BRUSSELS — European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s plan to shake up how the EU spends its almost €2 trillion budget is rapidly being diluted. Von der Leyen’s big idea is to steer hundreds of billions in funds away from farmer subsidies and regional payouts — traditionally the bread and butter of the EU budget — toward defense spending and industrial competitiveness. But those modernizing changes — demanded by richer Northern European countries that pay more into the budget than they receive back from it — are difficult to push through in the face of stern opposition from Southern and Central European countries, which get generous payments for farmers and their poorer regions. A coalition of EU governments, lawmakers and farmers is now joining forces to undo key elements of the new-look budget running from 2028 to 2034, less than six months after the European Commission proposed to focus on those new priorities. Von der Leyen’s offer last week to allow countries to spend up to an extra €45 billion on farmer subsidies is her latest concession to powerful forces that want to keep the budget as close as possible to the status quo. Northern European countries are growing increasingly frustrated by moves by other national capitals and stakeholders to turn back the clock on the EU budget, according to three European diplomats. They were particularly irritated by a successful Franco-Italian push last week to exact more concessions for farmers as part of diplomatic maneuvers to get the long-delayed Mercosur trade deal with Latin America over the line. “Some delegations showed up with speaking points that they have taken out of the drawer from 2004,” said an EU diplomat who, like others quoted in this story, was granted anonymity to speak freely. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy was worth 46 percent of the bloc’s total budget in 2004. The Commission’s proposal for 2028-2034 has reserved a minimum of roughly 25 percent of the total cash pot for farmers, although governments can spend significantly more than that. The Commission had no immediate comment when asked whether the anti-reform camp was successfully chipping away at von der Leyen’s proposal. THE ANTI-REFORM ALLIANCE The Commission’s July proposal to modernize the budget triggered shockwaves in Brussels and beyond. The transition away from sacred cows consolidated a ramshackle coalition of angry farmers, regional leaders and lawmakers who feared they would lose money and influence in the years to come. “This was the most radical budget [ever proposed] and there was resistance from many interested parties,” said Zsolt Darvas, a senior fellow at the Bruegel think tank. A protest by disgruntled farmers in Brussels during a summit of EU leaders on Dec. 18 was only the latest flashpoint of discontent. | Bastien Ohier/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images The scale of the Commission’s task became apparent weeks before the proposal was even published, as outspoken MEPs, ministers and farmers’ unions threatened to dismantle the budget in the following years of negotiations. That’s exactly what is happening now. “The Commission’s proposal was quite radical so no one thought it could go ahead this way,” said a second EU diplomat.   “We knew that this would be controversial,” echoed a Commission official working on the file. A protest by disgruntled farmers in Brussels during a summit of EU leaders on Dec. 18 was only the latest flashpoint of discontent. The terrible optics of the EU’s signing off on Mercosur as farmers took to the streets on tractors was not lost on national leaders and EU officials. Commission experts spent their Christmas break crafting a clever workaround that allows countries to raise agricultural subsidies by a further €45 billion without increasing the overall size of the budget. The extra money for farmers isn’t new — it’s been brought forward from an existing rainy-day fund that was designed to make the EU budget better suited to handling unexpected crises. By handing farmers a significant share of that financial buffer, however, the Commission is undermining its capacity to mobilize funding for emergencies or other policy areas. “You are curtailing the logic of having a more flexible budget for crises in the future,” said Eulalia Rubio, a senior fellow at the Jacques Delors Institute think tank. At the time, reactions to the budget compromise from frugal countries such as Germany and Netherlands were muted because it were seen as a bargaining chip to win Italy’s backing for the Mercosur deal championed by Berlin. The trouble was instead postponed, as it reduces budget flexibility. Darvas also argued that the Commission has not had to backtrack “too much” on the fundamentals of its proposal as countries retained the option of whether to spend the extra cash on agriculture. In a further concession, the Commission proposed additional guarantees to reduce the risk of national governments cutting payments to more developed regions. | Nicolas Tucat/AFP via Getty Images ANOTHER MONTH, ANOTHER CONCESSION This wasn’t the first time von der Leyen has tinkered with the budget proposal to extract herself from a political quagmire. The Commission president had already suggested changes to the budget in November to stem a budding revolt by her own European People’s Party (EPP), which was feeling the heat from farmers’ unions and regional leaders. At the time, the EU executive promised more money for farmers by introducing a “rural spending” target worth 10 percent of a country’s total EU funds. In a further concession, the Commission proposed additional guarantees to reduce the risk of national governments cutting payments to more developed regions — a sensitive issue for decentralized countries like Germany and Spain. “The general pattern that we don’t like is that the Commission is continuing to offer tiny tweaks here and there” to appease different constituencies, an EU official said. The Commission official retorted that national capitals would eventually have made those changes themselves as the “trend of the negotiations [in the Council] was going in that direction.” However, budget veterans who are used to painstaking negotiations were surprised by the speed at which Commission offered concessions so early in the process. “Everyone is scared of the [2027] French elections [fearing a victory by the far-right National Rally] and wants to get a deal by the end of the year, so the Commission is keen to expedite,” said the second EU diplomat. Nicholas Vinocur contributed to this report.

