The head of the U.S. oil industry’s top lobbying group said Tuesday that American producers are prepared to be a “stabilizing force” in Iran if the regime there falls — even as they remain skeptical about returning to Venezuela after the capture of leader Nicolás Maduro. “This is good news for the Iranian people — they’re taking freedom into their own hands,” American Petroleum Institute President Mike Sommers said of the mass protests that have embroiled Iran in recent days. President Donald Trump is said to be weighing his options for potential actions against the Iranian government in response to its violent crackdown on the protests. “Our industry is committed to being a stabilizing force in Iran if they decide to overturn the regime,” Sommers told reporters following API’s annual State of American Energy event in Washington. “It’s an important oil play in the world, about the sixth-largest producer now — they could absolutely do more,” he said of the country. Iran’s oil industry, despite being ravaged by years of U.S. sanctions, is still considered to be structurally sound, unlike that of Venezuela’s. In order for companies to return to Venezuela, on the other hand, they will need long-term investment certainty, operational security and rule of law — all of which will take significant time, Sommers said. “If they get those three big things right, I think there will be investment going to Venezuela,” he said. Background: Experts who spoke earlier from the stage at API’s event also underscored the differences between Iran and Venezuela, whose oil infrastructure has deteriorated under years of neglect from the socialist regime. “Iran was able to add production under the weight of the most aggressive sanctions the U.S. could possibly deploy,” said Kevin Book, managing director at the energy research firm ClearView Energy Partners. “Imagine what they could do with Western engineering.” Bob McNally, a former national security and energy adviser to President George W. Bush who now leads the energy and geopolitics consulting firm Rapidan Energy Group, said the prospects for growing Iran’s oil production are “completely different” from Venezuela’s. “You can imagine our industry going back there — we would get a lot more oil, a lot sooner than we will out of Venezuela,” McNally said. “That’s more conventional oil right near infrastructure, and gas as well.” No equity stakes: Sommers told reporters that API would oppose any efforts by the Trump administration to take a stake in oil companies that invest in Venezuela. The administration has taken direct equity stakes in a range of U.S. companies in a bid to boost the growth of sectors it sees as a geopolitical priority, such as semiconductor manufacturing and critical minerals. “We would be opposed to the United States government taking a stake in any American oil and gas companies, period,” Sommers said. “We’d have to know a little bit more about what the administration is proposing in terms of stake in [Venezuelan state-owned oil company] PdVSA, but we’re not for the nationalization of oil companies or for there to be a national oil company in the United States.”

LONDON — The union representing British nurses is under fire from some of its own members over what they say is an opaque investment strategy linked to companies investing in Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories. A report sent to Royal College of Nursing (RCN) management by activist group Nurses for Palestine and NGO Corporate Watch, and obtained by POLITICO, argues that the union’s choice of investment managers Legal & General and Sarasins is at odds with its own ethical investment policy. Members of the group say they don’t know exactly which shares the union holds in its portfolio, because the union’s management hasn’t informed them. The report points to a list of companies held by the RCN’s fund managers, including U.S. tech firm Palantir and Israeli arms-maker Elbit Systems, which activists say should be enough for the union to put its money elsewhere. A spokesperson for the RCN declined to say which companies were in its portfolio when contacted by POLITICO. The group said it was “committed to social responsibility” and stressed that it did not invest in weapons manufacturing or any “ethically unacceptable practices.” ‘TRUE ETHICAL INVESTMENT’ The Nurses for Palestine and NGO Corporate Watch report draws on a United Nations investigation into what its human rights council calls Israel’s “Economy of Genocide” to identify companies that activists say link fund managers to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories. The International Court of Justice is currently considering allegations of genocide against Israel, while an independent U.N. inquiry found Israel was committing genocide against the Palestinians. Israel has adamantly rejected those allegations and argued it upholds its obligations under international law. The companies named in the UN report include U.S. tech firms that provide Israel with cloud and artificial intelligence technology. These are among the most widely held shares in the world and are mainstays in the portfolios offered by popular fund managers, which often track the performance of the stock market. A Palantir spokesperson told POLITICO the company rejected its inclusion in the U.N. report and referred to previous statements clarifying its partnership with the Israeli military. The report — which follows two open letters whose signatories include 100 RCN members — does not present evidence that the union directly holds shares in companies more directly involved in the arms trade. But it argues that “true ethical investment” should look beyond investors’ own portfolios and at their fund managers’ “wider practices.” The RCN spokesperson said: “Despite the globalised nature of investments, our indirect exposure — to companies that we may not directly invest in — is a fraction of a single percentage.” According to its latest annual report, the RCN Group (including the union and its charitable foundation) had a combined investment portfolio worth £143.6 million as of Dec. 31, 2024. Sarasins said in a statement that it takes a “rigorous approach to identifying and assessing any potential exposure to human-rights risks across the many companies we invest in on behalf of our clients.”  “The situation in Gaza is evolving, and we are in the process of considering targeted engagement approaches and discussing these with expert contacts and stakeholders,” the firm said. A spokesperson for L&G said all of its investments were in line with international laws and regulations and that any holdings in the companies named in the report were part of “broad, global market indices.”

