ROME — Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini faces a battle to save his far-right League party from electoral oblivion. The party’s internal crisis exploded into public view last week after Salvini’s maverick deputy, Roberto Vannacci, an ex-general and defender of fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, threatened to form a splinter party to the right of the League called National Future. Salvini seeks to play down the split with his No. 2, but Vannacci’s move revealed starkly how the League — a key part of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing ruling coalition — risks disintegrating as a political force before next year’s elections. Current and former party members told POLITICO that Salvini’s rift with Vannacci had exposed a deeper and potentially devastating factional struggle at the heart of the party — between moderates and extremists, and over whether the League should return to its roots ad seek northern autonomy from Rome. In the short term, weakness in the League could bring some relief to the Atlanticist, pro-NATO Meloni, who is prone to irritation at the anti-Ukrainian, Kremlin-aligned outbursts of Salvini and Vannacci, who are supposed to be her allies. In the longer term, however, the party’s full implosion would potentially make it harder for her to build coalitions and to maintain Italy’s unusually stable government. PUBLIC FEUD The tensions between Salvini and Vannacci became impossible to disguise last month. On Jan. 24 Vannacci registered a trademark for his new National Future party. He later distanced himself from an Instagram account announcing the party’s launch, but hinted on X that he could still turn to social media to launch a party when the time was ripe. “If I decide to open such channels, I will be sure to inform you,” he said. By Jan. 29 Salvini was in full firefighting mode. Speaking before the stately tapestries of the Sala della Regina in Italy’s parliament, he insisted there was “no problem.” “There is space for different sensibilities in the League … we want to build and grow, not fight,” he added, vowing to hold a meeting with Vannacci to set the relationship back on course. Many in the League are more hostile to Vannacci, however, particularly those alarmed by the former paratrooper’s placatory language about Mussolini and Russian leader Vladimir Putin. A powerful bloc in the League that is more socially moderate — and deeply committed to northern autonomy — is pressing for Salvini to take the initiative and fire Vannacci, according to two people involved in the party discussions. Daniele Albertazzi, a politics professor and expert on populism at the University of Surrey, said a schism looked imminent. “[Vannacci] is not going to spend years building someone else’s party,” Albertazzi said. “It’s clear he doesn’t want to play second fiddle to Salvini.” FROM ASSET TO LIABILITY Vannacci emerged from obscurity in 2023 with a self-published bestseller “The World Back to Front.” It espoused the Great Replacement Theory — a conspiracy that white populations are being deliberately replaced by non-whites — and branded gay people “not normal.” More recently he has stated he prefers Putin to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Vannacci emerged from obscurity in 2023, with a self-published bestseller “The World Back to Front.” | Nicola Ciancaglini/Ciancaphoto Studio/Getty Images Albertazzi said Vannacci was positioning himself on the extreme right. “You can see it even in the typography of his symbol [for National Future], which evokes the fascist era,” he said. Salvini originally identified the military veteran as a lifeline who could reverse the League’s flagging fortunes. Salvini had early success in transforming the League from a regional party “of the north” into a national force, and it won a record 34 percent of the Italian vote in the 2019 European elections. But by 2022 things were souring, and support collapsed to about 8 percent in the general election. Vannacci was brought in to broaden the party’s appeal and shore up his own leadership. The gamble initially paid off. In the 2024 European elections, Vannacci personally received more than 500,000 preference votes — roughly 1.5 percent of the national total —validating Salvini’s strategy. But Vannacci has since become a liability. He was responsible for a failed regional campaign in his native Tuscany in October and has flouted party discipline, building his own internal group, opening local branches and organizing rallies outside the League’s control, operating as “a party within a party.” In recent interviews Vannacci has increasingly flirted with the idea of going solo with his own party. For the traditional northern separatist camp in the League, Vannacci has gone too far. Luca Zaia, head of the Veneto regional assembly, a towering figure in northern politics, and three other major northern leaders are now demanding privately that he be expelled, according to two League insiders.  “His ideas are nationalist and fascist, and have never been compatible with the League,” said a party member, who was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive internal disputes. “The writing is on the page. Since the first provocation it has been clear that it is only a matter of when, not if, he starts his own party.”  An elected League official added: “Now if he gets votes it’s Salvini’s fault for giving him a ton of publicity. No one had heard of him before. He basically won the lottery.” Attilio Fontana, a senior League official who is president of the Lombardy region, said Vannacci’s actions raised questions for Salvini. “I think that if inside the party there are differences, that can enrich the party. But creating local branches, holding demonstrations outside the party, registering a new logo and website, this is an anomaly … these are issues that [Salvini] will be looking at,” he told reporters in Milan on Friday.  EVERY VOTE COUNTS There’s no guarantee any party Vannacci launches will be a success. Three leaders in his “World Back to Front” movement — seen as a precursor to his National Future party — quit on Friday, issuing a statement that described a lack of leadership and “permanent chaos.” But his party could upset the political landscape, even if he only peels off relatively minor support from the League. Meloni will have a close eye on the arithmetic of potential alliances in the run-up to next year’s election, particularly if left-wing parties team up against her. Giorgia Meloni will have a close eye on the arithmetic of potential alliances in the run-up to next year’s election. | Simona Granati/Corbis via Getty Images Polling expert Lorenzo Pregliasco of You Trend, which is canvassing a potential new party led by Vannacci, said it had a potential electorate on the right of the coalition of about 2 per cent,  among voters who had supported [Meloni’s] Brothers of Italy, League voters and non-voters with an anti immigrant, anti-political correctness stance, who are attracted by Vannacci’s outspokenness.  The potential party “poses some risks for Meloni and the coalition … It’s not a huge electorate but in national elections two points could make the difference between winning and not winning, or winning but with a very narrow majority that could mean you were not able to form a government.”  Vannacci “has been clever in putting himself forward as a provocative opinion leader and converted this into electoral success … He has the potential to be a strong media presence and central to political debate.” The northern separatist Pact for the North movement, led by former League MP Paolo Grimoldi, said Salvini’s reputation was now damaged because of the faith he put in Vannacci. While Salvini could resign and support an alternative figure such Zaia as League leader, this was extremely unlikely, Grimoldi told POLITICO. “If not, there aren’t tools to get rid of him before the next election,” he added.  “The result will be political irrelevance and electoral defeat [for the League].”

