BRUSSELS — If European governments didn’t realize before that Donald Trump’s threats to seize Greenland were serious, they do now. Policymakers are no longer ignoring the U.S. president’s ramped-up rhetoric — and are desperately searching for a plan to stop him. “We must be ready for a direct confrontation with Trump,” said an EU diplomat briefed on ongoing discussions. “He is in an aggressive mode, and we need to be geared up.” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Wednesday that he planned to discuss a U.S. acquisition of Greenland with Danish officials next week. The White House said Trump’s preference would be to acquire the territory through a negotiation and also that it would consider purchasing the island — but that a military takeover was possible. As diplomatic efforts intensified in Europe, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said he and his counterparts from Germany and Poland had discussed a joint European response to Trump’s threats. “What is at stake is the question of how Europe, the EU, can be strengthened to deter threats, attempts on its security and interests,” Barrot told reporters. “Greenland is not for sale, and it is not for taking … so the threats must stop.” POLITICO spoke with officials, diplomats, experts and NATO insiders to map out how Europe could deter the U.S. president from getting that far, and what its options are if he does. They were granted anonymity to speak freely. “Everyone is very stunned and unaware of what we actually have in the toolbox,” said a former Danish MP. “No one really knows what to do because the Americans can do whatever they want. But we need answers to these questions immediately. They can’t wait three or five or seven years.” On Wednesday, POLITICO set out the steps Trump could take to seize Greenland. Now here’s the flip side: What Europe does to stop him. OPTION 1: FIND A COMPROMISE Trump says Greenland is vital for U.S. security interests and accuses Denmark of not doing enough to protect it against increasing Chinese and Russian military activity in the Arctic.  A negotiated settlement that sees Trump come out of talks with something he can sell as a win and that allows Denmark and Greenland to save face is perhaps the fastest route out of trouble. A former senior NATO official suggested the alliance could mediate between Greenland, Denmark and the U.S., as it has done with alliance members Turkey and Greece over their disputes. U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker said on Wednesday that Trump and his advisers do not believe Greenland is properly secured. | Omar Havana/Getty Images U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker said on Wednesday that Trump and his advisers do not believe Greenland is properly secured. “As the ice thaws and as the routes in the Arctic and the High North open up … Greenland becomes a very serious security risk for the mainland of the United States of America.” NATO allies are also mulling fresh overtures to Trump that could bolster Greenland’s security, despite a widely held view that any direct threat from Russian and Chinese ships to the territory is overstated. Among other proposals, the alliance should consider accelerating defense spending on the Arctic, holding more military exercises in the region, and posting troops to secure Greenland and reassure the U.S. if necessary, according to three NATO diplomats.  The alliance should also be open to setting up an “Arctic Sentry” scheme — shifting its military assets to the region — similar to its Eastern Sentry and Baltic Sentry initiatives, two of the diplomats said. “Anything that can be done” to bolster the alliance’s presence near Greenland and meet Trump’s demands “should be maxed out,” said one of the NATO diplomats cited above. Trump also says he wants Greenland for its vast mineral deposits and potential oil and gas reserves. But there’s a reason Greenland has remained largely untapped: Extracting resources from its inhospitable terrain is difficult and very expensive, making them less competitive than Chinese imports. Denmark’s envoys say they tried for years to make the case for investment in Greenland, but their European counterparts weren’t receptive — though an EU diplomat familiar with the matter said there are signs that attitude is shifting. OPTION 2: GIVE GREENLAND A TON OF CASH The Trump administration has thrown its weight behind Greenland’s independence movement. The pitch is that if the Arctic territory leaves the Kingdom of Denmark and signs up to a deal with the U.S., it will be flooded with American cash.  While Trump has repeatedly refused to rule out using military force to take Greenland, he has also insisted he wants it to come willingly. The EU and Denmark are trying to convince Greenlanders that they can give them a better deal. Brussels is planning to more than double its spending on Greenland from 2028 under long-term budget plans drawn up after Trump started to make claims on the Danish-held territory, according to a draft proposal from the European Commission published in September. Under the plans, which are subject to further negotiations among member countries, the EU would almost double spending on Greenland to €530 million for a seven-year period starting in 2028.  That comes on top of the money Denmark sends Greenland as part of its agreement with the self-governing territory. Greenland would also be eligible to apply for an additional €44 million in EU funding for remote territories associated with European countries, per the same document. Danish and European support currently focuses mainly on welfare, health care, education and the territory’s green transition. Under the new spending plans, that focus would expand to developing the island’s ability to extract mineral resources. “We have many, many people below the poverty line, and the infrastructure in Greenland is lagging, and our resources are primarily taken out without good profit to Greenland but mostly profit to Danish companies,” said Kuno Fencker, a pro-independence Greenlandic opposition MP.  An attractive offer from Denmark and the EU could be enough to keep Greenlanders out of America’s grasp. OPTION 3: RETALIATE ECONOMICALLY Since Trump’s first term in office, “there’s been a lot of effort to try and think through how we ensure European security, Nordic security, Arctic security, without the U.S. actively involved,” said Thomas Crosbie, a U.S. military expert at the Royal Danish Defense College, which provides training and education for the Danish defense force. “That’s hard, but it’s possible. But I don’t know if anyone has seriously contemplated ensuring European security against America. It’s just crazy,” Crosbie said. The EU does have one strong political tool at its disposal, which it could use to deter Trump: the Anti-Coercion Instrument, the “trade bazooka” created after the first Trump administration, which allows the EU to retaliate against trade discrimination. The EU threatened to deploy it after Trump slapped tariffs on the bloc but shelved it in July after the two sides reached a deal. With the U.S. still imposing tariffs on the EU, Brussels could bring the bazooka back out. “We have exports to the United States a bit above €600 billion, and for around one-third of those goods we have a market share of more than 50 percent and it’s totally clear that this is also the power in our hands,” said Bernd Lange, chair of the European Parliament’s trade committee. But Trump would have to believe the EU was serious, given that all its tough talk amounted to nothing the last time around. OPTION 4: BOOTS ON THE GROUND If the U.S. does decide to take Greenland by military force, there’s little Europeans could do to prevent it.  “They are not going to preemptively attack Americans before they claim Greenland, because that would be done before an act of war,” said Crosbie, the Danish military educator. “But in terms of responding to the first move, it really depends. If the Americans have a very small group of people, you could try and arrest those people, because there’d be a criminal act.” It’s a different story if the U.S. goes in hard. Legally speaking, it’s possible Denmark would be forced to respond militarily. Under a 1952 standing order, troops should “immediately take up the fight without waiting for, or seeking orders” in “the event of an attack on Danish territory.” European countries should weigh the possibility of deploying troops to Greenland — if Denmark requests it — to increase the potential cost of U.S. military action, an EU diplomat said, echoing suggestions that Berlin and Paris could send forces to deter any incursion. While those forces are unlikely to be able to withstand a U.S. invasion, they would act as a deterrent. “You could have a tripwire effect where you have some groups of people who are physically in the way, like a Tiananmen Square-type situation, which would potentially force the [U.S.] military to use violence” or to back down, said Crosbie.  But that strategy comes at a high cost, he said. “This is completely unexplored territory, but it is quite possible that people’s lives will be lost in the attempt to reject the American claim over Greenland.” Gerardo Fortuna, Clea Caulcutt and Eli Stokols contributed reporting.

The Trump administration is lashing out at foreign laws aimed at clamping down on online platforms that have gained outsized influence on people’s attention — while trying to avoid launching new trade wars that could threaten the U.S. economy. Over the past month, U.S. officials have paused talks on a tech pact with the United Kingdom, canceled a trade meeting with South Korean officials and issued veiled threats at European companies over policies they believe unfairly penalize U.S. tech giants. Several tech policy professionals and people close to the White House say the recent actions amount to a “negotiating tactic,” in the words of one former U.S. trade official. As talks continue with London, Brussels and Seoul, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative is pressing partners to roll back digital taxes on large online platforms and rules aimed at boosting online privacy protections — measures U.S. officials argue disproportionately target America’s tech behemoths. “It’s telegraphing that we’ve looked at this deeply, we think there’s a problem, we’re looking at tools to address it and we’re looking at remedies if we don’t come to an agreement,” said Everett Eissenstat, who served as the director of the National Economic Council in Trump’s first term. “It’s not an unprecedented move, but naming companies like that and telegraphing that we have targets, we have tools, is definitely meaningful.” But so far, the administration has shied away from new tariffs or other aggressive actions that could upend tentative trade agreements or upset financial markets. And the new tough talk may not be enough to placate some American tech companies, who are pressing for action. One possible action, floated by U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, would be launching investigations into unfair digital trade practices, which would allow the administration to take action against countries that impose digital regulations on U.S. companies. “I would just say that’s the next level of escalation. I think that’s what people are waiting for and looking for,” said a representative from a major tech company, granted anonymity to speak candidly and discuss industry expectations. “What folks are looking for is like action over the tweets, which, we love the tweets. Everyone loves the tweets.” Trump used similar investigations to justify raising tariffs on hundreds of Chinese imports in his first term. But those investigations take time, and it can be years before any increases would go into effect. Greer has also been careful to hedge threats of new trade probes, stressing they are not meant to spiral into a broader conflict. Speaking on CNBC’s “Squawk Box” last week, he floated launching a trade investigation into the EU’s digital policies, but said the goal would be a “negotiated outcome,” not an automatic path to higher tariffs. “I don’t think we’re in a world where we want to have some renewed trade fight or something with the EU — that’s not what we’re talking about,” Greer said. “We want to finish off our deal and implement it,” he continued, referring to the trade pact the partners struck over the summer. Greer also raised the prospect of a trade probe in private talks with South Korea earlier this fall, saying the U.S. might have to resort to such action if the country continues to pursue legislation the administration views as harmful to U.S. tech firms. But a White House official clarified that the U.S. was not yet considering such a “heavy-handed approach.” Even industry officials aren’t certain how aggressive they want the Trump administration to be, acknowledging that if the U.S. escalated its fight with the EU over their tech regulations, it could spark a digital trade war that would ultimately end up harming all of the companies involved, according to a former USTR official, granted anonymity to speak candidly. President Donald Trump has long criticized the tech regulations — pioneered by the European Union and now proliferating around the globe. But he’s made the issue a much more central part of his second-term trade agenda, with mixed results. While Trump’s threat to cut off trade talks with Canada got Prime Minister Mark Carney to rescind their three percent tax on revenue earned by large online platforms, his administration has struggled to make headway with the EU, UK and South Korea in the broader trade negotiations over tariffs. The tentative trade deal the administration reached with the EU over the summer included a commitment from the bloc to address “unjustified digital trade barriers” and a pledge not to impose network usage fees, but left the scope and direction of future discussions largely undefined. The agreement fleshed out with South Korea this fall appeared to go even further, spelling out commitments that regulations governing online platforms and cross-border data flows won’t disadvantage American companies. But none of those governments have so far caved to U.S. pressure to abandon their digital regulations entirely, and the canceled talks and threatening social media posts are a sign of Trump’s growing frustration. “You won’t be surprised to know that what we think is fair treatment and what they think is fair treatment is quite different and I’ve been quite frankly disappointed over the past few months to see zero moderation by the EU,” Greer said Dec. 10 at an event at the Atlantic Council. Last week, Greer’s office amped up the rhetoric further, threatening to take action against major European companies like Spotify, German automation company Siemens and Mistral AI, the French artificial intelligence firm, if the EU doesn’t back off enforcement of its digital rules. The threat came a week after the EU fined X, the company formerly known as Twitter, $140 million for failing to meet EU transparency rules. Greer’s office also canceled a meeting planned for last Thursday with South Korean officials, as South Korean lawmakers introduced new digital legislation and held an explosive hearing on a data breach at Coupang, an American-headquartered e-commerce company whose largest market is in South Korea. The South Korean Embassy denied any relationship between the Coupang hearing and the cancellation of the recent meeting. “Neither Coupang’s data breach, the subsequent investigation by the Korean government, nor the National Assembly’s hearing played a role in the scheduling of the KORUS Joint Committee,” said an embassy official. The canceled meetings and frozen talks are significant — delaying implementation of bare bones trade agreements and investment pledges inked in recent months. But the Trump administration has shown little interest in blowing up the deals its reached and reapplying the steep tariffs it threatened over the summer, which could trigger significant retaliation and, as concerns about affordability and inflation continue to simmer in the U.S., prove politically dicey. Launching trade investigations at USTR or fining specific foreign companies could be a less inflammatory move. “What is happening is that these issues are starting to come to a head,” said Dirk Auer, a Director of Competition Policy International Center for Law & Economics, who focuses on antitrust issues and recently testified before Congress on digital services laws. “At some point the administration has to put up or shut up. They need to put their money where their mouth is. And I think that’s what’s happening right now.” Gabby Miller contributed to this report.

