BRUSSELS — The EU will begin to ban all Russian gas imports to the bloc early next year after lawmakers, officials and diplomatic negotiators struck a last-minute deal over a key piece of legislation set to reshape Europe’s energy sector. Put forward over the summer, the bill is designed to kill off the EU’s lingering Russian energy dependency at a critical juncture in the Ukraine war, with Russia advancing steadily and Kyiv fast running out of cash. While Europe’s imports of Russian gas have fallen sharply since 2022, the country still accounts for around 19 percent of its total intake. The EU is already set to sanction Russian gas imports, but those measures are temporary and subject to renewal every six months. The new legislation is designed to make that rupture permanent and put member countries that still operate contracts with Russia on a surer footing in the event of legal action. “We were paying to Russia €12 billion per month at the beginning of the war for fossil fuels. Now we’re down to €1.5 billion per month … We aim to bring it down to zero,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told reporters on Wednesday. “This is a good day for Europe and for our independence from Russian fossil fuels — this is how we make Europe resilient.” “We wanted to show that Europe will never go back to Russian fossil fuels again — and the only ones who lost today are Russia and Mr Putin,” Green MEP Ville Niinistö, one of the Parliament’s two lead negotiators on the file, told POLITICO. The law will enter into force on Jan. 1 next year and then apply to different kinds of gas in phases. Spot market purchases of gas will be banned almost immediately, while existing short- and long-term contracts will be banned in 2026 and 2027. A prohibition on pipeline gas will come into effect in September 2027, owing to concerns from landlocked countries reliant on Russian gas, such as Slovakia and Hungary. Finalized in barely six months, the law was the subject of fierce disagreements in recent weeks as the European Parliament’s more ambitious stance irked member countries concerned about the legal risks and technical difficulties of the ban. But despite fears that talks would be prolonged and even spill over into the new year, negotiators reached a compromise on key aspects of the law at the last minute. Now both sides can claim victory. Lawmakers, for instance, repeatedly pushed for an earlier timeline and ultimately ensured that none of the bans would enter into force later than 2027. The Parliament also secured commitments from national capitals to impose one of three penalties on companies that breach the rule: a lump sum penalty of €40 million, 3.5 percent of a company’s annual turnover, or 300 percent of the value of the offending transaction. Where the Council included its demands, the Parliament was able to water them down. For instance, lawmakers convinced member countries to tighten a controversial clause allowing countries facing energy crises to lift the ban — suspensions will only last four weeks at a time and will need to be reviewed by Parliament and the Commission. The Parliament also backed down from a push for a parallel ban on Russian crude imports in the same file after the Commission promised a separate bill early next year, as first reported by POLITICO. The Council did push through its controversial list of “safe” countries from which the EU can still import gas without rigorous vetting. Lawmakers complained that the list includes Qatar, Algeria and Nigeria, but have now accepted it, so long as countries can be excised from the list if they offend. MEPs gushed that they got far more than they expected and weren’t trampled by seasoned diplomats, as some had feared. “We have strengthened the European Commission’s initial proposal by introducing a pathway towards a ban on oil and its products, ending long-term contracts sooner than originally proposed, and secured harmonized EU penalties for non-compliance,” European People’s Party MEP Inese Vaidere, who also led the file, told POLITICO. “We achieved more than my realistic landing scenario — earlier phase-outs, tougher penalties, and closing the loopholes that let Russian gas sneak in,” said Niinistö. “This was about proving European unity — Parliament, Council and Commission on the same side — and showing citizens that we can cut Russia’s revenues faster and more decisively than ever proposed before.”

Mr. Marcin Laskowski | via PGE The European Union finds itself navigating an era of extraordinary challenges. From defending our shared values against authoritarian aggression to preserving unity in the face of shifting geopolitical landscapes, the EU is once again being tested. Covid-19, the energy crisis, the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine and renewed strains in international relations have taught us a simple lesson: a strong Europe needs capable leaders, resilient institutions and, above all, stable yet flexible financial frameworks. The debate on the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) is therefore not only about figures. It is, fundamentally, a debate about Europe’s security, resilience and its future. From the perspective of the power sector, the stakes are particularly high. Electricity operators live every day with the consequences of EU regulation, carrying both the costs of compliance and the opportunities of EU investment support. Data confirms that European funds channeled into the electricity sector generate immense value for the EU economy and consumers alike. Why? Because electrification is the backbone of Europe’s industrial transformation. The Clean Industrial Deal makes it clear: within a few short years, Europe must raise the electrification rate of its economy by 50 percent — from today’s 21.3 percent to 32 percent by 2030. That means the future of sectors as diverse as chemicals, steel, food processing and high-tech manufacturing is, in reality, a debate about electrification. If this transition is not cost-effective, Europe risks eroding its global competitiveness rather than strengthening it. > That means the future of sectors as diverse as chemicals, steel, food > processing and high-tech manufacturing is, in reality, a debate about > electrification. Electrification is also central to REPowerEU — Europe’s pledge to eliminate dependence on Russian fossil fuels. It is worth recalling that in 2024 the EU still paid more to Russia for oil and gas (€21 billion) than it provided in financial support to Ukraine (€19 billion). Only a massive scale-up of clean, domestic electricity can reverse this imbalance once and for all. But this requires a fresh approach. For too long, the power sector has been seen only through the lens of its own transition. Yet without power sector, no other sector will decarbonize successfully. Already today, electricity accounts for 30 percent of EU emissions but has delivered 75 percent of the reductions achieved from the Emissions Trading Scheme. As electrification accelerates, the sector — heavily reliant on weather-dependent renewables — faces growing costs in ensuring security of supply and system stability. This is why investments must also focus on infrastructure that directly enhances security and resilience, including dual-use solutions such as underground cabling of electricity distribution grids, mobile universal power supply systems for high/medium/low voltage, and advanced cyber protection. These are not luxuries, but prerequisites for a power system capable of withstanding shocks, whether geopolitical, climatic or digital. > For too long, the power sector has been seen only through the lens of