Faced with an ageing population and rising chronic disease rates, Europe wants to make its citizens healthier. It also needs to keep its most powerful industries happy. In the basket of health policies that EU lawmakers rushed to get across the line before Christmas, industry was the big winner: The pharmaceutical, food and drink sectors walked away with a set of major policy wins — and (potentially) healthier profits. While the pharma industry previously feared losing some of its monopoly rights on new drugs, the Commission this month offered it an extra year of patent protection for novel biotech drugs — among the most expensive treatments in the world. The food and drink sectors, meanwhile, successfully pushed back against proposals to tax ultra-processed foods and alcopops, for now. On Dec. 16 the Commission published its Biotech Act and Safe Hearts Plan, which landed just days after a long-awaited update of the pharmaceutical legislation. Taken together, they seek to incentivize industries to innovate and do business in Europe, improve access to medicines, and tackle the burden of cardiovascular disease. The pharma industry broadly celebrated the biotech proposal. The Biotech Act “reflects priorities we’ve intensively advocated to keep Europe globally competitive in life sciences,” Ognjenka Manojlovic, head of policy at European pharmaceutical company Sanofi, told POLITICO. That includes accelerating clinical trials, boosting intellectual property, and strengthening financing for Europe’s biotech ecosystem, Manojlovic said. The pharmaceutical sector had pushed for longer monopoly rights in the pharma legislation. In the end they were kept at the current standard eight years — instead of being cut by two years as the European Commission had initially proposed. For Europe’s public health insurers, who pay for drugs, the decisions taken to maintain and then extend market protections for medicines are hard to square. “We are puzzled by the Commission’s intentions,” said Yannis Natsis, director of the European Social Insurance Platform, a network of Europe’s social insurance organizations, warning that taxpayers will have to pick up the bill. Meanwhile, health campaigners are also unhappy at the Commission’s “missed opportunity” to tackle obesity and heart disease with junk food taxes — as proposed in an earlier draft of the Safe Hearts Plan. Samuele Tonello, at consumer organization BEUC, said the Safe Hearts Plan “lacks teeth” to better protect consumers from unhealthy foods, and flagged the “urgency of [cardiovascular diseases].”  A MAN ON A MISSION Health Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi has made no secret of his support for industry, and has championed the Commission’s competitiveness mantra since taking office in late 2024. Health Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi has made no secret of his support for industry, and has championed the Commission’s competitiveness mantra since taking office in late 2024. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images The standout feature of his end-of-year bonanza was the 12-month patent extension in the Biotech Act I — legislation that was split in two late in the day, allowing Várhelyi to meet his end-of-year deadline for the pharma component. The proposal came just a week after the Commission, countries and MEPs clinched a deal to reform Europe’s pharmaceutical laws, in which IP rights were among the last issues to be settled. Updates to the pharma laws were a legacy of the last Commission, whereas the Biotech Act became something of a personal mission for Várhelyi. He repeatedly stressed that there was “no time to lose” in delivering a targeted policy aimed at revitalizing Europe’s flagging biotech industry, which risks being overtaken by competition from China and the U.S. Few commissioners are more vocal than Várhelyi about the premium they place on the competitiveness of European industry.  Industry insiders had heard whispers of his plans to expand IP incentives for the biotech sector, even if Council representatives were dismayed not to have been informed in advance — especially with the ink barely dry on the Pharma Package. That’s not to say pharma is happy with its lot. Industry lobby group the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) tempered its praise of the Biotech Act, lamenting that the extra year of monopoly rights would only apply to a “limited subset of products.”  The extra year of protection is tied to the Commission’s efforts to locate more pharma research and manufacturing in Europe. It would apply only to new products, tested and at least partially made in Europe.  