Mujtaba Rahman is the head of Eurasia Group’s Europe practice. He posts at @Mij_Europe. 2026 is here, and Europe is under siege. External pressure from Russia is mounting in Ukraine, China is undermining the EU’s industrial base, and the U.S. — now effectively threatening to annex the territory of a NATO ally — is undermining the EU’s multilateral rule book, which appears increasingly outdated in a far more transactional and less cooperative world. And none of this shows signs of slowing down. In fact, in the year ahead, the steady erosion of the norms Europe has come to rely on will only be compounded by the bloc’s weak leadership — especially in the so-called “E3” nations of Germany, France and the U.K. Looking forward, the greatest existential risks for Europe will flow from the transatlantic relationship. For the bloc’s leaders, keeping the U.S. invested in the war in Ukraine was the key goal for 2025. And the best possible outcome for 2026 will be a continuation of the ad-hoc diplomacy and transactionalism that has defined the last 12 months. However, if new threats emerge in this relationship — especially regarding Greenland — this balancing act may be impossible. The year also starts with no sign of any concessions from Russia when it comes to its ceasefire demands, or any willingness to accept the terms of the 20-point U.S.-EU-Ukraine plan. This is because Russian President Vladimir Putin is calculating that Ukraine’s military situation will further deteriorate, forcing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to capitulate to territorial demands. I believe Putin is wrong — that backed by Europe, Zelenskyy will continue to resist U.S. pressure on territorial concessions, and instead, increasingly target Russian energy production and exports in addition to resisting along the frontline. Of course, this means Russian aerial attacks against Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure will also increase in kind. Nonetheless, Europe’s growing military spending, purchase of U.S. weapons, financing for Kyiv and sanctions against Russia — which also target sources of energy revenue — could help maintain last year’s status quo. But this is perhaps the best case scenario. Activists protest outside Downing street against the recent policies of Donald Trump. | Guy Smallman/Getty Images Meanwhile, European leaders will be forced to publicly ignore Washington’s support for far-right parties, which was clearly spelled out in the new U.S. national security strategy, while privately doing all they can to counter any antiestablishment backlash at the polls. Specifically, the upcoming election in Hungary will be a bellwether for whether the MAGA movement can tip the balance for its ideological affiliates in Europe, as populist, euroskeptic Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is currently poised to lose for the first time in 15 years. Orbán, for his part, has been frantically campaigning to boost voter support, signaling that he and his inner circle actually view defeat as a possibility. His charismatic rival Péter Magyar, who shares his conservative-nationalist political origins but lacks any taint of corruption poses a real challenge, as does the country’s stagnating economy and rising prices. While traditional electoral strategies — financial giveaways, smear campaigns and war fearmongering — have so far proven ineffective for Orbán, a military spillover from Ukraine that directly affects Hungary could reignite voter fears and shift the dynamic. To top it all off, these challenges will be compounded by the E3’s weakness. The hollowing out of Europe’s political center has already been a decade in the making. But France, Germany and the U.K. each entered 2026 with weak, unpopular governments besieged by the populist right and left, as well as a U.S. administration rooting for their collapse. While none face scheduled general elections, all three risk paralysis at best and destabilization at worst. And at least one leader — namely, Britain’s Keir Starmer — could fall because of an internal party revolt. The year’s pivotal event in the U.K. will be the midterm elections in May. As it stands, the Labour Party faces the humiliation of coming third in the Welsh parliament, failing to oust the Scottish National Party in the Scottish parliament and losing seats to both the Greens and ReformUK in English local elections. Labour MPs already expect a formal challenge to Starmer as party leader, and his chances of surviving seem slight. France, meanwhile, entered 2026 without a budget for the second consecutive year. The good news for President Emmanuel Macron is that his Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s minority government will probably achieve a budget deal targeting a modest deficit reduction by late February or March. And with the presidential election only 16 months away and local elections due to be held in March, the opposition’s appetite for a snap parliamentary election has abated. However, this is the best he can hope for, as a splintered National Assembly will sustain a mood of slow-motion crisis until the 2027 race. Finally, while Germany’s economy looks like it will slightly recover this year, it still won’t overcome its structural malaise. Largely consumed by ideological divisions, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government will struggle to implement far-reaching reforms. And with the five upcoming state elections expected to see increased vote shares for the far-right Alternative for Germany party, pressure on the government in Berlin will only mount A historic truth — one often forgotten in the quiet times — will reassert itself in 2026: that liberty, stability, prosperity and peace in Europe are always brittle. The holiday from history, provided by Pax Americana and exceptional post-World War II cooperation and integration, has officially come to an end. Moving forward, Europe’s relevance in the new global order will be defined by its response to Russia’s increased hybrid aggression, its influence on diplomacy regarding the Ukraine war and its ability to improve competitiveness, all while managing an increasingly ascendant far right and addressing the existential threats to its economy and security posed by Russia, China and the U.S. This is what will decide whether Europe can survive.

