LONDON — Prime Minister Keir Starmer usually goes out of his way not to annoy Donald Trump. So he better hope the windmill-hating U.S. president doesn’t notice what the U.K. just did. In a fillip for the global offshore wind industry, Starmer’s government on Wednesday announced its biggest-ever down payment on the technology. It agreed to price guarantees, funded by billpayers to the tune of up to £1.8 billion (€2.08 billion) a year, for eight major projects in England, Scotland and Wales. The schemes have the capacity to generate 8.4 gigawatts of electricity, the U.K. energy department said — enough to power 12 million homes. It represented the biggest “wind auction in Europe to date,” said industry group WindEurope. It’s also an energy strategy that could have been tailor-made to rankle Trump. The U.S. president has repeatedly expressed a profound loathing for wind turbines and has tried to use his powers to halt construction on projects already underway in the U.S. — sending shockwaves across the global industry. Even when appearing alongside Starmer at press conferences, Trump has been unable to hide his disgust at the very sight of windmills. “You are paying in Scotland and in the U.K. … to have these ugly monsters all over the place,” he said, sitting next to Starmer during a visit to his Turnberry golf course last year. The spinning blades, Trump complained, would “kill all your birds.” At the time, the prime minister explained meekly that the U.K. was seeking a “mix” of energy sources. But this week’s investments speak far louder about his government’s priorities. The U.K.’s strategy — part of a plan to run the British power grid on 95 percent clean electricity by 2030 — is a clear signal that for all Starmer’s attempts to appease Trump, the U.K. will not heed Washington’s assertions that fossil fuels are the only way to deliver affordable bills and secure supply. “With these results, Britain is taking back control of our energy sovereignty,” said Starmer’s Energy Secretary Ed Miliband, a former leader of the Labour party. “With these results, Britain is taking back control of our energy sovereignty,” said Energy Secretary Ed Miliband. | Pool photo by Justin Tallis via Getty Images While not mentioning Trump or the U.S., he said the U.K. wanted to “stand on our two feet” and not depend on “markets controlled by petrostates and dictators.” WIND VS. GAS The goal of the U.K.’s offshore wind drive is to reduce reliance on gas for electricity generation. One of the most gas-dependent countries in Europe, the U.K. was hit hard in 2022 by the regional gas price spike that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The government ended up spending tens of billions of pounds to pay a portion of every household energy bill in the country to fend off widespread hardship. It’s a scenario that Miliband and Starmer want to avoid in future by focusing on producing electricity from domestic sources like offshore wind that are not subject to the ups and downs of global fossil fuel markets. Trump, by contrast, wants to keep Europe hooked on gas — specifically, American gas. The U.S. National Security Strategy, updated late last year, states Trump’s desire to use American fossil fuel exports to “project power.” Trump has already strong-armed the European Union into committing to buy $750 billion worth of American liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a quid pro quo for tariff relief. No one in Starmer’s government explicitly named Trump or the U.S. on Wednesday. But Chris Stark, a senior official in Miliband’s energy department tasked with delivering the 2030 goal, noted that “every megawatt of offshore wind that we’re bringing on is a few more metric tons of LNG that we don’t need to import.” The U.K.’s investment in offshore wind also provides welcome relief to a global industry that has been seriously shaken both by soaring inflation and interest rates — and more recently by a Trump-inspired backlash against net zero and clean energy. “It’s a relief for the offshore sector … It’s a relief generally, that the U.K. government is able to lean into very large positive investment stories in U.K. infrastructure,” said Tom Glover, U.K. country chair of the German energy firm RWE, which was the biggest winner in the latest offshore wind investment, securing contracts for 6.9 gigawatts of capacity. A second energy industry figure, granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the record, said the U.K.’s plans were a “great signal for the global offshore wind sector” after a difficult few years — “not least the stuff in the U.S.” The other big winner was British firm SSE, which has plans to build one of the world’s largest-ever offshore wind projects, Berwick Bank — off the coast of Donald Trump’s beloved Scotland.

Croatian President Zoran Milanović has slammed France for selling Zagreb secondhand fighter jets while providing its rival Serbia with a brand-new fleet. “We look like fools,” he raged last week, “because the French sell new Rafales to the Serbs and used ones to us.” Zagreb finalized a government-to-government deal with Paris in 2021 to modernize its air force by purchasing a dozen Rafale fighters valued at €999 million. The final aircraft, which were procured from France’s own stocks, were delivered last April, replacing Croatia’s outdated Soviet-era MiG-21 fleet. In August 2024, Serbia signed a deal to buy 12 Rafale jets from French manufacturer Dassault Aviation fresh from the factory. That transaction has enraged the Croatian president. Croatia fought Serbia in the 1990s in the bloody wars that followed Yugoslavia’s disintegration. While relations between the two countries have improved dramatically since then, non-NATO Serbia’s close ties with Moscow are a worry to Zagreb, which joined the Atlantic alliance in 2009 and the EU in 2013. Serbia’s own EU candidacy has largely stalled, with Belgrade ditching a Western Balkans summit in Brussels last month. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos called on Serbia in November to “urgently reverse the backsliding on freedom of expression.” French Europe Deputy Minister Benjamin Haddad, who was in Zagreb on Monday to discuss defense cooperation, defended the Serbia contract, saying Croatia should be pleased Belgrade was “gradually freeing itself from dependence on Russia and strengthening its ties with Western countries.” But Milanović hit back that the deal was “implemented behind Croatia’s back and to the detriment of Croatia’s national interests,” and showed “that every country takes care of its own interests, including profits, first and foremost.” The left-wing president added that the Croatian government, led by center-right Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, had erred by not confirming “whether France would sell the same or even more advanced aircraft models to one of our neighboring countries outside NATO.” DOMESTIC SQUABBLES Croatian officials are split over whether the president was right to react the way he did. One Croatian diplomat told POLITICO that Milanović had a point and that France was wrong to sell the newer jets to Serbia after fobbing off Croatia with an older model. But a second Croatian official said the deal was a good one for Zagreb and noted that the Croatian government had signed a letter of intent in December with Paris to upgrade its Rafale jets to the latest F4 standard. “From France’s point of view, the signing of the letter of intent on December 8 in France by the minister [Catherine Vautrin] and her Croatian counterpart aims to support the partner in modernizing its Rafale fleet to the highest standard currently in service in France,” an official from the French armed forces ministry echoed. “The defense relationship with Croatia is dynamic and not set in stone in 2021.” Croatia’s defense ministry said Milanović’s remarks “show elementary ignorance of how the international arms trade works.” “Great powers — the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China — have been selling the same or similar weapons to countries that are in tense and even openly antagonistic relations for decades,” the ministry added. “The USA is simultaneously arming Israel and Egypt, Russia [is arming] India and Pakistan, while the West is simultaneously arming Greece and Turkey. This is the rule, not the exception.” In Croatia, the president is also the commander-in-chief of the military but shares jurisdiction over defense policy with the government, which is responsible for the budget and the day-to-day management of the armed forces. Milanović and Plenković are often at odds, a third Croatian official said, arguing the president was using the issue to hammer his political rival. DIRT-CHEAP FIGHTER JETS France has looked to strengthen defense ties with Croatia, which spends over 2 percent of its GDP on defense and is transitioning its Soviet-era military stocks to Western arms. Some of those purchases are coming from France. Plenković was in Paris in December to sign a separate deal with KNDS France for 18 Caesar self-propelled howitzers and 15 Serval armored vehicles, with the equipment to be purchased with the EU’s loans-for-weapons SAFE money.  In the original fighter jet deal, Croatia bought airplanes that were being used by the French air force, meaning they were cheaper than new stock and were available quickly. At the time the decision was criticized in Paris by parliamentarians arguing France was weakening its own air force to seal export contracts. Serbia, meanwhile, reportedly paid €2.7 billion for the same number of jets, which are expected to be delivered as of 2028. China and Russia provide the vast majority of Belgrade’s weapons, with France a distant third.

