LONDON — The U.K. and Poland have agreed to cooperate more closely to shoot down air and missile threats, as they seek to strengthen the protection of their skies. The two NATO allies will step up joint training of helicopter pilots and work together on new capabilities to counter attacks from the air. British and Polish military personnel will train together in virtual environments to improve air defense techniques, while eight Polish military helicopter pilots will undertake training in the U.K. under NATO’s military aviation program. Two Polish helicopter instructors will be permanently stationed at RAF Shawbury in the West Midlands for a full rotational tour. The announcement came during a visit by Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Downing Street on Tuesday. U.K. Defense Secretary, John Healey, hailed Poland as “a crucial ally for the U.K. in this era of rising threats” and said together they were “stepping up to defend Europe and face down the threat from (Vladimir) Putin.” British fighter jets conducted an air defense mission over Poland as part of an allied response to Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace, with pilots from the two countries flying together as part of NATO’s Eastern Sentry mission. Healey announced last year that British armed forces would get fresh powers to bring down suspicious drones over military sites as part of the Armed Forces Bill, amid a spate of aerial incursions across Europe. Ministers have committed to improving the U.K.’s aerial defenses, following concerns that it is increasingly vulnerable given the changing nature of threats from the air. The U.K. and Poland have cooperated extensively on air defense in the past, including a £1.9 billion export agreement announced in April 2023 to equip 22 Polish air defense batteries, and a separate deal worth over £4 billion to continue the next phase of Poland’s future air defense programme, Narew. 

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

LONDON — The U.K. will break China’s stranglehold over crucial net zero supply chains, Energy Minister Chris McDonald has pledged. McDonald, a joint minister at the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the Department for Business and Trade, told POLITICO he is determined to bolster domestic access to critical minerals. Critical minerals like lithium and copper are used in essential net-zero technologies such as electric vehicles and batteries, as well as defense assets like F35 fighter jets. China currently controls 90 percent of rare earth refining, according to a government critical minerals strategy published last week. McDonald said China’s dominance of mineral processing risks driving up prices for the net zero transition.  The U.K. has made a legally-binding pledge to reduce planet-damaging emissions to net zero by 2050. McDonald fears China has become a “monopoly provider” of critical minerals and that its dominant role in processing allowed China to control the costs for buyers. “We want to capture this supply chain in the U.K. as part of our industrial strategy. To do that … means, ultimately, we’re going to have to wrest control of critical minerals back into a broad group of countries, not just China,” he said. The government’s critical minerals strategy includes a target that no more than 60 percent of U.K. annual demand for critical minerals in aggregate is supplied by any one country by 2035 — including China. “So, if there is an investment from China that helps with that, then that’s great. And if it doesn’t help with that, or it sort of compounds that issue that isn’t consistent with our strategy, then we judge it on that basis ultimately,” McDonald said. Additional reporting by Graham Lanktree.

