Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney publicly backed Kevin Warsh as the next chair of the Federal Reserve on Friday, calling him a “fantastic choice,” in a rare point of alignment amid an escalating U.S.-Canada trade war. “Kevin Warsh is a fantastic choice to lead the world’s most important central bank at this crucial time,” Carney wrote on X shortly after President Donald Trump announced he will nominate the former Fed board member to replace current chair, Jerome Powell. Carney is an experienced central banker himself. He oversaw the Bank of Canada from 2008-2013, briefly overlapping with Warsh’s first tenure as a Fed governor, before leading the Bank of England from 2013-2020. The endorsement stood out as relations between the Trump administration and Canada continue to strain, with Canadian officials warning that Trump’s trade agenda and broader foreign policy are destabilizing both the U.S. and Canadian economies. On Saturday, Trump threatened to impose a 100 percent tariff on Canada if it follows through on a planned trade deal with China. In his latest threat Thursday, he said he would impose a 50 percent tariff on Canadian-made aircrafts after a dispute over aviation certification. “Canada is effectively prohibiting the sale of Gulfstream products in Canada through this very same certification process,” the president wrote on Truth Social. “If, for any reason, this situation is not immediately corrected, I am going to charge Canada a 50% Tariff on any and all Aircraft sold into the United States of America.” Earlier this week, the Bank of Canada said U.S. tariffs are expected to have a “lasting negative impact” on Canada’s economy, citing prolonged uncertainty tied to Trump’s trade policies. “It’s pretty clear that the days of open rules-based trade with the United States are over,” Bank of Canada Gov. Tiff Macklem said. “It’s not a good thing for Americans. It’s not a good thing for Canadians.” In an interview with Reuters on Wednesday, Macklem said Trump’s actions could derail the central bank’s economic forecasts, pointing to Trump’s repeated tariff threats against Canada and other actions abroad, including repeat pressure on Greenland and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. “There is unusual potential for a new shock, a new disruption,” he said. “Geopolitical risks are elevated.” Macklem also voiced his support for Powell, telling Reuters that he told Powell in a private conversation that he was “doing a good job under difficult circumstances.” Several global central bank leaders, including Macklem, issued a joint statement earlier this month in support of Powell and the Federal Reserve after the Department of Justice launched a criminal investigation into the Fed chair. They warned that political pressure on central banks could undermine global financial stability. “We stand in full solidarity with the Federal Reserve System and its Chair Jerome H. Powell,” the statement said. “Chair Powell has served with integrity, focused on his mandate and an unwavering commitment to the public interest. To us, he is a respected colleague who is held in the highest regard by all who have worked with him.”

BRUSSELS — Only a few days ago, EU diplomats and officials were whispering furtively about the idea they might one day need to think about how to push back against Donald Trump. They’re not whispering anymore.  Trump’s attempt, as EU leaders saw it, to “blackmail” them with the threat of tariffs into letting him take the sovereign Danish island of Greenland provoked a howl of outrage — and changed the world.  Previous emergency summits in Brussels focused on existential risks to the European Union, like the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the coronavirus pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This week, the EU’s 27 leaders cleared their diaries to discuss the assault they faced from America.  There can be little doubt that the transatlantic alliance has now been fundamentally transformed from a solid foundation for international law and order into a far looser arrangement in which neither side can be sure of the other.  “Trust was always the foundation for our relations with the United States,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk as he arrived for the summit in Brussels on Thursday night. “We respected and accepted American leadership. But what we need today in our politics is trust and respect among all partners here, not domination and for sure not coercion. It doesn’t work in our world.”  The catalyst for the rupture in transatlantic relations was the U.S. president’s announcement on Saturday that he would hit eight European countries with tariffs of 10 percent for opposing his demand to annex Greenland.  That was just the start. In an avalanche of pressure, he then canceled his support for the U.K. premier’s decision to hand over the Chagos Islands, home to an important air base, to Mauritius; threatened France with tariffs on Champagne after Macron snubbed his Board of Peace initiative; slapped down the Norwegian prime minister over a Nobel Peace Prize; and ultimately dropped his threats both to take Greenland by military force and to hit countries that oppose him with tariffs.  