LONDON — The U.K. and Poland have agreed to cooperate more closely to shoot down air and missile threats, as they seek to strengthen the protection of their skies. The two NATO allies will step up joint training of helicopter pilots and work together on new capabilities to counter attacks from the air. British and Polish military personnel will train together in virtual environments to improve air defense techniques, while eight Polish military helicopter pilots will undertake training in the U.K. under NATO’s military aviation program. Two Polish helicopter instructors will be permanently stationed at RAF Shawbury in the West Midlands for a full rotational tour. The announcement came during a visit by Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Downing Street on Tuesday. U.K. Defense Secretary, John Healey, hailed Poland as “a crucial ally for the U.K. in this era of rising threats” and said together they were “stepping up to defend Europe and face down the threat from (Vladimir) Putin.” British fighter jets conducted an air defense mission over Poland as part of an allied response to Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace, with pilots from the two countries flying together as part of NATO’s Eastern Sentry mission. Healey announced last year that British armed forces would get fresh powers to bring down suspicious drones over military sites as part of the Armed Forces Bill, amid a spate of aerial incursions across Europe. Ministers have committed to improving the U.K.’s aerial defenses, following concerns that it is increasingly vulnerable given the changing nature of threats from the air. The U.K. and Poland have cooperated extensively on air defense in the past, including a £1.9 billion export agreement announced in April 2023 to equip 22 Polish air defense batteries, and a separate deal worth over £4 billion to continue the next phase of Poland’s future air defense programme, Narew. 

Europe’s biggest ever trade deal finally got the nod Friday after 25 years of negotiating.  It took blood, sweat, tears and tortured discussions to get there, but EU countries at last backed the deal with the Mercosur bloc — paving the way to create a free trade area that covers more than 700 million people across Europe and Latin America.  The agreement, which awaits approval from the European Parliament, will eliminate more than 90 percent of tariffs on EU exports. European shoppers will be able to dine on grass-fed beef from the Argentinian pampas. Brazilian drivers will see import duties on German motors come down.  As for the accord’s economic impact, well, that pales in comparison with the epic battles over it: The European Commission estimates it will add €77.6 billion (or 0.05 percent) to the EU economy by 2040.  Like in any deal, there are winners and losers. POLITICO takes you through who is uncorking their Malbec, and who, on the other hand, is crying into the Bordeaux. WINNERS Giorgia Meloni Italy’s prime minister has done it again. Giorgia Meloni saw which way the political winds were blowing and skillfully extracted last-minute concessions for Italian farmers after threatening to throw her weight behind French opposition to the deal.  The end result? In exchange for its support, Rome was able to secure farm market safeguards and promises of fresh agriculture funding from the European Commission — wins that the government can trumpet in front of voters back home. It also means that Meloni has picked the winning side once more, coming off as the team player despite the last-minute holdup. All in all, yet another laurel in Rome’s crown.  The German car industry  Das Auto hasn’t had much reason to cheer of late, but Mercosur finally gives reason to celebrate. Germany’s famed automotive sector will have easier access to consumers in LatAm. Lower tariffs mean, all things being equal, more sales and a boost to the bottom line for companies like Volkswagen and BMW. There are a few catches. Tariffs, now at 35 percent, aren’t coming down all at once. At the behest of Brazil, which hosts an auto industry of its own, the removal of trade barriers will be staggered. Electric vehicles will be given preferential treatment, an area that Europe’s been lagging behind on.  Ursula von der Leyen Mercosur is a bittersweet triumph for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Since shaking hands on the deal with Mercosur leaders more than a year ago, her team has bent over backwards to accommodate the demands of the skeptics and build the all-important qualified majority that finally materialized Friday. Expect a victory lap next week, when the Berlaymont boss travels to Paraguay to sign the agreement. Giorgia Meloni saw which way the political winds were blowing and skillfully extracted last-minute concessions for Italian farmers after threatening to throw her weight behind French opposition to the deal. | Ettore Ferrari/EPA On the international stage, it also helps burnish Brussels’ standing at a time when the bloc looks like a lumbering dinosaur, consistently outmaneuvered by the U.S. and China. A large-scale trade deal shows that the rules-based international order that the EU so cherishes is still alive, even as the U.S. whisked away a South American leader in chains.  But the deal came at a very high cost. Von der Leyen had to promise EU farmers €45 billion in subsidies to win them over, backtracking on efforts to rein in agricultural support in the EU budget and invest more in innovation and growth.   Europe’s farmers  Speaking of farmers, going by the headlines you could be forgiven for thinking that Mercosur is an unmitigated disaster. Surely innumerable tons of South American produce sold at rock-bottom prices are about to drive the hard-working French or Polish plowman off his land, right?  The reality is a little bit more complicated. The deal comes with strict quotas for categories ranging from beef to poultry. In effect, Latin American farmers will be limited to exporting a couple of chicken breasts per European person per year. Meanwhile, the deal recognizes special protections for European producers for specialty products like Italian parmesan or French wine, who stand to benefit from the expanded market. So much for the agri-pocalpyse now.  Mercosur is a bittersweet triumph for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. | Olivier Matthys/EPA Then there’s the matter of the €45 billion of subsidies going into farmers’ pockets, and it’s hard not to conclude that — despite all the tractor protests and manure fights in downtown Brussels — the deal doesn’t smell too bad after all.  LOSERS Emmanuel Macron  There’s been no one high-ranking politician more steadfast in their opposition to the trade agreement than France’s President Emmanuel Macron who, under enormous domestic political pressure, has consistently opposed the deal. It’s no surprise then that France joined Poland, Austria, Ireland and Hungary to unsuccessfully vote against Mercosur.  The former investment banker might be a free-trading capitalist at heart, but he knows well that, domestically, the deal is seen as a knife in the back of long-suffering Gallic growers. Macron, who is burning through prime ministers at rates previously reserved for political basket cases like Italy, has had precious few wins recently. Torpedoing the free trade agreement, or at least delaying it further, would have been proof that the lame-duck French president still had some sway on the European stage.  Surely innumerable tons of South American produce sold at rock-bottom prices are about to drive the hard-working French or Polish plowman off his land, right? | Darek Delmanowicz/EPA Macron made a valiant attempt to rally the troops for a last-minute counterattack, and at one point it looked like he had a good chance to throw a wrench in the works after wooing Italy’s Meloni. That’s all come to nought. After this latest defeat, expect more lambasting of the French president in the national media, as Macron continues his slow-motion tumble down from the Olympian heights of the Élysée Palace.  