own party started to rebel. Indeed, Yermak’s departure is a tectonic political shift for Ukraine. But perhaps Budanov allowed himself a private smirk after his new appointment — after all, he’d not only outsmarted the Russians again, but he’d also bested Yermak, who saw him as a rival and had tried to get him fired several times, only to emerge as the second most powerful figure in Ukraine. However, the task at hand is not easy. And in his new role, the popular wartime master spy will need every ounce of the political shrewdness he demonstrated while outfoxing Yermak. Taking over as the head of the presidential office is daunting enough at the best of times. But these are the worst of times — Ukraine is at a critical juncture in a long-running existential war, and Russian President Vladimir Putin shows no sign of wanting this to end. In fact, quite the reverse. Every time a U.S.-brokered deal appears on the table, Putin throws up yet another nyet. Meanwhile, on the battlefield, Ukraine is coming under increasing pressure, as Russia has the tactical upper hand. The battles in the east are highlighting the country’s severe manpower shortage. Ukraine’s port city Odesa is coming under ferocious drone and missile attacks as part of Russia’s bid to throttle the country’s economy by disrupting exports. And on the home front, Russian attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure are of much greater magnitude this year, and Ukraine doesn’t have the air defenses to cope — nor is it likely to get them soon. On top of all of that, Kyiv is also facing an impatient U.S. president, eager for Kyiv to cave to unacceptable Russian demands, which would leave the country vulnerable and likely in political turmoil. So, not only will Budanov have to help his boss avoid falling afoul of a mercurial Donald Trump, who seems sympathetic to Moscow and echoes Kremlin talking points all too often, he’ll also have to assist Zelenskyy in handling Ukraine’s increasingly turbulent partisan politics and bridge a widening gap between the country’s leader and its parliament. Moreover, if Zelenskyy has no choice but to accept an unfavorable peace deal, Budanov will have to help him sell it to Ukrainians. Partisan politics — long a muscular, no-holds-barred sport in Ukraine — came roaring back to life this year, sparked by an ill-judged and ultimately aborted maneuver by Zelenskyy and Yermak to try to strip two key anti-corruption agencies of their independence this summer, just as both were starting to probe presidential insiders. The snow-balling corruption scandal involving the country’s shattered energy sector has only added to public disillusionment and parliamentary frustration. And while Ukrainians will back Zelenskyy to the hilt in his diplomatic jousting with Washington, criticism of his governance has only swelled. “The biggest expectation from this power shift — beyond the ousting of Yermak’s loyalists — is a genuine transformation in governance, particularly in how the authorities engage with their own citizens. For too long, the war has served as a convenient veil for democratic backsliding. Ukrainian society has endured a profound breakdown in trust: a yawning chasm between the government and the people, fueled by human rights violations, widespread disillusionment with the war’s objectives, and rampant corruption,” said former Zelenskyy aide-turned-critic Iuliia Mendel. Andriy Yermak’s departure is a tectonic political shift for Ukraine. | Sergey Dolzhenko/EPA And lucky for Zelenskyy, aside from obvious political savvy, Budanov will take over the presidential office on Kyiv’s Bankova Street armed with the huge advantage of public popularity as well. Budanov’s esteem comes from how he’s been running Zelenskyy’s equivalent of Winston Churchill’s so-called Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare, overseeing successful, morale-boosting Ukrainian commando raids in Russian-occupied Ukraine and in Russia itself. He’s orchestrated dramatic sabotage missions, assassinations and long-range drone attacks on military and energy targets, including one that took out radar systems and a Russian An-26 military transport plane in Crimea last month. And he’s not just a desk jockey either. Budanov is very much a man of action who secretly participates in raids himself, reprising a personal frontline history that saw him fighting in the Donbas immediately after Maidan, as part of an elite commando unit of the Ukrainian military intelligence service. In 2014, he was wounded in the east. Two years later, he led a dramatic amphibious sabotage mission on Russian-occupied Crimea, which involved a nail-biting and violent retreat into Ukrainian-controlled territory. No wonder the Russians are keen to neutralize him — and they have tried. According to his aides, Russian special forces have made several botched attempts on Budanov’s life, including one in 2019, when a bomb affixed to his car exploded prematurely. But how will this buccaneering