Mathias Döpfner is chair and CEO of Axel Springer, POLITICO’s parent company. America and Europe have been transmitting on different wavelengths for some time now. And that is dangerous — especially for Europe. The European reactions to the new U.S. National Security Strategy paper and to Donald Trump’s recent criticism of the Old Continent were, once again, reflexively offended and incapable of accepting criticism: How dare he, what an improper intrusion! But such reactions do not help; they do harm. Two points are lost in these sour responses. First: Most Americans criticize Europe because the continent matters to them. Many of those challenging Europe — even JD Vance or Trump, even Elon Musk or Sam Altman — emphasize this repeatedly. The new U.S. National Security Strategy, scandalized above all by those who have not read it, states explicitly: “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” And Trump says repeatedly, literally or in essence, in his interview with POLITICO: “I want to see a strong Europe.” The transatlantic drift is also a rupture of political language. Trump very often simply says what he thinks — sharply contrasting with many European politicians who are increasingly afraid to say what they believe is right. People sense the castration of thought through a language of evasions. And they turn away. Or toward the rabble-rousers. My impression is that our difficult American friends genuinely want exactly what they say they want: a strong Europe, a reliable and effective partner. But we do not hear it — or refuse to hear it. We hear only the criticism and dismiss it. Criticism is almost always a sign of involvement, of passion. We should worry far more if no criticism arrived. That would signal indifference — and therefore irrelevance. (By the way: Whether we like the critics is of secondary importance.) Responding with hauteur is simply not in our interest. It would be wiser — as Kaja Kallas rightly emphasized — to conduct a dialogue that includes self-criticism, a conversation about strengths, weaknesses and shared interests, and to back words with action on both sides. Which brings us to the second point: Unfortunately, much of the criticism is accurate. Anyone who sees politics as more than a self-absorbed administration of the status quo must concede that for decades Europe has delivered far too little — or nothing at all. Not in terms of above-average growth and prosperity, nor in terms of affordable energy. Europe does not deliver on deregulation or debureaucratization; it does not deliver on digitalization or innovation driven by artificial intelligence. And above all: Europe does not deliver on a responsible and successful migration policy. The world that wishes Europe well looked to the new German government with great hope. Capital flows on the scale of trillions waited for the first positive signals to invest in Germany and Europe. For it seemed almost certain that the world’s third-largest economy would, under a sensible, business-minded and transatlantic chancellor, finally steer a faltering Europe back onto the right path. The disappointment was all the more painful. Aside from the interior minister, the digital minister and the economics minister, the new government delivers in most areas the opposite of what had been promised before the election. The chancellor likes to blame the vice chancellor. The vice chancellor blames his own party. And all together they prefer to blame the Americans and their president. Instead of a European fresh start, we see continued agony and decline. Germany still suffers from its National Socialist trauma and believes that if it remains pleasantly average and certainly not excellent, everyone will love it. France is now paying the price for its colonial legacy in Africa and finds itself — all the way up to a president driven by political opportunism — in the chokehold of Islamist and antisemitic networks. In Britain, the prime minister is pursuing a similar course of cultural and economic submission. And Spain is governed by socialist fantasists who seem to take real pleasure in self-enfeeblement and whose “genocide in Gaza” rhetoric mainly mobilizes bored, well-heeled daughters of the upper middle class. Hope comes from Finland and Denmark, from the Baltic states and Poland, and — surprisingly — from Italy. There, the anti-democratic threats from Russia, China and Iran are assessed more realistically. Above all, there is a healthy drive to be better and more successful than others. From a far weaker starting point, there is an ambition for excellence. What Europe needs is less wounded pride and more patriotism defined by achievement. Unity and decisive action in defending Ukraine would be an obvious example — not merely talking about European sovereignty but demonstrating it, even in friendly dissent with the Americans. (And who knows, that might ultimately prompt a surprising shift in Washington’s Russia policy.) That, coupled with economic growth through real and far-reaching reforms, would be a start. After which Europe must tackle the most important task: a fundamental reversal of a migration policy rooted in cultural self-hatred that tolerates far too many newcomers who want a different society, who hold different values, and who do not respect our legal order. If all of this fails, American criticism will be vindicated by history. The excuses for why a European renewal is supposedly impossible or unnecessary are merely signs of weak leadership. The converse is also true: where there is political will, there is a way. And this way begins in Europe — with the spirit of renewal of a well-understood “Europe First” (what else?) — and leads to America. Europe needs America. America needs Europe. And perhaps both needed the deep crisis in the transatlantic relationship to recognize this with full clarity. As surprising as it may sound, at this very moment there is a real opportunity for a renaissance of a transatlantic community of shared interests. Precisely because the situation is so deadlocked. And precisely because pressure is rising on both sides of the Atlantic to do things differently. A trade war between Europe and America strengthens our shared adversaries. The opposite would be sensible: a New Deal between the EU and the U.S. Tariff-free trade as a stimulus for growth in the world’s largest and third-largest economies — and as the foundation for a shared policy of interests and, inevitably, a joint security policy of the free world. This is the historic opportunity that Friedrich Merz could now negotiate with Donald Trump. As Churchill said: “Never waste a good crisis!”