President Donald Trump said he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had an “amazing meeting” in South Korea in October. More than two months later, there’s still no formal agreement, however, leaving the commitments from both sides fuzzy and lowering expectations for a broader trade deal in 2026. Trump labeled his Oct. 30 meeting with Xi “a 12” out of 10, and the White House announced a series of measures the two sides agreed to in an effort to cool their trade war. That included, crucially, restarting Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products like soybeans and the elimination of Beijing’s restrictions on critical minerals exports. In exchange, the U.S. agreed to extend a pause on triple-digit tariffs on Chinese goods. A Chinese Commerce Ministry statement, however, did not confirm those commitments, although it did acknowledge the U.S. tariff pause. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer in late October told reporters that negotiators were “moving forward to the final details” of an agreement. Weeks later, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the administration hoped to finalize the rare earth provisions of the deal by Thanksgiving. That deadline passed without any public text or announcement. The lack of written terms, affirmed by both sides, has allowed both the Trump administration and Chinese government wiggle room in how they implement their trade truce, but critics say it also leaves the commitments open to competing interpretations — and, inevitably, more conflict down the line. The absence of a wider U.S.-China deal going forward will make the irritants that roiled trade ties in 2025 — tit-for-tat tariff hikes, export curbs on key items and targeted import shutdowns — potential tripwires for fresh economic chaos in the coming year. “This is not complicated,” said Cameron Johnson, a senior partner at Shanghai-based supply chain consultancy Tidalwave Solutions. “The Chinese may or may not be slow rolling this but this is Diplomacy 101 — what have you agreed to and what’s the time frame?” They also say it bodes poorly for the type of sweeping trade realignment between the world’s two largest economies that Trump promised at the start of his term. The president has touted an upcoming visit to Beijing in April as the next step in the talks. “If they can’t even agree to something along the lines of what the U.S. fact sheet was and what the broad outlines of the commitments are, it raises concern about how much of a joint understanding there is about the follow through,” said Greta Peisch, a partner at Wiley Rein law firm in D.C. and former general counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative under President Joe Biden. The White House, nonetheless, remains upbeat about the prospects for U.S.-China trade ties. “President Trump’s close relationship with President Xi is helping ensure that both countries are able to continue building on progress and continue resolving outstanding issues,” the White House said in a statement, adding that the administration “continues to monitor China’s compliance with our trade agreement.” A USTR official pointed to previously released statements outlining the administration’s expectations from China. The Treasury Department did not respond to a request for comment. Allies of the president argue that leaving the October understanding unwritten is not a failure but a feature of Trump’s strategy, giving both sides flexibility to manage tensions without triggering disputes over minor compliance disagreements. “The Chinese don’t want a real, definitive agreement, and on Trump’s side, in some ways, he’s better off as well, assuming that they live up to their spoken commitments,” said Wilbur Ross, who served as Commerce secretary in Trump’s first term. But there are already signs of confusion. The White House fact sheet released Nov. 1 said China had agreed to buy 12 million tons of U.S. soybeans by the end of 2025. The Chinese Commerce Ministry statement referred only to “expanding agricultural trade,” rather than a specific soybean target. Beijing has begun buying U.S. soybeans again, totaling at least 4 million metric tons since late October, well off pace to meet the 12 million mark in 2025. Greer told senators last month that the White House fact sheet reflected a “discrepancy” in timing, saying the initial purchases were intended to occur over the current crop year — generally understood to run into mid- to late 2026 — rather than within a single calendar year. The spokesperson for the Chinese embassy, Liu Pengyu, declined to comment on whether China would meet its soybean purchase commitment. U.S. soybean farmers worry, meanwhile, that China’s purchase commitments are vulnerable if there’s a fresh rupture in trade ties. The deal’s lack of transparency is also hitting industries that rely on China’s rare earth magnet supplies. Rare earths are essential for producing everything from washing machines and iPhones to medical equipment. When China announced sweeping new export restrictions in October, it set off alarms across global manufacturing supply chains. The White House says China agreed to keep rare earths and magnets flowing, but companies say shipments are still gated by licensing and remain unpredictable. “Supply chains are slowing down and certain investments that potentially could be made aren’t being made because business doesn’t have certainty of what the [rare earths] road map looks like,” Johnson said. Meanwhile U.S. trade sweeteners for Beijing just keep coming. Trump on Dec. 8 announced that Nvidia would be allowed to sell its powerful H200 artificial intelligence chip in China — despite concerns the move could give Beijing a technological edge at U.S. expense. There has been no sign of reciprocal moves by Beijing. It’s prompted warnings from national security hawks that Beijing will feel emboldened to demand the U.S. lift similar restrictions on cutting-edge tech in future trade talks. “President Trump has taken more direct control of China policy in a way that he hadn’t in his first term, so we’re seeing his own personal inclination manifesting more clearly than before,” said Christopher Adams, former senior coordinator for China affairs at the Treasury Department and now senior adviser at Covington and Burling. “And