LONDON — Choosing your Brexit camp was once the preserve of Britain’s Tories. Now Labour is joining in the fun.  Six years after Britain left the EU, a host of loose — and mostly overlapping — groupings in the U.K.’s ruling party are thinking about precisely how close to try to get to the bloc. They range from customs union enthusiasts to outright skeptics — with plenty of shades of grey in between. There’s a political urgency to all of this too: with Prime Minister Keir Starmer tanking in the polls, the Europhile streak among many Labour MPs and members means Brexit could become a key issue for anyone who would seek to replace him. “The more the screws and pressure have been on Keir around leadership, the more we’ve seen that play to the base,” said one Labour MP, granted anonymity like others quoted in this piece to speak frankly. Indeed, Starmer started the new year explicitly talking up closer alignment with the European Union’s single market. At face value, nothing has changed: Starmer’s comments reflect his existing policy of a “reset” with Brussels. His manifesto red lines on not rejoining the customs union or single market remain. Most of his MPs care more about aligning than how to get there. In short, this is not like the Tory wars of the late 2010s. Well, not yet. POLITICO sketches out Labour’s nascent Brexit tribes. THE CUSTOMS UNIONISTS  It all started with a Christmas walk. Health Secretary Wes Streeting told an interviewer he desires a “deeper trading relationship” with the EU — widely interpreted as hinting at joining a customs union. This had been a whispered topic in Labour circles for a while, discussed privately by figures including Starmer’s economic adviser Minouche Shafik. Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy said last month that rejoining a customs union is not “currently” government policy — which some took as a hint that the position could shift. But Streeting’s leadership ambitions (he denies plotting for the top job) and his willingness to describe Brexit as a problem gave his comments an elevated status among Labour Europhiles.  “This has really come from Wes’s leadership camp,” said one person who talks regularly to No. 10 Downing Street. Naomi Smith, CEO of the pro-EU pressure group Best for Britain, added any Labour leadership contest will be dominated by the Brexit question. MPs and members who would vote in a race “are even further ahead than the public average on all of those issues relating to Europe,” she argued. Joining a customs union would in theory allow smoother trade without returning to free movement of people. But Labour critics of a customs union policy — including Starmer himself — argue it is a non-starter because it would mean tearing up post-Brexit agreements with other countries such as India and the U.S. “It’s just absolutely nonsense,” said a second Labour MP.    Keir Starmer has argued that the customs union route would mean hard conversations with workers in the car industry after Britain secured a U.K.-U.S. tariff deal last summer. | Colin McPherson/Getty Images And since Streeting denies plotting and did not even mention a customs union by name, the identities of the players pushing for one are understandably murky beyond the 13 Labour MPs who backed a Liberal Democrat bill last month requiring the government to begin negotiations on joining a bespoke customs union with the EU. One senior Labour official said “hardly any” MPs back it, while a minister said there was no organized group, only a vague idea. “There are people who don’t really know what it is, but realize Brexit has been painful and the economy needs a stimulus,” they said. “And there are people who do know what this means and they effectively want to rejoin. For people who know about trade, this is an absolute non-starter.” Anand Menon, director of the UK in a Changing Europe think tank, said a full rejoining of the EU customs union would mean negotiating round a suite of “add-ons” — and no nations have secured this without also being in the EU single market. (Turkey has a customs union with the EU, but does not benefit from the EU’s wider trade agreements.) “I’m not convinced the customs union works without the single market,” Menon added.  Starmer has argued that the customs union route would mean hard conversations with workers in the car industry after Britain secured a U.K.-U.S. tariff deal last summer, a person with knowledge of his thinking said. “When you read anything from any economically literate commentator, the customs union is not their go-to,” added the senior Labour official quoted above. “Keir is really strong on it. He fully believes it isn’t a viable route in the national interest or economic interest.” THE SINGLE MARKETEERS (A.K.A. THE GOVERNMENT) Starmer and his allies, then, want to park the customs union and get closer to the single market.  Paymaster General Nick Thomas-Symonds has long led negotiations along these lines through Labour’s existing EU “reset.” He and Starmer recently discussed post-Brexit policy on a walk through the grounds of the PM’s country retreat, Chequers. Working on the detail with Thomas-Symonds is Michael Ellam, the former director of communications for ex-PM Gordon Brown, now a senior civil servant in the Cabinet Office. Ellam is “a really highly regarded, serious guy” and attends regular meetings with Brussels officials, said a second person who speaks regularly to No. 10.   A bill is due to be introduced to the U.K. parliament by summer which will allow “dynamic” alignment with new EU laws in areas of agreement. Two people with knowledge of his role said the bill will be steered through parliament by Cabinet Office Minister Chris Ward, Starmer’s former aide and close ally, who was by his side when Starmer was shadow Brexit secretary during the “Brexit wars” of the late 2010s. Starmer himself talked up this approach in a rare long-form interview this week with BBC host Laura Kuenssberg, saying: “We are better looking to the single market rather than the customs union for our further alignment.” While the PM’s allies insist he simply answered a question, some of his MPs spy a need to seize back the pro-EU narrative. The second person who talks regularly to No. 10 argued a “relatively small … factional leadership challenge group around Wes” is pushing ideas around a customs union, while Starmer wants to “not match that but bypass it, and say actually, we’re doing something more practical and potentially bigger.”  