Donald Trump Coming within days of the U.S. mission to snatch Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro and put him on trial in New York, the Mercosur deal finally shows that Europe has no shortage of soft power to work constructively with like-minded partners — if it actually has the wit to make use of it smartly.  Any trade deal should be seen as a win-win proposition for both sides, and that is just not the way U.S. President Donald Trump and his art of the geopolitical shakedown works. It also has the incidental benefit of strengthening his adversaries — including Brazilian President and Mercosur head honcho Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva — who showed extraordinary patience as he waited on the EU to get their act together (and nurtured a public bromance with Macron even as the trade talks were deadlocked). China  China has been expanding exports to Latin America, particularly Brazil, during the decades when the EU was negotiating the Mercosur trade deal. The EU-Mercosur deal is an opportunity for Europe to claw back some market share, especially in competitive sectors like automotive, machines and aviation. The deal also strengthens the EU’s hand on staying on top when it comes to direct investments, an area where European companies are still outshining their Chinese competitors. Emmanuel Macron made a valiant attempt to rally the troops for a last-minute counterattack, and at one point it looked like he had a good chance to throw a wrench in the works after wooing Italy’s Meloni. | Pool photo by Ludovic Marin/EPA More politically, China has somewhat succeeded in drawing countries like Brazil away from Western points of view, for instance via the BRICS grouping, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and other developing economies. Because the deal is not only about trade but also creates deeper political cooperation, Lula and his Mercosur counterparts become more closely linked to Europe. The Amazon rainforest  Unfortunately, for the world’s ecosystem, Mercosur means one thing: burn, baby, burn. The pastures that feed Brazil’s herds come at the expense of the nation’s once-sprawling, now-shrinking tropical rainforest. Put simply, more beef for Europe means less trees for the world. It’s not all bad news for the climate. The trade deal does include both mandatory safeguards against illegal deforestation, as well as a commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement for its signatories. 

Germans overwhelmingly don’t trust the U.S. and don’t rate President Donald Trump, according to a survey by ARD DeutschlandTrend. Only 12 percent of respondents rate his performance positively and a mere 15 percent consider the U.S. to be a trustworthy partner for Germany, the lowest figure for the U.S. in the history of the survey. Only Russia fared worse for trustworthiness, at 9 percent. The results are closely tied to Trump’s military assault on Venezuela and the capture of its president, Nicolás Maduro, last weekend. Some 72 percent of respondents said the intervention was unjustified, though opinion diverges on how German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Brussels should respond. The survey gave Germans a concrete choice: to be “rather restrained so as not to provoke Donald Trump” or to “speak out clearly against U.S. actions even if it might upset the president.” Meanwhile, 39 percent favored restraint, citing the complexity of the situation and the need for caution, while half supported a firmer stance, even at the risk of angering Washington. But the transatlantic rupture extends beyond Venezuela. Trump’s renewed interest in seizing Greenland, tariff threats against European exports and his ambivalent stance on support for Ukraine have deepened unease in Germany, reinforcing the sense that U.S. policy is being driven less by alliance management than by presidential impulse. That message landed heavily when Trump recently questioned on Truth Social whether NATO would come to Washington’s aid if the U.S. were in need. From a leader who has repeatedly cast alliances as transactional, the remark struck at a core tenet of German postwar foreign policy. That this shift is unfolding under Merz — a self-described transatlanticist and former head of the Atlantik-Brücke, a private network that fosters political, business and cultural ties between Germany and the U.S. — underscores just how far the relationship has frayed.

LONDON — Choosing your Brexit camp was once the preserve of Britain’s Tories. Now Labour is joining in the fun.  Six years after Britain left the EU, a host of loose — and mostly overlapping — groupings in the U.K.’s ruling party are thinking about precisely how close to try to get to the bloc. They range from customs union enthusiasts to outright skeptics — with plenty of shades of grey in between. There’s a political urgency to all of this too: with Prime Minister Keir Starmer tanking in the polls, the Europhile streak among many Labour MPs and members means Brexit could become a key issue for anyone who would seek to replace him. “The more the screws and pressure have been on Keir around leadership, the more we’ve seen that play to the base,” said one Labour MP, granted anonymity like others quoted in this piece to speak frankly. Indeed, Starmer started the new year explicitly talking up closer alignment with the European Union’s single market. At face value, nothing has changed: Starmer’s comments reflect his existing policy of a “reset” with Brussels. His manifesto red lines on not rejoining the customs union or single market remain. Most of his MPs care more about aligning than how to get there. In short, this is not like the Tory wars of the late 2010s. Well, not yet. POLITICO sketches out Labour’s nascent Brexit tribes. THE CUSTOMS UNIONISTS  It all started with a Christmas walk. Health Secretary Wes Streeting told an interviewer he desires a “deeper trading relationship” with the EU — widely interpreted as hinting at joining a customs union. This had been a whispered topic in Labour circles for a while, discussed privately by figures including Starmer’s economic adviser Minouche Shafik. Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy said last month that rejoining a customs union is not “currently” government policy — which some took as a hint that the position could shift. But Streeting’s leadership ambitions (he denies plotting for the top job) and his willingness to describe Brexit as a problem gave his comments an elevated status among Labour Europhiles.  “This has really come from Wes’s leadership camp,” said one person who talks regularly to No. 10 Downing Street. Naomi Smith, CEO of the pro-EU pressure group Best for Britain, added any Labour leadership contest will be dominated by the Brexit question. MPs and members who would vote in a race “are even further ahead than the public average on all of those issues relating to Europe,” she argued. Joining a customs union would in theory allow smoother trade without returning to free movement of people. But Labour critics of a customs union policy — including Starmer himself — argue it is a non-starter because it would mean tearing up post-Brexit agreements with other countries such as India and the U.S. “It’s just absolutely nonsense,” said a second Labour MP.    Keir Starmer has argued that the customs union route would mean hard conversations with workers in the car industry after Britain secured a U.K.