But the generics sector, which makes cheaper, off-patent drugs to compete with branded medicines, sees the Biotech Act as a further sweetening of what is already one of the world’s most generous IP systems. Lobby group Medicines for Europe claims each year of delayed competition for the top three biologic drugs would cost countries €7.7 billion. Longer IP “will have a dramatic impact on healthcare budgets and delayed patients’ access to essential medicines,” said Adrian van den Hoven, head of the lobby. These kinds of estimates would normally be included in an impact assessment published alongside the proposal, but in its haste to get the Biotech Act out the Commission didn’t do one. POLITICO asked the Commission for an estimate of what the extra year of patent protection would cost. A Commission spokesperson would not give a figure but said they had used the impact assessment for the pharma legislation as a reference. “It is also important to stress that the number of products eligible for an additional year of SPC will be limited to only those that are truly innovative and tested and manufactured in the EU. The approach is deliberately targeted to incentivise genuinely innovative therapies that deliver a clear added value for patients and support European innovation,” the spokesperson said. LUCKY ESCAPE FOR UPFS The big food and drink sectors are on shakier ground with Várhelyi. The commissioner has repeatedly made known his distaste for ultra-processed food, and an early leaked version of the Safe Hearts Plan included new taxes on unhealthy highly processed foods and alcopops. But the final proposal showed the Commission had undertaken a significant climbdown. Concrete targets to tax unhealthy food and drink in 2026 were gone, replaced with a much woollier commitment to “work towards” such a levy. Alcopops were excluded altogether.  Industry lobby FoodDrinkEurope took a far more measured tone on the final plan than its explosive reactions to the earlier leaks, but that may well ramp up again if and when health tax proposals emerge. The text suggests the soft drinks industry may be the Commission’s first target if it does decide to pursue new levies, while UPFs remain in Várhelyi’s sights. “In the next couple of years, we will need to tackle the issue of ultra-processed food much more,” he told MEPs in December. For now, though, the plan seems to have let industry off easy. Health NGOs saw it as a disappointment, given its lack of hard-hitting policies to reduce consumption of UPFs and other unhealthy products. While the pharma legislation is all wrapped up, the Biotech Act still needs to win the approval of EU countries and the European Parliament. For the food and pharma sectors, the proposals set out this month are confirmation they have allies in the Berlaymont.

BRUSSELS — When cocoa farmer Leticia Yankey came to Brussels last October, she had a simple message for the EU: Think about the mess your simplification agenda is creating for companies and communities. It was just weeks after the European Commission said it might delay the EU’s anti-deforestation law, which requires companies to prove the goods they import into the region are not produced on deforested land, for the second time. But in Yankey’s Ghana, cocoa farmers were ready for the rules, known as the EU Deforestation Regulation or EUDR, to kick in. “How are we going to be taken serious the next time we move to our communities, our farmers, and even the [Licensed Buying Companies] to tell them that EUDR is … coming back?” Yankey asked.  Since then, the Commission has kept making changes to the plan. First by floating the delay, then backtracking but proposing tweaks to the law — only for EU governments and lawmakers to reinstate the postponement, pile on additional carve-outs and then leave open the door for further changes in the spring. All within three months. It’s not just smaller companies and remote communities that are rankled by the EU’s will-they-won’t-they approach to lawmaking. Bart Vandewaetere, a VP for government relations and ESG engagement at Nestlé, says that when he reports on European legislative developments to the company board, they “[look] a little bit at me like: ‘Okay, what’s next? Will you come next week with something else, or do we need to implement it this way, or we wait?’” Since the start of Ursula von der Leyen’s second term as European Commission President, the EU has been rolling back dozens of rules in a bid to make it easier for businesses to make money and create jobs.   