A third Labour MP was blunter about No. 10’s messaging: “They’re terrified and they’re worrying about an internal leadership challenge.” Starmer’s allies argue that their approach is pragmatic and recognizes what the EU will actually be willing to accept. Christabel Cooper, director of research at the pro-Labour think tank Labour Together — which plans polling and focus groups in the coming months to test public opinion on the issue — said: “We’ve talked to a few trade experts and economists, and actually the customs union is not all that helpful. To get a bigger bang for your buck, you do need to go down more of a single market alignment route.”  Stella Creasy argued that promising a Swiss-style deal in Labour’s next election manifesto (likely in 2029) would benefit the economy — far more than the “reset” currently on the table. | Nicola Tree/Getty Images Nick Harvey, CEO of the pro-EU pressure group European Movement UK, concurred: “The fact that they’re now talking about a fuller alignment towards the single market is very good news, and shows that to make progress economically and to make progress politically, they simply have to do this.”  But critics point out there are still big questions about what alignment will look like — or more importantly, what the EU will go for.  The bill will include areas such as food standards, animal welfare, pesticide use, the EU’s electricity market and carbon emissions trading, but talks on all of these remain ongoing. Negotiations to join the EU’s defense framework, SAFE, stalled over the costs to Britain. Menon said: “I just don’t see what [Starmer] is spelling out being practically possible. Even at the highest levels there has been, under the Labour Party, quite a degree of ignorance, I think, about how the EU works and what the EU wants.   “I’ve heard Labour MPs say, well, they’ve got a veterinary deal with New Zealand, so how hard can it be? And you want to say, I don’t know if you’ve noticed, but New Zealand doesn’t have a land border with the EU.”  THE SWISS BANKERS Then there are Europhile MPs, peers and campaigners who back aligning with the single market — but going much further than Starmer.  For some this takes the form of a “Swiss-style” deal, which would allow single market access for some sectors without rejoining the customs union.   This would plough through Starmer’s red lines by reintroducing EU freedom of movement, along with substantial payments to Brussels.  But Stella Creasy, chair of the Labour Movement for Europe (LME), argued that promising a Swiss-style deal in Labour’s next election manifesto (likely in 2029) would benefit the economy — far more than the “reset” currently on the table. She said: “If you could get a Swiss-style deal and put it in the manifesto … that would be enough for businesses to invest.”  Creasy said LME has around 150 MPs as members and holds regular briefings for them. While few Labour MPs back a Swiss deal — and various colleagues see Creasy as an outlier — she said MPs and peers, including herself, plan to put forward amendments to the dynamic alignment bill when it goes through parliament.  Tom Baldwin, Starmer’s biographer and the former communications director of the People’s Vote campaign (which called for a second referendum on Brexit), also suggests Labour could go further in 2029. “Keir Starmer’s comments at the weekend about aligning with — and gaining access to — the single market open up a whole range of possibilities,” he said. “At the low end, this is a pragmatic choice by a PM who doesn’t want to be forced to choose between Europe and America.   “At the upper end, it suggests Labour may seek a second term mandate at the next election by which the U.K. would get very close to rejoining the single market. That would be worth a lot more in terms of economic growth and national prosperity than the customs union deal favoured by the Lib Dems.”  A third person who speaks regularly to No. 10 called it a “boil the frog strategy.” They added: “You get closer and closer and then maybe … you go into the election saying ‘we’ll try to negotiate something more single markety or customs uniony.’”  THE REJOINERS? Labour’s political enemies (and some of its supporters) argue this could all lead even further — to rejoining the EU one day. “Genuinely, I am not advocating rejoin now in any sense because it’s a 10-year process,” said Creasy, who is about as Europhile as they come in Labour. “Our European counterparts would say ‘hang on a minute, could you actually win a referendum, given [Reform UK Leader and Brexiteer Nigel] Farage is doing so well?’”  With Prime Minister Keir Starmer tanking in the polls, the Europhile streak among many Labour MPs and members means Brexit could become a key issue for anyone who would seek to replace him. | Tom Nicholson/Getty Images Simon Opher, an MP and member of the Mainstream Labour group closely aligned with Burnham, said rejoining was “probably for a future generation” as “the difficulty is, would they want us back?” But look into the soul of many Labour politicians, and they would love to still be in the bloc — even if they insist rejoining is not on the table now. Andy Burnham — the Greater Manchester mayor who has flirted with the leadership — remarked last year that he would like to rejoin the EU in his lifetime (he’s 56). London Mayor Sadiq Khan said “in the medium to long term, yes, of course, I would like to see us rejoining.” In the meantime Khan backs membership of the single market and customs union, which would still go far beyond No. 10’s red lines.  THE ISSUES-LED MPS Then there are the disparate — yet overlapping — groups of MPs whose views on Europe are guided by their politics, their constituencies or their professional interests. To Starmer’s left, backbench rebels including Richard Burgon and Dawn Butler backed the push toward a customs union by the opposition Lib Dems. The members of the left-wing Socialist Campaign Group frame their argument around fears Labour will lose voters to other progressive parties, namely the Lib Dems, Greens and SNP, if they fail to show adequate bonds with Europe. Some other, more centrist MPs fear similar. Labour MPs with a military background or in military-heavy seats also want the U.K. and EU to cooperate further. London MP Calvin Bailey, who spent more than two decades in the Royal Air Force, endorsed closer security relations between Britain and France through greater intelligence sharing and possibly permanent infrastructure. Alex Baker, whose Aldershot constituency is known as the home of the British Army, backed British involvement in a global Defense, Security and Resilience Bank, arguing it could be key to a U.K.