-U.S. tariff deal last summer. | Colin McPherson/Getty Images And since Streeting denies plotting and did not even mention a customs union by name, the identities of the players pushing for one are understandably murky beyond the 13 Labour MPs who backed a Liberal Democrat bill last month requiring the government to begin negotiations on joining a bespoke customs union with the EU. One senior Labour official said “hardly any” MPs back it, while a minister said there was no organized group, only a vague idea. “There are people who don’t really know what it is, but realize Brexit has been painful and the economy needs a stimulus,” they said. “And there are people who do know what this means and they effectively want to rejoin. For people who know about trade, this is an absolute non-starter.” Anand Menon, director of the UK in a Changing Europe think tank, said a full rejoining of the EU customs union would mean negotiating round a suite of “add-ons” — and no nations have secured this without also being in the EU single market. (Turkey has a customs union with the EU, but does not benefit from the EU’s wider trade agreements.) “I’m not convinced the customs union works without the single market,” Menon added.  Starmer has argued that the customs union route would mean hard conversations with workers in the car industry after Britain secured a U.K.-U.S. tariff deal last summer, a person with knowledge of his thinking said. “When you read anything from any economically literate commentator, the customs union is not their go-to,” added the senior Labour official quoted above. “Keir is really strong on it. He fully believes it isn’t a viable route in the national interest or economic interest.” THE SINGLE MARKETEERS (A.K.A. THE GOVERNMENT) Starmer and his allies, then, want to park the customs union and get closer to the single market.  Paymaster General Nick Thomas-Symonds has long led negotiations along these lines through Labour’s existing EU “reset.” He and Starmer recently discussed post-Brexit policy on a walk through the grounds of the PM’s country retreat, Chequers. Working on the detail with Thomas-Symonds is Michael Ellam, the former director of communications for ex-PM Gordon Brown, now a senior civil servant in the Cabinet Office. Ellam is “a really highly regarded, serious guy” and attends regular meetings with Brussels officials, said a second person who speaks regularly to No. 10.   A bill is due to be introduced to the U.K. parliament by summer which will allow “dynamic” alignment with new EU laws in areas of agreement. Two people with knowledge of his role said the bill will be steered through parliament by Cabinet Office Minister Chris Ward, Starmer’s former aide and close ally, who was by his side when Starmer was shadow Brexit secretary during the “Brexit wars” of the late 2010s. Starmer himself talked up this approach in a rare long-form interview this week with BBC host Laura Kuenssberg, saying: “We are better looking to the single market rather than the customs union for our further alignment.” While the PM’s allies insist he simply answered a question, some of his MPs spy a need to seize back the pro-EU narrative. The second person who talks regularly to No. 10 argued a “relatively small … factional leadership challenge group around Wes” is pushing ideas around a customs union, while Starmer wants to “not match that but bypass it, and say actually, we’re doing something more practical and potentially bigger.”  A third Labour MP was blunter about No. 10’s messaging: “They’re terrified and they’re worrying about an internal leadership challenge.” Starmer’s allies argue that their approach is pragmatic and recognizes what the EU will actually be willing to accept. Christabel Cooper, director of research at the pro-Labour think tank Labour Together — which plans polling and focus groups in the coming months to test public opinion on the issue — said: “We’ve talked to a few trade experts and economists, and actually the customs union is not all that helpful. To get a bigger bang for your buck, you do need to go down more of a single market alignment route.”  Stella Creasy argued that promising a Swiss-style deal in Labour’s next election manifesto (likely in 2029) would benefit the economy — far more than the “reset” currently on the table. | Nicola Tree/Getty Images Nick Harvey, CEO of the pro-EU pressure group European Movement UK, concurred: “The fact that they’re now talking about a fuller alignment towards the single market is very good news, and shows that to make progress economically and to make progress politically, they simply have to do this.”  But critics point out there are still big questions about what alignment will look like — or more importantly, what the EU will go for.  The bill will include areas such as food standards, animal welfare, pesticide use, the EU’s electricity market and carbon emissions trading, but talks on all of these remain ongoing. Negotiations to join the EU’s defense framework, SAFE, stalled over the costs to Britain. Menon said: “I just don’t see what [Starmer] is spelling out being practically possible. Even at the highest levels there has been, under the Labour Party, quite a degree of ignorance, I think, about how the EU works and what the EU wants.   “I’ve heard Labour MPs say, well, they’ve got a veterinary deal with New Zealand, so how hard can it be? And you want to say, I don’t know if you’ve noticed, but New Zealand doesn’t have a land border with the EU.”  THE SWISS BANKERS Then there are Europhile MPs, peers and campaigners who back aligning with the single market — but going much further than Starmer.  For some this takes the form of a “Swiss-style” deal, which would allow single market access for some sectors without rejoining the customs union.   This would plough through Starmer’s red lines by reintroducing EU freedom of movement, along with substantial payments to Brussels.  But Stella Creasy, chair of the Labour Movement for Europe (LME), argued that promising a Swiss-style deal in Labour’s next election manifesto (likely in 2029) would benefit the economy — far more than the “reset” currently on the table. She said: “If you could get a Swiss-style deal and put it in the manifesto … that would be enough for businesses to invest.”  Creasy said LME has around 150 MPs as members and holds regular briefings for them. While few Labour MPs back a Swiss deal — and various colleagues see Creasy as an outlier — she said MPs and peers, including herself, plan to put forward amendments to the dynamic alignment bill when it goes through parliament.  Tom Baldwin, Starmer’s biographer and the former communications director of the People’s Vote campaign (which called for a second referendum on Brexit), also suggests Labour could go further in 2029. “Keir Starmer’s comments at the weekend about aligning with — and gaining access to — the single market open up a whole range of possibilities,” he said. “At the low end, this is a pragmatic choice by a PM who doesn’t want to be forced to choose between Europe and America.   “At the upper end, it suggests Labour may seek a second term mandate at the next election by which the U.K. would get very close to rejoining the single market. That would be worth a lot more in terms of economic growth and national prosperity than the customs union deal favoured by the Lib Dems.”  A third person who speaks regularly to No. 10 called it a “boil the frog strategy.” They added: “You get closer and closer and then maybe … you go into the election saying ‘we’ll try to negotiate something more single markety or customs uniony.’”  THE REJOINERS? Labour’s political enemies (and some of its supporters) argue this could all lead even further — to rejoining the EU one day. “Genuinely, I am not advocating rejoin now in any sense because it’s a 10-year process,” said Creasy, who is about as Europhile as they come in Labour. “Our European counterparts would say ‘hang on a minute, could you actually win a referendum, given [Reform UK Leader and Brexiteer Nigel] Farage is doing so well?’”  