its own > transition. Yet without power sector, no other sector will decarbonize > successfully. The European Commission estimates that annual investment needs in the power sector will reach €311 billion from 2031— nearly ten times more than the needs of industry sector. This is an unavoidable reality. The critical question is how to mobilize this capital in a way that is least burdensome for citizens and businesses. If mishandled, it could undermine Europe’s industrial competitiveness, growth and jobs. The MFF alone cannot deliver this transformation. Yet it can, and must, be a vital part of the solution. The European Parliament rightly underlined that completing the Energy Union and upgrading energy infrastructure requires continued EU-level financing. In its July proposal, the Commission earmarked 35 percent of the next budget — about €700 billion — for climate and environmental action. These funds must be allocated in a technology-neutral way, systematically covering generation, transmission, distribution and storage. Public-good investments such as power grids — especially local and regional distribution networks — should be treated as a top priority, enabling small and medium-sized enterprises and households to deploy renewables, access affordable energy and reduce energy poverty. > The debate is not only about money, it is also about the way it is spent. The debate is not only about money, it is also about the way it is spent.  A cautious approach is needed to the “money for reforms” mechanism. EU funds for energy transition must not be judged through unrelated conditions. Support for investments in energy projects must not be held hostage to reforms not linked to energy or climate. This caution should also apply to extending the “do no significant harm” principle to areas outside the scope of the Taxonomy Regulation, where it risks adding unnecessary complexity, administrative burden and uncertainty. The focus must remain firmly on delivering the infrastructure and investments needed for decarbonization and security. Moreover, EU budget rules must align with state aid frameworks, particularly the General Block Exemption Regulation, and reflect the long lead times required for power sector investments. At the same time, Europe cannot afford to lose public trust. The green transition will not succeed if imposed against citizens; it must be built with them. Europe needs more carrots, not more sticks. The next EU budget, therefore, must be more than a financial plan. It must be a strategic instrument to strengthen resilience, sovereignty and competitiveness, anchored in the electrification of Europe’s economy. Without it, we risk not only missing our climate targets but also undermining the very security and unity that the EU exists to defend.

COPENHAGEN — Connie Hedegaard remembers when climate was Europe’s great unifier. More than a decade ago, as the EU’s first climate commissioner, she helped turn carbon policy into a pillar of Brussels’ power and a point of pride for the bloc. But with southern Europe now burning and Brussels pivoting to a new mantra of security and competitiveness, she worries the tide is turning — with dire ramifications. “When people lose their homes or their families to extreme weather, they don’t just suffer loss, they also lose trust in decision-makers,” Hedegaard told POLITICO on the sidelines of an organic farming summit. “That mistrust is what feeds polarization.” And she didn’t mince words about the industry giants and other actors she says are responsible for stalling progress. “I remember when BP called itself ‘Beyond Petroleum,’” she said, citing the giant British oil firm. “Now they are backtracking. They should be ashamed of themselves.”  The warning by the Danish national, who led the European Commission’s newly established climate wing between 2010 and 2014, comes more than a year after far-right parties surged in the European election, capitalizing on voter anger over inflation and green rules.  Eight months into Ursula von der Leyen’s second term atop the Commission, her ambitious Green Deal climate and environmental agenda has become a political punching bag, with national governments pushing for looser targets and industry lobbying to slow the pace of change. But Hedegaard argued that treating the Green Deal as a burden in tough times is a dangerous miscalculation.  “For Europe, climate and security are interlinked. I think most people can see it when they look at our energy dependency and the need for transformation of our energy systems,” she said. “If policymakers fail to act, they risk fueling the very populism they claim to fear.” CLIMATE REALITY From last year’s “monster” floods in Spain to this summer’s fires in Cyprus and southern France, climate disasters have battered Europe with increased scale and frequency. In Scandinavia, July’s record-breaking heat left hospitals overwhelmed and even drove reindeer into cities in search of shade. The European Environment Agency estimates such disasters have already cost the continent nearly half a trillion euros over the past four decades. In Scandinavia, July’s record-breaking heat left hospitals overwhelmed and even drove reindeer into cities in search of shade. | Jouni Porsanger/Lehtikuva/AFP via Getty Images Hedegaard is no stranger to political battles. A former Danish minister and longtime center-right politician, she cut her teeth in Copenhagen before moving to Brussels in 2010. Remembered in EU corridors for her direct and conversational style, honed by an early career as a journalist, Hedegaard is blunt in her assessments. Her pointed attack on BP, for instance, comes after the company scaled back its renewable energy investments while raising annual spending on oil and gas — reversing the climate pledges the firm once trumpeted. BP did not respond to a request for comment. Hedegaard’s remarks also come as climate lawsuits mount around the world. Last month, the International Court of Justice ruled that governments can be held legally responsible for failing to act on climate change, a decision that could also embolden challenges against corporations. Since leaving Brussels, Hedegaard has taken on several roles in climate policy and sustainability, including chairing the European Climate Foundation. But her post-EU career has not been without controversy. In 2016, she joined Volkswagen’s new Sustainability Council, a move critics said risked greenwashing in the wake of the carmaker’s emission-cheating Dieselgate scandal. She defended the role as unpaid and aimed at pushing the company to clean up its act. For von der Leyen, Hedegaard has an unvarnished message: Don’t blink. “She has stood firm so far. She must continue to do that,” she said of the EU executive president. Hedegaard also warned that Europe can’t afford to stall while China pours billions into climate-friendly technology. “If Europe hesitates while others go full speed, we risk losing the industries of the future,” she said. A climate pact with Beijing last month was hailed as a diplomatic win, but underscored how cooperation is increasingly entangled with rivalry over who will dominate the supply chain. Closer to home, Hedegaard pointed to farming as one of the EU’s most immediate levers. She argued that the Common Agricultural Policy, which consumes around a third of the EU budget, could be used more forcefully to drive the green transition while cutting red tape for the smallest farmers. “It takes courage,” she said, “but agriculture is one of the sectors where we actually have the tools to act.” “This is not the time to hesitate or foot-drag,” she added. “It is time to deliver.”