The European Commission will present a new plan to break the EU’s dependencies on China for critical raw materials, President Ursula von der Leyen announced on Saturday. The EU executive chief warned of “clear acceleration and escalation in the way interdependencies are leveraged and weaponized,” in a speech Saturday at the Berlin Global Dialogue. In recent months, China has tightened export controls over rare earths and other critical materials. The Asian powerhouse controls close to 70 percent of the world’s rare earths production and almost all of the refining. The EU’s response “must match the scale of the risks we face in this area,” von der Leyen said, adding that “we are focusing on finding solutions with our Chinese counterparts.” Brussels and Beijing are set to discuss the export controls issue during meetings next week. “But we are ready to use all of the instruments in our toolbox to respond if needed,” the head of the EU executive warned. This suggests that the Commission could make use of the EU’s most powerful trade weapon — the Anti-Coercion Instrument. This comes after French President Emmanuel Macron called on the EU executive to trigger the trade bazooka at a meeting of EU leaders on Thursday. His push has not met with much support from the other leaders around the table. NEW BREAKAWAY PLAN To break the EU’s over-reliance on China for critical materials imports and refining, the Commission will put forward a “RESourceEU plan,” von der Leyen said. She did not provide much detail about the plan, nor when it would be presented. But she said it would follow a similar model as the REPowerEU plan that the Commission introduced in 2022 to phase out Russian fossil fuels after Moscow’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Under REPowerEU, the Commission proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes, accelerate the deployment of renewables, improve grids interconnections across the bloc and boost the EU hydrogen market, among other measures. The EU executive also put forward a legislative proposal, which is currently under negotiations with the European Parliament and the Council, to ban Russian gas imports by the end of 2027. The aim of RESourceEU “is to secure access to alternative sources of critical raw materials in the short, medium and long term for our European industry,” von der Leyen explained. “It starts with the circular economy. Not for environmental reasons. But to exploit the critical raw materials already contained in products sold in Europe,” she said. She added that the EU “will speed up work on critical raw materials partnerships with countries like Ukraine and Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Chile and Greenland.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore. We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials,” von der Leyen said.

STRASBOURG — Europe should protect its share of market from global competitors’ investment in green tech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Wednesday. Von der Leyen said European Union leaders will discuss the issue during their Thursday summit. “The clean transition is in full swing,” she said during a debate in the European Parliament, pointing out how every year, hundreds of gigawatts of energy are added globally. “Cleantech markets around the world are booming,” including batteries, wind turbines and electric cars. “The rise in cleantech in Europe is also good news for energy security, and it is a great economic opportunity,” she added. Yet, she warned, Europe in the past missed out on chances to lead on green industry, with the loss of solar panel industry to more competitive Chinese companies being “a cautionary tale that we must not forget.” “Europe was a global leader in solar, but heavily subsidized Chinese competitors started to outprice Europe’s young industry — and today, China controls 90 percent of the global market.” “This time, we should learn our lesson,” she added, name-checking the Middle East and the “Global South” as regions competing for their spot in the global industrial green tech race. The European Commission expects renewables and other forms of clean energy to supply 50 percent of energy globally, while the cleantech market is projected to grow from €600 billion to €2 trillion over the next 10 years. The EU wants to capture 15 percent of the global production of clean technologies, with the EU market growing to €375 billion by 2035, according to Commission projections.