LONDON — The British government is working to give its trade chief new powers to move faster in imposing higher tariffs on imports, as it faces pressure from Brussels and Washington to combat Chinese industrial overcapacity. Under new rules drawn up by British officials, Trade Secretary Peter Kyle will have the power to direct the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) to launch investigations and give ministers options to set higher duty levels to protect domestic businesses. The trade watchdog will be required to set out the results of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations within a year, better monitor trade distortions and streamline processes for businesses to prompt trade probes. The U.K. is in negotiations with the U.S. and the EU to forge a steel alliance to counter Chinese overcapacity as the bloc works to introduce its own updated safeguards regime. The EU is the U.K.’s largest market and Brussels is creating a new steel protection regime that is set to slash Britain’s tariff-free export quotas and place 50 percent duties on any in excess. The government said its directive to the TRA will align the U.K. with similar powers in the EU and Australia, and follow World Trade Organization rules. It is set out in a Strategic Steer to the watchdog and will be introduced as part of the finance bill due to be wrapped up in the spring. “We are strengthening the U.K.’s system for tackling unfair trade to give our producers and manufacturers — especially SMEs who have less capacity and capability — the backing they need to grow and compete,” Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle said in a statement. “By streamlining processes and aligning our framework with international peers, we are ensuring U.K. industry has the tools to protect jobs, attract investment and thrive in a changing global economy,” Kyle added. These moves come after the government said on Wednesday that its Steel Strategy, which plots the future of the industry in Britain and new trade protections for the sector, will be delayed until next year. The Trump administration has been concerned about the U.K.’s steps to counter China’s steel overcapacity and refused to lower further a 25 percent tariff carve-out for Britain’s steel and aluminum exports from the White House’s 50 percent global duties on the metals. Trade Secretary Kyle discussed lowering the Trump administration’s tariffs on U.K. steel with senior U.S. Cabinet members in Washington on Wednesday.  “We are very much on the case of trying to sort out precisely where we land with the EU safeguard,” Trade Minister Chris Bryant told parliament Thursday, after meeting with EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič on Wednesday for negotiations. “We will do everything we can to make sure that we have a strong and prosperous steel sector across the whole of the U.K.,” Bryant said. The TRA has also launched a new public-facing Import Trends Monitor tool to help firms detect surges in imports that could harm their business and provide evidence that could prompt an investigation by the watchdog. “We welcome the government’s strategic steer, which marks a significant milestone in our shared goal to make the U.K.’s trade remedies regime more agile, accessible and assertive, as well as providing greater accountability,” said the TRA’s Co-Chief Executives Jessica Blakely and Carmen Suarez. Sophie Inge and Jon Stone contributed reporting.