LONDON — One of Keir Starmer’s favorite meals is tandoori salmon curry, a dish the U.K. prime minister loves so much he once prepared it in front of the TV cameras. But if he ever finds time to whip it up in the kitchen of his Downing Street flat, he may want to pause over who is supplying the fuel to heat his gas hob.  The gas coming through the pipes is provided by TotalEnergies Gas & Power, a subsidiary of the French fossil fuel giant, TotalEnergies. And it isn’t just Downing Street it’s fueling. Much of Whitehall — the administrative center of the British state — is supplied with gas for heating, kitchens and hot water via a multi-year, multi-billion pound contract with the firm, known as ‘Supply of Energy 2,’ which could see up to £8 billion in British taxpayers’ money flowing to the energy multinational. According to data obtained through Freedom of Information requests, No. 10, the Foreign Office on King Charles Street, the Treasury’s headquarters and Ed Miliband’s Department for Energy Security and Net Zero are all getting their gas from TotalEnergies’ subsidiary. So too, contract records show, are the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The Bank of England and — beyond the capital — local council offices, NHS hospitals and schools likewise buy gas from the firm via ‘Supply of Energy 2’ and other lucrative public sector procurement deals. Asked whether it could rule out that the prime minister’s flat above No. 11 Downing Street also receives gas from the contract, the government declined to comment. TotalEnergies fuels the British state. But there’s a problem. Because TotalEnergies also trades in Russian gas. THE SIBERIA CONNECTION The energy giant holds a 20 percent stake in Yamal LNG — a sprawling energy complex in the wilderness of Russia’s northern Siberia region, where huge fossil fuel reserves lie beneath the earth.  Majority-owned by Russian private energy firm Novatek, this is where gas is processed for shipment — in liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers — to several European Union countries that are still, more than three years after Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, importing Russian LNG to fuel their economies. According to TotalEnergies, it supplies gas from Yamal under long-term contractual arrangements — pre-dating Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 — that it it cannot break. But it’s a trade flow that remains deeply controversial. EU imports of Russian LNG — in which TotalEnergies is one of the major players — were worth up to $8.5 billion (£6.3 billion) in 2024/25 according to an estimate from the Helsinki-based think tank the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. France, Spain and Belgium are the biggest importers. The LNG trade provides revenue for Russian fossil fuel companies that in turn generates tax income for the Kremlin — and helps fuel Putin’s war machine in Ukraine. Last week, the European Commission in Brussels embarked on a new push to crack down on Russian gas imports, including a ban on imports under long-term contracts — but not until January 2028. The U.K., by contrast, has already banned direct imports of Russian LNG. Its political leaders like to talk up their hardline stance on Putin’s fossil fuels. “Every family and business across the U.K. has paid the price for Russia weaponizing energy,” Prime Minister Starmer said at an energy security conference in London in April, positioning the U.K. as the chief adversary of Putin and his grip on energy markets. “We must continue to crack down on their energy revenues which are still fuelling Putin’s war chest.” Last week, Starmer said he wanted allies at the G7 summit in Canada to “squeeze Russia’s energy revenues and reduce the funds they are able to pour into their illegal war.”  But, critics say, a gas supply contract with a firm that still supplies Russian gas to the continent fatally undermines the U.K.’s claim to moral leadership on the issue. “It is outrageous that British government buildings are being heated with gas from a company still tied to Russian LNG,” said Svitlana Romanko, executive director of Razom We Stand, a Ukrainian NGO which campaigns against Russia’s fossil fuel trade. “Every contract with TotalEnergies sends a message that the U.K. is willing to look the other way as Ukrainians suffer.” ‘HYPOCRITICAL’ Gas supplied under TotalEnergies Gas & Power’s U.K. contracts is procured on the domestic market, so it is highly unlikely any of it actually originated in Russia. In line with the U.K.’s ban, the company does not import Russian LNG directly to the U.K. The gas coming through the pipes is provided by TotalEnergies Gas & Power, a subsidiary of the French fossil fuel giant, TotalEnergies. | Teresa Suarez/EPA Nonetheless, says Phuc-Vinh Nguyen, head of energy at the Jacques Delors Institute, a Paris-based think tank, it was “hypocritical” of the U.K. to have sealed such a lucrative contract with a firm that still imports Russian gas to European neighbors. The stance allows Britain to say in public “we are officially and actively banning Russian energy,” said Nguyen. “But by the back door [they] are dealing with a company that is actively working with the Russian regime.” TotalEnergies Chief Executive Patrick Pouyanné has said that “as long as the European authorities do not impose sanctions, and ask us to continue supplying the region with Russian LNG, we will do so.” Asked earlier this year about the potential for new investments