The world order is fracturing and the European Union must turn to outer space in its search for raw materials. In short, it needs to mine the Moon. So argues the European Commission in a new report on the key threats to Europe’s security and prosperity, published Tuesday. “[T]he global order has been shaken tremendously,” the EU executive’s sixth annual Strategic Foresight Report warned, adding non-EU countries may no longer be relied upon to supply materials vital in low-carbon energy technology. “In response, there may be a growing emphasis on … advanced mining technologies including space mining, starting with the Moon,” the report said. Metals such as lithium, copper, nickel and rare earths are essential for renewable energy and electric vehicles, and very few of them are mined within the EU. The Commission is worried countries with rich reserves of these metals could team up to manipulate supply, the same way the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) manipulates oil supply. This could drive up prices and “restrict access to essential materials, posing a serious challenge to the EU’s strategic autonomy and clean energy transition,” the Commission said. HAS BRUSSELS GONE MAD? Space mining has been promoted by many government agencies, including the U.S. government’s NASA and Japan’s JAXA. In the EU, Luxembourg has positioned itself as Europe’s space mining hub, with hopes of mining the Moon and asteroids using robots. These celestial bodies are often rich in useful metals such as rare earths, aluminum, titanium, and manganese, as well as precious metals like gold and platinum. In June this year, the Commission released its Vision for the Space Economy, in which it estimated so-called space resources could be worth up to €170 billion between 2018 and 2045. Still, industrial-scale space mining remains a distant dream, and practical solutions for mining and transporting mined metals back to Earth are in their infancy. The EU has also fallen behind on establishing critical raw material supply chains and refining capacity. | Christopher Neundrof/EPA WHY IS EUROPE WORRIED? The energy transition is sending demand for critical minerals (literally) skyrocketing. To meet the goals of the Paris climate agreement, for example, the world needs to mine as much copper over the next 25 years as has been mined in the whole of human history, according to some estimates. Copper is essential in anything that uses electricity. It’s a similar story for lithium, used in EV batteries. The European Commission expects EU lithium demand for batteries to be 12 times higher in 2030 than in 2020, and 21 times higher in 2050. Currently, the EU does not mine any lithium at all. The EU’s small, densely populated landmass, comparatively strong environmental protections, and active civil society make it a difficult jurisdiction in which to develop mines, even when resources are discovered. People don’t like having mines in their backyard, as mining giant Rio Tinto’s attempt to open a lithium mine in the EU’s neighbor, Serbia, has shown. The EU has also fallen behind on establishing critical raw material supply chains and refining capacity. Meanwhile, forward-thinking China has established a stranglehold on critical raw material supply chains, refining 40 percent of the world’s copper, 60 percent of its lithium, 70 percent of its cobalt, and nearly 100 percent of its graphite, according to a report last year by the Jacques Delors Centre. “The EU … imports close to 100 per cent of its rare earths from China,” the Delors report said. “This exposes it to supply disruptions and price volatility, amplifying vulnerabilities in critical sectors.”

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Gordon Repinski im Gespräch mit BMW-Chef Oliver Zipse. Im Zentrum: Der neue SUV iX3 und die „Neue Klasse“. BMWs frontaler Angriff auf Tesla und chinesische Hersteller wird am heutigen Freitag, 11 Uhr deutscher Zeit der Öffentlichkeit offiziell vorgestellt. Zipse erklärt die neue Designsprache „Licht statt Chrom“, das „Panoramic Display“ im Innenraum und warum auch der Sound einer sich öffnenden oder zuschlagenden Autotür mit entscheidet. Der CEO spricht über den harten Wettbewerb in China, seinen persönlichen Austausch mit Donald Trump über die US-Zölle und warum BMW trotz schwieriger Zeiten nicht in der Krise steckt. Es geht außerdem über die zurückliegenden Monate seiner Amtszeit, die Zukunft der deutschen Autoindustrie und was er vom angekündigten „Herbst der Reformen“ der Bundesregierung erwartet. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

CHIATURA, Georgia — Giorgi Neparidze, a middle-aged man from near the town of Chiatura in western Georgia, still has marks on his lips from where he sewed his mouth shut during a hunger strike last year. He says Georgian Manganese, a mining company with close links to the government, has wrought environmental devastation around his home and has ignored the rights of its workers. He is seeking compensation.  Europe, which imports Georgia’s manganese, is partly to blame for the black rivers and collapsing houses in Chiatura district, Neparidze says. The former miner-turned-environmental and civil rights activist claims that in one village, Shukruti, toxic dust from the pits is making people unwell. Filthy black water, laced with heavy metals, periodically spurts out of pumps there. Houses are collapsing as the tunnels underneath them cave in.  