-EU Defence and Security Pact. The government opted against joining such a scheme.   Parliamentarians keen for young people to bag more traveling rights were buoyed by a breakthrough on Erasmus+ membership for British students at the end of last year. More than 60 Labour MPs earlier signed a letter calling for a youth mobility scheme allowing 18 to 30-year-olds expanded travel opportunities on time limited visas. It was organized by Andrew Lewin, the Welywn Hatfield MP, and signatories included future Home Office Minister Mike Tapp (then a backbencher).  Labour also has an influential group of rural MPs, most elected in 2024, who are keen to boost cooperation and cut red tape for farmers. Rural MP Steve Witherden, on the party’s left, said: “Three quarters of Welsh food and drink exports go straight to the EU … regulatory alignment is a top priority for rural Labour MPs. Success here could point the way towards closer ties with Europe in other sectors.”  THE NOT-SO-SECRET EUROPHILES (A.K.A. ALL OF THE ABOVE) Many Labour figures argue that all of the above are actually just one mega-group — Labour MPs who want to be closer to Brussels, regardless of the mechanism. Menon agreed Labour camps are not formalized because most Labour MPs agree on working closely with Brussels. “I think it’s a mishmash,” he said. But he added: “I think these tribes will emerge or develop because there’s an intra-party fight looming, and Brexit is one of the issues people use to signal where they stand.” A fourth Labour MP agreed: “I didn’t think there was much of a distinction between the camps of people who want to get closer to the EU. The first I heard of that was over the weekend.”  The senior Labour official quoted above added: “I don’t think it cuts across tribes in such a clear way … a broader group of people just want us to move faster in terms of closeness into the EU, in terms of a whole load of things. I don’t think it fits neatly.” For years MPs were bound by a strategy of talking little about Brexit because it was so divisive with Labour’s voter base. That shifted over 2025. Labour advisers were buoyed by polls showing a rise in “Bregret” among some who voted for Brexit in 2016, as well as changing demographics (bluntly, young voters come of age while older voters die).  No. 10 aides also noted last summer that Farage, the leader of the right-wing populist party Reform UK, was making Brexit less central to his campaigning. Some aides (though others dispute this) credit individual advisers such as Tim Allan, No. 10’s director of communications, as helping a more openly EU-friendly media strategy into being. For all the talk of tribes and camps, Labour doesn’t have warring Brexit factions in the same way that the Tories did at the height of the EU divorce in the 2010s. | Jakub Porzycki/Getty Images THE BLUE LABOUR HOLDOUTS  Not everyone in Labour wants to hug Brussels tight.  A small but significant rump of Labour MPs, largely from the socially conservative Blue Labour tribe, is anxious that pursuing closer ties could be seen as a rejection of the Brexit referendum — and a betrayal of voters in Leave-backing seats who are looking to Reform. One of them, Liverpool MP Dan Carden, said the failure of both London and Brussels to strike a recent deal on defense funding, even amid threats from Russia, showed Brussels is not serious.   “Any Labour MP who thinks that the U.K. can get closer to the single market or the customs union without giving up freedoms and taking instruction from an EU that we’re not a part of is living in cloud cuckoo land,” he said. A similar skepticism of the EU’s authority is echoed by the Tony Blair Institute (TBI), led by one of the most pro-European prime ministers in Britain’s history. The TBI has been meeting politicians in Brussels and published a paper translated into French, German and Italian in a bid to shape the EU’s future from within.   Ryan Wain, the TBI’s senior director for policy and politics, argued: “We live in a G2 world where there are two superpowers, China and the U.S. By the middle of this century there will likely be three, with India. To me, it’s just abysmal that Europe isn’t mentioned in that at all. It has massive potential to adapt and reclaim its influence, but that opportunity needs to be unlocked.”  Such holdouts enjoy a strange alliance with left-wing Euroskeptics (“Lexiteers”), who believe the EU does not have the interests of workers at its heart. But few of these were ever in Labour and few remain; former Leader Jeremy Corbyn has long since been cast out. At the same time many Labour MPs in Leave-voting areas, who opposed efforts to stop Brexit in the late 2010s, now support closer alignment with Brussels to help their local car and chemical industries. As such, there are now 20 or fewer MPs holding their noses on closer alignment. Just three Labour MPs, including fellow Blue Labour supporter Jonathan Brash, voted against a bill supporting a customs union proposed by the centrist, pro-Europe Lib Dems last month.  WHERE WILL IT ALL END?  For all the talk of tribes and camps, Labour doesn’t have warring Brexit factions in the same way that the Tories did at the height of the EU divorce in the 2010s. Most MPs agree on closer alignment with the EU; the question is how they get there.  Even so, Menon has a warning from the last Brexit wars. Back in the late 2010s, Conservative MPs would jostle to set out their positions — workable or otherwise. The crowded field just made negotiations with Brussels harder. “We end up with absolutely batshit stupid positions when viewed from the EU,” said Menon, “because they’re being derived as a function of the need to position yourself in a British political party.” But few of these were ever in Labour and few remain; former Leader Jeremy Corbyn has long since been cast out. | Seiya Tanase/Getty Images The saving grace could be that most Labour MPs are united by a deeper gut feeling about the EU — one that, Baldwin argues, is reflected in Starmer himself. The PM’s biographer said: “At heart, Keir Starmer is an outward-looking internationalist whose pro-European beliefs are derived from what he calls the ‘blood-bond’ of 1945 and shared values, rather than the more transactional trade benefits of 1973,” when Britain joined the European Economic Community.  All that remains is to turn a “blood-bond” into hard policy. Simple, right?