he prioritizes transactional dealmaking over pushing national security concerns.” It also could disincentivize Beijing from pursuing more ambitious trade goals with the U.S. over the coming year and from putting things on paper going forward, said Peter Harrell, former senior director for international economics on Biden’s national security council. “The Chinese understand that as long as they meet some minimal expectations on soybeans and rare earth exports, they’re not going to face a ton of immediate pressure to be nailed down on final texts,” he said. That falls short of what the administration pitched when it launched its “Liberation Day” tariff campaign in April, with Bessent predicting the pressure of Trump’s steep “reciprocal” tariffs would force China to shift away from its export-driven economic model. That same month Trump predicted Beijing would rush to negotiate trade terms to avoid being locked out of the U.S. market. What ensued was a cycle of escalating tariffs that briefly hit triple digits and a weaponization of export curbs targeted at each other’s key economic vulnerabilities until Trump and Xi ceased hostilities in October. “We settled for a pretty limited bilateral deal without any kind of broad market access or structural reforms aimed at addressing unfair competition or Chinese [industrial] overcapacity,” said Barbara Weisel, a former U.S. trade negotiator from 1994 to 2017 now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Poland has signed a multi-billion euro contract to develop domestic capacity for manufacturing precision-guided rockets for its HOMAR-K multiple rocket launcher program, the state-run Armament Agency said Monday. The 14 billion złoty (€3.3 billion) deal, which expands on a series of major defense contracts with Warsaw’s South Korean partners, covers the delivery of 239-mm CGR-080 precision-guided rockets with a range of 80 kilometers. The missiles will be produced in a newly-built facility in Poland starting in 2030 by a consortium led by Polish-Korean joint-venture Hanwha WB Advanced System together with Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace.  The deal is the third in a sequence linked to the HOMAR-K program. The first contract, signed in November 2022, covered the supply of 218 Korean K239 Chunmoo launcher modules, along with their integration onto the Polish-made Jelcz truck chassis. The pact also included logistics and training packages, a stock of missiles (including larger 607-mm tactical weapons with a range of 290 km) and technical support. The second contract, signed in April 2024, provided for 72 additional launcher modules, logistics and training, integration work, more missiles and further technical support. Poland has earmarked 4.8 percent of its GDP for defense spending in 2026, making it NATO’s top spender relative to the size of its economy.

Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * This is sponsored content from AstraZeneca. * The advertisement is linked to public policy debates on the future of cancer care in the EU. More information here. Europe has made huge strides in the fight against cancer.[1] Survival rates have climbed, detection has improved and the continent has become home to some of the world’s most respected research hubs.[2],[3] None of that progress came easy — it was built on years of political attention and cooperation across borders. However, as we look to 2026 and beyond, that progress stands at a crossroads. Budget pressures and tougher global competition threaten to push cancer and health care down the EU agenda. Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan — a flagship initiative aimed at expanding screening, improving early detection and boosting collaboration — is set to expire in 2027, with no clear plan to secure or extend its gains.[4],[5] “My [hope is that we can continue] the work started with Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan and make it sustainable… [and] build on the lessons learned, [for other disease areas] ” says Antonella Cardone, CEO of Cancer Patients Europe. A new era in cancer treatment Concern about the lapsing initiative is compounded by two significant shifts in health care: declining investment and increasing scientific advancement. Firstly, Europe has seen the increased adoption of cost-containment policies by some member states. Under-investment in Europe in cancer medicines has been a challenge — specifically with late and uneven funding, and at lower levels than international peers such as the US — potentially leaving patients with slower and more limited access to life-saving therapies.[6],[7],[8] Meanwhile, the U.S., which pays on average double for medicines per capita than the EU,[9] is actively working to rebalance its relationship with pharmaceuticals to secure better pricing (“fair market value”) through policies across consecutive administrations.[10] All the while, China is rapidly scaling investment in biotech and clinical research, determined to capture the trials, talent, and capital that once flowed naturally to Europe.[11] The rebalancing of health and life-science investment can have significant consequences. If Europe does not stay attractive for life-sciences investment, the impact will extend beyond cancer patient outcomes. Jobs, tax revenues, advanced manufacturing, and Europe’s leadership in strategic industries are all at stake.[12] Secondly, medical science has never looked more promising.[7] Artificial intelligence is accelerating drug discovery, clinical trials, and diagnostics, and the number of approved medicines for patients across Europe has jumped from an average of one per year between 1995 and 2000 to 14 per year between 2021 and 2024.[13],[14],[15], [7] Digital health tools and innovative medtech startups are multiplying, increasing competitiveness and lowering costs — guiding care toward a future that is more personalized and precise.[16],[17] Europe stands at the threshold of a new era in cancer treatment. But if policymakers ease up now, progress could stall — and other regions, especially the U.S. and China, are more than ready to widen the innovation gap. Recognizing the strategic investment Health spending is generally treated as a budget item to be contained. Yet investment in cancer care has been one of Europe’s smartest economic bets.