President Donald Trump ratcheted up his threats against Colombia on Wednesday, telling reporters Colombian President Gustavo Petro is “next” in the White House’s regional campaign against drug trafficking. While initially, Trump told reporters “I haven’t really thought too much about” Petro, his comments quickly swerved into serious saber-rattling against the Colombian leader. “Colombia is producing a lot of drugs,” Trump said. “So he better wise up or he’ll be next. He’ll be next soon. I hope he’s listening, he’s going to be next.” Trump’s comments mark a sharp escalation of Trump’s threats against the Colombian leader. In a conversation with POLITICO earlier this week, the U.S. president floated expanding his anti-drug trafficking military operation — which have so far been focused on Venezuela — to Mexico and Colombia. Trump has overseen a slate of strikes against alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean since September and launched a massive buildup of military power off the coast of Venezuela in an attempt to pressure the country’s president, Nicolas Maduro, to leave office. Tensions between Trump and Petro escalated this fall amid the U.S.’s aggressive campaign against drug trafficking in the region. The Trump administration decertified Colombia as a drug control partner and revoked Petro’s visa in September, slashing aid to the country and bashing its leader as an “illegal drug dealer” the following month. Though Trump has made clear he wants Petro out of office, he could get his wish without having to follow through on his threats. The Colombian leader is term-limited — and the country is set to head to the polls for its presidential election in May. The Colombian embassy did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

French President Emmanuel Macron said Brussels is too slow in its handling of probes into American Big Tech companies due to U.S. pressure over the EU’s digital laws. “We have cases that have been before the Commission for two years. It’s much too slow,” Macron said Friday in reference to the EU’s content moderation rule book, the Digital Services Act (DSA). The debate around the matter is “not gaining momentum,” Macron told a local town hall event in the Vosges region, and “many in the Commission and member states are afraid to pursue it because there’s an American offensive against the application of directives on digital services and markets.” Macron promised to push for action at the EU level, adding: “We have a geopolitical battle to fight. This is not Russian interference, it is clearly American because these platforms do not want us to bother them.” Macron’s remarks follow a week that saw renewed pressure from the U.S. over the EU’s two tech rulebooks, the DSA and the Digital Markets Act. U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick urged EU ministers on Monday to “reconsider” the rulebooks in exchange for lower U.S. steel and aluminium tariffs, in line with the American playbook of treating the EU’s tech rules as a bargaining chip in a transatlantic trade war. The rules have been a target for the U.S. administration and tech executives ever since President Donald Trump returned to office. Both the EU’s tech chief, Henna Virkkunen, and her competition colleague, Teresa Ribera, came out against the U.S. pressure this week, with the latter accusing Washington of “blackmail.” The European Commission is also under pressure from European Parliament lawmakers, with the Socialists and Democrats group moving to set up an inquiry committee to investigate the EU’s enforcement of digital rules. Responding to Macron’s remarks, European Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier said: “We have been very clear since the very beginning: We are fully behind our digital legislation and are enforcing it.” He argued that “some cases take a bit more time than others, because the DSA investigations are broad.” “The Commission services are building solid cases, because we have to win them in court,” he said. The EU has investigations open under the DSA into X, Meta, AliExpress, Temu and TikTok. The probes could lead to fines of 6 percent of a company’s annual global turnover, but none have been levied so far.

BRUSSELS — Europe isn’t popping the champagne corks just yet even after U.S. Supreme Court judges cast doubt on the future of Donald Trump’s sweeping tariffs.  In a highly anticipated hearing on Wednesday, both conservative and progressive judges sharply questioned the U.S. president’s use of emergency powers to impose tariffs on the rest of the world — including the European Union.  Yet officials and observers across the Atlantic know full well that should the court strike down the tariffs, in cases brought by a dozen Democratic-run states and two sets of private companies, Trump will find a way to replace them. “The president’s authority is not limited,” German lawmaker Bernd Lange, who chairs the European Parliament’s international trade committee, told POLITICO. “New legal bases will be sought, which will again entail significantly greater effort and perhaps further uncertainties for certain product groups.”  Trump imposed his duties — including a 15 percent baseline tariff on the 27-nation bloc — under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a 1977 sanctions law that empowers the president to “regulate” imports but does not specifically authorize tariffs.  A key question now is whether Trump, in imposing his “Liberation Day” tariffs in April, grabbed power that is constitutionally bound to Congress. During the hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts questioned why Trump believed he had the authority to impose tariffs under a law that has never been used for that purpose.  Tariffs are a form of taxation and “that has always been the core power of Congress,” Roberts said. “So, to have the president’s foreign affairs power trump that basic power for Congress seems to me to kind of neutralize between the two powers, the executive power and the legislative power.” The skeptical tone struck by judges from both U.S. political camps has led some observers to predict a majority ruling by the nine-judge bench to kill the tariffs. For that to happen, some or all of Trump’s own conservative appointees on the bench — Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett — would need to vote against them.  “Not only the Court’s liberal judges but also key conservative judges such as Justice Roberts, Coney Barrett, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh advanced a deeply skeptical line of questioning,” said David Kleimann, a senior researcher at think tank ODI Global.  The hearing, Kleimann said, “will certainly give rise to hopes among international stakeholders that the Court will annul the tariff orders, which will, however, remain a matter of first seeing and then believing.” FIXING A ‘GLOBAL PROBLEM’  Even if the Supreme Court strikes down the tariffs, Brussels wouldn’t be out of the woods.  Trump’s sectoral tariffs on pharmaceuticals, cars and steel using other legal avenues — chiefly Section 232 investigations into specific industrial sectors — aren’t the subject of the case before the Supreme Court. And it is those measures that are inflicting the most pain on European exporters. Precisely because of that, former EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy cautioned his fellow Europeans to “not rejoice too quickly.”  “If Trump loses this case, he will use other legal grounds, albeit more complicated ones,” Lamy told POLITICO, referring to the sectoral tariffs.  “It would be great if they were overturned and they had trouble reinstating the latest tariffs, but we’re not counting on it,” agreed an EU trade diplomat, who was granted anonymity to speak candidly.  One argument made by the Trump administration — including by the government’s lawyer, Dean John Sauer — is that the tariffs are needed because America’s trade deficits with many of its trading partners are, in fact, a genuine emergency. Sauer argued that the trade deficits the tariffs are intended to address are “a global problem.” Countries hit by tariffs “haven’t disputed … that the president has correctly identified that virtually every major trading partner has this longstanding, so asymmetric, unfair treatment of our trade.” In Europe’s case, that is true: Commission President Ursula von der Leyen admitted, as she struck the EU’s trade deal with Trump, that it was “actually about rebalancing. So you can call it fairness, you can call it rebalancing. We have a surplus, the U.S. has a deficit, and we need to rebalance it.”  By buying into Trump’s narrative, von der Leyen handed his team a victory — allowing Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to boast about a new trading era, dubbed the “Turnberry system” after the Scottish golf course where Trump and von der Leyen shook hands on their deal in July.  HOW FIRM IS A HANDSHAKE?  For the EU, the question now is how solid a foundation it has built with the Turnberry accord, which was baked into a bare-bones joint statement the following month.  EU officials assert that the 15 percent tariff cap on most exports should hold even if the Supreme Court throws out Trump’s tariffs. A decision is expected by the end of this year, but could come much sooner. The European Commission declined to comment on legal proceedings in another country as a matter of policy. “But I can say that the Commission’s focus is on implementing the commitments spelled out in the EU-U.S. joint statement,” deputy chief spokesperson Olof Gill said Thursday. Ultimately, however, the court’s decision could have knock-on effects on legislation to implement the EU’s side of its deal with Washington. The European Parliament, which needs to pass the enabling legislation, has taken a critical view of the U.S. deal. Many lawmakers fault the EU executive for agreeing to a humiliating one-sided deal by agreeing to abolish all tariffs on U.S. industrial goods. A Supreme Court verdict striking down the U.S. tariffs could swell the camp of lawmakers determined to vote down the procedure.  “It would be very unlikely that the EU Parliament [would] continue its work on lowering EU tariffs on U.S. products in case the Court declares the U.S. tariffs illegal,” said Brando Benifei, a Spanish Socialist who chairs the Parliament body responsible for strengthening ties with the U.S.  “It would be absurd.”