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Today’s angry and discombobulating geopolitical landscape is giving rise to noticeably more acrimonious diplomatic exchanges than seen in preceding decades — even sharper than during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term. This is likely just a reflection of the times we live in: Roiled by shocks and uncertainty, even world leaders and their envoys are on edge. And social media doesn’t help keep exchanges calm and respectful either. Measured speech doesn’t go viral. If you want attention, be disparaging and abrasive. Let’s take Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s carefully crafted speech at Davos last week. Carney earned a standing ovation from global and corporate leaders as he bewailed the unfolding great-power rivalry, urging “middle powers” to act together “because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu.” Yet, it was Trump’s free-wheeling, sharp-edged speech with its personal criticism of fellow Western leaders — including a jab at French President Emmanuel Macron — that roared on social media. This shift away from traditional diplomatic etiquette toward more confrontational, seemingly no-nonsense and aggressive public-facing communication is very much in keeping with populist styles of leadership. And it’s now shaping an era where antagonistic communication isn’t just tolerated but celebrated and applauded by many. Trump is very much a man of his times. And it’s time Europe finally caught on. Aside from Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin is also often known to use colloquial and crude language to attack Western and Ukrainian leaders — though noticeably, he never uses such language with Trump. In an address last month, Putin referred to European leaders as podsvinki — little pigs. And before invading Ukraine in February 2022, he used a vulgar Russian rhyme to insinuate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy needed to be raped. China, too, has been noticeably more menacing in its diplomatic speech in recent years — though it tends to eschew personal invective. The shift began around 2019, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi instructed envoys to display a stronger “fighting spirit” to defend Beijing from supposed Western bullying. The abrasive style led to the more aggressive envoys being dubbed “wolf warriors,” after a blockbuster movie in which Chinese commandos vanquish American mercenaries. But driving the trend are Trump and his aides, who can go toe-to-toe with anyone when it comes to put-downs, slurs or retaliation. And if met with pushback, they simply escalate. Hence the avuncular counsel of U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to Europeans on the Greenland-related tariff threats last week: “Sit back, take a deep breath, do not retaliate.” But here’s the curious thing: While the Russians and Chinese use such language to target their foes, Trump and his senior aides reserve much of their invective for supposed allies, namely Europe with Canada thrown in for good measure. And they’re utterly relentless in doing so — far more than during his first term, when there were still some more traditionally minded folks in the White House to temper or walk back the rhetoric. This all seemed to reach its pinnacle in Davos last week, where it seemed belittling European allies was part of virtually everything the U.S. delegation said in the Swiss ski resort. Bessent couldn’t even restrain himself from insulting Swiss-German fare. And U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik appeared almost gleeful in infuriating Europe’s leaders with his combative remarks at a VIP dinner which, according to the Financial Times, not only sparked uproar but prompted European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde to leave the event early. “Only one person booed, and it was Al Gore,” said the U.S. Commerce Department in a statement to media. But others at the event — around 200 people — said there was, indeed, some heckling, though not so much because of the content of Lutnik’s criticism, some of which Europeans have also made about net zero, energy policy, globalization and regulation. According to two attendees, who asked to be granted anonymity to speak freely, it was in reaction to the contemptuous tone instead. Likewise, Trump’s delegation — the largest ever brought from Washington to Davos — didn’t miss a beat in pressing America First themes, making it clear the U.S. would prioritize its own economic interests regardless of how it affects allies. “When America shines, the world shines,” Lutnik said. China, too, has been noticeably more menacing in its diplomatic speech in recent years — though it tends to eschew personal invective. | Pool photo by Vincent Thian/EPA As the forum unfolded, however, U.S. Vice President JD Vance insisted that what was fueling such criticism wasn’t hatred for the old continent, but that it was more a matter of tough love. “They think that we hate Europe. We don’t. We love Europe,” he said. “We love European civilization. We want it to preserve itself.” That in itself seems pretty condescending. Tough love or not, Europe-bashing plays well with the MAGA crowd back home who feel Europeans are the haughty ones, lacking gratitude, freeloading and in dire need of subordination — and squeals of complaint merely incite more of the same. To that end, Zelenskyy made a telling a point: European leaders shouldn’t waste their time trying to change Trump but rather focus on themselves. Time to stop complaining about America First and get on with putting Europe First.

Its been a bad stretch of polling for President Donald Trump. In recent weeks, a string of new polls has found Trump losing ground with key constituencies, especially the young, non-white and low-propensity voters who swung decisively in his direction in 2024. The uptick in support for Trump among those non-traditional Republican voters helped fuel chatter of an enduring “realignment” in the American electorate — but the durability of that realignment is now coming into doubt with those same groups cooling on Trump. Surveying the findings of the most recent New York Times-Siena poll, polling analyst Nate Cohn bluntly declared that “the second Trump coalition has unraveled.” Is it time to touch up the obituaries for the Trumpian realignment? To find out, I spoke with conservative pollster and strategist Patrick Ruffini, whose 2024 book “Party of the People” was widely credited with predicting the contours of Trump’s electoral realignment. Ruffini cautioned against prematurely eulogizing the GOP’s new coalition, noting that the erosion of support has so far not extended to the constituencies that have served as the primary drivers of the Trumpian realignment — particularly white working-class voters and working-class Latinos and Asian Americans. But he also acknowledged that the findings of the recent polls should raise alarms for Republicans ahead of 2026 and especially 2028. His advice to Trump for reversing the trend: a relentless focus on “affordability,” which the White House has so far struggled to muster, and which remains the key issue dragging down the president. “I think that is undeniable,” he said. “It’s the number one issue among the swing voter electorate.” This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. Based on your own polling, do you agree that “the second Trump coalition has unraveled?” It really depends on how you define the Trump coalition. The coalition that has really reshaped American politics over the last decade has been a coalition that saw voters who are aligned with a more populist view of America come into the Republican Party — in many cases, after voting for Barack Obama twice. Those shifts have proven to be pretty durable, especially among white working-class voters but also among conservative Hispanic voters and conservative Asian American voters. You have another group of voters who is younger and disconnected from politics — a group that had been really one of the core groups for Barack Obama and the Democrats back in the 2010s. They didn’t always vote, but there was really no hope or prospect for Republicans winning that group or being very competitive with that group. That happens for the first time in 2024, when that specific combination of young, minority, male voters really comes into play in a big way. But that shift right has proven to be a little bit less durable — and maybe a lot less durable — because of the nature of who those voters are. They’re not really connected to one political party, and they’re inherently non-partisan. So what you’re seeing is less of a shift among people who reliably vote in midterms, and what we are seeing is more of a shift among those infrequent voters. The question then becomes are these voters going to show up in 2026? How big of a problem is it for Republicans if they don’t? How alarmed should Republicans be by the current trends? I think they’re right to focus on affordability. You’ve seen that as an intentional effort by the White House, including what seems like embracing some Democratic policy proposals that also are in some ways an end-run around traditional Republican and conservative economics — things like a 10 percent cap on credit card interest. What’s the evidence that cost of living is the thing that’s primarily eroding Republican support among that group of voters you described? I think that is undeniable. It’s the number one issue among the swing voter electorate. However you want to define the swing voter electorate in 2024, cost of living was far and away the number one issue among the Biden-to-Trump voters in 2024. It is still the number one issue. And that’s because of demographically who they are. The profile of the voter who swung in ‘24 was not just minority, but young, low-income, who tends to be less college-educated, less married and more exposed to affordability concerns. So I think that’s obviously their north star right now. The core Democratic voter is concerned about the erosion of norms and democracy. The core Republican voter is concerned about immigration and border security. But this swing vote is very, very much concerned about the cost of living. Is there any evidence that things like Trump’s immigration crackdown or his foreign policy adventurism are contributing at all to the erosion of support among this group? I have to laugh at the idea of foreign policy being decisive for a large segment of voters. I think you could probably say that, to the extent that Trump had some non-intervention rhetoric, there might be some backlash among some of the podcast bros, or among the Tucker Carlson universe. But that is practically a non-entity when it comes to the actual electorate and especially this group that is floating between the two political parties. Maybe there’s a dissident faction on the right that is particularly focused on this, but what really matters is this cost-of-living issue, which people don’t view as having been solved by Trump coming into office. The White House would say — and Vance said recently — that it takes a while to turn the Titanic around. Which is not the most reassuring metaphor, but sure. Exactly, but nonetheless. I think a lot of these things are very interesting bait for media, but they are not necessarily what is really driving the voters who are disconnected from these narratives. What about his immigration agenda? Does that seem to be having any specific effect? I do think there’s probably some aspect of this that might be challenging with Latinos, but I think it’s