Here was a leader, it seemed to many watching EU officials, so wild and unpredictable that he couldn’t even remain true to his own words.  But what dismayed the professional political class in Brussels and beyond was more mundane: Trump’s decision to leak the private text messages he’d received directly from other world leaders by publishing them to his 11.6 million followers on social media.  Trump’s screenshots of his phone revealed French President Emmanuel Macron offering to host a G7 meeting in Paris, and to invite the Russians in the sidelines. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who once called Trump “daddy,” also found his private text to Trump made public, in which he praised the president’s “incredible” achievements, adding: “Can’t wait to see you.”  Leaking private messages “is not acceptable — you just don’t do it,” said one senior diplomat, like others, on condition of anonymity because the matter is sensitive. “It’s so important. After this, no one can trust him. If you were any leader you wouldn’t tell him anything. And this is a crucial means of communication because it is quick and direct. Now everything will go through layers of bureaucracy.”  Mark Carney had been one of the classic Davos set and was a regular attendee: suave, a little smug, and seeming entirely comfortable among snow-covered peaks and even loftier clientele. | Gian Ehrenzeller/EPA The value of direct contact through phone texts is well known to the leaders of Europe, who, as POLITICO revealed, have even set up their own private group chat to discuss how to respond when Trump does something inflammatory. Such messages enable ministers and officials at all levels to coordinate solutions before public statements have to be made, the same senior diplomat said. “If you don’t have trust, you can’t work together anymore.”  NO MORE NATO Diplomats and officials now fear the breakdown in personal trust between European leaders and Trump has potentially grave ramifications.  Take NATO. The military alliance is, at its core, a promise: that member countries will back each other up and rally to their defense if one of them comes under attack. Once that promise looks less than solid, the power of NATO to deter attacks is severely undermined. That’s why Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned that if Trump invaded the sovereign Danish territory of Greenland it would be the end of NATO.  The fact he threatened to do so has already put the alliance into intensive care, another diplomat said.  Asked directly if she could still trust the U.S. as she arrived at the Brussels summit, Frederiksen declined to say yes. “We have been working very closely with the United States for many years,” she replied. “But we have to work together respectfully, without threatening each other.”  European leaders now face two tasks: To bring the focus back to the short-term priorities of peace in Ukraine and resolving tensions over Greenland; and then to turn their attention to mapping out a strategy for navigating a very different world. The question of trust, again, underpins both.  When it comes to Ukraine, European leaders like Macron, Germany’s Friedrich Merz and the U.K.’s Keir Starmer have spent endless hours trying to persuade Trump and his team that providing Kyiv with an American military element underpinning security guarantees is the only way to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin from attacking again in future.  Given how unreliable Trump has been as an ally to Europe, officials are now privately asking what those guarantees are really worth. Why would Russia take America’s word seriously? Why not, in a year or two, test it to make sure?  THE POST-DAVOS WORLD Then there’s the realignment of the entire international system.  There was something ironic about the setting for Trump’s assaults on the established world order, and about the identities of those who found themselves the harbingers of its end.  Among the snow-covered slopes of the Swiss resort of Davos, the world’s business and political elite gather each year to polish their networks, promote their products, brag about their successes, and party hard. The super rich, and the occasional president, generally arrive by helicopter.  As a central bank governor, Mark Carney had been one of the classic Davos set and was a regular attendee: suave, a little smug, and seeming entirely comfortable among snow-covered peaks and even loftier clientele.  Now prime minister of Canada, this sage of the centrist liberal orthodoxy had a shocking insight to share with his tribe: “Today,” Carney began this week, “I’ll talk about the rupture in the world order, the end of a nice story, and the beginning of a brutal reality where geopolitics among the great powers is not subject to any constraints.”  “The rules-based order is fading,” he intoned, to be replaced by a world of “great power rivalry” in which “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”  “The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy.”  