Pedro Sánchez is the prime minister of Spain. It’s no secret the world is going through a time of turbulence. The principles that held it together for decades are under threat; disinformation is spreading freely; and even the foundations of the welfare state — which brought us the longest period of prosperity in human history — are now being questioned by a far-right transnational movement challenging our democratic systems’ ability to deliver collective solutions and social justice. In the face of this attack, Europe stands as a wall of resistance. The EU has been  — and must remain — a shelter for the values that uphold our democracies, our cohesion and our freedom. But let’s be honest, values don’t put a roof over your head. And at any rate, these values are fading fast in the face of something as concrete and urgent as the lack of affordable housing. If we do not act, Europe risks becoming a shelter without homes. The figures are clear: The housing crisis is devastating the standard of living across Europe. Between 2010 and 2025, home prices rose by 60 percent, while rental prices went up by nearly 30 percent. In countries like Estonia or Hungary, prices have tripled. In densely populated or high-tourism cities, families can spend over 70 percent of their income on rent. And individuals with stable jobs in Madrid, Lisbon or Budapest can no longer afford to live where they work or where they grew up. Meanwhile, 93 million Europeans — that’s one in five — are living at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This isn’t just the perception of experts or institutions: Around half of Europeans consider housing to be an “urgent and immediate problem.” Housing, which should be a right, has become a trap that shapes peoples’ present, suffocates their future and endangers Europe’s cohesion, economic dynamism and prosperity. The roots of this problem may differ from country to country, but two facts are undeniable and shared throughout our continent: First, the need for more houses, which we’ve been falling behind on for years. For nearly two decades now, residential construction in the EU has fallen short of demand. After a period of strong growth in the 1990s and early 2000s, the 2008 financial crisis triggered a collapse in housing investment, and the sector never fully recovered. The pandemic only widened this gap, halting permits, delaying materials and worsening labor shortages that further stalled construction. Second, and just as urgent, is that we must ensure both new construction and existing housing stock serve their true purpose: upholding the fundamental right to decent and affordable housing. Because as we continue to fall short of guaranteeing this basic right, homes are increasingly being diverted to fuel speculation or serve secondary uses like tourist rentals. In fact, according to preliminary European Parliament data, there were around 4 million short-term rental listings on digital platforms across the EU in 2025. In my home country, cities like Madrid and València have witnessed the displacement of residents from their historic centers, which are transforming into theme parks for tourists. For nearly two decades now, residential construction in the EU has fallen short of demand. | David Zorrakino/Getty Images At the same time, housing is increasingly being treated as a financial asset instead of a social good. In Ireland, investment funds have acquired nearly half of all newly built homes since 2017, while in Sweden, institutional investors now control 24 percent of all private rental apartments. Just as no one would dare justify doubling the price of a bowl of rice for a starving child, we cannot accept turning the roofs meant to shelter people into a vehicle for speculation — and citizens overwhelmingly share in this view. Seventy-one percent of Europeans believe that the places they live would benefit from more controls on property speculation, like taxing vacant rentals or regulating short-term rentals. This is what the EU stands for: When it’s a choice between profit and people, we choose people. That choice can’t wait any longer. Thankfully, with yesterday’s Affordable Housing Plan, the European Commission is starting to move on housing, taking steps that Spain has long advocated. Brussels now increasingly recognizes the scale of this emergency and acknowledges that specific market conditions may require differentiated national and local responses. This will help consolidate a shared policy understanding regarding housing-stressed areas and strengthen the case for targeted measures — which may include, among others, restrictions on short-term rentals. Crucially, the plan also stresses the need for EU financing to boost housing supply. The time for words is over. We need urgent action. A growing outcry over housing is resonating across Europe, and our citizens need concrete solutions. Any failure to act with ambition and urgency risks turning the housing crisis into a new driver of Euroskepticism. After World War II, Europe was built on two founding promises: securing peace and delivering well-being. Honoring that legacy today means taking decisive action by massively increasing flexible funding to match the scale of the housing crisis, and guaranteeing member countries can swiftly implement the legal tools needed to adopt bold regulatory measures on short-term rentals and address the impact of nonresident buyers on housing access. The true measure of our union isn’t just written in treaties. It must be demonstrated by ensuring every person can live with dignity and have a place to call home. Let us rise to that promise — boldly, together and without delay.