[18],[19] The sector anchors millions of high-skilled jobs (it employs around 29 million people in the EU[11]) and attracts global life sciences investment. According to the European Commission, the sector contributes nearly €1.5 trillion to the EU economy.[12] Studies from the Institute of Health Economics confirm that money put into research directly translates into better survival outcomes.[20] The same report shows that although the overall spend on cancer is increasing, the cost per patient has actually decreased since 1995, suggesting that innovative treatments are increasing efficiency.[20] Those gains matter not only to patients and families, but to Europe’s long-term stability: healthier populations mean fewer costs down the line, stronger productivity, and more sustainable public finances.[20] Fixing Europe’s access gap Cancer medicines bring transformative value — to patients, to society and to the wider economy. [21] However, even as oncology therapies advance, patients across Europe are not benefiting equally. EFPIA’s 2024 Patients W.A.I.T. indicator shows that, on average, just 46 percent of innovative medicines approved between 2020 and 2023 were available to patients in 2024.[22] On average, it takes 578 days for a new oncology medicine to reach European patients, and only 29 percent of drugs are fully available in all member states.[23] This is not caused by a lack of breakthrough medicines, but by national policy mechanisms that undervalue innovation. OECD and the Institute for Health Economics data show that divergent HTA requirements, rigid cost-effectiveness thresholds, price-volume clawbacks, ad hoc taxes on pharmaceutical revenues and slow national reimbursement decisions collectively suppress timely access to new cancer medicines across the EU.[24] These disparities cut against Europe’s long-standing reputation as a collection of societies that values equitable, high-quality care for all of its citizens. It risks eroding one of the EU’s defining strengths: the commitment to fairness and collective progress. Cancer policy solutions for the EU Although this is ultimately a matter for member states, embedding cancer as a permanent EU priority — backed by funding, coordination, and accountability — could give national systems the incentives and strategic direction to buck these trends. These actions will reassure pharmaceutical companies that Europe is serious about attracting clinical trials and the launch of new medicines, ensuring that its citizens, societies and economies enjoy the benefits this brings. Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan delivered progress, but its expiry presents a pivotal moment. 2026 and beyond bring a significant opportunity for the EU to build on this by ensuring that member states implement National Cancer Control Plans and have clear targets and accountability on their national performance, including on investment and access. To do this, EU policymakers should consider three actions as an immediate priority with lasting impact: * Embed cancer and investment within EU governance. Build it into the European Semester on health with mandatory indicators, regular reviews, and accountability frameworks to ensure continuity. This model worked well during Covid-19 and should be adapted for non-communicable diseases starting with cancer as a pilot. * Secure stable and sufficient funding. The Multiannual Financial Framework must ensure adequate funding for health and cancer to encourage coordinated initiatives across member states. * Strengthen EU-level coordination. Ensure that pan-EU structures such as the Comprehensive Cancer Centres and Cancer Mission Hubs are adequately funded and empowered. These are the building blocks of a lasting European commitment to cancer. With action, Europe can secure a sustainable foundation for patients, resilience and continued scientific excellence. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] European Commission, OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 2023. State of Health in the EU: Synthesis Report 2023. Available at: https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/state_2023_synthesis-report_en.pdf [Accessed December 2025] [2] Efpia. 2025. Cancer care 2025: an overview of cancer outcomes data across Europe. Available at: https://www.efpia.eu/news-events/the-efpia-view/statements-press-releases/ihe-cancer-comparator-report-2025/ [Accessed December 2025] [3] Cancer Core Europe. 2024. Cancer Core Europe: Advancing Cancer Care Through Collaboration. Available at: https://www.cancercoreeurope.eu/cce-advancing-cancer-care-collaboration/ [Accessed December 2025] [4] European Commission. 2021. Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan. Available at:https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/eu_cancer-plan_en_0.pdf [Accessed December 2025] [5] European Parliament. 2025. Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan: Implementation findings. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2025/765809/EPRS_STU(2025)765809_EN.pdf [Accessed December 2025] [6] Hofmarcher, T., et al. 2024. Access to Oncology Medicines in EU and OECD Countries (OECD Health Working Papers, No.170). OECD Publishing. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/09/access-to-oncology-medicines-in-eu-and-oecd-countries_6cf189fe/c263c014-en.pdf [Accessed December 2025] [7] Manzano, A., et al. 2025. Comparator Report on Cancer in Europe 2025 – Disease Burden, Costs and Access to Medicines and Molecular Diagnostics (IHE). Available at: https://ihe.se/app/uploads/2025/03/IHE-REPORT-2025_2_.pdf [Accessed December 2025] [8] Efpia. [no date]. Europe’s choice. Available at: https://www.efpia.eu/europes-choice/ [Accessed December 2025] [9] OECD. 2024. Prescription Drug Expenditure per Capita. https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=1&vw=tb&df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df[id]=DSD_SHA%40DF_SHA&df[ag]=OECD.ELS.HD&df[vs]=&pd=2015%2C&dq=.A.EXP_HEALTH.USD_PPP_PS%2BPT_EXP_HLTH._T..HC51%2BHC3.._T…&to[TIME_PERIOD]=false&lb=bt [Accessed December 2025] [10] The White House. 2025. Delivering most favored-nation prescription drug pricing to American patients. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/05/delivering-most-favored-nation-prescription-drug-pricing-to-american-patients/ [Accessed December 2025] [11] Eleanor Olcott, Haohsiang Ko and William Sandlund. 2025. The relentless rise of China’s Biotechs. Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c0a1b15b-84ee-4549-85eb-ed3341112ce5 [Accessed December 2025] [12] European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication. 2025. Making Europe a Global Leader in Life Sciences. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/making-europe-global-leader-life-sciences-2025-07-02_en [Accessed December 2025] [13] Financial Times. 2025. How AI is reshaping drug discovery. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8c8f3c10-9c26-4e27-bc1a-b7c3defb3d95 [Accessed December 2025] [14] Seedblink. 2025. Europe’s HealthTech investment landscape in 2025: A deep dive. https://seedblink.com/blog/2025-05-30-europes-healthtech-investment-landscape-in-2025-a-deep-dive [15] European Commission. [No date]. Artificial Intelligence in healthcare. Available at: https://health.ec.europa.eu/ehealth-digital-health-and-care/artificial-intelligence-healthcare_en [Accessed December 2025] [16] Codina, O. 2025. Code meets care: 20 European HealthTech startups to watch in 2025 and beyond. EU-Startups. Available at: https://www.eu-startups.com/2025/06/code-meets-care-20-european-healthtech-startups-to-watch-in-2025-and-beyond [Accessed December 2025] [17] Protogiros et al. 2025. Achieving digital transformation in cancer care across Europe: Practical recommendations from the TRANSiTION project. Journal of Cancer Policy. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213538325000281 [Accessed December 2025] [18] R-Health Consult. [no date]. The case for investing in a healthier future for the European Union. EFPIA. Available at: https://www.efpia.eu/media/xpkbiap5/the-case-for-investing-in-a-healthier-future-for-the-european-union.pdf [Accessed December 2025] [19] Pousette A., Hofmarcher T. 2024.Tackling inequalities in cancer care in the European Union. Available at: https://ihe.se/en/rapport/tackling-inequalities-in-cancer-care-in-the-european-union-2/ [Accessed December 2025] [20] Efpia. 2025. Comparator Report Cancer in Europe 2025. Available at: https://www.efpia.eu/media/0fbdi3hh/infographic-comparator-report-cancer-in-europe.pdf [Accessed December 2025] [21] Garau, E. et al. 2025. The Transformative Value of Cancer Medicines in Europe. Dolon Ltd. Available at: https://dolon.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/EOP_Investment-Value-of-Oncology-Medicines-White-Paper_2025-09-19-vF.pdf?x16809 [Accessed December 2025] [22] IQVIA. 2025. EFPIA Patients W.A.I.T. Indicator 2024 Survey. Available at: https://www.efpia.eu/media/oeganukm/efpia-patients-wait-indicator-2024-final-110425.pdf [Accessed December 2025] [23] Visentin M. 2025. Improving equitable access to medicines in Europe must remain a priority. The Parliament. Available at: https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/improving-equitable-access-to-medicines-in-europe-must-remain-a-priority [Accessed December 2025] [24] Hofmarcher, T. et al. 2025. Access to novel cancer medicines in Europe: inequities across countries and their drivers. ESMO Open. Available at: https://www.esmoopen.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2059-7029%2825%2901679-5 [Accessed December 2025]

President Donald Trump promised that a wave of emergency tariffs on nearly every nation would restore “fair” trade and jump-start the economy. Eight months later, half of U.S. imports are avoiding those tariffs. “To all of the foreign presidents, prime ministers, kings, queens, ambassadors, and everyone else who will soon be calling to ask for exemptions from these tariffs,” Trump said in April when he rolled out global tariffs based on the United States’ trade deficits with other countries, “I say, terminate your own tariffs, drop your barriers, don’t manipulate your currencies.” But in the time since the president gave that Rose Garden speech announcing the highest tariffs in a century, enormous holes have appeared. Carveouts for specific products, trade deals with major allies and conflicting import duties have let more than half of all imports escape his sweeping emergency tariffs. Some $1.6 trillion in annual imports are subject to the tariffs, while at least $1.7 trillion are excluded, either because they are duty-free or subject to another tariff, according to a POLITICO analysis based on last year’s import data. The exemptions on thousands of goods could undercut Trump’s effort to protect American manufacturing, shrink the trade deficit and raise new revenue to fund his domestic agenda. In September, the White House exempted hundreds of goods, including critical minerals and industrial materials, totaling nearly $280 billion worth of annual imports. Then in November, the administration exempted $252 billion worth of mostly agricultural imports like beef, coffee and bananas, some of which are not widely produced in the U.S. — just after cost-of-living issues became a major talking point out of Democratic electoral victories — on top of the hundreds of other carveouts. “The administration, for most of this year, spent a lot of time saying tariffs are a way to offload taxes onto foreigners,” said Ed Gresser, a former assistant U.S. trade representative under Democratic and Republican administrations, including Trump’s first term, who now works at the Progressive Policy Institute, a D.C.-based think tank. “I think that becomes very hard to continue arguing when you then say, ‘But we are going to get rid of tariffs on coffee and beef, and that will bring prices down.’ … It’s a big retreat in principle.” The Trump administration has argued that higher tariffs would rebalance the United States’ trade deficits with many of its major trading partners, which Trump blames for the “hollowing out” of U.S. manufacturing in what he evoked as a “national emergency.” Before the Supreme Court, the administration is defending the president’s use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act to enact the tariffs, and Trump has said that a potential court-ordered end to the emergency tariffs would be “country-threatening.” In an interview with POLITICO on Monday, Trump said he was open to adding even more exemptions to tariffs. He downplayed the existing carveouts as “very small” and “not a big deal,” and said he plans to pair them with tariff increases elsewhere. Responding to POLITICO’s analysis, White House spokesperson Kush Desai said, “The Trump administration is implementing a nuanced and nimble tariff agenda to address our historic trade deficit and safeguard our national security. This agenda has already resulted in trillions in investments to make and hire in America along with over a dozen trade deals with some of America’s most important trade partners.” To date, the majority of exemptions to the “reciprocal” tariffs — the minimum 10 percent levies on most countries — have been for reasons other than new trade deals, according to POLITICO’s analysis. The White House also pushed back against the notion that November’s cuts were made in an effort to reduce food prices, saying that the exemptions were first outlined in the September order. The U.S. granted subsequent blanket exemptions, regardless of the status of countries’ trade negotiations with the Trump administration, after announcing several trade deals. Following the exemptions on agricultural tariffs, Trump announced on Monday a $12 billion relief aid package for farmers hurt by tariffs and rising production costs. The money will come from an Agriculture Department fund, though the president said it was paid for by revenue from tariffs (by law, Congress would need to approve spending the money that tariffs bring in). In addition to the exemptions from Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, more than $300 billion of imports are also exempted as part of trade deals the administration has negotiated in recent months, including with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan and more recently, Malaysia, Cambodia and Brazil. The deal with Brazil removed a range of products from a cumulative tariff of 50 percent, making two-thirds of imports from the country free from emergency tariffs. For Canadian and Mexican goods, Trump imposed tariffs under a separate emergency justification over fentanyl trafficking and undocumented migrants. But about half of imports from Mexico and nearly 40 percent of those from Canada will not face tariffs because of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement that Trump negotiated in his first term. Last year, importers claimed USMCA exemptions on $405 billion in goods; that value is expected to increase, given that the two countries are facing high tariffs for the first time in several years. The Trump administration has also exempted several products — including autos, steel and aluminum — from the emergency reciprocal tariffs because they already face duties under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The imports covered by those tariffs could total up to $900 billion annually, some of which may also be exempt under USMCA. The White House is considering using the law to justify further tariffs on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and several other industries. For now, the emergency tariffs remain in place as the Supreme Court weighs whether Trump exceeded his authority in imposing them. In May, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that Trump’s use of emergency authority was unlawful — a decision the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld in August. During oral arguments on Nov. 5, several Supreme Court justices expressed skepticism that the emergency statute authorizes a president to levy tariffs, a power constitutionally assigned to Congress. As the rates of tariffs and their subsequent exemptions are quickly added and amended, businesses are struggling to keep pace, said Sabine Altendorf, an economist with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “When there’s uncertainty and rapid changes, it makes operations very difficult,” Altendorf said. “Especially for agricultural products where growing times and planting times are involved, it’s very important for market actors to be able to plan ahead.” ABOUT THE DATA Trump’s trade policy is not a straightforward, one-size-fits-all approach, despite the blanket tariffs on most countries of the world. POLITICO used 2024 import data to estimate the value of goods subject to each tariff, accounting for the stacking rules outlined below. Under Trump’s current system, some tariffs can “stack” — meaning a product can face more than one tariff if multiple trade actions apply to it. Section 232 tariffs cover automobiles, automobile parts, products made of steel and aluminum, copper and lumber — and are applied in that order of priority. Section 232 tariffs as a whole then take priority over other emergency tariffs. We applied this stacking priority order to all imports to ensure no double-counting. To calculate the total exclusions, we did not count the value of products containing steel, aluminum and copper, since the tariff would apply only to the known portion of the import’s metal contentand not the total import value of all products containing them. This makes the $1.7 trillion in exclusions a minimum estimate. Goods from Canada and Mexico imported under USMCA face no tariffs. Some of these products fall under a Section 232 category and may be charged applicable tariffs for the non-USMCA portion of the import. To claim exemptions under USMCA, importers must indicate the percentage of the product made or assembled in Canada or Mexico. Because detailed commodity-level data on which imports qualify for USMCA is not available, POLITICO’s analysis estimated the amount that would be excluded from tariffs on Mexican and Canadian imports by applying each country’s USMCA-exempt share to its non-Section 232 import value. For instance, 38 percent of Canada’s total imports qualified for USMCA. The non-Section 232 imports from Canada totaled around $320 billion, so we used only $121 billion towards our calculation of total goods excluded from Trump’s emergency tariffs. Exemptions from trade deals included those with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Brazil, Cambodia and Malaysia. They do not include “frameworks” for agreements announced by the administration. Exemptions were calculated in chronological order of when the deals were announced. Imports already exempted in previous orders were not counted again, even if they appeared on subsequent exemption lists.