very easy to fall back into the 2010 pattern of saying Latino voters are inordinately primarily focused on immigration, which has proven incorrect time after time after time. So, yes, I would say the ICE actions are probably a bit negative, but I think Latino voters primarily share the same concerns as other voters in the electorate. They’re primarily focused on cost of living, jobs and health care. How would Trump’s first year in office have looked different if he had been really laser-focused on consolidating the gains that Republicans saw among these voters in 2024? What would he have done that he didn’t do, and what shouldn’t he have done that he did do? I would first concede that the focus on affordability needed to be, like, a Day 1 concern. I will also concede how hard it is to move this group that is very, very disaffected from traditional politics and doesn’t trust or believe the promises made by politicians — even one as seemingly authentic as Trump. I go back to 2018. While in some ways you would kill for the economic perceptions that you had in 2018, that didn’t seem to help them much in the midterms. The other problem with a laser focus on affordability on Day 1 is that I don’t think it clearly aligns with what the policy demanders on the right are actually asking for. If you ask, “What is MAGA economic policy?”, for many, MAGA economic policy is tariffs — and in many ways, tariffs run up against an impulse to do something about affordability. Now, to date, we haven’t really seen that actually play out. We haven’t really seen an increase in the inflation rate, which is good. But there’s an opportunity cost to focusing on certain issues over this focus on affordability. I think the challenge is that I don’t think either party has a pre-baked agenda that is all about reducing costs. They certainly had a pre-baked agenda around immigration, and they do have a pre-baked agenda around tariffs. What else has stopped the administration from effectively consolidating this part of the 2024 coalition? It’s a very hard-to-reach group. In 2024, Trump’s team had the insight to really put him front-and-center in these non-political arenas, whether it was going to UFC matches or appearing on Joe Rogan. I think it’s very easy for any administration to come into office and pivot towards the policy demanders on the right, and I think that we’ve seen a pivot in that direction, at least on the policy. So I would say they should be doing more of that 2024 strategy of actually going into spaces where non-political voters live and talking to them. Is it possible to turn negative perception around among this group? Or is it a one-way ratchet, where once you’ve lost their support, it’s very hard to get it back? I don’t think it’s impossible. We are seeing some improvement in the economic perception numbers, but we also saw how hard it is to sustain that. I think the mindset of the average voter is just that they’re in a far different place post-Covid than they were pre-Covid. There’s just been a huge negative bias in the economy since Covid, so I think any thought that, “Oh, it would be easy that Trump gets elected, and that’s going to be the thing that restores optimism” was wrong. I think he’s taken really decisive action, and he has solved a lot of problems, but the big nut to crack is, How do you break people out of this post-Covid economic pessimism? The more critical case that could be made against Trump’s approach to economic policy is not just that he’s failed to address the cost-of-living crisis, but that he’s actively done things that run contrary to any stated vision of economic populism. The tax cuts are the major one, which included some populist components tacked on, but which was essentially a massively regressive tax cut. Do you think that has contributed to the sour feeling among this cohort at all? I think we know very clearly when red lines are crossed and when different policies really get voters writ large to sit up and take notice. For instance, it was only when you had SNAP benefits really being cut off that Congress had any impetus to actually solve the shutdown. I don’t think people are quite as tuned in to the distributional effects of tax policy. The White House would say that there were very popular parts of this proposal, like the Trump accounts and no tax on tips, that didn’t get coverage — and our polling has shown that people have barely actually heard about those things compared to some of the Democratic lines of attack. So I think that the tax policy debate is relatively overrated, because it simply doesn’t matter as much to voters as much as the cultural issues or the general sense that life is not as affordable as it was. Assuming these trends continue and this cohort of sort of young, low-propensity voters continues to shift away from Trump, what does the picture look like for Republicans in 2026 and 2028? I would say 2026 is perhaps a false indicator. In the midterms, you’re really talking about an electorate that is going to be much older, much whiter, much more college-educated. I think you really have to have a presidential campaign to test how these voters are going to behave. And presidential campaigns are also a choice between Republicans and Democrats. I think certainly Republicans would want to make it into a Republican-versus-Democrat choice, because polling is very clear that voters do not trust the Democrats either on these issues. It’s clear that a lot of these voters have actually moved away from the Democratic Party — they just haven’t necessarily moved into the Republican Party. Thinking big picture, does this erosion of support change or alter your view of the “realignment” in any respect? I’ve always said that we are headed towards a future where these groups are up for grabs, and whichever party captures them has the advantage. That’s different from the politics of the Obama era, where we were talking about an emerging Democratic majority driven by a generational shift and by the rise of non-white voters in the electorate. The most recent New York Times poll has Democrats ahead among Latino voters by 16 points, which is certainly different than 2024, when Trump lost them by just single digits, but that is a far cry from where we were in 2016 and 2018. So I think in many respects, that version of it is coming true. But if 2024 was a best-case scenario for the right, and 2026 is a worst-case scenario, we really have to wait till 2028 to see where this all shakes out.

BRUSSELS — Only a few days ago, EU diplomats and officials were whispering furtively about the idea they might one day need to think about how to push back against Donald Trump. They’re not whispering anymore.  Trump’s attempt, as EU leaders saw it, to “blackmail” them with the threat of tariffs into letting him take the sovereign Danish island of Greenland provoked a howl of outrage — and changed the world.  Previous emergency summits in Brussels focused on existential risks to the European Union, like the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the coronavirus pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This week, the EU’s 27 leaders cleared their diaries to discuss the assault they faced from America.  There can be little doubt that the transatlantic alliance has now been fundamentally transformed from a solid foundation for international law and order into a far looser arrangement in which neither side can be sure of the other.  “Trust was always the foundation for our relations with the United States,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk as he arrived for the summit in Brussels on Thursday night. “We respected and accepted American leadership. But what we need today in our politics is trust and respect among all partners here, not domination and for sure not coercion. It doesn’t work in our world.”  The catalyst for the rupture in transatlantic relations was the U.S. president’s announcement on Saturday that he would hit eight European countries with tariffs of 10 percent for opposing his demand to annex Greenland.  That was just the start. In an avalanche of pressure, he then canceled his support for the U.K. premier’s decision to hand over the Chagos Islands, home to an important air base, to Mauritius; threatened France with tariffs on Champagne after Macron snubbed his Board of Peace initiative; slapped down the Norwegian prime minister over a Nobel Peace Prize; and ultimately dropped his threats both to take Greenland by military force and to hit countries that oppose him with tariffs.  Here was a leader, it seemed to many watching EU officials, so wild and unpredictable that he couldn’t even remain true to his own words.  But what dismayed the professional political class in Brussels and beyond was more mundane: Trump’s decision to leak the private text messages he’d received directly from other world leaders by publishing them to his 11.6 million followers on social media.  Trump’s screenshots of his phone revealed French President Emmanuel Macron offering to host a G7 meeting in Paris, and to invite the Russians in the sidelines. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who once called Trump “daddy,” also found his private text to Trump made public, in which he praised the president’s “incredible” achievements, adding: “Can’t wait to see you.”  Leaking private messages “is not acceptable — you just don’t do it,” said one senior diplomat, like others, on condition of anonymity because the matter is sensitive. “It’s so important. After this, no one can trust him. If you were any leader you wouldn’t tell him anything. And this is a crucial means of communication because it is quick and direct. Now everything will go through layers of bureaucracy.”  Mark Carney had been one of the classic Davos set and was a regular attendee: suave, a little smug, and seeming entirely comfortable among snow-covered peaks and even loftier clientele. | Gian Ehrenzeller/EPA The value of direct contact through phone texts is well known to the leaders of Europe, who, as POLITICO revealed, have even set up their own private group chat to discuss how to respond when Trump does something inflammatory. Such messages enable ministers and officials at all levels to coordinate solutions before public statements have to be made, the same senior diplomat said. “If you don’t have trust, you can’t work together anymore.”  NO MORE NATO Diplomats and officials now fear the breakdown in personal trust between European leaders and Trump has potentially grave ramifications.  Take NATO. The military alliance is, at its core, a promise: that member countries will back each other up and rally to their defense if one of them comes under attack. Once that promise looks less than solid, the power of NATO to deter attacks is severely undermined. That’s why Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned that if Trump invaded the sovereign Danish territory of Greenland it would be the end of NATO.  The fact he threatened to do so has already put the alliance into intensive care, another diplomat said.  Asked directly if she could still trust the U.S. as she arrived at the Brussels summit, Frederiksen declined to say yes. “We have been working very closely with the United States for many years,” she replied. “But we have to work together respectfully, without threatening each other.”  European leaders now face two tasks: To bring the focus back to the short-term priorities of peace in Ukraine and resolving tensions over Greenland; and then to turn their attention to mapping out a strategy for navigating a very different world. The question of trust, again, underpins both.  