Encouraged by EU leaders to hack back regulations quickly and without fuss, the Commission presented 10 simplification packages last year — on top of its plan to loosen the anti-deforestation law — to water down rules in the agricultural, environment, tech, defense and automotive sectors as well as on access to EU funding. COMPLICATION AGENDA Brussels says it is answering the wishes of business for less paperwork and fewer legislative constraints, which companies claim prevent them from competing with their U.S. and Chinese rivals. It also promises billions in savings as a result. “We will accelerate the work, as a matter of utmost priority, on all proposals with a simplification and competitiveness dimension,” the EU institutions wrote this month in a joint declaration of priorities for the year ahead. The ones who got ready to implement the laws already even go as far as to say the EU is losing one of its key appeals: being a regulatory powerhouse with policies that encourage companies to transition towards more sustainable business models. | Nicolas Economou/NurPhoto via Getty Images But for many businesses, the frequent introduction, pausing and rewriting of EU rules is, just making life more complicated. “What we constantly hear from clients is that regulatory uncertainty makes it difficult to plan ahead,” said Thomas Delille, a partner at global law firm Squire Patton Boggs, even though they generally support the simplification agenda. The ones who got ready to implement the laws already even go as far as to say the EU is losing one of its key appeals: being a regulatory powerhouse with policies that encourage companies to transition towards more sustainable business models. “The European Union unfortunately has lost some trust in the boardrooms by making simplifications that are maybe undermining predictability,” said Nestlé’s Vandewaetere. The risk is that the EU will shoot itself in the foot by making it harder for companies to invest in the region, which is essential for competitiveness.  “This approach rewards the laggards,” said Tsvetelina Kuzmanova, senior project manager as the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, adding that it “lowers expectations at the very moment when companies need clarity and policy stability to invest.” INEVITABLE TURBULENCE Many of Europe’s decision-makers are convinced that undoing business rules is a necessary step in boosting economic growth.  The simplification measures “were needed and they are needed,” said Danish Environment Minister Magnus Heunicke, confirming that he believes the EU regulatory environment is clearer now for businesses than it was a year ago. Denmark, which held the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU for the last six months, had led much of the negotiations on the simplification packages, or “omnibuses” in Brussels parlance. Brussels is also receiving as many calls from businesses to speed up its deregulation drive as those urging caution. For example, European agriculture and food chain lobbies like Copa-Cogeca and FoodDrink Europe said in a joint appeal that the EU should “address the regulatory, administrative, legal, practical and reporting burdens that agri-food operators are facing.” These, they added, are major obstacles to investing in sustainability and productivity. Successive omnibus packages should, meanwhile, be “proposed whenever necessary.” But undoing laws requires as much work and time as drafting them. Over the past year, lawmakers and EU governments have been enthralled in deeply political negotiations over these packages. Entire teams of diplomats, elected officials, assistants, translators and legal experts have been mobilized to argue over technical detail that many were engaged in drafting just a couple of years earlier.   Of the 10 omnibus proposals, three have already been finalized. The EU has also paused the implementation of the rules it’s currently reviewing so that companies don’t have to comply while the process is ongoing. “If you look at this from an industry perspective, there will be some turbulence before there is simplification, it’s inevitable,” said Gerard McElwee, another partner at Squire Patton Boggs.  Ironically, the EU has also faced criticism for making cuts too quickly — particularly to rules on environmental protection — and without properly studying the effect they would have on Europe’s economy and communities. Yankey, the cocoa farmer, said she understands the Commission’s quandary. “They just want to listen to both sides,” she said. “Somebody is ready, somebody is not ready.” But her community will need more EU support to help understand and adapt to legislative tweaks that impact them. The constant changes do not “help us to build confidence in the rules or the game that we are playing,” she said.