past translate into a political future? And other than popularity, what does Budanov bring to the table for Zelenskyy? A senior Ukrainian official, who was granted anonymity to speak candidly, anticipates Budanov’s presence will give the beleaguered presidency a lift: “He’s got credibility. He’s got personal stature. He’s unlikely to operate like Yermak, who was a spider casting his web far and wide. Budanov is likely to focus on national security, leaving the ministers unmolested and able to get on with their jobs and not be micromanaged by the center. So, less monopolization of power by the presidency — and that will be no bad thing,” he said. Similarly, Daniel Vajdich, a Republican foreign policy expert and president of the Yorktown Solutions consulting firm that advises Ukrainian state entities, dubbed Budanov’s appointment “a brilliant move on Zelenskyy’s part.” “I think it’s very good that someone who’s widely respected is taking charge of the president’s office in the wake of Yermak. It will be a very positive dynamic for decision-making in Kyiv,” he told POLITICO. It’s true, Yermak was a gift for MAGA’s Ukraine-bashing wing. Whereas Budanov, as a war hero, is less of an easy target, with no links to graft or any obvious self-serving politics. And if he does harbor personal political ambitions, it seems he has put those aside by taking on this new role — at least in the near term. It would be hard for him to run against Zelenskyy in any near-future elections. Plus, if things go wrong in the coming weeks and months, he risks tarnishing his own image and diminishing his electoral appeal.  In fact, there’s some surprise in Ukraine’s parliament that Budanov agreed to take the job. “It’s very confusing,” a Ukrainian lawmaker confided to POLITICO, having been granted anonymity to speak frankly. “He does have his own political ambitions. I am scratching my head to understand why he took the job — politically, it would have been safer for him to stay doing what he was doing.” Overall, the talk in parliament is that Budanov must have received political promises for the future — either over the prime ministership after elections, or Zelenskyy could have indicated he might not seek reelection and that the former spy chief could slot in as the government candidate. But other, possibly less jaundiced, lawmakers told POLITICO that Budanov’s decision to take the job could well speak less to his political calculations and more to his patriotism — country first. Maybe so, but Ukraine analyst Adrian Karatnycky suspects something more complicated is going on: Budanov’s appointment “comes at a time when the parliament is becoming more independent-minded, with lawmakers seeing that Zelenskyy’s political power is diminishing,” he said. The president’s loyalists see that too, and the appointment could be seen as “an attempt by Zelenskyy and his circle as an exercise in finding a possible substitute should they need one — and if polling indicates that Zelenskyy is unelectable.” So, part job, part audition. Either way, the big remaining question is whether Budanov will bridge the growing gap between the presidency and the parliament and civil society — something Yermak didn’t care to do. In other words, will he meet public expectations for a genuine transformation in Ukrainian governance? If he can, that would strengthen Zelenskyy — and ultimately himself.

KYIV — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is planning to remove Vasyl Malyuk as head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the state’s top counterintelligence agency, as part of an ongoing government reshuffle. The reshuffle has already seen two other top spies — Kyrylo Budanov and Oleh Ivashchenko — shifted to other responsibilities. Budanov has agreed to head the president’s office, while Ivashchenko will be chief of the HUR military intelligence service. Malyuk is said to be fighting to retain his post. “There are attempts to remove Malyuk, but nothing has been decided yet,” a Ukrainian official told POLITICO on Saturday. “Talks are still going on. But if Malyuk is out of SBU, this will seriously weaken Ukraine’s ability to protect itself,” added the official, who was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. “Malyuk is in his place, and the results of the security service prove it. It was he who turned the SBU into an effective special service that conducts unique special operations and gives Ukraine strong ‘cards’ at the negotiating table,” the official said. Enigmatic Malyuk, 42, has been managing the SBU since 2023. Since he was officially appointed by the parliament, he has overseen some of the agency’s high-profile assassinations and most daring special operations inside Russia, like the 2025 operation “Spiderweb” in which Ukrainian drones hit Russia’s strategic bombers on several protected airfields, causing $7 billion in damage to Russian military aviation. Neither Malyuk nor Zelenskyy responded to requests for comment. The SBU press service and the president’s office refused to comment. Holos Yaroslav Zheleznyak, a Ukrainian MP from the opposition party, said that Zelenskyy did not plan to fire Malyuk, but to offer him a new job. The Ukrainian leader has offered Malyuk a post at the Foreign Intelligence Service, which Ivashchenko used to head, or at the National Security Council of Ukraine, now headed by Rustem Umerov. POLITICO confirmed that information through other Ukrainian officials.  