in Russia in the event of a peace deal in Ukraine, Pouyanné did not rule it out. “We’ll have to take time before [re-engaging] … but at the same time, we’ll see what will happen,” he told CNBC, while branding it a “theoretical question.” He called the war “terrible” and “traumatic.” TotalEnergies said it condemned Russia’s invasion and that it operates legally in line with the energy and sanctions policies of the EU. The company only imports Russian gas to Europe under its existing contract and does not buy it on the so-called spot market for short-notice gas trades. Mai Rosner, senior fossil fuel campaigner at the Global Witness NGO, said TotalEnergies was nonetheless “one of the largest buyers of Russian gas, and a key player in bringing Putin’s fossil fuels to market.” “The U.K. government says it stands with Ukraine, is committed to energy security, and wants to lead on clean energy. So it’s deeply concerning that its highest offices are still powered by gas from TotalEnergies,” she said. PRESSURE FROM LABOUR MPS Whitehall’s contract with TotalEnergies’ U.K. subsidiary — first reported by POLITICO — was secured by the Crown Commercial Service (CCS), the government’s procurement body, under the previous Conservative administration. The contract started on Feb. 27, 2023 and was made public in March 2023. On taking office, Starmer’s government rejected calls from campaigners to scrap it. Now, for the first time, MPs in Starmer’s Labour party are raising concerns. Tan Dhesi, the Labour chair of the House of Commons Defence Committee, told POLITICO the government should “assess this particular contract to ensure we’re not undermining our steadfast support for Ukraine.” One of Keir Starmer’s favorite meals is tandoori salmon curry, a dish the U.K. prime minister loves so much he once prepared it in front of the TV cameras. | Pool Photo by Jason Alden via EPA “We must ensure any inadvertent support for the Russian war effort is eliminated and therefore target dealings with companies supporting the Russian economy,” he added. “Ensuring peace in Europe and the defense of Ukrainian sovereignty must be reflected across government policy, including in procurement.” Phil Brickell, a Labour member of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, said: “Handing taxpayer money to a company which continues to have ties with Russia, while our Ukrainian allies are indiscriminately being bombed during Putin’s relentless war of aggression, is not appropriate.” “The government should review the suitability of this supplier and exit the contract at the earliest opportunity,” Brickell added. GAS TIES RUN DEEP But any attempt to untangle the U.K. state’s deep ties with TotalEnergies might not be so easy. The CCS’s over-arching ‘Supply of Energy 2’ contract does not expire until February 2027 and some of the so-called “call-offs” from the contract secured by individual government departments run for longer still. The MoD and Home Office contracts both have end dates in 2030, according to public documents. Beyond the CCS contract, other public sector organizations are supplied by TotalEnergies Gas & Power via separate deals.  According to publicly-available records, the Bank of England and several local councils — including Lancashire, Hampshire, Bristol, and Southampton — have multi-year contracts via so-called “frameworks” arranged by the Kent County Council-owned public procurement firm, LASER. Each deal is potentially worth millions of pounds to the French fossil fuel giant. Councils in Shropshire, Herefordshire, Telford & Wrekin and Worcestershire, meanwhile, have a separate, combined contract worth up to £100 million, commencing in April next year and not expiring until 2030. TotalEnergies Gas & Power is one of only a handful of energy firms able to offer such large-scale public sector gas deals. But energy industry experts said U.K. officials would have alternative options. MONITORING DEVELOPMENTS A government spokesperson said:“We are making the U.K. a clean energy superpower to get off the roller coaster of fossil fuel markets controlled by dictators like Putin, replacing that with clean homegrown power we control — and have ended all imports of Russian fossil fuels in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.” The U.K., by contrast, has already banned direct imports of Russian LNG. Its political leaders like to talk up their hardline stance on Vladimir Putin’s fossil fuels. | Pool Photo by Alexander Kazakov via EPA A spokesperson for LASER, the procurement firm, said the company “fully recognizes the importance of ethical procurement and the concerns raised around energy supply chains.” All of its contracts “comply with the U.K. government’s sanctions regime and guidance on public procurement,” they added. “We will continue to monitor developments and act accordingly in line with government policy and sector best practice.” A Bank of England spokesperson said the Bank’s “procurement processes abide by all relevant [government] financial sanctions legislation.” A Southampton City Council spokesperson said it had been advised by LASER “that all of our energy contracts, including gas, comply with the U.K. government’s sanctions regime and guidance on public procurement.” They added: “We will continue to monitor developments with our procurement partner, Laser Energy, and act accordingly in line with government policy and sector best practice.” Other councils either declined or did not respond to a request for comment.