With Prime Minister Keir Starmer tanking in the polls, the Europhile streak among many Labour MPs and members means Brexit could become a key issue for anyone who would seek to replace him. | Tom Nicholson/Getty Images Simon Opher, an MP and member of the Mainstream Labour group closely aligned with Burnham, said rejoining was “probably for a future generation” as “the difficulty is, would they want us back?” But look into the soul of many Labour politicians, and they would love to still be in the bloc — even if they insist rejoining is not on the table now. Andy Burnham — the Greater Manchester mayor who has flirted with the leadership — remarked last year that he would like to rejoin the EU in his lifetime (he’s 56). London Mayor Sadiq Khan said “in the medium to long term, yes, of course, I would like to see us rejoining.” In the meantime Khan backs membership of the single market and customs union, which would still go far beyond No. 10’s red lines.  THE ISSUES-LED MPS Then there are the disparate — yet overlapping — groups of MPs whose views on Europe are guided by their politics, their constituencies or their professional interests. To Starmer’s left, backbench rebels including Richard Burgon and Dawn Butler backed the push toward a customs union by the opposition Lib Dems. The members of the left-wing Socialist Campaign Group frame their argument around fears Labour will lose voters to other progressive parties, namely the Lib Dems, Greens and SNP, if they fail to show adequate bonds with Europe. Some other, more centrist MPs fear similar. Labour MPs with a military background or in military-heavy seats also want the U.K. and EU to cooperate further. London MP Calvin Bailey, who spent more than two decades in the Royal Air Force, endorsed closer security relations between Britain and France through greater intelligence sharing and possibly permanent infrastructure. Alex Baker, whose Aldershot constituency is known as the home of the British Army, backed British involvement in a global Defense, Security and Resilience Bank, arguing it could be key to a U.K.-EU Defence and Security Pact. The government opted against joining such a scheme.   Parliamentarians keen for young people to bag more traveling rights were buoyed by a breakthrough on Erasmus+ membership for British students at the end of last year. More than 60 Labour MPs earlier signed a letter calling for a youth mobility scheme allowing 18 to 30-year-olds expanded travel opportunities on time limited visas. It was organized by Andrew Lewin, the Welywn Hatfield MP, and signatories included future Home Office Minister Mike Tapp (then a backbencher).  Labour also has an influential group of rural MPs, most elected in 2024, who are keen to boost cooperation and cut red tape for farmers. Rural MP Steve Witherden, on the party’s left, said: “Three quarters of Welsh food and drink exports go straight to the EU … regulatory alignment is a top priority for rural Labour MPs. Success here could point the way towards closer ties with Europe in other sectors.”  THE NOT-SO-SECRET EUROPHILES (A.K.A. ALL OF THE ABOVE) Many Labour figures argue that all of the above are actually just one mega-group — Labour MPs who want to be closer to Brussels, regardless of the mechanism. Menon agreed Labour camps are not formalized because most Labour MPs agree on working closely with Brussels. “I think it’s a mishmash,” he said. But he added: “I think these tribes will emerge or develop because there’s an intra-party fight looming, and Brexit is one of the issues people use to signal where they stand.” A fourth Labour MP agreed: “I didn’t think there was much of a distinction between the camps of people who want to get closer to the EU. The first I heard of that was over the weekend.”  The senior Labour official quoted above added: “I don’t think it cuts across tribes in such a clear way … a broader group of people just want us to move faster in terms of closeness into the EU, in terms of a whole load of things. I don’t think it fits neatly.” For years MPs were bound by a strategy of talking little about Brexit because it was so divisive with Labour’s voter base. That shifted over 2025. Labour advisers were buoyed by polls showing a rise in “Bregret” among some who voted for Brexit in 2016, as well as changing demographics (bluntly, young voters come of age while older voters die).  No. 10 aides also noted last summer that Farage, the leader of the right-wing populist party Reform UK, was making Brexit less central to his campaigning. Some aides (though others dispute this) credit individual advisers such as Tim Allan, No. 10’s director of communications, as helping a more openly EU-friendly media strategy into being. For all the talk of tribes and camps, Labour doesn’t have warring Brexit factions in the same way that the Tories did at the height of the EU divorce in the 2010s. | Jakub Porzycki/Getty Images THE BLUE LABOUR HOLDOUTS  Not everyone in Labour wants to hug Brussels tight.  A small but significant rump of Labour MPs, largely from the socially conservative Blue Labour tribe, is anxious that pursuing closer ties could be seen as a rejection of the Brexit referendum — and a betrayal of voters in Leave-backing seats who are looking to Reform. One of them, Liverpool MP Dan Carden, said the failure of both London and Brussels to strike a recent deal on defense funding, even amid threats from Russia, showed Brussels is not serious.   “Any Labour MP who thinks that the U.K. can get closer to the single market or the customs union without giving up freedoms and taking instruction from an EU that we’re not a part of is living in cloud cuckoo land,” he said. A similar skepticism of the EU’s authority is echoed by the Tony Blair Institute (TBI), led by one of the most pro-European prime ministers in Britain’s history. The TBI has been meeting politicians in Brussels and published a paper translated into French, German and Italian in a bid to shape the EU’s future from within.   Ryan Wain, the TBI’s senior director for policy and politics, argued: “We live in a G2 world where there are two superpowers, China and the U.S. By the middle of this century there will likely be three, with India. To me, it’s just abysmal that Europe isn’t mentioned in that at all. It has massive potential to adapt and reclaim its influence, but that opportunity needs to be unlocked.”  Such holdouts enjoy a strange alliance with left-wing Euroskeptics (“Lexiteers”), who believe the EU does not have the interests of workers at its heart. But few of these were ever in Labour and few remain; former Leader Jeremy Corbyn has long since been cast out. At the same time many Labour MPs in Leave-voting areas, who opposed efforts to stop Brexit in the late 2010s, now support closer alignment with Brussels to help their local car and chemical industries. As such, there are now 20 or fewer MPs holding their noses on closer alignment. Just three Labour MPs, including fellow Blue Labour supporter Jonathan Brash, voted against a bill supporting a customs union proposed by the centrist, pro-Europe Lib Dems last month.  WHERE WILL IT ALL END?  For all the talk of tribes and camps, Labour doesn’t have warring Brexit factions in the same way that the Tories did at the height of the EU divorce in the 2010s. Most MPs agree on closer alignment with the EU; the question is how they get there.  Even so, Menon has a warning from the last Brexit wars. Back in the late 2010s, Conservative MPs would jostle to set out their positions — workable or otherwise. The crowded field just made negotiations with Brussels harder. “We end up with absolutely batshit stupid positions when viewed from the EU,” said Menon, “because they’re being derived as a function of the need to position yourself in a British political party.” But few of these were ever in Labour and few remain; former Leader Jeremy Corbyn has long since been cast out. | Seiya Tanase/Getty Images The saving grace could be that most Labour MPs are united by a deeper gut feeling about the EU — one that, Baldwin argues, is reflected in Starmer himself. The PM’s biographer said: “At heart, Keir Starmer is an outward-looking internationalist whose pro-European beliefs are derived from what he calls the ‘blood-bond’ of 1945 and shared values, rather than the more transactional trade benefits of 1973,” when Britain joined the European Economic Community.  All that remains is to turn a “blood-bond” into hard policy. Simple, right?