Manganese, a black metal traditionally used to reinforce steel, is crucial for Europe’s green energy transition as it is used in both wind turbines and electric car batteries. The metal is also vital for military gear like armor and guns. In 2022, the European Union bought 20,000 metric tons of manganese alloys from Georgia — almost 3 percent of its total supply. A year later the bloc added manganese to its list of critical minerals. But Chiaturans say their lives are being ruined so that Western Europeans can breathe cleaner air. “We are sacrificed so that others can have better lives,” Neparidze says. “There are only 40,000 people in Chiatura. They might feel ill or live in bad conditions but they are sacrificed so that millions of Europeans can have a cleaner environment.” Neparidze says cancer rates in the region are unusually high. Doctors at a hospital in Chiatura back up the observation, but no official study has linked the illnesses to the mines. An aerial view of Chiatura with the polluted Kvirila River running through the town | Olivia Acland Hope that things will improve appears dim. European companies often don’t know where their manganese is sourced from. As ANEV, Italy’s wind energy association, confirms: “There is no specific obligation to trace all metals used in steel production.”  Last year the EU enacted a law that was meant to change that. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive obliges companies to run closer checks on their supply chains and clamp down on any human rights violations, poor working conditions and environmental damage.  But barely a year after it took effect, the European Commission proposed a major weakening of the law in a move to reduce red tape for the bloc’s sluggish industry. EU member countries, motivated by this deregulation agenda, are now pushing for even deeper cuts, while French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz want to get rid of the law altogether.  Meanwhile, Europe’s appetite for mined raw materials like manganese, lithium, rare earths, copper and nickel is expected to skyrocket to meet the needs of the clean energy transition and rearmament. Many of these resources are in poorly regulated and often politically repressive jurisdictions, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Indonesia and Georgia. Weakening the EU supply chain law will have consequences for communities like Neparidze’s. “Only an empty shell of the directive remains,” says Anna Cavazzini, a member of the European Parliament’s Green Party, adding that the legislature caved to pressure from businesses seeking to reduce their costs. “Now is not the time to abandon the defense of human rights and give corporations a free hand,” she says.  A resident of Chiatura standing on a collapsed house following a mining-related landslide in Itkhvisi village. | Olivia Acland As Georgia’s government pivots toward Russia and stifles dissent, life is becoming increasingly dangerous for activists in Chiatura. On April 29, four activists including Neparidze were arrested for allegedly assaulting a mine executive. A statement put out by Chiatura Management Company, the firm in charge of staffing Georgian Manganese’s underground operations, says that Tengiz Koberidze, manager of the Shukruti mine, was “verbally abused and pelted with stones.” Supporters call it a staged provocation in which Koberidze tried to incite violence, and say it’s part of a broader campaign to silence resistance. If convicted they face up to six years behind bars. Koberidze did not respond to requests for comment. Chiatura residents are protesting over two overlapping issues. On one side, miners are demanding safer working conditions underground, where tunnel collapses have long been a risk, along with higher wages and paid sick leave. When the mine was temporarily shut in October 2024, they were promised 60 percent of their salaries, but many say those payments never materialized. Workers are also raising concerns about mining pollution in the region. “The company doesn’t raise wages, doesn’t improve safety, and continues to destroy the natural environment. Its profits come not just from extracting resources, but from exploiting both workers and the land,” says one miner, David Chinchaladze. Georgian Manganese did not respond to interview requests or written questions. Officials at Georgia’s Ministry of Mines and the government’s Environment Protection and Natural Resources Department did not respond to requests for comment. A collapsing building in Shukruti. | Olivia Acland.  The second group of protesters comes from the village of Shukruti, which sits directly above the mining tunnels. Their homes are cracking and sinking into the ground. In 2020, Georgian Manganese pledged to pay between 700,000 and 1 million Georgian lari ($252,000 to $360,000) annually in damages — a sum that was meant to be distributed among residents. But while the company insists the money has been paid, locals — backed by watchdog NGO Social Justice — say otherwise. According to them, fewer than 5 percent of Shukruti’s residents have received any compensation.  