BRUSSELS — Any talk of returning to Russian oil and gas is premature and threatens Europe’s security interests, European Union countries bordering Russia warned Monday as speculation grows that a United States-brokered peace deal could normalize economic ties with Moscow.  The remarks come as speculation mounts over when — or if — Europe might reopen the energy taps with Russia. In recent days, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and Ukraine’s top sanctions official have both suggested economic relations with the Kremlin could thaw after hostilities eventually end in Ukraine.  That has sparked a push from Kyiv’s most ardent EU allies to ensure that any thaw in relations doesn’t compromise on Russian fossil fuels. They spoke out Monday as both energy and foreign ministers met in Brussels to discuss U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine, as well as the bloc’s energy security. “Russian energy is poisonous,” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys told POLITICO. “It comes with political manipulation and blackmail. The revenues of its sales go directly to funding Russia’s brutalities in Ukraine, but also to various sabotage and disinformation campaigns in our countries.” He added: “I believe that Europe has learned its lessons and won’t walk back into the trap of reliance on Russian energy resources. It is in our fundamental interest to make sure this does not happen.” The European Commission, the EU’s executive, insists that returning to business as usual with Moscow is not currently in the cards. “There’s no change in the EU’s policy toward Russia when it comes to energy,” EU energy chief Dan Jørgensen said Monday. “We want to be independent of energy imports from Russia,” he told reporters after the energy ministers’ gathering. But EU countries on Russia’s border argued that independence must continue even after the war. “Self-sufficiency in the energy sector, as any other sector, is critical for Europe in the future,” Finland’s Climate Minister Sari Multala told POLITICO. “It’s not the time to discuss letting sanctions go or helping the situation for Russia in any way,” Multala said. “That would not strengthen Ukraine’s position in [any] peace negotiations.” Estonian Climate Minister Yoko Alender similarly rejected claims that European countries could return to buying oil and gas from Moscow as part of a peace deal. “I, at the moment, don’t see any signs that Russia has changed any of its aims, so I think definitely Europe instead needs to go away from Russian fossil fuels,” she said. “Estonia is not buying any energy from Russia and we see that Europe needs to really be decisive and unified on this and as a whole stop this practice.” Germany’s outgoing vice chancellor, Robert Habeck, was slightly more equivocal. He hit out at calls to resume Russian oil imports as “the wrong direction” and said it was unwise to buy Russian fuel “as long as this horrible war is going on.” Yet Habeck — whose country was hit hard by price rises when the Kremlin cut gas exports after launching the war — was less declarative about what might happen after the war.  “Russia misused our energy dependency,” he said, but ultimately Ukraine should be allowed to “define a way how peace can be secured again.” The debates come several days after Ukraine’s top sanctions official, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, told POLITICO he believed a return to Western countries doing business with Moscow was just “a matter of time,” but only once peace is established and guaranteed. According to him, existing restrictions on the country’s energy exports had to be seen as “leverage” in exchange for concrete action on security and justice, such as compensation for Ukraine. But he cautioned Europe against becoming dependent again on Russian resources. “Russia has a lot of potential, especially energy resources,” he said, hinting third countries could try to harness them again. “Maybe not, and hopefully not, to the same extent — hopefully not ever finding themselves in the position of total dependence on Russian energy of any kind.” Speaking later on Monday, Vlasiuk added that sanctions were worth keeping in place while Russia remains a serious threat to the continent. “Another way to look at it is that energy sanctions provide Europe with more time to reduce dependencies on Russia and facilitate long-term deterrence, strengthening Europe’s ability to protect itself and values.” At the same time, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Russian leader Vladimir Putin would hold talks over the phone with Trump on Tuesday. He declined to comment on the agenda. The EU has indefinitely shelved a long-awaited strategy to end its remaining imports of Russian oil, gas and nuclear technology, as the bloc adopts a wait-and-see approach to peace talks in Ukraine. Still, Jørgensen on Monday insisted he would present the plan “quite soon.” “We are really concerned about possible lifting [of] energy sanctions on Russia,” said Svitlana Romanko, director of Ukrainian advocacy organization Razom We Stand. “Lifting of those sanctions now would be like giving a pyromaniac matches and expecting them not to start fires.”