When it comes to Ukraine, European leaders like Macron, Germany’s Friedrich Merz and the U.K.’s Keir Starmer have spent endless hours trying to persuade Trump and his team that providing Kyiv with an American military element underpinning security guarantees is the only way to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin from attacking again in future.  Given how unreliable Trump has been as an ally to Europe, officials are now privately asking what those guarantees are really worth. Why would Russia take America’s word seriously? Why not, in a year or two, test it to make sure?  THE POST-DAVOS WORLD Then there’s the realignment of the entire international system.  There was something ironic about the setting for Trump’s assaults on the established world order, and about the identities of those who found themselves the harbingers of its end.  Among the snow-covered slopes of the Swiss resort of Davos, the world’s business and political elite gather each year to polish their networks, promote their products, brag about their successes, and party hard. The super rich, and the occasional president, generally arrive by helicopter.  As a central bank governor, Mark Carney had been one of the classic Davos set and was a regular attendee: suave, a little smug, and seeming entirely comfortable among snow-covered peaks and even loftier clientele.  Now prime minister of Canada, this sage of the centrist liberal orthodoxy had a shocking insight to share with his tribe: “Today,” Carney began this week, “I’ll talk about the rupture in the world order, the end of a nice story, and the beginning of a brutal reality where geopolitics among the great powers is not subject to any constraints.”  “The rules-based order is fading,” he intoned, to be replaced by a world of “great power rivalry” in which “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”  “The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy.”  Carney impressed those European officials watching. He even quoted Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who has enjoyed outsized influence in recent months due to the connections he forged with Trump on the golf course.  NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who once called Donald Trump “daddy,” also found his private text to Donald Trump made public, in which he praised the president’s “incredible” achievements, adding: “Can’t wait to see you.” |  Jim lo Scalzo/EPA Ultimately, Carney had a message for what he termed “middle powers” — countries like Canada. They could, he argued, retreat into isolation, building up their defenses against a hard and lawless world. Or they could build something “better, stronger and more just” by working together, and diversifying their alliances. Canada, another target of Trump’s territorial ambitions, has just signed a major partnership agreement with China. As they prepared for the summit in Brussels, European diplomats and officials contemplated the same questions. One official framed the new reality as the “post-Davos” world. “Now that the trust has gone, it’s not coming back,” another diplomat said. “I feel the world has changed fundamentally.”  A GOOD CRISIS It will be up to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her team to devise ways to push the continent toward greater self-sufficiency, a state that Macron has called “strategic autonomy,” the diplomat said. This should cover energy, where the EU has now become reliant on imports of American gas.  The most urgent task is to reimagine a future for European defense that does not rely on NATO, the diplomat said. Already, there are many ideas in the air. These include a European Security Council, which would have the nuclear-armed non-EU U.K. as a member. Urgent efforts will be needed to create a drone industry and to boost air defenses.  The European Commission has already proposed a 100,000-strong standing EU army, so why not an elite special forces division as well? The Commission’s officials are world experts at designing common standards for manufacturing, which leaves them well suited to the task of integrating the patchwork of weapons systems used by EU countries, the same diplomat said.  Yet there is also a risk. Some officials fear that with Trump’s having backed down and a solution to the Greenland crisis now apparently much closer, EU leaders will lose the focus and clarity about the need for change they gained this past week. In a phrase often attributed to Churchill, the risk is that EU countries will “let a good crisis go to waste.”  Domestic political considerations will inevitably make it harder for national governments to commit funding to shared EU defense projects. As hard-right populism grows in major regional economies, like France, the U.K. and Germany, making the case for “more Europe” is harder than ever for the likes of Macron, Starmer and Merz. Even if NATO is in trouble, selling a European army will be tough.  While these leaders know they can no longer trust Trump’s America with Europe’s security, many of them lack the trust of their own voters to do what might be required instead. 

The world has been rewired. The post-war order is fragmenting, public pessimism has reached crisis levels, and the gap between elite and public opinion is wider than ever. The FGS Global Radar 2026 — drawing on 175 interviews with senior leaders and polling nearly 20,000 people across 27 democracies — maps the new terrain. For leaders gathering in Davos this week, understanding it is critical. Via FGS Global Previous Radar reports were defined by volatility and uncertainty. These remain constants. But in 2026, the shape of the world is now more clearly defined — and the question for leaders is whether they can see it clearly enough to navigate it. A rewired world The multilateral consensus in place since World War II — guided by international institutions and liberal democracies — is being rewritten. Those institutions are weakening, with strongman leaders increasingly calling the shots within their own spheres of influence. > The post-war rules-based order is fragmenting into spheres of influence, with > transactional relationships and strongman leadership supplanting shared > values. As one expert put it: “The post-war rules-based order is fragmenting into spheres of influence, with transactional relationships and strongman leadership supplanting shared values.” The United States and China are now in fierce, direct competition for dominance — across trade, technology and an emerging space race. Gray zone conflict will be common. The rest of the world is having to align accordingly, navigating constantly shifting sands. For those gathering in Davos, the implications are stark. We are shifting from “What are our shared principles?” to “What can you do for me?” As another expert observed: “America doesn’t have anyone’s back anymore.” Our polling finds that seven in 10 people want their country to be more assertive of national interests, even if this creates friction with others. Nationalist sentiment is ascending. And Europe? “If Trump and Xi are talking, Europe isn’t even at the table.” The elite-public divide This year’s Radar report reveals something leaders at Davos must confront directly: a profound and widening gap between elite opinion and public sentiment. Ideas widely favored by leaders — letting artificial intelligence flourish, cutting spending, incentivizing entrepreneurs — are roundly opposed by voters. More troubling still, the public is susceptible to populist claims that difficult trade-offs don’t need to be made. In our poll, most people agreed: “There are clear and easy solutions to the big challenges facing the country, if only we had better political leaders.” > We are shifting from ‘What are our shared principles?’ to ‘What can you do for > me?’ We are living in a K-shaped world. The winners are high-income earners and technology industries. Those on lower incomes and in traditional sectors are struggling. Most people across the 27 countries polled expect to be worse off next year; only those on high incomes believe they will be better off. The cost of living remains the most important issue across generations and political affiliations. This feeds directly into attitudes on tax. Large majorities want more of the burden borne by business and the wealthy. Sixty-four percent support a wealth tax. These are not fringe positions — they are mainstream sentiment across developed democracies. The generational divide compounds the problem. Fifty-four percent of 18-34 year olds believe too much support goes to the elderly. Fifty percent of over-55s think too much goes to the young. Each generation feels the other is getting a better deal. And across all age groups, 73 percent believe life will be harder for the next generation. Pessimism at crisis levels Public confidence has been eroding for years. But the mood has now intensified to a crisis point. Across all 27 countries polled, 76 percent say their country feels divided. Sixty-eight percent believe their political system is failing and needs fundamental reform. Sixty-two percent feel their national identity is disappearing. > Pessimism on this scale, replicated across democracies, isn’t normal — and may > not be sustainable. To be clear: pessimism on this scale, replicated across democracies, isn’t normal — and may not be sustainable. It is fueling political instability and populism. Systems and governments that appear analog in a digital world, and fail to deliver better outcomes, will increasingly be challenged. Trust in traditional institutions continues to collapse. Sixty-one percent believe mainstream media have their own agenda and cannot be trusted. The hierarchy of trust is stark: medical doctors at 85 percent, big business at 41 percent, ChatGPT at 34 percent and politicians at just 22 percent. Perhaps most striking: 47 percent of people report feeling disconnected from society. When presented with the Matrix dilemma — a choice between blissful ignorance and complex reality — a quarter chose ignorance. Among Gen Z, it rises to over a third. Disengagement is becoming a generational norm. Europe’s pivotal moment For European leaders, the report offers both warning and opportunity. Our polling finds overwhelming support — 70-80 percent — in every EU country for major reform and stronger control of national borders. The Draghi and Letta reports are seen as offering the most coherent reform roadmap in years, but implementation is stuck at just 11 percent. As one expert noted: “Things are bad — but not so bad people are willing to be pushed through a pain barrier.” That may not remain true for long. What leaders must do The Radar concludes with a clear message: in a rewired world, long-term strategy matters more than ever. “If you haven’t got a strategy, you’re lost,” said one leader we interviewed. But strategy alone is not enough. The next most cited quality was agility — the ability to move fast and adapt. One compelling analogy: leaders need satellite navigation. Be clear on your destination, but flexible on how you get there. “You need a North Star, but like a GPS, you’re going to have to re-route — roadworks, delays, traffic jams.” Authenticity emerged as essential. “Authenticity by definition is infinitely durable. You are what you are.” And finally, storytelling: “Social media divides us, hates complexity, kills concentration. Nothing sticks. Leaders must repeat their message relentlessly.” Strategy. Agility. Authenticity. Storytelling. These are what 2026 demands. Download the full FGS Global Radar 2026 report here: https://fgsglobal.com/radar.