BRUSSELS ― Ursula von der Leyen is facing the starkest challenge to the EU’s accountability in a generation ― with a fraud probe ensnaring two of the biggest names in Brussels and threatening to explode into a full-scale crisis. Exactly a year into her second term as Commission president, von der Leyen, already plagued by questions over her commitment to transparency and amid simmering tension with the bloc’s foreign policy wing, must now find a way to avoid being embroiled in a scandal that dates back to her first years in office. An announcement by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office that the EU’s former foreign affairs chief and a senior diplomat currently working in von der Leyen’s Commission had been detained on Tuesday was seized on by her critics, with renewed calls that she face a fourth vote of no confidence. “The credibility of our institutions is at stake,” said Manon Aubry, co-chair of The Left in the European Parliament. If proven, the allegations would set in motion the biggest scandal to engulf Brussels since the mass resignation of the Jacques Santer Commission in 1999 over allegations of financial mismanagement. Police detained former Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini, a center-left Italian politician who headed the EU’s foreign policy wing, the European External Action Service, from 2014-2019, and Stefano Sannino, an Italian civil servant who was the EEAS secretary-general from 2021 until he was replaced earlier this year. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office said it had “strong suspicions” that a 2021-2022 tendering process to set up a diplomatic academy attached to the College of Europe, where Mogherini is rector, hadn’t been fair and that the facts, if proven, “could constitute procurement fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and violation of professional secrecy.” The saga looks set to inflame already strained relations between von der Leyen and the current boss of the EEAS, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, four EU officials told POLITICO. Earlier this year Sannino left his secretary-general job and took up a prominent role in von der Leyen’s Commission. An EU official defended von der Leyen, instead blaming the EEAS, an autonomous service under the EU treaties that operates under the bloc’s high representative, Kallas — who is one of the 27 European commissioners. “I know the people who don’t like von der Leyen will use this against her, but they use everything against her,” the official said. Police detained former Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini, a center-left Italian politician who headed the EU’s foreign policy wing, the European External Action Service, from 2014-2019. | Christoph Gollnow/Getty Images “Because President von der Leyen is the most identifiable leader in Brussels, we lay everything at her door,” the official added. “And it’s not fair that she would face a motion of censure for something the External Action Service may have done. She’s not accountable for all of the institutions.” Mogherini, Sannino and a third person have not been charged and their detention does not imply guilt. An investigative judge has 48 hours from the start of their questioning to decide on further action. When contacted about Sannino, the Commission declined to comment. When contacted about Mogherini, the College of Europe declined to answer specific questions. In a statement it said it remained “committed to the highest standards of integrity, fairness, and compliance — both in academic and administrative matters.” ‘CRIME SERIES’ The investigation comes as Euroskeptic, populist and far-right parties ride a wave of voter dissatisfaction and at a time when the EU is pressuring countries both within and outside the bloc over their own corruption scandals. “Funny how Brussels lectures everyone on ‘rule of law’ while its own institutions look more like a crime series than a functioning union,” Zoltan Kovacs, spokesperson for the government of Hungary, which has faced EU criticism, said on X. Romanian MEP Gheorghe Piperea, a member of the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists group, who was behind a failed no-confidence vote in von der Leyen in July, told POLITICO he was considering trying to trigger a fresh motion. Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova told state media that EU officials “prefer to ignore their own problems, while constantly lecturing everyone else.” The EU has struggled to shake off a series of corruption scandals since this decade began. Tuesday’s raids come on the back of the 2022 “Qatargate” scandal, when the Gulf state was accused of seeking to influence MEPs through bribes and gifts, as well as this year’s bribery probe into Chinese tech giant Huawei’s lobbying activities in Europe.  Those investigations implicated members of the European Parliament, and at the time Commission officials were quick to point the finger at lawmakers and distance themselves from the scandals. But the Commission hasn’t been immune to allegations of impropriety. In 2012, then-Health Commissioner John Dalli resigned over a tobacco lobbying scandal. Von der Leyen herself was on the receiving end of a slap-down by the EU’s General Court, which ruled earlier this year that she shouldn’t have withheld from the public text messages that she exchanged with the CEO of drug giant Pfizer during the Covid-19 pandemic. Tuesday’s revelations are far more dangerous for the Commission, given the high profile of the suspects and the gravity of the allegations they face. ‘DISASTROUS IMPACT’ After serving as a European Commission vice president and head of the EEAS, Mogherini was appointed rector of the College of Europe in 2020, amid criticism she wasn’t qualified for the post, didn’t meet the criteria, and had entered the race months after the deadline. In 2022 she became the director of the European Union Diplomatic Academy, the project at the heart of Tuesday’s dawn raids. Sannino, a former Italian diplomat, was the EEAS’s top civil servant and is now the director-general for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf department in the Commission. Stefano Sannino, a former Italian diplomat, was the EEAS’s top civil servant and is now the director-general for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf department in the Commission. | Pool Photo by Johanna Geron via Getty Images Cristiano Sebastiani, the staff representative of one of the EU’s major trade unions, Renouveau & Démocratie, said that if proven, the allegations would have “a disastrous impact on the credibility of the institutions concerned, and more broadly on citizens’ perception of all European institutions.” He said he had received “tens of messages” from EU staff concerned about reputational damage. “This is not good for EU institutions and for the Commission services. It is not good for Europe, it steers attention away from other things,” said a Commission official granted anonymity to speak freely. “It conveys this idea of elitism, of an informal network doing favors. Also, Mogherini was one of the most successful [EU high representatives], it’s not good in terms of public diplomacy.”