BRUSSELS — If European governments didn’t realize before that Donald Trump’s threats to seize Greenland were serious, they do now. Policymakers are no longer ignoring the U.S. president’s ramped-up rhetoric — and are desperately searching for a plan to stop him. “We must be ready for a direct confrontation with Trump,” said an EU diplomat briefed on ongoing discussions. “He is in an aggressive mode, and we need to be geared up.” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Wednesday that he planned to discuss a U.S. acquisition of Greenland with Danish officials next week. The White House said Trump’s preference would be to acquire the territory through a negotiation and also that it would consider purchasing the island — but that a military takeover was possible. As diplomatic efforts intensified in Europe, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said he and his counterparts from Germany and Poland had discussed a joint European response to Trump’s threats. “What is at stake is the question of how Europe, the EU, can be strengthened to deter threats, attempts on its security and interests,” Barrot told reporters. “Greenland is not for sale, and it is not for taking … so the threats must stop.” POLITICO spoke with officials, diplomats, experts and NATO insiders to map out how Europe could deter the U.S. president from getting that far, and what its options are if he does. They were granted anonymity to speak freely. “Everyone is very stunned and unaware of what we actually have in the toolbox,” said a former Danish MP. “No one really knows what to do because the Americans can do whatever they want. But we need answers to these questions immediately. They can’t wait three or five or seven years.” On Wednesday, POLITICO set out the steps Trump could take to seize Greenland. Now here’s the flip side: What Europe does to stop him. OPTION 1: FIND A COMPROMISE Trump says Greenland is vital for U.S. security interests and accuses Denmark of not doing enough to protect it against increasing Chinese and Russian military activity in the Arctic.  A negotiated settlement that sees Trump come out of talks with something he can sell as a win and that allows Denmark and Greenland to save face is perhaps the fastest route out of trouble. A former senior NATO official suggested the alliance could mediate between Greenland, Denmark and the U.S., as it has done with alliance members Turkey and Greece over their disputes. U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker said on Wednesday that Trump and his advisers do not believe Greenland is properly secured. | Omar Havana/Getty Images U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker said on Wednesday that Trump and his advisers do not believe Greenland is properly secured. “As the ice thaws and as the routes in the Arctic and the High North open up … Greenland becomes a very serious security risk for the mainland of the United States of America.” NATO allies are also mulling fresh overtures to Trump that could bolster Greenland’s security, despite a widely held view that any direct threat from Russian and Chinese ships to the territory is overstated. Among other proposals, the alliance should consider accelerating defense spending on the Arctic, holding more military exercises in the region, and posting troops to secure Greenland and reassure the U.S. if necessary, according to three NATO diplomats.  The alliance should also be open to setting up an “Arctic Sentry” scheme — shifting its military assets to the region — similar to its Eastern Sentry and Baltic Sentry initiatives, two of the diplomats said. “Anything that can be done” to bolster the alliance’s presence near Greenland and meet Trump’s demands “should be maxed out,” said one of the NATO diplomats cited above. Trump also says he wants Greenland for its vast mineral deposits and potential oil and gas reserves. But there’s a reason Greenland has remained largely untapped: Extracting resources from its inhospitable terrain is difficult and very expensive, making them less competitive than Chinese imports. Denmark’s envoys say they tried for years to make the case for investment in Greenland, but their European counterparts weren’t receptive — though an EU diplomat familiar with the matter said there are signs that attitude is shifting. OPTION 2: GIVE GREENLAND A TON OF CASH The Trump administration has thrown its weight behind Greenland’s independence movement. The pitch is that if the Arctic territory leaves the Kingdom of Denmark and signs up to a deal with the U.S., it will be flooded with American cash.  While Trump has repeatedly refused to rule out using military force to take Greenland, he has also insisted he wants it to come willingly. The EU and Denmark are trying to convince Greenlanders that they can give them a better deal. Brussels is planning to more than double its spending on Greenland from 2028 under long-term budget plans drawn up after Trump started to make claims on the Danish-held territory, according to a draft proposal from the European Commission published in September. Under the plans, which are subject to further negotiations among member countries, the EU would almost double spending on Greenland to €530 million for a seven-year period starting in 2028.  That comes on top of the money Denmark sends Greenland as part of its agreement with the self-governing territory. Greenland would also be eligible to apply for an additional €44 million in EU funding for remote territories associated with European countries, per the same document. Danish and European support currently focuses mainly on welfare, health care, education and the territory’s green transition. Under the new spending plans, that focus would expand to developing the island’s ability to extract mineral resources. “We have many, many people below the poverty line, and the infrastructure in Greenland is lagging, and our resources are primarily taken out without good profit to Greenland but mostly profit to Danish companies,” said Kuno Fencker, a pro-independence Greenlandic opposition MP.  An attractive offer from Denmark and the EU could be enough to keep Greenlanders out of America’s grasp. OPTION 3: RETALIATE ECONOMICALLY Since Trump’s first term in office, “there’s been a lot of effort to try and think through how we ensure European security, Nordic security, Arctic security, without the U.S. actively involved,” said Thomas Crosbie, a U.S. military expert at the Royal Danish Defense College, which provides training and education for the Danish defense force. “That’s hard, but it’s possible. But I don’t know if anyone has seriously contemplated ensuring European security against America. It’s just crazy,” Crosbie said. The EU does have one strong political tool at its disposal, which it could use to deter Trump: the Anti-Coercion Instrument, the “trade bazooka” created after the first Trump administration, which allows the EU to retaliate against trade discrimination. The EU threatened to deploy it after Trump slapped tariffs on the bloc but shelved it in July after the two sides reached a deal. With the U.S. still imposing tariffs on the EU, Brussels could bring the bazooka back out. “We have exports to the United States a bit above €600 billion, and for around one-third of those goods we have a market share of more than 50 percent and it’s totally clear that this is also the power in our hands,” said Bernd Lange, chair of the European Parliament’s trade committee. But Trump would have to believe the EU was serious, given that all its tough talk amounted to nothing the last time around. OPTION 4: BOOTS ON THE GROUND If the U.S. does decide to take Greenland by military force, there’s little Europeans could do to prevent it.  “They are not going to preemptively attack Americans before they claim Greenland, because that would be done before an act of war,” said Crosbie, the Danish military educator. “But in terms of responding to the first move, it really depends. If the Americans have a very small group of people, you could try and arrest those people, because there’d be a criminal act.” It’s a different story if the U.S. goes in hard. Legally speaking, it’s possible Denmark would be forced to respond militarily. Under a 1952 standing order, troops should “immediately take up the fight without waiting for, or seeking orders” in “the event of an attack on Danish territory.” European countries should weigh the possibility of deploying troops to Greenland — if Denmark requests it — to increase the potential cost of U.S. military action, an EU diplomat said, echoing suggestions that Berlin and Paris could send forces to deter any incursion. While those forces are unlikely to be able to withstand a U.S. invasion, they would act as a deterrent. “You could have a tripwire effect where you have some groups of people who are physically in the way, like a Tiananmen Square-type situation, which would potentially force the [U.S.] military to use violence” or to back down, said Crosbie.  But that strategy comes at a high cost, he said. “This is completely unexplored territory, but it is quite possible that people’s lives will be lost in the attempt to reject the American claim over Greenland.” Gerardo Fortuna, Clea Caulcutt and Eli Stokols contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is determined to travel to South America next week to sign the EU’s long-delayed trade pact with the Mercosur bloc, but she’s having to make last-minute pledges to Europe’s farmers in order to board that flight. EU countries are set to make a pivotal decision on Friday on whether the contentious deal with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — which has been more than a quarter of a century in the making — will finally get over the line. It’s still not certain that von der Leyen can secure the majority she needs on Friday; everything boils down to whether Italy, the key swing voter, will support the accord. To secure Rome’s backing, von der Leyen on Tuesday rolled out some extra budget promises on farm funding. The target was clear: Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose refusal to back the Mercosur agreement forced von der Leyen to cancel her planned signing trip in December. At its heart, the Mercosur agreement is a drive by Europe’s big manufacturers to sell more cars, machinery and chemicals in Latin America, while the agri powerhouses of the southern hemisphere will secure greater access to sell food to Europe — a prospect that terrifies EU farmers. While Germany and Spain have long led the charge for a deal, France and Poland are dead-set against. That leaves Italy as the key member country poised to cast the deciding vote. Von der Leyen’s letter on Tuesday was carefully choreographed political theater. Writing to the EU Council presidency and European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, she offered earlier access to up to €45 billion in agricultural funding under the bloc’s next long-term budget, while reaffirming €293.7 billion in farm spending after 2027. POLITICO was the first to report on Monday that the declaration was in the works. She insisted the measures in her letter would “provide the farmers and rural communities with an unprecedented level of support, in some respects even higher than in the current budget cycle.” The money isn’t new — it’s being brought forward from an existing pot in the EU’s next long-term budget — but governments can now lock it in for farmers early, before it is reassigned during later budget negotiations. Von der Leyen framed the move as offering stability and crisis readiness, giving Meloni a tangible win she can parade to her powerful farm lobby. WILL MELONI BACK MERCOSUR? The big question is whether Italy will view von der Leyen’s promises as going far enough ahead of the crunch meeting on Friday. Early signs suggested Rome might be softening. Meloni issued a statement saying the farm funding pledge was “a positive and significant step forward in the negotiations leading to the new EU budget,” but conspicuously avoided making a direct link to Mercosur. (French President Emmanuel Macron also welcomed von der Leyen’s letter, but there’s no prospect of Paris backing Mercosur on Friday.) taly’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose refusal to back the Mercosur agreement forced Ursula von der Leyen to cancel her planned signing trip in December. | Tom Nicholson/Getty Images Nicola Procaccini, a close Meloni ally in the European Parliament, told POLITICO: “We are moving in the right direction to enable Italy to sign Mercosur.” Right direction, but not yet at the destination? The government in Rome would not comment on whether it was about to back the deal. Germany, the EU’s industrial kingpin, is keen to secure a Mercosur agreement to boost its exports, but is still wary as to whether sufficient support exists to finalize an accord on Friday. A German official cautioned everything was still to play for. “A qualified majority is emerging, but it’s not a done deal yet. Until we have the result, there’s no reason to sit back and relax,” the official said. Optimism is growing regarding Rome in the pro-Mercosur camp, however. After all, the pact is widely viewed as strongly in the interests not only of Italy’s engineering companies, but also of its high-end wine and food producers, which are big exporters to South America. Additional curveballs are being thrown by Romania and Czechia, said one EU diplomat, who expressed concern they could turn against the deal on Friday, reducing any majority to very tight margins. The diplomat said they believed Italy would back the deal, however. FINAL STRETCH? The maneuvering is set to continue on Wednesday, when agriculture ministers descend on Brussels for what the Commission is billing as a “political meeting” after December’s farm protests. Officially, Mercosur isn’t on the agenda. Unofficially, however, it’s expected to be omnipresent — in the corridors, in the side meetings, and in the questions ministers choose not to answer. Farm ministers don’t approve trade deals, but the optics matter. Von der Leyen needs momentum — and cover — ahead of Friday’s vote. France — the country most hostile to the deal — will be vocal. On Wednesday, French Agriculture Minister Annie Genevard is expected to open yet another offensive — this time for a lower trigger on emergency safeguards related to the deal. This would reopen a compromise already struck between EU governments, the Parliament and the Commission. It’s a familiar tactic: Keep pushing. “France is still not satisfied with the proposals made by the Commission,” a French agriculture ministry official told reporters on Tuesday, while acknowledging that there has been some improvement. “Paris’ strategy for this week is still to continue to look for a blocking minority.” “Italy has its own strategy, we have ours,” added the official, who was granted anonymity in line with the rules for French government briefings. France’s allies, notably Poland, are equally blunt. Agriculture Minister Stefan Krajewski said the priority was simply “to block this agreement.” If that failed, Warsaw would seek maximum safeguards and compensation. That means it’s all coming down to the wire on Friday. A second failure to dispatch von der Leyen to finalize the agreement would be deeply embarrassing, and would only stoke Berlin’s anger at other EU countries thwarting the deal. For now, it’s still unclear whether von der Leyen will board that plane. Bartosz Brzeziński reported from Brussels, Giorgio Leali reported from Paris, and Nette Nöstlinger reported from Berlin.