Mujtaba Rahman is the head of Eurasia Group’s Europe practice. He posts at @Mij_Europe. 2026 is here, and Europe is under siege. External pressure from Russia is mounting in Ukraine, China is undermining the EU’s industrial base, and the U.S. — now effectively threatening to annex the territory of a NATO ally — is undermining the EU’s multilateral rule book, which appears increasingly outdated in a far more transactional and less cooperative world. And none of this shows signs of slowing down. In fact, in the year ahead, the steady erosion of the norms Europe has come to rely on will only be compounded by the bloc’s weak leadership — especially in the so-called “E3” nations of Germany, France and the U.K. Looking forward, the greatest existential risks for Europe will flow from the transatlantic relationship. For the bloc’s leaders, keeping the U.S. invested in the war in Ukraine was the key goal for 2025. And the best possible outcome for 2026 will be a continuation of the ad-hoc diplomacy and transactionalism that has defined the last 12 months. However, if new threats emerge in this relationship — especially regarding Greenland — this balancing act may be impossible. The year also starts with no sign of any concessions from Russia when it comes to its ceasefire demands, or any willingness to accept the terms of the 20-point U.S.-EU-Ukraine plan. This is because Russian President Vladimir Putin is calculating that Ukraine’s military situation will further deteriorate, forcing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to capitulate to territorial demands. I believe Putin is wrong — that backed by Europe, Zelenskyy will continue to resist U.S. pressure on territorial concessions, and instead, increasingly target Russian energy production and exports in addition to resisting along the frontline. Of course, this means Russian aerial attacks against Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure will also increase in kind. Nonetheless, Europe’s growing military spending, purchase of U.S. weapons, financing for Kyiv and sanctions against Russia — which also target sources of energy revenue — could help maintain last year’s status quo. But this is perhaps the best case scenario. Activists protest outside Downing street against the recent policies of Donald Trump. | Guy Smallman/Getty Images Meanwhile, European leaders will be forced to publicly ignore Washington’s support for far-right parties, which was clearly spelled out in the new U.S. national security strategy, while privately doing all they can to counter any antiestablishment backlash at the polls. Specifically, the upcoming election in Hungary will be a bellwether for whether the MAGA movement can tip the balance for its ideological affiliates in Europe, as populist, euroskeptic Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is currently poised to lose for the first time in 15 years. Orbán, for his part, has been frantically campaigning to boost voter support, signaling that he and his inner circle actually view defeat as a possibility. His charismatic rival Péter Magyar, who shares his conservative-nationalist political origins but lacks any taint of corruption poses a real challenge, as does the country’s stagnating economy and rising prices. While traditional electoral strategies — financial giveaways, smear campaigns and war fearmongering — have so far proven ineffective for Orbán, a military spillover from Ukraine that directly affects Hungary could reignite voter fears and shift the dynamic. To top it all off, these challenges will be compounded by the E3’s weakness. The hollowing out of Europe’s political center has already been a decade in the making. But France, Germany and the U.K. each entered 2026 with weak, unpopular governments besieged by the populist right and left, as well as a U.S. administration rooting for their collapse. While none face scheduled general elections, all three risk paralysis at best and destabilization at worst. And at least one leader — namely, Britain’s Keir Starmer — could fall because of an internal party revolt. The year’s pivotal event in the U.K. will be the midterm elections in May. As it stands, the Labour Party faces the humiliation of coming third in the Welsh parliament, failing to oust the Scottish National Party in the Scottish parliament and losing seats to both the Greens and ReformUK in English local elections. Labour MPs already expect a formal challenge to Starmer as party leader, and his chances of surviving seem slight. France, meanwhile, entered 2026 without a budget for the second consecutive year. The good news for President Emmanuel Macron is that his Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s minority government will probably achieve a budget deal targeting a modest deficit reduction by late February or March. And with the presidential election only 16 months away and local elections due to be held in March, the opposition’s appetite for a snap parliamentary election has abated. However, this is the best he can hope for, as a splintered National Assembly will sustain a mood of slow-motion crisis until the 2027 race. Finally, while Germany’s economy looks like it will slightly recover this year, it still won’t overcome its structural malaise. Largely consumed by ideological divisions, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government will struggle to implement far-reaching reforms. And with the five upcoming state elections expected to see increased vote shares for the far-right Alternative for Germany party, pressure on the government in Berlin will only mount A historic truth — one often forgotten in the quiet times — will reassert itself in 2026: that liberty, stability, prosperity and peace in Europe are always brittle. The holiday from history, provided by Pax Americana and exceptional post-World War II cooperation and integration, has officially come to an end. Moving forward, Europe’s relevance in the new global order will be defined by its response to Russia’s increased hybrid aggression, its influence on diplomacy regarding the Ukraine war and its ability to improve competitiveness, all while managing an increasingly ascendant far right and addressing the existential threats to its economy and security posed by Russia, China and the U.S. This is what will decide whether Europe can survive.

Andrea Carlo is a British-Italian researcher and journalist living in Rome. His work has been published in various outlets, including TIME, Euronews and the Independent. Last month, UNESCO designated Italian cuisine part of the world’s “intangible cultural heritage.” This wasn’t the first time such an honor was bestowed upon food in some form — French haute cuisine and Korean kimchi fermentation, among others, have been similarly recognized. But it was the first time a nation’s cuisine in its entirety made the list. So, as the U.N. agency acknowledged the country’s “biocultural diversity” and its “blend of culinary traditions […] associated with the use of raw materials and artisanal food preparation techniques,” Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni reacted with expected pride. This is “a victory for Italy,” she said. And prestige aside — Italy already tops UNESCO’s list of World Heritage Sites — it isn’t hard to see the potential benefits this designation might entail. One study even suggests the UNESCO nod alone could boost Italian tourism by up to 8 percent. But behind this evident soft power win also lies a political agenda, which has turned “Italian cuisine” into a powerful weapon for the country’s right-wing government. For Meloni’s government, food is all the rage. It permeates every aspect of political life. From promoting “Made in Italy” products to blocking EU nutrition labelling scores and banning lab-grown meat, Rome has been doing its utmost to regulate what’s on Italian plates. In fact, during Gaza protests in Rome in September, Meloni was sat in front of the Colosseum for a “Sunday lunch” as part of her government’s long-running campaign to make the coveted list. Clearly, the prime minister has made Italian cuisine one of the main courses of her political menu. And all of this can be pinpointed to a phenomenon political scientists call “gastronationalism,” whereby food and its production are used to fuel identitarian narratives — a trend the Italian far right has latched onto with particular gusto. There are two main principles involving Italian gastronationalism: The notion that the country’s culinary traditions must be protected from “foreign contamination,” and that its recipes must be enshrined to prevent any “tinkering.” And the effects of this gastronationalism now stretch from political realm all the way to the world of social media “rage-bait,” with a deluge of TikTok and Instagram content lambasting “culinary sins” like adding cream to carbonara or putting pineapple on pizza. At the crux of this gastronationalism, though, lies the willful disregard of two fundamental truths: First, foreign influence has contributed mightily to what Italian cuisine is today; and second, what is considered to be “Italian cuisine” is neither as old nor as set in stone as gastronationalists would like to admit. Europe, as a continent, is historically poor in its selection of indigenous produce — and Italy is no exception. The remarkable variety of the country’s cuisine isn’t due to some geographic anomaly, rather, it is the byproduct of centuries of foreign influence combined with a largely favorable climate: Citrus fruits imported by Arab settlers in the Middle Ages, basil from the Indian subcontinent through ancient Greek trading routes, pasta-making traditions from East Asia, and tomatoes from the Americas. Lying at the crossroads of the Mediterranean and home to major trading outposts, Italy was a sponge for cultural cross-pollination, which enriched its culinary heritage. To speak of the “purity” of Italian food is inherently ahistorical. This wasn’t the first time such an honor was bestowed upon