BERLIN — Before Leif-Erik Holm became one of the German far right’s leading figures, he was a morning radio DJ in his home state in eastern Germany celebrated, by his station, for making “the best jokes far and wide.” Ahead of regional elections across Germany next year, Holm, 55, is now set to become the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party’s top candidate in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, a largely rural area bordering Poland and the Baltic Sea. With polls showing the AfD in first place at 38 percent support in the state, it’s one of the places where the party — now the largest opposition group in Germany’s national parliament — is within striking distance of taking significant governing power for the first time since its formation over a decade ago. Holm embodies the type of candidate at least some AfD leaders increasingly want at the top of the ticket. With an avuncular demeanor, he eschews the kind of incendiary rhetoric other politicians in the party have embraced and says he seeks dialogue with his political opponents. Asked what his party would do if it takes power in his state next year, Holm rattled off some innocuous-sounding proposals: invest more in education, including STEM subjects, and ensure children of immigrants learn German before they start school. “I’m actually a nice guy,” Holm said. Underneath the guy-next-door image, however, there’s a clear political calculus. National co-head of the party, Alice Weidel, is attempting something of a rebrand, believing that the AfD won’t be able to make the jump to real political power unless it moves away from candidates who embrace openly extreme positions. That means moving away from controversial leaders like Björn Höcke — found guilty by a court for uttering a banned slogan used by Adolf Hitler’s SA storm troopers — and Maximilian Krah, who last year said he would “never say that anyone who wore an SS uniform was automatically a criminal.” Instead, the preferred candidate, at least for Weidel and people in her camp, is someone like Holm, who can present a more sanitized face of the party. But the makeover is proving to be only skin deep, and even Weidel, despite her national leadership role, can’t prevent the mask from slipping. NEW LOOK, SAME POLITICS Since its creation in 2013 as a Euroskeptic party, the AfD has grown more extreme, mobilizing its increasingly radicalized base primarily around the issue of migration. Earlier this year, Germany’s federal domestic intelligence agency — which is tasked with surveilling groups found to be anti-constitutional — deemed the AfD an extremist group. Weidel is now trying to tamp down on the open extremism. The effort is intended to make the AfD more palatable to mainstream conservatives — and to make it harder for German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s center-right alliance to refuse to govern in coalition with the party by maintaining the postwar “firewall” around the far right. Weidel’s push to present a more polished party image isn’t necessarily supported by large swaths of the AfD’s rank and file — especially in its strongholds in the former East Germany — who point to the fact that the party’s political ascent coincided with its radicalization. The argument isn’t without merit. Despite its rising extremism, the party came in second in the snap federal election early this year — the best national showing for a far-right party since World War II. The party is now ahead of Merz’s conservatives in polls. Alice Weidel’s push to present a more polished party image isn’t necessarily supported by large swaths of the AfD’s rank and file. | Sean Gallup/Getty Images  Weidel is nevertheless pressing ahead with her drive to try to soften the AfD’s image. As part of this effort, Weidel has tried to somewhat shift her party from its proximity to the Kremlin — seeking closer ties with Republicans in the U.S. From now on, the party will “fight alongside the white knight rather than the black knight,” a person familiar with Weidel’s thinking said. In another remake attempt, earlier this year, an extremist youth group affiliated with the AfD dissolved itself to avert a possible ban that might have damaged the party. Last weekend, a new youth wing was formed that party leaders will have direct control over. Other far-right parties across Europe have made their own rebranding efforts. In France, far-right leader Marine Le Pen has attempted to normalize her party — an effort referred to as dédiabolisation, or “de-demonization” — ditching the open antisemitism of its founders. As part of that push, Le Pen moved to disassociate her party from the AfD in the European Parliament. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has moderated her earlier anti-EU, pro-Russia stances. For the AfD, however, the attempted transformation is less a matter of substance — and more a matter of optics. Underneath Weidel’s effort to burnish her party’s reputation, many of its most extreme voices continue to hold sway. THE POLISHED RADICAL Perhaps no AfD leader embodies that tension more than Ulrich Siegmund, the lead candidate for the party in the state of Saxony-Anhalt, where it is polling first at 40 percent support ahead of a regional vote next September. It’s here, in this small state of just over 2 million people, where AfD leaders pin most of their hopes of getting into state government next year — possibly even with an absolute majority. Like Holm, Siegmund too tries to cultivate a regular-guy persona. Even members of opposing parties in the state parliament describe him as friendly and approachable. With over half a million followers on TikTok, he reaches more people than any other state politician in Germany. Perhaps no AfD leader embodies that tension more than Ulrich Siegmund, the lead candidate for the party in the state of Saxony-Anhalt. | Emmanuele Contini/NurPhoto via Getty Images At the same time, Siegmund is clearly connected to the extreme fringe of the party. He was one of the attendees at a secret meeting of right-wing extremists in which a “master plan” to deport migrants and “unassimilated citizens” was reportedly discussed. When news of the meeting broke last year, it sparked sustained protests against the far right across Germany and temporarily dented the AfD’s popularity in polls. Speaking to POLITICO, Siegmund minimized the secret meeting