Carney impressed those European officials watching. He even quoted Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who has enjoyed outsized influence in recent months due to the connections he forged with Trump on the golf course.  NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who once called Donald Trump “daddy,” also found his private text to Donald Trump made public, in which he praised the president’s “incredible” achievements, adding: “Can’t wait to see you.” |  Jim lo Scalzo/EPA Ultimately, Carney had a message for what he termed “middle powers” — countries like Canada. They could, he argued, retreat into isolation, building up their defenses against a hard and lawless world. Or they could build something “better, stronger and more just” by working together, and diversifying their alliances. Canada, another target of Trump’s territorial ambitions, has just signed a major partnership agreement with China. As they prepared for the summit in Brussels, European diplomats and officials contemplated the same questions. One official framed the new reality as the “post-Davos” world. “Now that the trust has gone, it’s not coming back,” another diplomat said. “I feel the world has changed fundamentally.”  A GOOD CRISIS It will be up to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her team to devise ways to push the continent toward greater self-sufficiency, a state that Macron has called “strategic autonomy,” the diplomat said. This should cover energy, where the EU has now become reliant on imports of American gas.  The most urgent task is to reimagine a future for European defense that does not rely on NATO, the diplomat said. Already, there are many ideas in the air. These include a European Security Council, which would have the nuclear-armed non-EU U.K. as a member. Urgent efforts will be needed to create a drone industry and to boost air defenses.  The European Commission has already proposed a 100,000-strong standing EU army, so why not an elite special forces division as well? The Commission’s officials are world experts at designing common standards for manufacturing, which leaves them well suited to the task of integrating the patchwork of weapons systems used by EU countries, the same diplomat said.  Yet there is also a risk. Some officials fear that with Trump’s having backed down and a solution to the Greenland crisis now apparently much closer, EU leaders will lose the focus and clarity about the need for change they gained this past week. In a phrase often attributed to Churchill, the risk is that EU countries will “let a good crisis go to waste.”  Domestic political considerations will inevitably make it harder for national governments to commit funding to shared EU defense projects. As hard-right populism grows in major regional economies, like France, the U.K. and Germany, making the case for “more Europe” is harder than ever for the likes of Macron, Starmer and Merz. Even if NATO is in trouble, selling a European army will be tough.  While these leaders know they can no longer trust Trump’s America with Europe’s security, many of them lack the trust of their own voters to do what might be required instead. 

Reform UK leader Nigel Farage said he doesn’t like banks and will scrap interest payments British lenders receive through the Bank of England’s quantitative easing program.  The Reform Party included the proposal to end the practice of the U.K. central bank paying interest on the reserves placed with it by banks in its 2024 manifesto, which it claimed would bring in up to £40 billion for taxpayers.  “We are going to do it. Some of the banks won’t like it. Well, I don’t like the banks very much because they debanked me, didn’t they?” Farage said in an interview with Bloomberg at the World Economic Forum in Davos.  “This will be tough for banks to accept, but I am sorry, the drain on public finances is just too great. It’s not a tax. They are just not going to get free money anymore. They’ll adjust; business always does.” The BoE currently pays interest on the bank reserves created during the post-global financial crisis quantitative easing (QE) program. That money is now largely held on deposit back at the BoE by commercial banks, which earn a risk-free return linked to the current Bank Rate. Amid concerns about what a Reform government would mean for policymakers’ independence, Farage declared that he’s “not questioning the independence” of the central bank, but didn’t rule out appointing his own governor.  “Andrew Bailey is a perfectly polite, nice man, but they should have picked somebody who was a Brexiteer to be in charge of the Bank of England to think totally differently, especially around financial markets, financial market regulation,” he said.  “If we don’t do things differently, we’re going to get poorer. We’re going to pick different people with a different attitude towards everything.”  Farage has recently claimed he is giving “serious thought” to scrapping the independent Office for Budget Responsibility if his party wins the next general election.