food in some form — French haute cuisine and Korean kimchi fermentation, among others, have been similarly recognized. | Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images But even more controversial is acknowledging that the concept of “Italian cuisine” is a relatively recent construct — one largely borne from post-World War II efforts to both unite a culturally and politically fragmented country, and to market its international appeal. From north to south, not only is Italy’s cuisine remarkably diverse, but most of its iconic dishes today would have been alien to those living hardly a century ago. Back then, Italy was an agrarian society that largely fed itself with legume-rich foods. Take my great-grandmother from Lake Como — raised on a diet of polenta and lake fish — who had never heard of pizza prior to the 1960s. “The mythology [of gastronationalism] has made complex recipes — recipes which would have bewildered our grandmothers — into an exercise of national pride-building,” said Laura Leuzzi, an Italian historian at Glasgow’s Robert Gordon University. Food historian Alberto Grandi took that argument a step forward, titling his latest book — released to much furor — “Italian cuisine does not exist.” From carbonara to tiramisù, many beloved Italian classics are relatively recent creations, not much older than the culinary “blasphemies” from across the pond, like chicken parmesan or Hawaiian pizza. Even more surprising is the extent of U.S. influence on contemporary Italian food itself. Pizza, for instance, only earned its red stripes when American pizza-makers began adding tomato sauce to the dough, in turn influencing pizzaioli back in Italy. And yet, some Italian politicians, like Minister of Agriculture Francesco Lollobrigida, have called for investigations into brands promoting supposedly misleadingly “Italian sounding” products, such as carbonara sauces using “inauthentic” ingredients like pancetta. Lollobrigida would do well to revisit the original written recipe of carbonara, published in a 1954 cookbook, which actually called for the use of pancetta and Gruyère cheese — quite unlike its current pecorino, guanciale and egg yolk-based sauce. Simply put, Italian cuisine wasn’t just exported by the diaspora — it is also the product of the diaspora. One study even suggests the UNESCO nod alone could boost Italian tourism by up to 8 percent. | Michael Nguyen/NurPhoto via Getty Images What makes it so rich and beloved is that it has continued to evolve through time and place, becoming a source of intergenerational cohesion, as noted by UNESCO. Static “sacredness” is fundamentally antithetical to a cuisine that’s constantly reinventing itself, both at home and abroad. The profound ignorance underpinning Italian gastronationalism could be considered almost comedic if it weren’t so perfidious — a seemingly innocuous tool in a broader arsenal of weaponry, deployed to score cheap political points. Most crucially, it appeals directly to emotion in a country where food has been unwittingly dragged into a culture war. “They’re coming for nonna’s lasagna” content regularly makes the rounds on Facebook, inflaming millions against minorities, foreigners, vegans, the left and more. And the real kicker? Every nonna makes her lasagna differently. Hopefully, UNESCO’s recognition can serve as a moment of reflection in a country where food has increasingly been turned into a source of division. Italian cuisine certainly merits recognition and faces genuine threats — the impact of organized crime and the effects of climate change on crop growth biggest among them. But it shouldn’t become an unwitting participant in an ideological agenda that runs counter to its very spirit. For now, perhaps it’s best if our government kept politics off the dinner table.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Former White House strategist Steve Bannon is clearly gleeful as we sit down to discuss the new U.S. National Security Strategy and the hostility it displays toward America’s supposed allies in Europe. With its brutal claim that Europe is headed for “civilizational erasure,” the document prompted gasps of horror from European capitals when it was released this month. But the MAGA firebrand — and current host of the influential “War Room” podcast — only has words of praise. “It is a shot across the bow of the EU, and even NATO,” he purred, seemingly astonished that the 33-page document ever saw the light of day in its published form without being muted by the more fainthearted Trump aides. Famously, Bannon had once claimed he wanted “to drive a stake through the Brussels vampire.” And now, he and other MAGA influencers get to sharpen their stake with the encouragement of U.S. government policy. Above all, it’s what Bannon describes as the commitment to “back resistance movements to the globalists” that thrills him most. “It was pleasantly shocking that it was so explicit,” he said of the document’s prioritization of support for so-called “patriotic European parties,” with the aim of halting the continent’s supposed slide into irreversible decline due to mass migration, falling birth rates and the dilution of national cultural identities. But while Bannon extols Trump’s foreign-policy priorities, former U.S. diplomats fret the administration may be signaling an intention to go beyond expressing its rhetorical support for MAGA’s ideological allies and browbeating their opponents. Could Washington be tempted to launch more clandestine activities? And if the continent’s current trajectory does, indeed, represent a threat to U.S. national security interests by weakening transatlantic allies — as the document claims — would that justify straying into the unsettling territory of covert action? In short, could we see a reprise of Cold War tactics of political subversion? A time that saw the CIA competing with the KGB, meddling in elections in Italy and Greece, secretly funding academic journals, magazines and think tanks across Western Europe, and disseminating black propaganda to shape public opinion and counter Soviet propaganda. “[The NSS] could just be seen as a guiding document for people who are trying, in an overt way, on behalf of the Trump administration, to exert influence over the direction of European politics,” said Jeff Rathke, head of the American-German Institute at Johns Hopkins University. But the former U.S. diplomat worries it could also entail more: “It remains unclear the degree to which other parts of the U.S. national security and foreign policy establishment might also see it as a nudge to do things that go beyond simple overt expressions of endorsement and support,” he said. “That, I think, is an interesting dimension that hasn’t really been explored in the media reporting so far.” According to Rathke, who previously served in the U.S. embassies in Dublin, Moscow and Riga, and was the deputy director of the State Department’s Office of European Security and Political Affairs, “different agencies of the U.S. government” are now probably trying to figure out how the NSS should shape their own activities. NSS documents are generally aspirational, explained former U.S. diplomat and CIA officer Ned Price. “They set out the broad parameters of what an administration hopes to achieve and act as a helpful guide. When you’re talking about something like covert action, the NSS isn’t in itself a green light to do something. That would take a presidential finding and a lot of back-and-forth between the president and the CIA director,” he told POLITICO. But while Price finds it unlikely the administration would resort to covert action, he doesn’t categorically rule it out either. “Maybe in extremes, it could go back to Cold War-era CIA activities,” he mused. “That said, there’s been a lot of rule-bending. There are a lot of norms being broken. I don’t want to be too precious and say this administration couldn’t do such a thing — but it would be highly risky.” Above all, it’s what Bannon describes as the commitment to “back resistance movements to the globalists” that thrills him most. | Shannon Finney/Getty Images for Semafor Bannon, for his part, pooh-poohs the idea that the administration would organize clandestine operations against European liberals and centrists. “Even if Trump ordered it, there would be zero chance his instructions would be executed — particularly by the intelligence agencies,” he scoffed. As far as he sees it, they’re all “deep state” enemies of MAGA. Plus, why would you need covert action when you have the MAGA movement and deep-pocketed tech billionaires like Elon Musk promoting far-right European figures and parties? However, Washington’s muscular efforts to bully the EU into curtailing its landmark Digital Services Act (DSA) with visa bans and threats of punitive tariffs could, for example, read as overt covert action. Trump aides like Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Sarah Rogers say they oppose the DSA, which aims to block harmful speech and disinformation, because it amounts to foreign influence over online speech, stifles the free speech of Americans, and imposes costs on U.S. tech companies. But European MAGA allies have lobbied Washington hard to help them push back against the legislation, which, they say, is largely aimed at silencing them. The Department of State declined a POLITICO interview request with Rogers, referring us to the White House. The NSS will now likely turbocharge these transatlantic activities, and we’ll no doubt see the administration give even more love and attention to their “ideological allies in Europe,” said Price. “Instead of hosting the German chancellor, maybe we’ll see the hosting of the AfD head in the Oval Office.” For Europe’s ultraconservatives and populists, the document serves as an invitation to double their efforts to gain MAGA blessings as they try to reforge their politics in Trump’s image, hoping that what’s worked for him in America will work for them in Europe. “I think, in the past