Their protest has intensified in the last year, with workers now blocking the roads and Shukruti residents barring entry to the mines. But the risks are intensifying too. Since suspending EU accession talks last year amid deteriorating relations with the bloc, Georgia’s ruling party has shuttered independent media, arrested protestors and amplified propaganda. The country’s democracy is “backsliding,” says Irakli Kavtaradze, head of the foreign department of the largest opposition political party, United National Movement. Their tactics “sound like they come from a playbook that is written in the Kremlin,” he adds. ‘KREMLIN PLAYBOOK’ In the capital Tbilisi, around 200 kilometers east of Chiatura, protesters have taken to the streets every night since April 2, 2024 when the government unveiled a Kremlin-style “foreign agents” law aimed at muzzling civil society.  Many demonstrators wear sunglasses, scarfs and masks to shield their identities from street cameras, wary of state retaliation.  A scene from the 336th day of protests in Tbilisi in April 2025. | Olivia Acland. Their protests swelled in October last year after the government announced it would suspend talks to join the EU. For Georgians, the stakes are high: Russia already occupies 20 percent of the country after its 2008 invasion, and people fear that a more profound drift from the EU could open the door to further aggression. When POLITICO visited in April, a crowd strode down Rustaveli Avenue, the city’s main artery. Some carried EU flags while others passed around a loudspeaker, taking it in turns to voice defiant chants. “Fire to the oligarchy!” one young woman yelled, the crowd echoing her call. “Power lies in unity with the EU!” another shouted. They also called out support for protestors in Chiatura, whose fight has become something of a cause célèbre across the country: “Solidarity to Chiatura! Natural resources belong to the people!”  The fight in Chiatura is a microcosm of the country’s broader struggle: The activists are not just taking on a mining company but a corporate giant backed by oligarchs and the ruling elites.  Georgian Manganese’s parent company, Georgian American Alloys, is registered in Luxembourg and counts Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky as a shareholder. He is in custody in Kyiv over allegations that he hired a gang to kill a lawyer who threatened his business interests in 2003. Kolomoisky has also been sanctioned by the United States for his alleged involvement in siphoning billions out of PrivatBank, Ukraine’s largest bank.  Giorgi Kapanadze — a businessman closely connected with the ruling Georgian Dream party of Bidzina Ivanishvili — is listed as general manager of Georgian American Alloys.  Until recently, Kapanadze owned Rustavi TV, a channel notorious for airing pro-government propaganda. The European Parliament has called on the EU to hit Kapanadze with sanctions, accusing him of propping up the country’s repressive regime. Kolomoisky and Kapanadze did not respond to POLITICO’s requests for comment. The government swooped in to help Georgian Manganese in 2016 when a Georgian court fined it $82 million for environmental destruction in the region. The state placed it under “special management” and wrote off the fine. A new government-appointed manager was tasked, on paper, with cleaning up the mess. He was supposed to oversee a cleanup of the rivers that flow past the mines, among other promises. Manganese mining pit in Chiatura region, Georgia. | Olivia Acland But POLITICO’s own tests based on four samples taken in April 2025 from the Kvirila River, which runs through Chiatura, as well as its tributary, the Bogiristiskali, which were examined in a U.K. licensed laboratory, show the manganese levels in both rivers are over 10 times the legal limit. Iron levels are also higher than legally permitted. Locals use the polluted water to irrigate their crops. Fishermen are also pulling in increasingly empty nets as the heavy metals kill off aquatic life, according to local testimonies. The water from the Kvirila River flows out into the Black Sea, home to endangered dolphins, sturgeons, turtles and sharks.  A 2022 analysis by the Georgian NGO Green Policy found even worse results, with manganese in the Kvirila River averaging 42 times the legal limit. The group also detected excessive levels of iron and lead. Chronic manganese exposure can lead to irreversible neurological damage — a Parkinson’s-like condition known as manganism — as well as liver, kidney and reproductive harm. Lead and iron are linked to organ failure, cancer and cardiovascular disease. On Georgian Manganese’s website, the company concedes that “pollution of the Kvirila River” is one of the region’s “ecological challenges,” attributing it to runoff from manganese processing. It claims to have installed German-standard purification filters and claims that “neither polluted nor purified water” currently enters the river. Protesters like Neparidze aren’t convinced. They claim the filtration system is turned on only when inspectors arrive and that for the rest of the time, untreated wastewater is dumped straight into the rivers. BLOCKING EXPORTS Their protests having reaped few results, Chiaturans are taking increasingly extreme measures to make their voices heard.  