Donald Trump will be the major draw at this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, even as the U.S. president’s policies continue to undermine the spirit of global cooperation the elite gathering has championed in the past. “We’re pleased to welcome back President Trump to Davos, and he’s bringing the largest U.S. delegation ever,” WEF chief executive Børge Brende said at a press conference Tuesday. The U.S. president will bring “five secretaries and also other key players,” including a bipartisan delegation from the U.S. Congress, Brende said. The World Economic Forum, which takes place next week in the Alpine ski resort, comes as the world hangs on Trump’s words. Since the start of the month, Trump has captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, threatened to invade Greenland, hinted he could take action in Iran over violent crackdowns on protesters, announced a temporary cap on credit card interest rates that has stoked fears of a credit crunch, and opened a criminal investigation into Jerome Powell, chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Brende said the meeting will take place “against the most complex geopolitical backdrop since 1945.” According to the WEF, Trump will be joined by Canadian PM Mark Carney, China’s Vice-Premier He Lifeng, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and leaders from Israel and Palestine. From Europe, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will attend along with leaders from Germany, Spain, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Serbia. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte will also join. The informal grouping of countries supporting Ukraine, known as the “coalition of the willing,” are expected to meet with Trump and Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the WEF to seek U.S. backing for security guarantees for Ukraine, the Financial Times reported. Business leaders, including the head of AI giant Nvidia Jensen Huang and top executives from Microsoft, Meta, Palantir, Anthropic and OpenAI, will join senior leaders from JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, BlackRock and other major finance players in Davos. International organizations, which have seen their standing and funding rocked by Trump’s administration — including last week’s U.S. withdrawal from dozens of international organizations and the world’s overarching climate change treaty — will also attend. The heads of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development will take part. Celebrities and artists including David Beckham, Yo-Yo Ma, Marina Abramović, Matt Damon and will.i.am will also attend. The theme of the gathering will be “A Spirit of Dialogue.” “We do hope that a spirit of dialogue can also lead to areas where the leaders can find overlaps in interests,” Brende said.

Global central banks rallied behind Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell on Tuesday, pushing back against a perceived political attack on the independence of the world’s most important financial institution. “We stand in full solidarity with the Federal Reserve System and its Chair Jerome H. Powell,” the officials said in a joint statement. “The independence of central banks is a cornerstone of price, financial and economic stability in the interest of the citizens that we serve. It is therefore critical to preserve that independence, with full respect for the rule of law and democratic accountability.” The statement was signed by European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde on behalf of the ECB’s Governing Council, by Bank of England Governor Andrew Bailey as well as the heads of the Swiss, Swedish, Danish, Australian, Canadian, South Korean and Brazilian central banks. Pablo Hernández de Cos, general manager of the Bank for International Settlements and François Villeroy de Galhau, chair of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, also signed the statement. Over the weekend, Powell disclosed that the Fed had been served with grand jury subpoenas by the Department of Justice, raising the threat of a criminal indictment tied to his congressional testimony on the ongoing renovation of the Fed’s Washington headquarters. In what amounted to a dramatic escalation in the standoff between the White House and the central bank, Powell used an unusually direct video message to argue that the legal action is politically motivated and part of a campaign of “intimidation,” designed to push the Fed into cutting interest rates more aggressively. “The threat of criminal charges is a consequence of the Federal Reserve setting interest rates based on our best assessment of what will serve the public, rather than following the preferences of the president,” Powell said in language rare in its starkness for a serving Fed chair. Trump, a longtime critic who has piled personal insults on Powell since his reelection both through ad hoc comments and through his social media feed, denied any role in the investigation. Speaking to NBC News on Sunday, Trump said he was unaware of the probe but added that Powell is “certainly not very good at the Fed, and he’s not very good at building buildings.” The joint statement on Tuesday took a different view. “Chair Powell has served with integrity, focused on his mandate and an unwavering commitment to the public interest,” it said. “To us, he is a respected colleague who is held in the highest regard by all who have worked with him.” Expressions of support for Powell from around the world had already begun on Monday, with Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel telling POLITICO that: “The independence of central banks is a prerequisite for price stability and a great public good. Against this background, the recent developments in the U.S. regarding the Fed chairman are cause for concern.” Bank of France Governor Villeroy de Galhau, meanwhile, had told a  new year event at the ACPR regulator that Powell was “a model of integrity and commitment to the public interest.” POLITICO reported on Monday that the decision to subpoena the Fed had also raised concern among various White House officials, who are concerned that it may trigger volatility in financial markets and complicate efforts to keep the economy on track in an election year. Senior Republican Party lawmakers have also spoken out against the move.