BRUSSELS — Lawmakers in the European Parliament have called on the institution to change its travel booking software amid fears their travel plans could be spied on or disrupted by U.S. government interests, in a letter obtained by POLITICO. In a stark sign of growing unease about American tech reliance, 64 lawmakers are pressing President Roberta Metsola to ditch the chamber’s travel-booking provider, Carlson Wagonlit Travel, after it was acquired by American Express Global Business Travel in September. The lawmakers argue that the new U.S. ownership puts lawmakers at risk of foreign snooping, as CWT has access to the “most sensitive information,” including their “passport details, credit card data, travel arrangements and their exact whereabouts at any given moment,” and could put them at the mercy of American sanctions. CWT last month canceled travel bookings for the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Francesca Albanese, who was due to speak at the Parliament in Strasbourg because of U.S. sanctions, according to an internal email seen by POLITICO. “The use of CWT for our travel arrangements exposes MEPs and Parliament staff to the real and present danger of U.S. sanctions, which have already been weaponized against European officials in the past,” the letter warns. “Such measures are not merely theoretical; they are a direct threat to the operational independence and dignity of our institution.” Signatories of the letter include Andreas Schwab from the center-right European People’s Party; Tiemo Wölken, Laura Ballarín Cereza and Aurore Lalucq from the Socialists and Democrats; Helmut Brandstätter, Christophe Grudler, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin and Sandro Gozi from the liberal Renew group; Alexandra Geese and Nela Riehl from the Greens; and Leila Chaibi from The Left. The internal email said the Parliament is working to contract an alternative Belgian travel booking provider it can use for sanctioned individuals. A spokesperson for the Parliament told POLITICO: “A structural solution is in place for such situations, allowing the necessary arrangements to be made without any delay.” “As a matter of policy, and in compliance with applicable law, American Express Global Business Travel does not comment on our clients,” a spokesperson for the company said. Organizations across Europe are growing increasingly wary of the risks of years of reliance on U.S. tech, as the EU also tries to boost its own economic competitiveness. Alarm bells have been ringing about the possibility that the White House could weaponize the EU’s dependence on U.S. technology, in particular through sanctions. In a previous request reported by POLITICO, a cross-party group including several of the same lawmakers urged the European Parliament to phase out U.S. technology — most notably Microsoft — in favor of European alternatives. “In these turbulent times, when even old friends can turn into foes and their companies into a political tool, we cannot afford this level of dependence on foreign tech, let alone continue funneling billions of taxpayers’ money abroad,” that group said last month. The International Criminal Court has moved to replace Microsoft Suite with the German solution OpenDesk amid concerns that a new wave of U.S. sanctions could paralyze the organization’s day-to-day operations. “It is just unacceptable that MEPs could be prevented from fulfilling their parliamentary duties due to a decision by the U.S. administration to sanction them,” centrist lawmaker Anna Stürgkh told Metsola during a session of the Parliament on Monday, pressing Metsola “to make sure that the sovereignty of this house is ensured.” The Parliament’s spokesperson said that the “institution’s services ensure that all IT solutions comply with the EU legal obligations and protect user privacy.” Gerardo Fortuna contributed reporting.

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Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

This article is presented by EFPIA with the support of AbbVie I made a trip back to Europe recently, where I spent the vast majority of my pharmaceutical career, to share my perspectives on competitiveness at the European Health Summit. Now that I work in a role responsible for supporting patient access to medicine globally, I view Europe, and how it compares internationally, through a new lens, and I have been reflecting further on why the choices made today will have such a critical impact on where medicines are developed tomorrow. Today, many patients around the world benefit from medicines built on European science and breakthroughs of the last 20 years. Europeans, like me, can be proud of this contribution. As I look forward, my concern is that we may not be able to make the same claim in the next 20 years. It’s clear that Europe has a choice. Investing in sustainable medicines growth and other enabling policies will, I believe, bring significant benefits. Not doing so risks diminishing global influence. > Today, many patients around the world benefit from medicines built on European > science and breakthroughs of the last 20 years I reflect on three important points: 1) investment in healthcare benefits individuals, healthcare and society, but the scale of this benefit remains underappreciated; 2) connected to this, the underpinning science for future innovation is increasingly happening elsewhere; and 3) this means the choices we make today must address both of these trends. First, let’s use the example of migraine. As I have heard a patient say, “Migraine will not kill you but neither [will they] let you live.”