John Kampfner is a British author, broadcaster and commentator. His latest book “In Search of Berlin” is published by Atlantic. He is a regular POLITICO columnist. This is a tale of two cities, two streets and an unlikely divergence that speaks volumes about the state of politics in Europe today. Parisian authorities are forging ahead with plans to make the city 100 percent navigable by bike. On the Rue de Rivoli, one can pedal serenely in the knowledge that one lane is solely for cyclists, the other reserved for buses. Meanwhile, in Berlin, the first major decision taken by the incoming senate was to reopen one of the most famous thoroughfares, which had been partially closed off to vehicles. On Friedrichstrasse, where one could previously drink a coffee on wide wooden benches in the middle of the road, the cars have returned. So, as Germany heads to the polls on Feb. 23, the country once seen as a climate trailblazer is now in danger of becoming a laggard. And the Christian Democrats (CDU) — the party almost certain to lead the next government — is on a mission to dilute environmental targets, with leader Friedrich Merz framing all things green through the now-familiar “woke” and “anti-growth” lens. It’s no coincidence that environmental policies were barely mentioned in the first televised election debate between the CDU leader and Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Instead, the questions ranged from migration — which dominated the discourse — to cost of living, kindergarten locations and an arcane battle over the use of gender in the German language. In a recent stump speech in Bochum, the industrial heartlands of the Ruhr, Merz had already stated that the economic policy of recent years had been geared “almost exclusively toward climate protection. I want to say it clearly as I mean it: We will and we must change that.” Along these lines, the chancellor-in-waiting has vowed to scrap subsidies for environmentally friendly heat pumps (which brought the Greens so much political trouble last year). He has also described wind turbines as “ugly,” and vowed to bring back nuclear energy. Of course, some of this is clearly performative — technologically speaking, a nuclear comeback won’t happen — but it is central to Merz’s strategy to give the CDU a more distinctive conservative direction after the centrist era of former Chancellor Angela Merkel. And just how far he goes in rolling back some of the progress will depend on the party’s eventual coalition partner. Friedrich Merz is framing all things green through the now-familiar “woke” and “anti-growth” lens. | Maja Hitij/Getty Images As it stands, an alliance with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) — without Scholz — seems the most likely outcome, not least because they’re less likely to stand in Merz’s way on the environmental front. Across the Western world, the green movement is on a downward slide. It isn’t just the case in Donald Trump’s America — U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has signaled a British version of “grow, baby, grow” by approving plans to expand three of London’s airports. And though the mayor of Paris is pushing hard to green the capital city, French President Emmanuel Macron is showing far less enthusiasm than before. When Scholz assembled his “traffic light” coalition in December 2021, the Greens were a pivotal player. Having secured a record share of the vote, the party was joining the government for the first time since 2005. And as Robert Habeck — the party’s current candidate for chancellor — took over the country’s Ministry for Economic Affairs with an expanded environmental brief, expectations were high. Then, two months later, came Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Suddenly put on a war footing, Habeck’s task was to improvise a new energy policy and extricate Germany from Russia’s clutches. He was on the hunt for secure energy from anywhere, whatever the source, and that included going hat in hand to places like Qatar for supplies of LNG. The government’s record hasn’t exactly been disastrous, but it has, indeed, been patchy. It has secured some clear successes, particularly in renewable energy — wind and solar power provided 47 percent of Germany’s electricity in 2024, up from 31 percent in 2021. And emissions have steadily fallen, just not at the rate that was hoped for. As a result, Germany is expected to fail to meet its goal of cutting 65 percent of greenhouse gases by 2030, compared to 1990. According to a report by the country’s Council of Experts on Climate Change last week: “In light of the new geopolitical situation and the cyclical and structural weakness of the German economy, the conflicting objectives of climate protection policy with other policy areas are becoming increasingly apparent.” The language here is studiously diplomatic, but with the target of 1.5 degrees Celsius now a pipe dream, the commission also noted: “The comprehensive embedding of climate policy measures into an overall political strategy is now more important than ever.” The biggest problem here remains Germany’s car obsession. Too many combustion engine cars are being registered, while sales of electric vehicles fall — just like in other countries. Germany was asleep at the wheel in the first phase of electrification — one of its many failures in innovation. And as spending on infrastructure atrophied, the unreliability of the once-envied Deutsche Bahn has become embedded in the national psyche, leading more people to return to the roads. It would be unfair to suggest Merz is hostile to the green agenda, per se, but he’s using hostile rhetoric for a reason, trying to portray the cause as inimical to economic recovery. Truth is, he’ll only get so far. Many targets have already been embedded into the German economy and cannot be unpicked. Whether part of the next government or in opposition, the Greens aren’t going to just disappear — even as the Left party appears to have swallowed up a chunk of the Green vote in recent weeks. Indeed, the party has fallen from its high of 15 percent, but not by much. Acknowledging just how much the mood has turned, though, even the Greens themselves don’t mention climate protection that much on the campaign trail. They’d rather talk about housing and health care instead. Meanwhile, Habeck is caught in between, the whipping boy for both sides, denounced as metropolitan and “woke” by populists and as a sellout by the left. Much of the movement’s impetus has dissipated — for the moment at least.  