BUSAN, South Korea — President Donald Trump on Thursday said he had “an amazing meeting” with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, appearing to tamp down tensions that had been building for months. “Zero, to 10, with 10 being the best, I’d say the meeting was a 12,” Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One, shortly after he left South Korea on his way back to Washington. “A lot of decisions were made … and we’ve come to a conclusion on very many important points.” The agreement, according to Trump, includes a commitment from China to purchase soybeans from American farmers, curb the flow of fentanyl and postpone its export restrictions on rare earths, which are used in everything from iPhones to military equipment. “There is no road block at all on rare earth,” Trump said. “Hopefully, that will disappear from our vocabulary for a little while.” Trump said he intended to immediately lower tariffs on Chinese exports to 47 percent from 57 percent. The result pulls the two nations back from the brink and should induce a significant sigh of relief from capital markets around the world. Details remain sparse and there have been false starts and resets before, but Trump said he could sign an agreement “pretty soon” and that few stumbling blocks remained. Trump also said he plans to visit China in April and that Xi would travel to the United States after that. This was Trump and Xi’s first face-to-face meeting since the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan in June 2019, when the two countries were also in the middle of a trade war. Thursday’s summit in South Korea followed months of renewed tensions that have impeded trade between the two countries, despite several announced truces. While Trump has ratcheted up tariffs on China — at one point as high as 145 percent — and tightened export controls on high-tech goods, Beijing has responded with its own devastating pressure campaign. That includes reducing purchases of American farm goods, which fell by more than 50 percent in the first seven months of 2025. U.S. soybeans farmers, who exported a record $18 billion worth of their crop to China in 2022, have been hit particularly, with just $2.4 billion in shipments to China in January through July. Beijing also imposed new export controls on rare earth materials. Earlier this month, China added five more rare earth elements to its control list and, much more controversially, outlined a plan requiring foreign companies that use even tiny amounts of Chinese-sourced rare earths to obtain a license from Beijing to export their finished products. U.S. officials described that move as an intolerable attempt by China to control global supply chains, and Trump threatened new 100 percent tariffs to take effect on Nov. 1. But it appears both sides wanted to avoid that kind of escalation. During the weekend, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, after meeting with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Malaysia, said they believed Beijing was prepared to delay its rare earth restrictions for a year, make “substantial” purchases of American farm goods and attempt to curb shipments of fentanyl precursor chemicals to the U.S.

BRUSSELS — Wednesday’s election in the Netherlands should surely go down as one of the best days Europe’s centrists have enjoyed in years. Geert Wilders, the far-right populist who touted leaving the EU on his way to a shock victory in the 2023 election, lost nearly a third of his voters after 11 chaotic months for his Party for Freedom (PVV) in coalition.  At the same time, the fervently pro-European liberal Rob Jetten surged in the final days of the campaign and stands a good chance of becoming prime minister. At 38, he would be the youngest person to hold the office since World War II and the first openly gay candidate ever to do so.  “Many in the Brussels bubble will welcome the rise of a mainstream, pro-governing and reform-oriented party,” said one EU diplomat, granted anonymity because the subject is politically sensitive. “The Dutch have a lot to contribute to the EU.” But even as they exhale with relief at the end of the Wilders interlude, the inhabitants of Europe’s dominant liberal center-ground — those Brussels officials, diplomats and ministers who run the EU show — would be well advised not to celebrate too hard. If previous years are any guide, the final shape of the next government and its policy plans will not become clear for months. Who knows what will have happened in Ukraine, the Middle East, or in Donald Trump’s trade war with China in that time? “It is essential for European cooperation that a new government is stable and able to make bold decisions, given the current geopolitical challenges that Europe is facing,” the same diplomat said. Even when the new coalition finally begins its work, this election should worry Europe’s liberal centrists almost as much as it delights them. JETTEN INTO EUROPE  Jetten’s Democracy 66 party has never done so well at a Dutch election: Assuming he gets the job he wants, he’ll be the party’s first prime minister. This week he told POLITICO he wanted to move the Netherlands closer to the EU.  