it was a big mistake that conservative forces were just focused on their own countries,” explained Markus Frohnmaier, an Alternative for Germany (AfD) lawmaker who sits on the Bundestag’s foreign affairs committee. For Europe’s ultraconservatives and populists, the document serves as an invitation to double their efforts to gain MAGA blessings as they try to reforge their politics in Trump’s image, hoping that what’s worked for him in America will work for them in Europe. | Adam Gray/Getty Images Frohnmaier is among the AfD politicians flocking to the U.S. to meet with Trump officials and attend MAGA events. Earlier this month, he was the guest of honor at a gala hosted by New York’s Young Republicans Club, where he was awarded a prize in memory of founding CIA director Allen Dulles, who had overseen the agency’s massive operation to manipulate Italy’s 1948 election and ensure a Soviet-backed Popular Front didn’t win. “What we’re trying to do is something new, with conservatives starting to interact and network seriously to try to help each other with tactics and messaging and to spotlight the issues important for us,” he told POLITICO. Among the key issues for Frohnmaier is Germany’s firewall (brandmauer), which excludes the AfD from participating in coalition governments at the federal and state levels. He and other AfD politicians have discussed this with MAGA figures and Trump officials, urging them to spotlight it as “undemocratic” and help them smash it. But Bannon hopes it isn’t just the firewall that cracks — and he’s clearly relishing upcoming opportunities to amplify the radical populist message across Europe. “I think MAGA will be much more aggressive in Europe because President Trump has given a green light with the national security memo, which is very powerful,” he said. And he’s brimming with iconoclastic schemes to smash the bloc’s liberal hegemony and augment the Trump administration’s efforts. Interestingly, first up is Ireland. “I’m spending a ton of time behind the scenes on the Irish situation to help form an Irish national party,” Bannon told POLITICO. At first glance, Ireland wouldn’t seem the most promising territory for MAGA. Last year, none of the far-right candidates came anywhere near winning a seat in the Dáil, and this year, professional mixed martial arts fighter and MAGA favorite Conor McGregor had to drop out of Ireland’s presidential race, despite endorsements from both Trump and Musk. None of that’s deterring Bannon, though. “They’re going to have an Irish MAGA, and we’re going to have an Irish Trump. That’s all going to come together, no doubt. That country is right on the edge thanks to mass migration,” he said definitively. Of course, Britain, France and Germany figure prominently in future MAGA plans too: “MAGA thinks the European governments, by and large, are deadbeats. They love AfD. They love what National Rally is doing. They love Nigel Farage,” he said.

BRUSSELS — European leaders like Romania’s Nicușor Dan spent most of 2025 trying to work out how to live with Donald Trump. Or — even worse — without him. Since the great disruptor of international norms returned to the White House in January, he has made clear just how little he really cares for Europe — some of his key lieutenants are plainly hostile.  The U.S. president slashed financial and military aid to Ukraine, hit the European Union with tariffs, and attacked its leaders as “weak.” His administration is now on a mission to intervene in Europe’s democracy to back “patriotic” parties and shift politics toward MAGA’s anti-migrant goals.  For leaders such as Romania’s moderate president, the dilemma is always how far to accept Trump’s priorities — because Europe still needs America — and how strongly to resist his hostility to centrist European values. Does a true alliance even still exist across the Atlantic? “The world [has] changed,” Dan said in an interview from his top-floor Brussels hotel suite. “We shifted from a — in some sense — moral way of doing things to a very pragmatic and economical way of doing things.” EU leaders understand this, he said, and now focus their attention on developing practical strategies for handling the new reality of Trump’s world. Centrists will need to factor in a concerted drive from Americans to back their populist opponents on the right as the United States seeks to change Europe’s direction. Administration officials such as Vice President JD Vance condemned last year’s canceled election in Romania and the new White House National Security Strategy suggests the U.S. will seek to bend European politics to its anti-migrant MAGA agenda. For Dan, it is “OK” for U.S. politicians to express their opinions. But it would be a “problem” if the U.S. tried to “influence” politics “undemocratically” — for example, by paying media inside European countries “like the Russians are doing.” WEAK EUROPEANS Relations with America are critical for a country like Romania, which, unusually, remained open to the West during four decades of communist rule. On the EU’s eastern edge, bordering Ukraine, Romania is home to a major NATO base — soon to be Europe’s biggest — as well as an American ballistic missile defense site. But the Trump administration has announced the withdrawal of 800 American troops from Romania, triggering concern in Bucharest. As winter sun streamed in through the window, Dan argued that Europe and the U.S. are natural allies because they share more values than other regions of the world. He thought “a proper partnership” will be possible — “in the medium [term] future.” But for now, “we are in some sense of a transition period in which we have to understand better each other.” Dan’s frank assessment reveals the extent of the damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance this year. Trump has injected jeopardy into all aspects of the Western alliance — even restoring relations with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin.  At times, Europeans have been at a loss over how to respond.  Does Dan believe Trump had a point when he told POLITICO this month that European leaders were “weak”?  “Yes,” Dan said, there is “some” truth in Trump’s assessment. Europe can be too slow to make decisions. For example, it took months of argument and a fraught summit in Brussels last week that ended at 3 a.m. to agree on a way to fund Ukraine. But — crucially — even a fractious EU did eventually take “the important decision,” he said. That decision to borrow €90 billion in joint EU debt for a loan for cash-strapped Kyiv will keep Ukraine in the fight against Putin for the next two years.  WAITING FOR PEACE According to EU leaders who support the plan (Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia won’t take part), it makes a peace deal more likely because it sends a signal to Putin that Ukraine won’t just collapse if he waits long enough. But Dan believes the end of the war remains some way off, despite Trump’s push for a ceasefire.  “I am more pessimistic than optimistic on short term,” he said. Putin’s side does not appear to want peace: “They think a peace in two, three months from now will be better for them than peace now. So they will fight more — because they have some small progress on the field.”  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said at last week’s European Council summit that he wanted Trump to put more pressure on Putin to agree to a ceasefire. Does Dan agree? “Of course. We are supporting Ukraine.” But Trump’s “extremely powerful” recent sanctions on Russian oil firms Rosneft and Lukoil are already helping, Dan said. He also welcomed Trump’s commitment to peace, and America’s new openness to providing security guarantees to bolster a final deal.  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said at last week’s European Council summit that he wanted Trump to put more pressure on Putin to agree to a ceasefire. Does Dan agree? “Of course. We are supporting Ukraine.” | Olivier Hoslet/EPA It is clear that Dan hopes Putin doesn’t get the whole of Donbas in eastern Ukraine, but he doesn’t want to tie Zelenskyy’s hands. “Any kind of peace in which the aggressor is rewarded in some sense is not good for Europe and for the future security of the world,” Dan said. “But the decision for the peace is just on the Ukrainian shoulders. They suffer so much, so we cannot blame them for any decision they will do.” Romania plays a critical role as an operational hub for transferring supplies to neighboring Ukraine. With its Black Sea port of Constanța, the country will be vital to future peacekeeping operations. Ukrainian soldiers are training in Romania and it is already working with Bulgaria and Turkey to demine the Black Sea, Dan said.  Meanwhile, Russian drones have breached Romanian airspace more than a dozen times since the start of the full-scale war, and a village on the border with Ukraine had to be evacuated recently when drones set fire to a tanker ship containing gas. Dan played down the threat.  “We had some drones. We are sure they have not intentionally [been] sent on our territory,” he said. “We try to say to our people that they are not at all in danger.” Still, Romania is boosting its military spending to deter Russia all the same. CORRUPTION AND A CRISIS OF FAITH Dan, 56, won the presidency in May this year at a tense moment for the country of 19 million people. The moderate former mayor of Bucharest defeated his populist, Ukraine-skeptic opponent against the odds. The vote was a rerun, after the first attempt to hold a presidential election was canceled last December over allegations of massive Russian interference and unlawful activity in support of the far-right front-runner Călin Georgescu. Legal cases are underway, including charges against Georgescu and others over an alleged coup plot. But for many Romanians, the cancelation of the 2024 election merely reinforced their cynicism toward the entire democratic system in their country. They wanted change and almost half the electorate backed the far right to deliver it.  