Before the final decision on Malyuk, Zelenskyy also offered to make Mykhailo Fedorov, currently deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation, the new defense minister. “Mykhailo is deeply involved in the issues related to the Drone Line and works very effectively on digitalizing public services and processes,” Zelenskyy said in an evening address to the nation late Friday. “Together with all our military, the army command, national weapons producers, and Ukraine’s partners, we must implement defense-sector changes,” he added. Fedorov has so far issued no public comments on whether he will accept the new post. The Ukrainian parliament would have to formally appoint him and dismiss Denys Shmyhal, who has served as defense minister and also as prime minister in Zelenskyy’s war-time government. Zelenskyy thanked Shmyhal and said he will stay in the team. The Ukrainian official quoted above praised the performance of the SBU under Malyuk. “No other security structure currently has such results as the SBU. Why change those?” the official said. “The Kremlin will open the champagne if Malyuk is dismissed from his post.”

Moscow doubled down Wednesday on its claims that a Ukrainian drone had targeted President Vladimir Putin’s residence, even as Kyiv denied the allegations and announced fresh strikes on Russian fuel infrastructure on New Year’s Eve. The Kremlin insisted that Ukrainian drones had attempted to strike Putin’s residence on the shores of Lake Valdai between Moscow and St. Petersburg late Monday. On Wednesday, Russia’s Defense Ministry released video footage purportedly showing a downed drone lying in the snow in a forested area at night. The ministry said the footage depicted an attempt “to strike an aircraft-type UAV on the territory of a protected facility,” but provided no evidence confirming the incident had occurred near Putin’s residence. POLITICO was not able to verify the details of the video. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on Monday that the alleged attack had involved more than 90 long-range drones and warned that Moscow’s position in U.S.-led peace talks would harden as a result. Ukraine flatly rejected the claim, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy calling it “another lie from the Russian Federation” and accusing Moscow of manufacturing a provocation to derail diplomatic momentum. Residents of the nearby town of Valdai told Russian independent media Mozhem Obyasnit that they had heard no explosions or signs of an overnight attack. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service had previously warned that Moscow was preparing a disinformation operation aimed at derailing Zelenskyy’s progress in talks with U.S. President Donald Trump by blaming Ukraine for an alleged attack on Putin’s residence while presenting no credible evidence. Western officials also expressed skepticism. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas accused Moscow of spreading “unfounded claims,” describing the alleged attack as a “deliberate distraction” by which “Moscow aims to derail real progress towards peace by Ukraine and its Western partners.” U.S. officials struck a cautious note, with Washington’s ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, saying on Tuesday it was unclear whether the incident had occurred. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Monday that he was unhappy about the reports after speaking with Putin, but acknowledged that their veracity had yet to be established. While Russia called attention to the alleged threat to its president, Ukraine confirmed it had carried out a long-range strike deep inside Russian territory. In the early hours of Wednesday, drones operated by the Security Service of Ukraine’s Alpha Special Operations Center struck the Temp oil depot in the city of Rybinsk, in Russia’s northwestern Yaroslavl region, according to Ukrainian officials. The facility is part of Rosrezerv, Russia’s state material reserves system, and is designed to store large volumes of fuel. Footage released by Ukraine’s SBU counter-intelligence service showed a large fire engulfing the depot following the strike. Rybinsk is a major transit and logistics hub, and Temp plays a key role in storing and distributing oil products in northwestern Russia. “The SBU continues to cut off the supply chains of Russian oil products with surgical precision, both abroad and for the troops attacking Ukraine,” an SBU official told POLITICO. “This systematic work will continue in 2026.”

Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.” He writes POLITICO’s From Across the Pond column. Denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance.  Since U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Europe has slowly but steadily moved through the five stages of grief, taking an entire year to finally reach acceptance over the loss of the transatlantic relationship. Now, the question for 2026 is whether the bloc has the will and strength to turn this acceptance into real action. Trump’s reelection and inauguration represented the end of Pax America — a period of over 75 years where the U.S. was the undisputed Leader of the Free World, and successive presidents and administrations in Washington placed relations with Europe at the core of America’s global engagement. It was clear Trump would end this era and instead adopt a narrow, regionally focused policy of “America First.” And yet, few in Europe believed this would truly be the case. At a lunch attended by some dozen NATO ambassadors in mid-December 2024, one envoy after another declared that with a little more European spending on defense, everything would be okay. When I suggested they were in denial about how fundamental the change would be, one of them turned to me and said: “You can’t seriously believe that the United States will no longer see its security as tied to Europe’s, do you?” But not long after, Europe’s refusal to accept the fundamental transformation that Trump’s reelection entailed was put to the test by a series of events in February. At his first NATO meeting, new Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told his colleagues that Europe needed to “take ownership of conventional security on the continent.” Next, Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed that the U.S. and Russia would negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine — without Ukraine’s or Europe’s involvement. And then came Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he said that the biggest threat to Europe wasn’t Russia or China but “the threat from within, the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values.” Finally, at the end of the month, Trump and Vance confronted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, on live television. “You don’t have the cards,” Trump exclaimed, berating Ukraine for failing to end a war it had not started, and ignoring how Ukrainians had valiantly held off their subjugation and occupation by a much larger foe for more than three years. So, by February’s end, Europe’s denial turned to anger. When I met with a foreign minister of a major ally just days after Munich, the longtime supporter of the U.S. appeared despondent. “You stabbed us in the back. You’re leaving us to deal with Russia alone,” he shouted. But the anger lasted only so long, and in the next few months, the bloc shifted to bargaining. Key European leaders convinced Zelenskyy to forget about the Oval Office showdown and tell Trump he was fully committed to peace. Europe would then join Ukraine in supporting an unconditional ceasefire — as Trump had demanded. In August, stage three — bargaining — quickly gave way to stage four — depression. | Tom Brenner for The Washington Post via Getty Images Similarly, in April, when Trump announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs, hitting allied countries just as hard as non-allies, the U.K. and the EU moved swiftly to negotiate deals that would lower rates from the initial levels of 25 percent or more. By June, NATO leaders had even agreed to raise defense spending to the 5-percent of GDP mark Trump had insisted on. Europe’s negotiating on Ukraine, trade and defense gave Trump the victories he long craved. But it soon became clear that however great the victories or however fawning the flattery, the U.S. president would just pocket them and move on, with little regard for the transatlantic relationship. Trump was already back to negotiating Ukraine’s fate directly with Putin by August — in a red-carpeted summit in Alaska, no less. And though he had flown to the meeting promising “severe consequences” if the Russian leader didn’t agree to a ceasefire, he left having adopted Putin’s position that the war could only end if there was a fully agreed-upon peace agreement. Days later, no less than eight European leaders flew to Washington to try and persuade Trump to change course and push Russia to accept the ceasefire he had long proposed. And while it sort of worked, most of the leaders still left Washington deeply depressed. No matter what, when it came to Ukraine, an issue they deem existential for their security, Trump just wasn’t on the same page. Eventually, it was the publication of the new U.S. National Security Strategy in early December that proved too much — even for Europe’s most stalwart Atlanticists. The strategy not only berates the continent for supposedly causing its own rendezvous with “civilizational erasure,” it also clearly underscores that both Trump and his administration view Russia very differently than Europe. Gone is any mention of Moscow as a military threat. Instead, the U.S. is seeking a return to “strategic stability” with Russia, even offering itself up as a mediator between Russia and Europe on security. An ally just doesn’t say these things or behave in this way. So, after a long year, Europe has now come to accept the reality that the transatlantic relationship they have long known and depended on is no more. “The decades of Pax Americana are largely over for us in Europe, and for us in Germany as well,” said German Chancellor Friedrich Merz earlier this month. “The Americans are now very, very aggressively pursuing their own interests. And that can only mean one thing: that we, too, must now pursue our own interests.” What remains to be seen is whether Europe will do so. On that, the jury is still very much out.