Børge Brende is president and CEO of the World Economic Forum. Arancha Gonzalez Laya is dean of the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po). Mark Leonard is director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Amid an unsettled geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, Europe stands at a crossroads. The strategic debate currently taking place in many of the continent’s capitals is largely focused on whether to continue down the road of interdependence with foreign partners, or to forge a new path of greater strategic autonomy. But to be truly secure today and remain well-positioned for tomorrow, Europe needs to opt for a middle ground. Embracing interconnectedness where prudent while building autonomy where it can, this is an approach that can be called “strategic interdependence.” Today, the imbalanced strategic status quo has been most salient when it comes to security. The war on Ukraine was a wake-up call, exposing Europe’s overreliance on the transatlantic partnership. But this realization doesn’t mean the EU should prioritize autonomy over alliances. U.S. nuclear deterrence and defense partnerships, including NATO, are indispensable, and Europe cannot take this defense arrangement for granted.  That’s why the bloc must become a stronger pillar within NATO — both for its own sake and for its partners. Tactical commitments to the transatlantic alliance need to be coupled with stronger European strategic structures. And one possible way to do this would be to set up an informal European Security Council, one comprising representatives from the Council of the EU and the European Commission, to streamline defense coordination and enable swift, decisive action. Meanwhile, on energy, Europe’s reliance on Russian gas revealed the perils of depending on a single provider. Before the war on Ukraine, over 40 percent of Europe’s natural gas imports came from Russia, which created a critical vulnerability. The EU has responded to the crisis by diversifying its energy imports, significantly increasing its liquefied natural gas supplies. But while this is a prudent approach in the near term, long-term resilience requires the continent to become more self-reliant on green sources. This means Europe should continue energy partnerships with allies for short-term needs, but it must also address its overreliance on external sources for green components. Instead of competing in mature technologies like solar panels, where China controls over 80 percent of global manufacturing, the EU should be targeting sectors where it can gain a competitive advantage. Emerging fields such as battery tech, where innovation is still up for grabs, are one possibility here. Moreover, to ensure stability in its green transition, a Critical Raw Materials Reserve akin to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve could act as a buffer against supply-chain shocks. When it comes to technology, Europe is losing its edge as well: 80 percent of semiconductor suppliers are located outside the bloc, while U.S. and Chinese firms are dominating AI, quantum computing and advanced chips. To turn this around, the EU must overhaul its regulatory landscape by cutting red tape, eliminating barriers and setting up one-stop shops to simplify digital compliance for businesses. Additionally, by introducing de-risking tools, such as loan guarantee programs that will facilitate investment, the bloc needs to ensure capital is flowing to critical industries. To be clear, this isn’t about a lack of money: The EU boasts a 2.5 percent of GDP annual current-account surplus, which it invests abroad. Alliances with countries around the world will be essential, including on trade where Europe must pursue an active agenda. The EU’s single market, representing 15 percent of global GDP and 450 million consumers, is its economic trump card, and Europe should use this to secure needed critical resources for its digital and green industries. Europe is losing its edge as well: 80 percent of semiconductor suppliers are located outside the bloc. | I-hwa Cheng/Getty Images Crucially, striking the right strategic balance will also necessitate human capital. Europe’s demographic clock is ticking, and by 2050, the bloc’s working-age population will shrink by 20 percent, with countries like Germany facing a gap of 7 million workers by 2035. That’s why migration policies need to be strategic and better tailored to labor-market needs. Public support hinges on reframing migration as an opportunity — a driver of innovation, labor market renewal and sustainable growth for Europe’s aging economies. Strategic interdependence is more than a policy framework, it’s a mindset — one that Europe’s leaders must embrace if they are to navigate the world as it is, not as they wish it to be. By investing in defense, accelerating the green transition, fostering innovation, deepening global trade ties and reforming migration policies, they can secure Europe’s place as a global leader. For the alternative is a fragmented, stagnant bloc, sidelined in great-power rivalries. The choice is clear: Adapt or get left behind. 

OPTICS ‘MORE NECESSARY THAN THE SUN’ Coal brought prosperity — and sickness — to Bosnia. A phrase uttered by a worker in the 1990s came to define the struggles of a region dealing with the pollution caused by one of its main industries. Text and photos by MATTEO TREVISAN in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina A boy suffering from chronic respiratory problems plays at home, a few dozen meters from the the steel plant in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina. His father says they can never drink coffee in the garden because it fills up with black dust within minutes — and they can’t afford to move to a less polluted area. Next, a miner inside the Banovići coal mine and a night view of the steel plant in Zenica. Local activists say the factory’s activity becomes more intense at night when it is more difficult to monitor the plant’s emissions. “Here in Zenica we are all sick, only some don’t know they are sick yet.” Those were the words of an activist I met on my first trip to Bosnia in 2019. Two years later, he died of lung cancer. That was when — and largely why — this project started. Zenica, a city of roughly 100,000 people some 70 kilometers north of Sarajevo, is one of the most polluted cities in Bosnia. The main source of pollution, according to Eko Forum, a local environmental organization, is a huge steel plant owned by AcelorMittal. The plant, which is almost as large as the city itself, produces energy by burning coal. The situation has residents in the city and surrounding areas worried about their health and their future. Alma, who lives in Tetovo, a village not far from the industrial center of Zenica, said she moved to the area after she married, more than four decades ago. “At that time, many people worked in the factory, but today the situation is terrible. Within a 300-metre radius of my house, everyone has cancer.” She was diagnosed with stomach cancer herself in 2021. Juggernaut: Above, an aerial view of the steel plant in Zenica. The factory was bought by Indian steel giant ArcelorMittal in 2004, but the agreements between the company and the Bosnian government aren’t public. This is not just a story of Zenica, or even Bosnia, but more broadly of the Central Balkans, where countless cities and towns face heavily polluted air caused by outdated coal industries and power plants, open-cast lignite mines and ash dumps.  