Last night, officials in Brussels privately welcomed the prospect of the Dutch and their highly regarded diplomats returning to their historic place at the center of EU affairs, after two years in which they lost some influence. It was always going to be tough for the outgoing PM Dick Schoof, a 68-year-old technocrat, to follow the long-serving Mark Rutte, an EU star who now runs NATO. Domestic divisions made his job even harder.  But pro-European spirits also rose because the disruptive Wilders had wanted to keep the EU at arm’s length. Jetten’s position could hardly be more different. In fact, he sounds like an EU federalist’s dream.  “We want to stop saying ‘no’ by default, and start saying ‘yes’ to doing more together,” Jetten told POLITICO this week. “I cannot stress enough how dire Europe’s situation will be if we do not integrate further.”  STAYING DUTCH In Brussels, officials expect the next Dutch administration to maintain the same broad outlook on core policies: restraint on the EU’s long-term budget; cracking down on migration; boosting trade and competitiveness; and supporting Ukraine, alongside stronger common defense. One area where things could get complicated is climate policy. Jetten is committed to climate action and may end up in a power-sharing deal with GreenLeft-Labor, which was led at this election by former EU Green Deal chief Frans Timmermans.  How any government that Jetten leads balances climate action with improving economic growth will be key to policy discussions in Brussels. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has been trimming climate measures amid center-right complaints that they are expensive for consumers and businesses. But she wants to secure backing for new targets to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2040.  Elsewhere, housing and migration — two areas often linked by far-right politicians — were central issues in the Dutch campaign. Both will continue to feature on the EU’s agenda, too.  For many watching the results unfold in Brussels, the biggest concerns are practical: Will the next Dutch government be more stable than the last one? And how long will it take to for the coalition to form? Seven months passed between the last election in November 2023 and Schoof taking office as prime minister in July 2024. “This is a historic election result because we’ve shown not only to the Netherlands but also to the world that it’s possible to beat populist and extreme-right movements,” Jetten told his supporters. “I’m very eager to cooperate with other parties to start an ambitious coalition as soon as possible.”  WILDERS Beneath the rare good news of a pro-European triumph and a far-right failure lurk more worrying trends for EU centrists.  First of all, there’s the sheer volatility of the result. Most voters apparently made up their minds at the last moment.  Wilders went from winning the popular vote and taking 37 of the 150 seats in the Dutch lower house in 2023 to a projected 26 seats this time. Jetten’s D66 party, meanwhile, went from just nine seats two years ago to a projected 26, according to a preliminary forecast by the Dutch news agency ANP. The center-right Christian Democratic Appeal took just five seats in 2023 but now stands to win 18, according to the forecast. With swings this wild, anything could happen next time. Most major parties say they won’t work with Wilders in coalition now, making Jetten the more likely new PM if the projections hold. But Wilders says he is a long way from finished. “You won’t be rid of me until I’m 80,” the 62 year-old told supporters. In fact, Wilders might find a period in opposition — free from the constraints and compromises required in government — the perfect place to resume his inflammatory campaigns against Islam, immigration and the EU.  Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage had all been written off before storming back into their respective political front lines. “We had hoped for a different outcome, but we stood our ground,” Wilders wrote on X. “We are more determined than ever.”  TIMM’S UP  The other cloud on the pro-European horizon is the fate of Timmermans.  His center-left ticket was expected to do well and had been polling second behind Wilders’ Freedom Party in the months before the vote. But per the preliminary forecast, GreenLeft-Labor will fall from 25 seats to 20. Timmermans — who also stood in 2023 — resigned as leader.  It wasn’t just a defeat for the party, but also in some ways for Brussels. Timmermans had served as the European Commission’s executive vice president during von der Leyen’s first term, and was seen by some, especially his opponents, as a creation of the EU bubble.  Others point to the fact the center-left is struggling across Europe.  “It’s clear that I, for whatever reason, couldn’t convince people to vote for us,” Timmermans said. “It’s time that I take a step back and transfer the lead of our movement to the next generation.” Jetten’s pro-Europeanism could also come back to haunt him by the time of the next election. If he fails to deliver miracles to back up his optimistic pitch to voters, his Euroskeptic opponents have a ready-made argument for what went wrong. Recent history in the Netherlands, and elsewhere, suggests they won’t be afraid to use it.  Eva Hartog, Hanne Cokelaere, Pieter Haeck and Max Griera contributed reporting.