The Radio Spectrum Policy Group’s (RSPG) Nov. 12 opinion on the upper 6-GHz band is framed as a long-term strategic vision for Europe’s digital future. But its practical effect is far less ambitious: it grants mobile operators a cost-free reservation of one of Europe’s most valuable spectrum resources, without deployment obligations, market evidence or a realistic plan for implementation. > At a moment when Europe is struggling to accelerate the deployment of digital > infrastructure and close the gap with global competitors, this decision > amounts to a strategic pause dressed up as policy foresight. The opinion even invites the mobile industry to develop products for the upper 6-GHz band, when policy should be guided by actual market demand and product deployment, not the other way around. At a moment when Europe is struggling to accelerate the deployment of digital infrastructure and close the gap with global competitors, this decision amounts to a strategic pause dressed up as policy foresight. The cost of inaction is real. Around the world, advanced 6-GHz Wi-Fi is already delivering high-capacity, low-latency connectivity. The United States, Canada, South Korea and others have opened the 6-GHz band for telemedicine, automated manufacturing, immersive education, robotics and a multitude of other high-performance Wi-Fi connectivity use cases. These are not experimental concepts; they are operational deployments generating tangible socioeconomic value. Holding the upper 6- GHz band in reserve delays these benefits at a time when Europe is seeking to strengthen competitiveness, digital inclusion, and digital sovereignty. The opinion introduces another challenge by calling for “flexibility” for member states. In practice, this means regulatory fragmentation across 27 markets, reopening the door to divergent national spectrum policies — precisely the outcome Europe has spent two decades trying to avert with the Digital Single Market. > Without a credible roadmap, reserving the band for hypothetical cellular > networks only exacerbates policy uncertainty without delivering progress. Equally significant is what the opinion does not address. The upper 6-GHz band is already home to ‘incumbents’: fixed links and satellite services that support public safety, government operations and industrial connectivity. Any meaningful mobile deployment would require refarming these incumbents — a technically complex, politically sensitive and financially burdensome process. To date, no member state has proposed a viable plan for how such relocation would proceed, how much it would cost or who would pay. Without a credible roadmap, reserving the band for hypothetical cellular networks only exacerbates policy uncertainty without delivering progress. There is, however, a pragmatic alternative. The European Commission and the member states committed to advancing Europe’s connectivity can allow controlled Wi-Fi access to the upper 6-GHz band now — bringing immediate benefits for citizens and enterprises — while establishing clear, evidence-based criteria for any future cellular deployments. Those criteria should include demonstrated commercial viability, validated coexistence with incumbents, and fully funded relocation plans where necessary. This approach preserves long-term policy flexibility for member states and mobile operators, while ensuring that spectrum delivers measurable value today rather than being held indefinitely in reserve. > Spectrum is not an abstract asset. RSPG itself calls it a scarce resource that > must be used efficiently, but this opinion falls short of that principle. Spectrum is not an abstract asset. RSPG itself calls it a scarce resource that must be used efficiently, but this opinion falls short of that principle. Spectrum underpins Europe’s competitiveness, connectivity, and digital innovation. But its value is unlocked through use, not by shelving it in anticipation that hypothetical future markets might someday justify withholding action now. To remain competitive in the next decade, Europe needs a 6-GHz policy grounded in evidence, aligned with the single market, and focused on real-world impact. The upper 6-GHz band should be a driver of European innovation, not the latest casualty of strategic hesitation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Wi-Fi Alliance * The ultimate controlling entity is Wi-Fi Alliance More information here.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

After more than three decades in the pharmaceutical industry, I know one thing: science transforms lives, but policy determines whether innovation thrives or stalls. That reality shapes outcomes for patients — and for Europe’s competitiveness. Today, Europeans stand at a defining moment. The choices we make now will determine whether Europe remains a global leader in life sciences or we watch that leadership slip away. It’s worth reminding ourselves of the true value of Europe’s life sciences industry and the power we have as a united bloc to protect it as a European good. Europe has an illustrious track record in medical discovery, from the first antibiotics to the discovery of DNA and today’s advanced biologics. Still today, our region remains an engine of medical breakthroughs, powered by an extraordinary ecosystem of innovators in the form of start-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises, academic labs, and university hospitals. This strength benefits patients through access to clinical trials and cutting-edge treatments. It also makes life sciences a strategic pillar of Europe’s economy. The economic stakes Life sciences is not just another industry for Europe. It’s a growth engine, a source of resilience and a driver of scientific sovereignty. The EU is already home to some of the world’s most talented scientists, thriving academic institutions and research clusters, and a social model built on universal access to healthcare. These assets are powerful, yet they only translate into future success if supported by a legislative environment that rewards innovation. > Life sciences is not just another industry for Europe. It’s a growth engine, a > source of resilience and a driver of scientific sovereignty. This is also an industry that supports 2.3 million jobs and contributes over €200 billion to the EU economy each year — more than any other sector. EU pharmaceutical research and development spending grew from €27.8 billion in 2010 to €46.2 billion in 2022, an average annual increase of 4.4 percent. A success story, yes — but one under pressure. While Europe debates, others act Over the past two decades, Europe has lost a quarter of its share of global investment to other regions. This year — for the first time — China overtook both the United States and Europe in the number of new molecules discovered. China has doubled its share of industry sponsored clinical trials, while Europe’s share has halved, leaving 