BRUSSELS — Diplomats are working on a long-shot 11th-hour compromise to salvage a deal on sending vital financial aid to Ukraine at Thursday’s high-stakes EU leaders’ summit. On Wednesday evening Europe’s leaders were split into irreconcilable camps, at least publicly, and seemed unlikely to agree on how to fund Kyiv, thanks partly to the reemergence of the same bitter north-south divisions over joint debt that torpedoed EU unity during the eurozone crisis. Only a few hours before the 27 leaders gather in Brussels, two opposing groups are crossing swords over whether to issue a loan to Ukraine based on frozen Russian central bank reserves, largely held by the Euroclear bank in Belgium. Germany along with Nordic and Eastern European countries say there is no alternative to that scheme. But they are running into hardening resistance from Belgium and Italy, which are gunning for Plan B: Support for Kyiv based on EU debt guaranteed by the bloc’s common budget. Bulgaria, Malta, Hungary and Slovakia are also against the use of the assets. In a stark illustration of the schism, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said on Wednesday she would use the Council meeting to demand answers on the “possible risks” of leveraging the assets, while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz doubled down on the assets plan “to help end this war as quickly as possible.” ESCAPE PLAN The first contours of a potential route out of the impasse — one that would have to be hashed out during hours of negotiations — are beginning to take shape. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen cautiously opened the door to joint debt on Wednesday morning during a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. “I proposed two different options for this upcoming European Council, one based on assets and one based on EU borrowing. And we will have to decide which way we want to take,” she said. The key to such a plan would be carving Hungary and Slovakia — which both oppose giving further aid to Ukraine — out of the joint debt scheme, four EU diplomats told POLITICO. A deal could still be agreed at the Council among the 27 EU countries, but the ultimate arrangement would stipulate that only 25 would be involved in the funding. Agreeing such a scheme would give a crucial lifeline to Ukraine’s shattered public finances as its coffers risk running dry as early as next April. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is already predicting the assets will not be discussed in Brussels, and that negotiations have shifted to joint loans. Multiple diplomats, however, retorted that Orbán was wrong and that the Russian assets were still “the only game in town.” CRUNCH TIME Despite growing political pressure on the EU to prove it can rise to meet the existential challenges facing Ukraine, diplomats from the rival camps were often skeptical on Wednesday that a compromise could be found. The idea of EU joint debt has for years been anathema to the northern member countries, who have been unwilling to underwrite bonds for highly indebted southern countries. “The closest [situations] to what’s happening now with frozen assets are the 2012-2013 financial crisis and Greece’s bailout in 2015,” said a senior EU diplomat who, like others quoted in this story, was granted anonymity to speak freely. With respect to the Ukraine war, the northerners deny they oppose the use of eurobonds over concerns about the solvency of other EU countries, but argue they prefer the assets because they would provide a greater long-term cash infusion to Ukraine. “This is not about frugals versus spenders. It’s about being pro-Ukraine or not,” said a second EU diplomat, adding that northern and eastern European countries have taken the lead in bankrolling Ukraine’s war needs over the past four years. BACKING THE BELGIANS Despite weeks of painstaking negotiations over the assets, efforts to bring Belgium around are backfiring. The country adamantly opposes using the Russian money held by Euroclear in Brussels, and has now attracted allies. “[The Commission] created a monster, and they’ve been eaten by it,” said a third EU diplomat, referring to the assets plan. Germany and its allies, however, warn there is still no alternative to targeting the Euroclear money. “If you want to do something together as Europeans, the reparations loan is the only way,” a fourth EU diplomat said. The idea behind the assets-based loan is that Kyiv would not have to repay it unless Moscow coughs up the billions-worth of reparations needed to rebuild Ukraine’s pulverized cities — an unlikely scenario. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever is expected to push the Commission to explore joint debt during Thursday’s summit of EU leaders — in the hope that others around the table will echo his demands. His supporters claim the model “is cheaper and offers more clarity,” said a fifth EU diplomat. But critics point out it will also require the political blessing of Hungary’s pro-Russia Prime Minister Orbán — who has repeatedly threatened to torpedo further financial aid to Kyiv. The impasse would require the Commission to concoct a workaround to keep Ukraine afloat while allowing Orbán to save face, according to the four EU diplomats. In exchange for his support the Commission could spare Hungarian and Slovak taxpayers from having to pay for Ukraine’s defense.   “The Commission now pushes joint loans, but we will not let our families foot the bill for Ukraine’s war,” Orbán wrote on X on Wednesday afternoon. He added that “Russian assets will not be on the table at tomorrow’s EUCO [European Council].” However, a senior EU official was quick to reject the Hungarian leader’s claim that the Russian reserves were no longer in play. “The reparations loan is still very much on the table,” they said. Bjarke Smith-Meyer, Gabriel Gavin and Gerardo Fortuna contributed to this report

BRUSSELS ― Two legal opinions prepared by international lawyers contradict Belgium’s claim it could be on the hook to pay substantial damages if the EU moves ahead with plans to use Russia’s frozen assets to help Ukraine. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has said his country could be found liable for using the assets, arguing in a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that the risk of successful legal retaliation by Moscow is “very real.” Russia has since ramped up those fears, with the central bank filing a lawsuit in Moscow against Brussels-based financial depository Euroclear — where most of Russia’s frozen assets in Europe are held — over the freezing of funds and securities. But according to two legal opinions — one prepared by law firm Covington & Burling, another by a group of international legal scholars — assert that the risk of a successful legal claim against Belgium over the assets is minimal.  The main reason cited by the scholars is that Russia would find it nearly impossible to find a jurisdiction that would be willing to hear a case against Belgium or enforce any claim against the Belgian government or Euroclear over the assets. “Any judgment of a Russian court would not be recognized or enforced in the EU or the U.K. on public policy grounds,” six legal scholars wrote in a paper, adding that the Russian central bank is unlikely to bring claims in either U.K. or EU jurisdictions because doing so would waive its sovereign immunity. A claim brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union, the International Court of Justice or any comparable international institution would prove similarly problematic largely because Russia does not accept their jurisdiction, argue the authors of a paper by Covington & Burling.  In his letter to von der Leyen, De Wever raised the fact that Belgium has a bilateral investment treaty with Russia that exposes Brussels to legal risk in the event of a dispute. The letter cites specialized law firms but does not name them. The authors of both legal opinions assert that Russia would not be able to pursue its claim against Belgium or the EU via such a treaty due to the fact that the treaty does not cover sovereign assets. “A Tribunal constituted pursuant to such a treaty would lack jurisdiction to hear a dispute relating to alleged expropriation of Russia’s sovereign assets,” wrote Covington & Burling. The legal scholars — who are linked among other institutions to Stanford University, the Kyiv School of Economics and German law firm Bender Harrer Krevet, among others — conclude that Belgium has already weathered the most serious risk when the assets were frozen in the first place and when the EU voted to immobilize them indefinitely. “No material new risks will be created by adopting the full Reparations Loan plan and any such negligible risks are materially outweighed by the proposal’s benefits for European peace, security, stability, and the long-term viability of Ukraine,” write the scholars. The Belgian government did not respond to POLITICO’s request for comment.