President Donald Trump heads into a historic meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping facing a delicate test: projecting strength against America’s top adversary without triggering another economic shock at home. The high-stakes encounter, the first between the two men in more than six years, comes after months of tariff feints and escalating rhetoric that have rattled markets and strained global supply chains — and at a moment when Trump is eager to prove that his economic nationalism can still deliver concrete wins. Administration officials are voicing confidence that Trump and Xi will step back from the brink of a second trade war when they meet Thursday morning local time in South Korea, but even a small misstep could send markets spiraling, as they did when Trump last imposed triple-digit tariffs on Chinese imports in April. Markets have grown accustomed to Trump’s tariff back-and-forths over the last 10 months, but investors remain queasy over the specter of new levies, like the 100 percent the president is now threatening. Trump’s favorite negotiating tool — tariffs — hasn’t worked on China the way it has in other places. While the vast majority of countries rushed to notch trade agreements, Beijing has responded with not only its own tariffs but an effective embargo on U.S. soybean purchases and sweeping export controls that underscore the near-monopoly the country continues to have over rare earth materials, which are used in everything from iPhones to military equipment. Trump has raised expectations for a successful confab, telling reporters multiple times in the last week that his meeting with Xi is “going to work out very well.” “I think we’re going to have a deal,” Trump said Wednesday in South Korea, his third stop in a weeklong Asia trip. “That’s really a great result that’s better than fighting or going through all sorts of problems. The world is watching.” The president is likely to brandish any concessions he secures from Xi as proof that his pressure campaign is working. “I think the president is very focused on reaching an equilibrium in the economic relationship where we stop the cycle of escalation and we get to some sort of at least temporary or partial resolution to some of the immediate economic headwinds,” said Alex Gray, who served as National Security Council chief of staff and deputy assistant to the president during the first Trump administration. A reset of the U.S.-China relationship to where it was before the latest spat would give both leaders a way to claim victory to their domestic audiences. China’s embargo of U.S. soybean exports has been a persistent pressure point for Trump as frustrated farmers complain that Washington bailed out Argentina but has left them waiting for relief, a political vulnerability the president is eager to neutralize. And for Xi, the talks offer a chance to ease mounting economic pressure at home, where sluggish growth and capital flight have underscored the limits of Beijing’s self-reliance strategy. The two sides have quietly negotiated for months with little tangible progress, save for a May session in Geneva that produced a limited accord that ended a brief round of tit-for-tat tariffs between the two countries. Something similar could happen again — a limited agreement that deescalates the latest round of tensions but does little to meaningfully address the U.S.’s longstanding frustrations over its trade imbalance with China. “I think it will be a fragile truce on trade,” said Matt Pottinger, a former deputy national security adviser during the first Trump administration, now chairman of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “None of the systemic problems go away, but the two sides will probably agree to kick the can into next year before either pursues further escalation.” The “Phase One” trade pact that the U.S. and China signed in January 2020 called for hundreds of billions of dollars in additional Chinese purchases of U.S. goods and tougher intellectual-property enforcement. Yet China never met its purchase targets, which it blamed on the Covid-19 pandemic. Although former President Joe Biden maintained and expanded Trump’s tariffs on Beijing, Trump administration officials and congressional Republicans have accused him of failing to aggressively enforce the pact. The U.S. Trade Representative’s Office last week launched an investigation into what it describes as the country’s “apparent failure” to comply with the deal. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, following meetings in Kuala Lumpur with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, outlined the “framework” of an agreement in which China resumes its purchases of soybeans and delays implementation of new export controls, and the U.S. agrees not to impose new tariffs. China’s foreign ministry, in a statement ahead of the meeting, said it is “possible to stabilize and advance the bilateral relationship as long as the two sides fully implement the important common understandings reached by the two heads of state.” China also purchased multiple ships of American soybeans in advance of the meeting, a move that Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins in a post on X called “a great start.” Bessent has also said that Beijing will, as part of the framework, agree to new provisions on the precursor chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl, something Trump has been pushing for since he slapped a first round of tariffs on China in February. It’s a politically potent issue for Trump, who has repeatedly accused Beijing of failing to curb the flow of fentanyl into the U.S., but China hawks are skeptical that the commitment will be substantial or long-lasting. “Our attitude in the first administration was ‘don’t bother with talks.’ Talks only work in Beijing’s favor because whatever comes out of these conversations, whatever agreement you come up with, will only be valid in so long as it favors the Chinese side,” said a first-term Trump official, granted anonymity to discuss internal conversations. “As soon as it becomes inconvenient, they walk away from it.’” The official said that while Trump stands to look “like a senior diplomat, a statesman” in the meeting, Xi stands to get more out of it “if he can be made to look strong to his people, if the outcome is yet another meaningless trade deal.” Other former Trump officials worry that the president could be persuaded to make significant concessions, such as lifting export controls on semiconductor chips or the equipment used to manufacture them. Trump faced criticism in August for striking a deal with Nvidia to allow the sale of certain chips to China. “The base case is, they muddle through and they have a meeting and then they agree to have more meetings and more trade talks,” said Liza Tobin, who served as National Security Council director for China during the first Trump administration and the start of the Biden administration. “The worst case scenario for the United States is Trump concedes a whole lot of these real concessions.” But Trump, who likes to maintain maximum negotiating leverage heading into meetings with world leaders, hasn’t signed off on the framework Bessent has outlined publicly, telling reporters on Air Force One earlier this week that “nothing has been agreed to yet.” Trump has also teased that he “might” sign a final deal on TikTok on Thursday. The meeting comes as Trump’s tariff strategy is facing scrutiny at home. Five Republican senators joined Democrats on Wednesday against Trump’s 50 percent tariff on Brazil, a largely symbolic vote on a measure that the House has said it won’t take up even as it represents a rare GOP rebuke of Trump’s policies. Even if the framework holds, it would represent a narrow truce rather than a structural shift. It’s likely to sidestep the deeper disputes that have long defined the U.S.-China relationship as Trump officials continue to pressure China to curb industrial subsidies, improve market access for U.S. companies and curb China’s control of key supply chains. It’s also unclear to what extent China will push a conversation about Taiwan. Trump, asked Friday about whether he’s open to changing U.S. policy on Taiwan, said he didn’t want to talk about it because he didn’t “want to create any complexity” for an “already complex” trip. Pottinger, the former deputy national security adviser, said that the president’s style is “to maintain an open channel to the top decision makers within adversarial states.” But, he added, Trump “understands that Beijing coercing Taiwan would do serious harm to U.S. economic and national security and would be a stain on President Trump’s record.” Recent trade accords with southeast Asian countries — including Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia — may give Washington a stronger hand heading into the meeting, showing allies that the U.S. is trying to chip away at Beijing’s regional grip. The U.S. has also in the last week inked agreements with Australia and Japan to collaborate on establishing a rare earth supply chain outside of China, and signed memorandums with Thailand and Malaysia that could lead to rare earth exports from both countries. “It is really important for them to continue to lock up these deals in the Indo Pacific, because with all of this, if the outcome is that these countries begin to tilt even more towards China, economically and commercially than they already are, that’s a terrible outcome for the United States,” said Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and former aide to Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas). Ari Hawkins, Diana Nerozzi and Doug Palmer contributed to this report.