Gocha Kupatadze, a retired 67-year-old miner, spends his nights in a tarpaulin shelter beside an underground mine, where he complains that rats crawl over him. “This black gold became the black plague for us,” he says. “We have no choice but to protest.” Kupatadze’s job is to ensure that manganese does not leave the mine. Alongside other protesters he has padlocked the gate to the generator that powers the mine’s ventilation system, making it impossible for anyone to work there. Kupatadze says he is only resorting to such drastic measures because conditions in his village, Shukruti, have become unlivable. His family home, built in 1958, is now crumbling, with cracks in the walls as the ground beneath it collapses from years of mining. The vines that once sustained his family’s wine-making traditions have long since withered and died. Gocha Kupatadze, an activist sleeping in a tarpaulin tent outside a mine. | Olivia Acland. For over a year, protesters across the region have intermittently blocked mine entrances as well as main roads, determined to stop the valuable ore from leaving Chiatura. In some ways it has worked: Seven months ago, Chiatura Management Company, the firm in charge of staffing Georgian Manganese’s underground operations, announced it would pause production.  “Due to the financial crisis that arose from the radical protests by the people of Shukruti village, the production process in Chiatura has been completely halted,” it read. Yet to the people of Chiatura, this feels more like a punishment than a triumph.  Manganese has been extracted from the area since 1879 and many residents rely on the mines for their livelihoods. The region bears all the hallmarks of a mining town that thrived during the Soviet Union when conditions in the mines were much better, according to residents. Today, rusted cable cars sway above concrete buildings that house washing stations and aging machinery.   While locals had sought compensation for the damage to their homes, they now just find themselves out of work.  Soviet-era buildings and mining infrastructure around Chiatura. | Olivia Acland.  Making matters worse, Georgian Manganese, licensed to mine 16,430 hectares until 2046, is now sourcing much of its ore from open pits instead of underground mines. These are more dangerous to the communities around them: Machines rip open the hillsides to expose shallow craters, while families living next to the pits say toxic dust drifts off them into their gardens and houses.  MORE PITS The village of Zodi is perched on a plateau surrounded by gently undulating hills, 10 kilometers from Chiatura. Many of its residents rely on farming, and cows roam across its open fields. “It is a beautiful village with a unique microclimate which is great for wine-making,” says Kote Abdushelishvili, a 36-year-old filmmaker from Zodi.  Mining officials say the village sits on manganese reserves. In 2023, caterpillar trucks rolled into Zodi and began ripping up the earth. Villagers, including Abdushelishvili, chased them out. “We stopped them,” he says, “We said if you want to go on, you will have to kill us first.” A padlocked gate to the mine’s ventilation system. | Olivia Acland Abdushelishvili later went to Georgian Manganese’s Chiatura office to demand a meeting with the state-appointed special manager. When he was turned away, he shouted up to the window: “You can attack us, you can kill us, we will not stop.” Two days later, as Abdushelishvili strolled through a quiet neighborhood in Tbilisi, masked men jumped out of a car, slammed him to the pavement and beat him up. Despite the fierce resistance in Chiatura, Georgian Manganese continues to send its metal to European markets. In the first two months of 2025, the EU imported 6,000 metric tons of manganese from Georgia. With the bloc facing mounting pressures — from the climate crisis to new defense demands — its hunger for manganese is set to grow. As the EU weakens its corporate accountability demands and Georgia drifts further into authoritarianism, the voices of Chiatura’s people are growing even fainter.  “We are not asking for something unreasonable,” says activist Tengiz Gvelesiani, who was recently detained in Chiatura along with Neparidze, “We are asking for healthy lives, a good working environment and fresh air.” Georgian Manganese did not respond to requests for comment. This article was developed with the support of Journalismfund Europe.