Russia’s central bank on Friday filed a lawsuit in Moscow against Brussels-based Euroclear, which houses most of the frozen Russian assets that the EU wants to use to finance aid to Ukraine. The court filing comes just days before a high-stakes European Council summit, where EU leaders are expected to press Belgium to unlock billions of euros in Russian assets to underpin a major loan package for Kyiv.   “Due to the unlawful actions of the Euroclear depository that are causing losses to the Bank of Russia, and in light of mechanisms officially under consideration by the European Commission for the direct or indirect use of the Bank of Russia’s assets without its consent, the Bank of Russia is filing a claim in the Moscow Arbitration Court against the Euroclear depository to recover the losses incurred,” the central bank said in a statement. Belgium has opposed the use of sovereign Russian assets over concerns that the country may eventually be required to pay the money back to Moscow on its own. Some €185 billion in frozen Russian assets are under the stewardship of Euroclear, the Brussels-based financial depository, while another €25 billion is scattered across the EU in private bank accounts. With the future of the prospective loan still hanging in the air, EU ambassadors on Thursday handed emergency powers to the European Commission to keep Russian state assets permanently frozen. Such a solution would mean the assets remain blocked until the Kremlin pays post-war reparations to Ukraine, significantly reducing the possibility that pro-Russian countries like Hungary or Slovakia would hand back the frozen funds to Russia. While Russian courts have little power to force the handover of Euroclear’s euro or dollar assets held in Belgium, they do have the power to take retaliatory action against Euroclear balances held in Russian financial institutions. However, in 2024 the European Commission introduced a legal mechanism to compensate Euroclear for losses incurred in Russia due to its compliance with Western sanctions — effectively neutralizing the economic effects of Russia’s retaliation. Euroclear declined to comment.

BRUSSELS — European banks and other finance firms should decrease their reliance on American tech companies for digital services, a top national supervisor has said. In an interview with POLITICO, Steven Maijoor, the Dutch central bank’s chair of supervision, said the “small number of suppliers” providing digital services to many European finance companies can pose a “concentration risk.” “If one of those suppliers is not able to supply, you can have major operational problems,” Maijoor said. The intervention comes as Europe’s politicians and industries grapple with the continent’s near-total dependence on U.S. technology for digital services ranging from cloud computing to software. The dominance of American companies has come into sharp focus following a decline in transatlantic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump. While the market for European tech services isn’t nearly as developed as in the U.S. — making it difficult for banks to switch — the continent “should start to try to develop this European environment” for financial stability and the sake of its economic success, Maijoor said. European banks being locked in to contracts with U.S. providers “will ultimately also affect their competitiveness,” Maijoor said. Dutch supervisors recently authored a report on the systemic risks posed by tech dependence in finance. Dutch lender Amsterdam Trade Bank collapsed in 2023 after its parent company was placed on the U.S. sanctions list and its American IT provider withdrew online data storage services, in one of the sharpest examples of the impact on companies that see their tech withdrawn. Similarly a 2024 outage of American cybersecurity company CrowdStrike highlighted the European finance sector’s vulnerabilities to operational risks from tech providers, the EU’s banking watchdog said in a post-mortem on the outage. In his intervention, Maijoor pointed to an EU law governing the operational reliability of banks — the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) — as one factor that may be worsening the problem. Those rules govern finance firms’ outsourcing of IT functions such as cloud provision, and designate a list of “critical” tech service providers subject to extra oversight, including Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft and Oracle. DORA, and other EU financial regulation, may be “inadvertently nudging financial institutions towards the largest digital service suppliers,” which wouldn’t be European, Maijoor said. “If you simply look at quality, reliability, security … there’s a very big chance that you will end up with the largest digital service suppliers from outside Europe,” he said. The bloc could reassess the regulatory approach to beat the risks, Maijoor said. “DORA currently is an oversight approach, which is not as strong in terms of requirements and enforcement options as regular supervision,” he said. The Dutch supervisors are pushing for changes, writing that they are examining whether financial regulation and supervision in the EU creates barriers to choosing European IT providers, and that identified issues “may prompt policy initiatives in the European context.” They are asking EU governments and supervisors “to evaluate whether DORA sufficiently enhances resilience to geopolitical risks and, if not, to consider issuing further guidance,” adding they “see opportunities to strengthen DORA as needed,” including through more enforcement and more explicit requirements around managing geopolitical risks. Europe could also set up a cloud watchdog across industries to mitigate the risks of dependence on U.S. tech service providers, which are “also very important for other parts of the economy like energy and telecoms,” Maijoor said. “Wouldn’t there be a case for supervision more generally of these hyperscalers, cloud service providers, as they are so important for major parts of the economy?” The European Commission declined to respond.