[1] Individuals can face being under a migraine attack for more than half of every month, unable to leave home, maintain a job and engage in society.[2] It is the second biggest cause of disability globally and the first among young women.[3] It affects the quality of life of millions of Europeans.[4] From 2011-21 the economic burden of migraine in Europe due to the loss of working days ranged from €35-557 billion, depending on the country, representing 1-2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).[5]   Overall socioeconomic burden of migraine as percentage of the country’s GDP in 2021 Source: WifOR, The socioeconomic burden of migraine. The case of 6 European Countries.5 Access to effective therapies could radically improve individuals’ lives and their ability to return to work.[6] Yet, despite the staggering economic and personal impacts, in some member states the latest medicines are either not reimbursed or only available after several treatment failures.[7] Imagine if Europe shifted its perspective on these conditions, investing to improve not only health but unlocking the potential for workforce and economic productivity? Moving to my second point, against this backdrop of underinvestment, where are scientific advances now happening in our sector? In recent years it is impressive to see China has become the second-largest drug developer in the world,[8] and within five years it may lead the innovative antibodies therapeutics sector,[9] which is particularly promising for complex areas like oncology. Cancer is projected to become the leading cause of death in Europe by 2035,[10] yet the continent’s share of the number of oncology trials dropped from 41 percent in 2013 to 21 percent in 2023.10 Today, antibody-drug conjugates are bringing new hope in hard-to-treat tumor types,[11] like ovarian,[12] lung[13] and colorectal[14] cancer, and we hope to see more of these advances in the future. Unfortunately, Europe is no longer at the forefront of the development of these innovations. This geographical shift could impact high-quality jobs, the vitality of Europe’s biotech sector and, most importantly, patients’ outcomes. [15] > This is why I encourage choices to be made that clearly signal the value > Europe attaches to medicines This is why I encourage choices to be made that clearly signal the value Europe attaches to medicines. This can be done by removing national cost-containment measures, like clawbacks, that are increasingly eroding the ability of companies to invest in European R&D. To provide a sense of their impact, between 2012 and 2023, clawbacks and price controls reduced manufacturer revenues by over €1.2 billion across five major EU markets, corresponding to a loss of 4.7 percent in countries like Spain.[16] Moreover, we should address health technology assessment approaches in Europe, or mandatory discount policies, which are simply not adequately accounting for the wider societal value of medicines, such as in the migraine example, and promoting a short-term approach to investment. By broadening horizons and choosing a long-term investment strategy for medicines and the life science sector, Europe will not only enable this strategic industry to drive global competitiveness but, more importantly, bring hope to Europeans suffering from health conditions. AbbVie SA/NV – BE-ABBV-250177 (V1.0) – December 2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] The Parliament Magazine, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/unmet-medical-needs-and-migraine-assessing-the-added-value-for-patients-and-society, Last accessed December 2025. [2] The Migraine Trust; https://migrainetrust.org/understand-migraine/types-of-migraine/chronic-migraine/, Last accessed December 2025. [3] Steiner TJ, et al; Lifting The Burden: the Global Campaign against Headache. Migraine remains second among the world’s causes of disability, and first among young women: findings from GBD2019. J Headache Pain. 2020 Dec 2;21(1):137 [4] Coppola G, Brown JD, Mercadante AR, Drakeley S, Sternbach N, Jenkins A, Blakeman KH, Gendolla A. The epidemiology and unmet need of migraine in five european countries: results from the national health and wellness survey. BMC Public Health. 2025 Jan 21;25(1):254. doi: 10.1186/s12889-024-21244-8. [5] WifOR. Calculating the Socioeconomic Burden of Migraine: The Case of 6 European Countries. Available at: [https://www.wifor.com/en/download/the-socioeconomic-burden-of-migraine-the-case-of-6-eu­ropean-countries/?wpdmdl=358249&refresh=687823f915e751752703993]. Accessed June 2025. [6] Seddik AH, Schiener C, Ostwald DA, Schramm S, Huels J, Katsarava Z. Social Impact of Prophylactic Migraine Treatments in Germany: A State-Transition and Open Cohort Approach. Value Health. 2021 Oct;24(10):1446-1453. doi: 10.1016/j.jval.2021.04.1281 [7] Moisset X, Demarquay G, et al., Migraine treatment: Position paper of the French Headache Society. Rev Neurol (Paris). 