BRUSSELS — Brussels is making a final push to get the European Union’s long-awaited trade deal with the Latin American Mercosur bloc over the finish line this week. The European Commission is expected to issue a declaration aimed at reassuring countries that have held out against the deal before a decisive vote on Friday, five officials with direct knowledge of the discussions told POLITICO. While the substance of the declaration is still unclear some of the officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, suggested they could include reassurances on payments to European farmers. That would be critical for winning back the support of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who pulled the emergency brake before an EU leaders’ summit in Brussels last month under pressure from her country’s powerful farming lobby. Under the EU’s voting rules, a so-called qualified majority — of 15 out of the bloc’s 27 member countries representing 65 percent of its population — would be needed to back the deal that has been in the works for a quarter century. Italy, with its large population, effectively holds the casting vote. If the Commission can offer reassurances on some money for farmers under the EU’s next seven-year budget, which runs from 2028 to 2034, that would help soften the impact of a proposed one-fifth reduction in the Common Agricultural Policy, under which the bloc distributes subsidies to farmers. The new concessions may not win over France and Poland, the main opponents of the accord with Mercosur — which groups Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. But, without Italy, they and their allies would lack the votes to block the deal on Friday. The agriculture ministers of France and Poland are expected to visit Brussels Wednesday to seek reassurances that supplementary safeguards agreed on by the EU institutions to prevent European farmers from being undercut by a possible glut of South American produce are strong enough. If the vote goes through, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen would finally be free to fly to Paraguay as early as next week to sign the deal, which has been under negotiation for over a quarter of a century and would create a free-trade area of more than 700 million people and abolish duties on 90 percent of EU exports. If the vote goes through, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen would finally be free to fly to Paraguay as early as next week to sign the deal. | Olivier Hoslet/EPA POLITICO has reached out to the European Commission for comment. Earlier on Monday, chief spokesperson Paula Pinho said: “We are on the right track to envisage a signing of the agreement and we do hope that will take place quite soon.” The Italian government did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

President Donald Trump said he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had an “amazing meeting” in South Korea in October. More than two months later, there’s still no formal agreement, however, leaving the commitments from both sides fuzzy and lowering expectations for a broader trade deal in 2026. Trump labeled his Oct. 30 meeting with Xi “a 12” out of 10, and the White House announced a series of measures the two sides agreed to in an effort to cool their trade war. That included, crucially, restarting Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products like soybeans and the elimination of Beijing’s restrictions on critical minerals exports. In exchange, the U.S. agreed to extend a pause on triple-digit tariffs on Chinese goods. A Chinese Commerce Ministry statement, however, did not confirm those commitments, although it did acknowledge the U.S. tariff pause. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer in late October told reporters that negotiators were “moving forward to the final details” of an agreement. Weeks later, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the administration hoped to finalize the rare earth provisions of the deal by Thanksgiving. That deadline passed without any public text or announcement. The lack of written terms, affirmed by both sides, has allowed both the Trump administration and Chinese government wiggle room in how they implement their trade truce, but critics say it also leaves the commitments open to competing interpretations — and, inevitably, more conflict down the line. The absence of a wider U.S.-China deal going forward will make the irritants that roiled trade ties in 2025 — tit-for-tat tariff hikes, export curbs on key items and targeted import shutdowns — potential tripwires for fresh economic chaos in the coming year. “This is not complicated,” said Cameron Johnson, a senior partner at Shanghai-based supply chain consultancy Tidalwave Solutions. “The Chinese may or may not be slow rolling this but this is Diplomacy 101 — what have you agreed to and what’s the time frame?” They also say it bodes poorly for the type of sweeping trade realignment between the world’s two largest economies that Trump promised at the start of his term. The president has touted an upcoming visit to Beijing in April as the next step in the talks. “If they can’t even agree to something along the lines of what the U.S. fact sheet was and what the broad outlines of the commitments are, it raises concern about how much of a joint understanding there is about the follow through,” said Greta Peisch, a partner at Wiley Rein law firm in D.C. and former general counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative under President Joe Biden. The White House, nonetheless, remains upbeat about the prospects for U.S.-China trade ties. “President Trump’s close relationship with President Xi is helping ensure that both countries are able to continue building on progress and continue resolving outstanding issues,” the White House said in a statement, adding that the administration “continues to monitor China’s compliance with our trade agreement.” A USTR official pointed to previously released statements outlining the administration’s expectations from China. The Treasury Department did not respond to a request for comment. Allies of the president argue that leaving the October understanding unwritten is not a failure but a feature of Trump’s strategy, giving both sides flexibility to manage tensions without triggering disputes over minor compliance disagreements. “The Chinese don’t want a real, definitive agreement, and on Trump’s side, in some ways, he’s better off as well, assuming that they live up to their spoken commitments,” said Wilbur Ross, who served as Commerce secretary in Trump’s first term. But there are already signs of confusion. The White House fact sheet released Nov. 1 said China had agreed to buy 12 million tons of U.S. soybeans by the end of 2025. The Chinese Commerce Ministry statement referred only to “expanding agricultural trade,” rather than a specific soybean target. Beijing has begun buying U.S. soybeans again, totaling at least 4 million metric tons since late October, well off pace to meet the 12 million mark in 2025. Greer told senators last month that the White House fact sheet reflected a “discrepancy” in timing, saying the initial purchases were intended to occur over the current crop year — generally understood to run into mid- to late 2026 — rather than within a single calendar year. The spokesperson for the Chinese embassy, Liu Pengyu, declined to comment on whether China would meet its soybean purchase commitment. U.S. soybean farmers worry, meanwhile, that China’s purchase commitments are vulnerable if there’s a fresh rupture in trade ties. The deal’s lack of transparency is also hitting industries that rely on China’s rare earth magnet supplies. Rare earths are essential for producing everything from washing machines and iPhones to medical equipment. When China announced sweeping new export restrictions in October, it set off alarms across global manufacturing supply chains. The White House says China agreed to keep rare earths and magnets flowing, but companies say shipments are still gated by licensing and remain unpredictable. “Supply chains are slowing down and certain investments that potentially could be made aren’t being made because business doesn’t have certainty of what the [rare earths] road map looks like,” Johnson said. Meanwhile U.S. trade sweeteners for Beijing just keep coming. Trump on Dec. 8 announced that Nvidia would be allowed to sell its powerful H200 artificial intelligence chip in China — despite concerns the move could give Beijing a technological edge at U.S. expense. There has been no sign of reciprocal moves by Beijing. It’s prompted warnings from national security hawks that Beijing will feel emboldened to demand the U.S. lift similar restrictions on cutting-edge tech in future trade talks. “President Trump has taken more direct control of China policy in a way that he hadn’t in his first term, so we’re seeing his own personal inclination manifesting more clearly than before,” said Christopher Adams, former senior coordinator for China affairs at the Treasury Department and now senior adviser at Covington and Burling. “And he prioritizes transactional dealmaking over pushing national security concerns.” It also could disincentivize Beijing from pursuing more ambitious trade goals with the U.S. over the coming year and from putting things on paper going forward, said Peter Harrell, former senior director for international economics on Biden’s national security council. “The Chinese understand that as long as they meet some minimal expectations on soybeans and rare earth exports, they’re not going to face a ton of immediate pressure to be nailed down on final texts,” he said. That falls short of what the administration pitched when it launched its “Liberation Day” tariff campaign in April, with Bessent predicting the pressure of Trump’s steep “reciprocal” tariffs would force China to shift away from its export-driven economic model. That same month Trump predicted Beijing would rush to negotiate trade terms to avoid being locked out of the U.S. market. What ensued was a cycle of escalating tariffs that briefly hit triple digits and a weaponization of export curbs targeted at each other’s key economic vulnerabilities until Trump and Xi ceased hostilities in October. “We settled for a pretty limited bilateral deal without any kind of broad market access or structural reforms aimed at addressing unfair competition or Chinese [industrial] overcapacity,” said Barbara Weisel, a former U.S. trade negotiator from 1994 to 2017 now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.