The discussion surrounding the digital euro is strategically important to Europe. On Dec. 12, the EU finance ministers are aiming to agree on a general approach regarding the dossier. This sets out the European Council’s official position and thus represents a major political milestone for the European Council ahead of the trilogue negotiations. We want to be sure that, in this process, the project will be subject to critical analysis that is objective and nuanced and takes account of the long-term interests of Europe and its people. > We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question > but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can > be seized. We regard the following points as particularly important: * maintaining European sovereignty at the customer interface; * avoiding a parallel infrastructure that inhibits innovation; and * safeguarding the stability of the financial markets by imposing clear holding limits. We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can be seized and, at the same time, risks can be avoided. Opportunities of the digital euro:  1. European resilience and sovereignty in payments processing: as a public-sector means of payment that is accepted across Europe, the digital euro can reduce reliance on non-European card systems and big-tech wallets, provided that a firmly European design is adopted and it is embedded in the existing structures of banks and savings banks and can thus be directly linked to customers’ existing accounts. 2. Supplement to cash and private-sector digital payments: as a central bank digital currency, the digital euro can offer an additional, state-backed payment option, especially when it is held in a digital wallet and can also be used for e-commerce use cases (a compromise proposed by the European Parliament’s main rapporteur for the digital euro, Fernando Navarrete). This would further strengthen people’s freedom of choice in the payment sphere. 3. Catalyst for innovation in the European market: if integrated into banking apps and designed in accordance with the compromises proposed by Navarrete (see point 2), the digital euro can promote innovation in retail payments, support new European payment ecosystems, and simplify cross-border payments. > The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital > euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. Risks of the current configuration: 1. Risk of creating a gateway for US providers: in the configuration currently planned, the digital euro provides US and other non-European tech and payment companies with access to the customer interface, customer data and payment infrastructure without any of the regulatory obligations and costs that only European providers face. This goes against the objective of digital sovereignty. 2. State parallel infrastructures weaken the market and innovation: the European Central Bank (ECB) is planning not just two new sets of infrastructure but also its own product for end customers (through an app). An administrative body has neither the market experience nor the customer access that banks and payment providers do. At the same time, the ECB is removing the tried-and-tested allocation of roles between the central bank and private sector. Furthermore, the Eurosystem’s digital euro project will tie up urgently required development capacity for many years and thereby further exacerbate Europe’s competitive disadvantage. The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. In any case, the banks and savings banks have already developed a European market solution, Wero, which is currently coming onto the market. The digital euro needs to strengthen rather than weaken this European-led payment method. 3. Risks for financial stability and lending: without clear holding limits, there is a risk of uncontrolled transfers of deposits from banks and savings banks into holdings of digital euros. Deposits are the backbone of lending; large-scale outflows would weaken both the funding of the real economy – especially small and medium-sized enterprises – and the stability of the system. Holding limits must therefore be based on usual payment needs and be subject to binding regulations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany * The ultimate controlling entity is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany More information here.