2024 Dec;180(10):1087-1099. doi: 10.1016/j.neurol.2024.09.008. [8] The Economist, https://www.economist.com/china/2025/11/23/chinese-pharma-is-on-the-cusp-of-going-global, Last accessed December 2025. [9] Crescioli S, Reichert JM. Innovative antibody therapeutic development in China compared with the USA and Europe. Nat Rev Drug Discov. Published online November 7, 2025. [10] Manzano A., Svedman C., Hofmarcher T., Wilking N.. Comparator Report on Cancer in Europe 2025 – Disease Burden, Costs and Access to Medicines and Molecular Diagnostics. EFPIA, 2025. [IHE REPORT 2025:2, page 20] [11] Armstrong GB, Graham H, Cheung A, Montaseri H, Burley GA, Karagiannis SN, Rattray Z. Antibody-drug conjugates as multimodal therapies against hard-to-treat cancers. Adv Drug Deliv Rev. 2025 Sep;224:115648. doi: 10.1016/j.addr.2025.115648. Epub 2025 Jul 11. PMID: 40653109.. [12] Narayana, R.V.L., Gupta, R. Exploring the therapeutic use and outcome of antibody-drug conjugates in ovarian cancer treatment. Oncogene 44, 2343–2356 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41388-025-03448-3 [13] Coleman, N., Yap, T.A., Heymach, J.V. et al. Antibody-drug conjugates in lung cancer: dawn of a new era?. npj Precis. Onc. 7, 5 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41698-022-00338-9 [14] Wang Y, Lu K, Xu Y, Xu S, Chu H, Fang X. Antibody-drug conjugates as immuno-oncology agents in colorectal cancer: targets, payloads, and therapeutic synergies. Front Immunol. 2025 Nov 3;16:1678907. doi: 10.3389/fimmu.2025.1678907. PMID: 41256852; PMCID: PMC12620403. [15] EFPIA, Improving EU Clinical Trials: Proposals to Overcome Current Challenges and Strengthen the Ecosystem, efpias-list-of-proposals-clinical-trials-15-apr-2025.pdf, Last accessed December 2025. [16] The EU General Pharmaceutical Legislation & Clawbacks, © Vital Transformation BVBA, 2024.

BRUSSELS — European banks and other finance firms should decrease their reliance on American tech companies for digital services, a top national supervisor has said. In an interview with POLITICO, Steven Maijoor, the Dutch central bank’s chair of supervision, said the “small number of suppliers” providing digital services to many European finance companies can pose a “concentration risk.” “If one of those suppliers is not able to supply, you can have major operational problems,” Maijoor said. The intervention comes as Europe’s politicians and industries grapple with the continent’s near-total dependence on U.S. technology for digital services ranging from cloud computing to software. The dominance of American companies has come into sharp focus following a decline in transatlantic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump. While the market for European tech services isn’t nearly as developed as in the U.S. — making it difficult for banks to switch — the continent “should start to try to develop this European environment” for financial stability and the sake of its economic success, Maijoor said. European banks being locked in to contracts with U.S. providers “will ultimately also affect their competitiveness,” Maijoor said. Dutch supervisors recently authored a report on the systemic risks posed by tech dependence in finance. Dutch lender Amsterdam Trade Bank collapsed in 2023 after its parent company was placed on the U.S. sanctions list and its American IT provider withdrew online data storage services, in one of the sharpest examples of the impact on companies that see their tech withdrawn. Similarly a 2024 outage of American cybersecurity company CrowdStrike highlighted the European finance sector’s vulnerabilities to operational risks from tech providers, the EU’s banking watchdog said in a post-mortem on the outage. In his intervention, Maijoor pointed to an EU law governing the operational reliability of banks — the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) — as one factor that may be worsening the problem. Those rules govern finance firms’ outsourcing of IT functions such as cloud provision, and designate a list of “critical” tech service providers subject to extra oversight, including Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft and Oracle. DORA, and other EU financial regulation, may be “inadvertently nudging financial institutions towards the largest digital service suppliers,” which wouldn’t be European, Maijoor said. “If you simply look at quality, reliability, security … there’s a very big chance that you will end up with the largest digital service suppliers from outside Europe,” he said. The bloc could reassess the regulatory approach to beat the risks, Maijoor said. “DORA currently is an oversight approach, which is not as strong in terms of requirements and enforcement options as regular supervision,” he said. The Dutch supervisors are pushing for changes, writing that they are examining whether financial regulation and supervision in the EU creates barriers to choosing European IT providers, and that identified issues “may prompt policy initiatives in the European context.” They are asking EU governments and supervisors “to evaluate whether DORA sufficiently enhances resilience to geopolitical risks and, if not, to consider issuing further guidance,” adding they “see opportunities to strengthen DORA as needed,” including through more enforcement and more explicit requirements around managing geopolitical risks. Europe could also set up a cloud watchdog across industries to mitigate the risks of dependence on U.S. tech service providers, which are “also very important for other parts of the economy like energy and telecoms,” Maijoor said. “Wouldn’t there be a case for supervision more generally of these hyperscalers, cloud service providers, as they are so important for major parts of the economy?” The European Commission declined to respond.