60,000 European patients without the opportunity to participate in trials of the next generation of treatments. Why does this matter? Because every clinical trial site that moves elsewhere means a patient in Europe waits longer for the next treatment — and an ecosystem slowly loses competitiveness. Policy determines whether innovation can take root. The United States and Asia are streamlining regulation, accelerating approvals and attracting capital at unprecedented scale. While Europe debates these matters, others act. A world moving faster And now, global dynamics are shifting in unprecedented ways. The United States’ administration’s renewed push for a Most Favored Nation drug pricing policy — designed to tie domestic prices to the lowest paid in developed markets — combined with the potential removal of long-standing tariff exemptions for medicines exported from Europe, marks a historic turning point. A fundamental reordering of the pharmaceutical landscape is underway. The message is clear: innovation competitiveness is now a geopolitical priority. Europe must treat it as such. A once-in-a-generation reset The timing couldn’t be better. As we speak, Europe is rewriting the pharmaceutical legislation that will define the next 20 years of innovation. This is a rare opportunity, but only if reforms strengthen, rather than weaken, Europe’s ability to compete in life sciences. To lead globally, Europe must make choices and act decisively. A triple A framework — attract, accelerate, access — makes the priorities clear: * Attract global investment by ensuring strong intellectual property protection, predictable regulation and competitive incentives — the foundations of a world-class innovation ecosystem. * Accelerate the path from science to patients. Europe’s regulatory system must match the speed of scientific progress, ensuring that breakthroughs reach patients sooner. * Ensure equitable and timely access for all European patients. No innovation should remain inaccessible because of administrative delays or fragmented decision-making across 27 systems. These priorities reinforce each other, creating a virtuous cycle that strengthens competitiveness, improves health outcomes and drives sustainable growth. > Europe has everything required to shape the future of medicine: world-class > science, exceptional talent, a 500-million-strong market and one of the most > sophisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing bases in the world. Despite flat or declining public investment in new medicines across most member states over the past 20 years, the research-based pharmaceutical industry has stepped up, doubling its contributions to public pharmaceutical expenditure from 12 percent to 24 percent between 2018 and 2023. In effect, we have financed our own innovation. No other sector has done this at such scale. But this model is not sustainable. Pharmaceutical innovation must be treated not as a cost to contain, but as a strategic investment in Europe’s future. The choice before us Europe has everything required to shape the future of medicine: world-class science, exceptional talent, a 500-million-strong market and one of the most sophisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing bases in the world. What we need now is an ambition equal to those assets. If we choose innovation, we secure Europe’s jobs, research and competitiveness — and ensure European patients benefit first from the next generation of medical breakthroughs. A wrong call will be felt for decades. The next chapter for Europe is being written now. Let us choose the path that keeps Europe leading, competing and innovating: for our economies, our societies and, above all, our patients. Choose Europe. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) * The ultimate controlling entity is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) * The political advertisement is linked to the Critical Medicines Act. More information here.

LONDON — U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer will visit London on Nov. 24 as the U.K. seeks to secure more concessions in its trade talks with Washington, according to three people familiar with the plans. London continues to push for a favorable position on a narrow list of tariff lines — with President Donald Trump’s duties on pharmaceuticals and Scotch whisky among Britain’s top priorities. In a bid to stave off Trump’s 100 percent tariff threats on pharmaceutical imports, the U.K. has proposed increasing the amount the NHS pays for its drugs, as POLITICO first reported in early October. Ministers agreed last week to a two-week extension to the deadline by which pharma firms must tell the government if they intend to leave the NHS’s voluntary drug pricing scheme, signaling that a breakthrough in talks is imminent. Greer’s visit comes just two days before Chancellor Rachel Reeves’ budget, and British officials are eager to finalize the pharma deal ahead of that announcement, said two of the people cited higher. They were granted anonymity to speak freely on a sensitive matter. If Washington accepts the proposal — effectively committing the NHS to higher drug spending — Reeves will face pressure to spell out how much the increase will cost taxpayers. A Department of Health and Social Care spokesperson said: “We will always prioritise the needs of NHS patients. Investment in patient access to innovative medicines is critical to our NHS.” “We are now in advanced discussions with the US Administration to secure the best outcome for the UK, reflecting our strong relationship and the opportunities from close partnership with our pharmaceutical industry,” the spokesperson added. TRUMP’S ASKS Washington, meanwhile, is pushing for more. The U.S. administration wants Britain to grant additional concessions benefiting American farming and manufacturing, including a relaxation of product standards.  U.S. officials told The Times earlier this month that the talks risk “going off the rails,” voicing frustration over the pace of progress and delays in receiving documents from their U.K. counterparts. The U.K. has proposed increasing the amount the NHS pays for its drugs. | Leon Neal/Getty Images Negotiators will hold technical-level talks in Washington in mid-November before Greer’s visit. His office did not respond to a request for comment. Meanwhile the European Union has invited U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to Brussels on Nov. 24 — the same date Greer is in London — for talks with the bloc’s trade ministers. The Danish presidency of the Council of the EU, as well as the European Commission, invited the commerce secretary to attend a lunch with ministers dedicated to trade relations between the United States and the EU. It comes as the U.K. is seeking to form an alliance with the European Union and the U.S. to curb China’s dominance of the global steel market. Doug Palmer contributed to this report.