According to a Human Rights Watch report, Bosnia has the fifth highest number of deaths from air pollution in the world. Concentrations of pollutants in the region — which is home to seven of the 10 most polluting coal-fired power stations in Europe — are five times higher than the limits set by the EU, the U.N. Environment Program has found. In the years I explored the industrial cities of Zenica, Tuzla, Banovici and other places saddled with pollution, I discovered a remarkable country, scarred by war but resolutely hopeful that becoming a member of the EU will improve a toxic environmental landscape and usher in a brighter future.  Going under: Below, miners prepare to go underground at the Banovići mine. It takes them 45 minutes traveling on a conveyer belt to get the site, which lies 7 kilometers below the ground. On duty: At the Banovići mine in Tuzla, each miner is given a personal number plate, which he must hand in to the technical office before going underground to receive his personal torch. Keeping watch: Samir Lemeš, a university professor and president of local environmental organization Eko Forum, observes the steel plant in Zenica. Eko Forum has taken legal action against ArcelorMittal, owner of the plant, accusing it of not respecting Bosnia’s environmental standards. Dust: A resident of Zenica sweeps black dust that has settled on her terrace. Medecines: Mirsad Selimović at his home in Tetovo, with all his medicines placed in front of him. A former worker at the ArceloMittal steel factory, he has been fighting laryngeal cancer for 15 years. Advertisement Survivor: Below, Izet Barcic, from the village of Bukinje near Tuzla. He lives with his wife a few hundred meters from the thermal power station. “They operated four times and removed my lung. This plant is killing us all and I hope one day I’ll be able to leave this place.” Damaged: Waste from the stateowned thermal power plant in Tuzla is dropped into the Jezero Dva reservoir. There are no official studies on the correlation between the plant’s activity and public health. A study sponsored by the Centre for Ecology and Energy, an NGO, found a statistically significant association between negative health impacts and long-term exposure to heavy metals dispersed in the vicinity of the plant and landfills. Coal legacy: The Banovići coal mine in Tuzla, owned by RMU Banovici. It employs 2,000 people including miners, technicians and administrative staff. Banovići is one of the largest mines in the Balkans and supplies the country’s power generation and industrial plants, but also exports abroad. The mine has an estimated annual production of 1.5 million tons and ranks fifth in Europe. “Čelik:” Kemal Kudozović in his home in the village of Bukinje, located just a few hundred meters from the thermal power plant in Tuzla. He suffers from respiratory problems and his wife recently died of cancer. “I have no doubt that if I am sick and my wife is dead, it is only the thermal plant’s fault.” Keeping watch: View of the city of Zenica and the stadium of the Čelik football team, which means “steel” in Bosnian. In the background, the steel factory. Advertisement Tombs: Below, the Muslim cemetery in Tetovo, behind ArcelorMittal’s steel factory. Fighter: Edita is a member of the Eko Forum association and has been involved with the community in the village of Tetovo for several years. “The young people here want to leave, they have lost confidence and only the elderly are left to fight.” Unsealed: The Jezero Dva artificial lake, containing the waste from the Tuzla thermal power plant. The plant and the reservoirs into which the combustion ash is discharged are located on the edge of the city. “The reservoir has not been sealed, so the toxic sludge can seep into the ground and into the water,” said Denis Žiško from the Centar za Ekologiju i Energiju, an NGO. Cracks: Above, the interior of a house in the village of Bašići. As excavations in the lignite mine are moving closer to the settlements in the area, strong vibrations cause cracks in the walls. According to the Centre for Environment in Banja Luke, the mine does not comply with environmental regulations. Neighbors: Alma Alić moved to the village of Tetovo, in Zenica, when she got married. “Within a 300 meter radius of my house everyone has cancer,” Alić says. She has stomach cancer. Agriculture: Farmers near the village of Fajtovci, in Sanski Most. Local farmers complain that dairy farms in the area don’t want to buy their milk because the animals drink water and eat fodder polluted by the mine. Waste: Industrial waste from the ArcelorMittal steel plant collected in the Rača landfill. According to Bosnia’s regulations, it should have been stored in special facilities to prevent dust from spreading into the air or polluting groundwater. Carrying on: The shift supervisor calls miners before going underground at the Banovići mine. Advertisement

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has vowed to restore relations with Russia if the war in Ukraine ends during his term as leader. “If the war ends during the [2023-2027] mandate of this government, I’ll do everything possible for the renewal of economic and standard relations with Russia,”  he said at a Thursday press conference on a new tax package, adding the conflict has no military solution. The remarks come ahead of a joint meeting of the Slovak and Ukrainian governments on Monday, at which Bratislava wants to persuade Kyiv to remain a transit country for Russian gas. Kyiv banned the transit of products from Russian energy company Lukoil across its borders over the summer, alarming Hungary and Slovakia, both of which receive Russian oil via a pipeline across Ukraine thanks to an opt-out from EU sanctions. “We have an existential interest in maintaining transit routes for gas and oil through Ukraine,” Fico said, adding he sees no reason to buy gas and oil from alternative suppliers because it is “still the same Russian oil,” just with higher transit charges. Fico also said that his government has been under “extreme pressure” from the European Commission to stop buying from Moscow. Ukraine has recently given a green light to a new loophole that would see Lukoil sell its oil instead to Hungary’s MOL energy giant, which could then ship it through Ukraine to the EU. Both countries are now pushing for a similar agreement for Russian gas when a transit contract expires at the end of this year. Fico is known for his pro-Russian rhetoric. Back in January he claimed there was no war in Kyiv, prompting outrage from Ukraine. Over the summer he lamented not visiting Putin with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán — a trip that was widely condemned by EU capitals.