The Radio Spectrum Policy Group’s (RSPG) Nov. 12 opinion on the upper 6-GHz band is framed as a long-term strategic vision for Europe’s digital future. But its practical effect is far less ambitious: it grants mobile operators a cost-free reservation of one of Europe’s most valuable spectrum resources, without deployment obligations, market evidence or a realistic plan for implementation. > At a moment when Europe is struggling to accelerate the deployment of digital > infrastructure and close the gap with global competitors, this decision > amounts to a strategic pause dressed up as policy foresight. The opinion even invites the mobile industry to develop products for the upper 6-GHz band, when policy should be guided by actual market demand and product deployment, not the other way around. At a moment when Europe is struggling to accelerate the deployment of digital infrastructure and close the gap with global competitors, this decision amounts to a strategic pause dressed up as policy foresight. The cost of inaction is real. Around the world, advanced 6-GHz Wi-Fi is already delivering high-capacity, low-latency connectivity. The United States, Canada, South Korea and others have opened the 6-GHz band for telemedicine, automated manufacturing, immersive education, robotics and a multitude of other high-performance Wi-Fi connectivity use cases. These are not experimental concepts; they are operational deployments generating tangible socioeconomic value. Holding the upper 6- GHz band in reserve delays these benefits at a time when Europe is seeking to strengthen competitiveness, digital inclusion, and digital sovereignty. The opinion introduces another challenge by calling for “flexibility” for member states. In practice, this means regulatory fragmentation across 27 markets, reopening the door to divergent national spectrum policies — precisely the outcome Europe has spent two decades trying to avert with the Digital Single Market. > Without a credible roadmap, reserving the band for hypothetical cellular > networks only exacerbates policy uncertainty without delivering progress. Equally significant is what the opinion does not address. The upper 6-GHz band is already home to ‘incumbents’: fixed links and satellite services that support public safety, government operations and industrial connectivity. Any meaningful mobile deployment would require refarming these incumbents — a technically complex, politically sensitive and financially burdensome process. To date, no member state has proposed a viable plan for how such relocation would proceed, how much it would cost or who would pay. Without a credible roadmap, reserving the band for hypothetical cellular networks only exacerbates policy uncertainty without delivering progress. There is, however, a pragmatic alternative. The European Commission and the member states committed to advancing Europe’s connectivity can allow controlled Wi-Fi access to the upper 6-GHz band now — bringing immediate benefits for citizens and enterprises — while establishing clear, evidence-based criteria for any future cellular deployments. Those criteria should include demonstrated commercial viability, validated coexistence with incumbents, and fully funded relocation plans where necessary. This approach preserves long-term policy flexibility for member states and mobile operators, while ensuring that spectrum delivers measurable value today rather than being held indefinitely in reserve. > Spectrum is not an abstract asset. RSPG itself calls it a scarce resource that > must be used efficiently, but this opinion falls short of that principle. Spectrum is not an abstract asset. RSPG itself calls it a scarce resource that must be used efficiently, but this opinion falls short of that principle. Spectrum underpins Europe’s competitiveness, connectivity, and digital innovation. But its value is unlocked through use, not by shelving it in anticipation that hypothetical future markets might someday justify withholding action now. To remain competitive in the next decade, Europe needs a 6-GHz policy grounded in evidence, aligned with the single market, and focused on real-world impact. The upper 6-GHz band should be a driver of European innovation, not the latest casualty of strategic hesitation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Wi-Fi Alliance * The ultimate controlling entity is Wi-Fi Alliance More information here.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.