Corruption today remains a major problem in Romania and Dan made it his mission to restore voters’ faith. In his first six months, however, he prioritized painful and unpopular public-sector spending cuts to bring the budget deficit — which was the EU’s biggest — under control. “On the big problems of society, starting with corruption, we didn’t do much,” Dan confessed. That, he said, will change. A recent TV documentary about alleged corruption in the judiciary provoked street demonstrations and a protest letter signed by hundreds of judges. Dan is due to meet them this week and will then work on legislative reforms focused on making sure the best magistrates are promoted on merit rather than because of who they know. “People at the top are working for small networks of interests, instead of the public good,” Dan said. But for many Romanians, the cancellation of the 2024 election merely reinforced their cynicism toward the entire democratic system in their country. | Robert Ghement/EPA He was also clear that the state has not yet done enough to explain to voters why the election last year was canceled. More detail will come in a report expected in the next two months, he said. RUSSIAN MEDDLING One thing that is now obvious is that Russia’s attack on Romanian democracy, including through a vast TikTok influence campaign, was not isolated. Dan said his country has been a target for Moscow for a decade, and other European leaders tell him they now suffer the same disinformation campaigns, as well as sabotage. Nobody has an answer to the torrent of fake news online, he said. “I just have talks with leaders for countries that are more advanced than us and I think nobody has a complete answer,” he said. “If you have that kind of information and that information arrived to half a million people, even if you’re coming the next day saying that it was false, you have lost already.” The far-right populist Alliance for the Union of Romanians party is ahead in the polls on about 40 percent, mirroring the pattern elsewhere in Europe. Dan, who beat AUR leader George Simion in May, believes his own team must get closer to the people to defeat populism. And he wishes that national politicians around Europe would stop blaming all their unpopular policies on Brussels because that merely fuels populist causes. Dan said he has learned that EU politics is in fact a democratic process, in which different member countries bring their own ideas forward. “With my six months’ experience, I can say that it’s quite a debate,” he said. “There is not a bureaucratic master that’s arranging things. It’s a democracy. It’s a pity that the people do not feel that directly.” But what about those marathon EU summits that keep everyone working well beyond midnight? “The topics are well chosen,” Dan said. “But I think the debates are a little bit too long.”

Laura Thornton is the senior director for democracy programs at the McCain Institute. She spent more than two decades in Asia and the former Soviet Union with the National Democratic Institute. Earlier this month, I spoke at a conference in Bucharest for Eastern Europe’s democracy activists and leaders. I was discussing foreign malign influence operations, particularly around elections, highlighting Russia’s hybrid war in Moldova, when a Hungarian participant pointed out that U.S. President Donald Trump had offered Hungary’s illiberal strongman Viktor Orbán a one-year reprieve for complying with U.S. sanctions for using Russian oil and gas. With Hungarian elections around the corner and this respite being a direct relief to Orbán’s economy, “Is that not election interference?” she asked. The next day, while at the Moldova Security Forum in Chișinău, a Polish government official expressed his deep concern about sharing intelligence with the current U.S. administration. While he had great respect for the embassy in Warsaw, he noted a lack of trust in some leaders in Washington and his worry that intelligence would get leaked, in the worst case to Russia — as had happened during Trump’s first term. My week came to an end at a two-day workshop for democracy activists, all who described the catastrophic impact that the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) elimination had on their work, whether that be protecting free and fair elections, combating disinformation campaigns or supporting independent media. “It’s not just about the money. It’s the loss of the U.S. as a democratic partner,” said one Georgian participant. Others then described how this withdrawal had been an extraordinary gift to Russia, China and other autocratic regimes, becoming a main focus of their disinformation campaigns. According to one Moldovan participant, “The U.S. has abandoned Moldova” was now a common Russian narrative, while Chinese messaging in the global south was also capitalizing on the end of USAID to paint Washington as an unreliable ally. Having spent a good deal of my career tracking malign foreign actors who undermine democracy around the world and coming up with strategies to defend against them, this was a rude reality check. I had to ask myself: “Wait, are we the bad guys?” It would be naive to suggest that the U.S. has always been a good faith actor, defending global democracy throughout its history. After all, America has meddled in many countries’ internal struggles, supporting leaders who didn’t have their people’s well-being or freedom in mind. But while it has fallen short in the past, there was always broad bipartisan agreement over what the U.S. should be: a reliable ally; a country that supports those less fortunate, stands up against tyranny worldwide and is a beacon of freedom for human rights defenders. America’s values and interests were viewed as intertwined — particularly the belief that a world with more free and open democracies would benefit the U.S. As the late Senator John McCain famously said: “Our interests are our values, and our values are our interests.” At the Moldova Security Forum in Chișinău, a Polish government official expressed his deep concern about sharing intelligence with the current U.S. administration. | Artur Widak/Getty Images I have proudly seen this born out in my work. I’ve lived in several countries that have had little to offer the U.S. with regards to trade, extractive industries or influence, and yet we supported their health, education and agriculture programs. We also stood up for defenders of democracy and freedom fighters around the world, with little material benefit to ourselves. I’ve worked with hundreds of foreign aid and NGO workers in my life, and I can say not one of them was in it for a “good trade deal” or to colonize resources. But today’s U.S. foreign policy has broken from this approach. It has abandoned the post-World War II consensus on allies and the value of defending freedom, instead revolving around transactions and deal-making, wielding tariffs to punish or reward, and defining allies based on financial benefit rather than shared democratic values. There are new ideological connections taking place as well — they’re just not the democratic alliances of the past. At the Munich Security Forum earlier this year, U.S. Vice President JD Vance chose to meet with the far-right Alternative for Germany party rather than then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The Conservative Political Action Committee has also served as a transatlantic bridge to connect far-right movements in Europe to those in the U.S., providing a platform to strongmen like Orbán. The recently released U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly embraces this pivot away from values toward more transactional alliances, as well as a fondness for “patriotic European parties” and a call to “resist” the region’s “current trajectory” — a clear reference to the illiberal, far-right movements in Europe. Meanwhile, according to Harvard University’s school of public health, USAID’s closure has tragically caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, while simultaneously kneecapping the work of those fighting for freedom, human rights and democracy. And according to Moldovan organizations I’ve spoken with, while the EU and others continue to assist them in their fight against Russia’s hybrid attacks ahead of this year’s September elections, the American withdrawal is de facto helping the Kremlin’s efforts. It should have come as no surprise to me that our partners are worried and wondering whose side the U.S. is really on. But I also believe that while a country’s foreign policy often reflects the priorities and values of that nation as a whole, Americans can still find a way to shift this perception. Alliances aren’t only built nation-to-nation — they can take place at the subnational level, creating bonds between democratic cities or states in the U.S. with like-minded local governments elsewhere. Just like Budapest doesn’t reflect its anti-democratic national leadership, we can find connections and share lessons learned. Moreover, partnerships can be forged at the civil society level too. Many American democracy and civic organizations, journalists and foundations firmly believe in a pro-democracy U.S. foreign policy, and they want to build communities with democratic actors globally. At a meeting in Prague last month, a former German government official banged their hand on the table, emphatically stating: “The transatlantic relationship is dead!” And I get it. I understand that the democratic world may well be tempted to cut the U.S. off as an ally and partner. But to them I’d like to say that it’s not our democracy organizations, funding organizations and broader government that abandoned them when national leadership changed. Relationships can take on many shapes, layers and connections, and on both sides of the Atlantic, those in support of democracy must now find new creative avenues of cooperation and support. I hope our friends don’t give up on us so easily.