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. If there’s one thing we know, it’s that our transition away from fossil fuels won’t be possible without electric cars (EVs). Pulling ahead in this field, China has recently been making EVs that are far cheaper than Western-manufactured ones, and much of it comes down to one humble yet indispensable component: the battery. But now, thanks to one small town in Norway, it seems there might yet be hope for Europe, and for a greener future without risky dependencies on China. Oh, how the times have changed. Four years ago, Tesla was the world’s largest all-electric car brand, followed by China’s state-owned SAIC, Volkswagen, Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi and BYD ( another Chinese manufacturer). Today, five of the world’s 10 biggest EV brands are Chinese — and it’s not because buyers specifically want Chinese cars. It’s simply because they’re cheaper. Take, for example, BYD’s Dolphin Surf. Available in Europe as of this summer, these cars start at €22,900. That’s significantly less than Tesla models — and a couple other Chinese EVs are cheaper still. One reason for all this is that their batteries — that all-important part of an EV — cost less. For the past few years, Chinese makers have been switching to so-called LFP batteries, which are different from the NMC batteries most Western cars still use. LFP stands for lithium iron phosphate, and batteries made with these components aren’t just cheaper but last longer, thus making them more sustainable too. (NMCs still get more usage out of each charge, which makes them better for longer drives, but that gap is narrowing.) Given their focus on price, it’s not surprising Chinese brands have so massively adopted LFP batteries. “[China has] a huge cost advantage through economies of scale and battery technology. European manufacturers have fallen well behind,” David Bailey, a professor of business and economics at Birmingham Business School told the BBC. “Unless they wake up very quickly and catch up, they could be wiped out.” But there’s good news for Western EV makers: a renewable-energy company called Å Energi — a Norwegian hydropower giant — has been thinking ahead precisely along these lines. Four years ago, Å Energi teamed up with ABB, Siemens, the Danish pension fund PKA and the Norwegian investment firm Nysnø to form Morrow Batteries. Majority-owned by Å Energi, Morrow is based in the picturesque town of Arendal on Norway’s south coast, and it recently began producing LFP batteries for energy storage systems — think sun and wind energy that needs to be stored after being captured in solar panels and wind turbines — as well as for defense equipment. If all goes according to plan, Morrow will then expand to vehicles, with plans to build another three LFP facilities in Arendal before 2029. Of course, this company won’t be able to match China’s formidable LFP production on its own  — and yet, it exists. It exists because Å Energi dared to commit to this new technology, because the Norwegian government agreed to grant a loan, and because the EU decided to support the undertaking too. Four years ago, Tesla was the world’s largest all-electric car brand, followed by China’s state-owned SAIC. | Allison Dinner/EPA To date, the path to EV batteries has been strewn with grand ambition and, alas, bankruptcies. In the past couple years alone, Northvolt in Sweden and Britishvolt in the U.K. have both gone bust. But as technical as it may sound, LFP batteries are the surest way for Europe to reduce its dependence on Chinese EVs. So, if Morrow succeeds, and is perhaps joined by one or two new European battery-makers, Europe’s EV manufacturers will be better able to compete with Chinese rivals. To be viable, the green transition has to be a collective undertaking. It’s no surprise that this pioneering LFP factory is located in Norway, as the country has made EV adoption a priority. In 2023, nine in 10 cars sold in the country were already EVs, and the Norwegian government wants all newly sold cars to be zero-emission by the end of this year. Norway doesn’t have any significant car manufacturers, and unlike most battery-makers, Morrow isn’t owned by a car manufacturer. But LFP batteries look certain to be the future in all kinds of applications — and Norway is grabbing that opportunity. Morrow’s factory, or factories, may lose money at first, but in the long run, they’ll be a benefit to their owners and to Norway — not to mention Western consumers. Even more crucially, the arrival of a battery factory in Arendal points to a fundamental reality: that to do the right thing for our supply chains and, in many cases, the climate, companies need to team up with unexpected partners, and occasionally with the government too. In today’s climate, so to speak, business plans can no longer solely focus on immediate profit.