as “coffee klatsch,” claiming the real scandal is how the media overblew the episode. He described himself not as a dangerous extremist — but as a regular guy concerned for his country. “I am a normal citizen, taxpayer and resident of this country who simply wants a better home, especially for his children, for his family, for all of our children,” Siegmund said. “Because I simply cannot stand by and watch our country develop so negatively in such a short time.” Yet, when pressed, Siegmund could not conceal his extremism. He defended the use of the motto “Everything for Germany!” — the banned Nazi phrase that got his party colleague, Höcke, into legal trouble. “I think it goes without saying that you should give your all for your own country,” Siegmund said. “And I think that should also be the benchmark for every politician — to do everything they can for their own country, because that’s what they were elected to do and what they are paid to do.” Siegmund also took issue with the notion that the Nazis perpetrated history’s greatest crime against humanity, so therefore Germans have a special responsibility to avoid such terms. Ulrich Siegmund also took issue with the notion that the Nazis perpetrated history’s greatest crime against humanity, so therefore Germans have a special responsibility to avoid such terms. | Heiko Rebsch/picture alliance via Getty Images “I find this interpretation to be grossly exaggerated and completely detached from reality,” he said. “For me, it is important to look forward and not backward. And of course, we must always learn from history, but not just from individual aspects of history, but from history as a whole.” Siegmund said he couldn’t judge whether the Nazis had perpetrated history’s worst crime, relativizing the Holocaust in a manner reminiscent of some of the most extreme voices in his party. “I don’t presume to judge that,” he said, “because I can’t assess the whole of humanity.” One lesson from Germany’s history, Siegmund added, is that there should be no “language police” or attempts to ban the AfD as extremist, as some centrist politicians advocate. “If you want to ban the strongest force in this country according to opinion polls, then you’re not learning from history either,” he said. INTERNATIONAL NATIONALISTS The AfD’s national leaders privately smarted at Siegmund’s comments for making their faltering rebrand more difficult. (Holm did not respond to a request for comment on the statements.) That’s especially the case because Weidel and other AfD leaders are increasingly looking abroad for the legitimacy they crave at home and fear such rhetoric will complicate the effort. Weidel and people in her circle have sought to forge closer ties to the Trump administration and other right-wing governments, seeing connections with MAGA Republicans in the U.S. and other populist-right parties in Europe as a way of winning credibility for the AfD domestically. In Europe, Weidel has repeatedly visited Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at his official residence in Budapest. The party is also making an effort to reestablish connections with members of Le Pen’s party in the European Parliament, according to a high-ranking AfD official. Not everyone in the AfD, however, sees eye to eye with Weidel on the attempt to moderate the party image, especially when it comes to relations with Moscow. The AfD’s other national co-leader, Tino Chrupalla, recently told an interviewer on German public television that Vladimir Putin’s Russia poses no threat to Germany. Chrupalla’s rhetoric is much more friendly to the Kremlin, and he’s the preferred party leader among many of the AfD’s most radical supporters in eastern Germany — where pro-Moscow sympathies are more prevalent. Many of the AfD’s followers in the former East Germany, where the party polls strongest, see Weidel, born in the former West Germany, as too mild in her approach. Ultimately, the direction of the AfD — in next year’s state elections and beyond — may well depend on which leader’s vision prevails.

Catherine de Vries is Generali chair in European policies and professor at Bocconi University in Milan. Last week, Dutch voters rewarded the political center. The centrist-liberal D66 and center-right Christian Democratic Appeal benefited from a gowing appetite for stability, while the race for the largest party ended in a photo finish between D66 and Geert Wilders’s far-right Freedom Party. With no group receiving more than a fifth of the vote, upcoming coalition talks promise to be complicated, and a majority government before the holidays looks unlikely. As with so many recent elections across the continent, the EU was again the elephant in the room. Bloc-wide issues barely featured in the campaign ahead of the vote, yet the result could have far-reaching consequences for the Netherlands’ role in Brussels. What is already clear is that the Dutch electorate voted far more pro-European than it did in 2023. Indeed, it seems the Euroskepticism that once dominated the political mood has given way to a quiet mandate for cooperation and reform — an unmistakably pro-EU signal to The Hague. And if D66 leader Rob Jetten can succeed in becoming the party’s first prime minister, it would mark a decisive shift in the country’s policy toward the bloc. D66 has long been the most outspokenly pro-EU party across the Dutch political spectrum. Speaking to POLITICO after the election, Jetten argued that the Netherlands should use its veto power far less often and instead “say yes to cooperation more often.” “Europe risks stagnation if we fail to deepen integration. The Netherlands helped found the Union, now we should help shape its future,” he said. These words signal a clear break from the previous government of technocrat Dick Schoof, which had been largely invisible in Brussels. As Dutch broadcaster NOS recently reported, the country’s influence in the EU has “withered.” Or, as one senior EU diplomat bluntly put it: “No one listens to the Dutch anymore.” Schoof’s administration had begun with high expectations — exemptions on asylum, nitrogen and nature rules, and a lower contribution to the EU budget — but the reality in Brussels proved unforgiving. The Netherlands often found itself isolated, and its attempts to secure “opt-outs” were quietly abandoned. A Jetten premiership could reverse this pattern. Though similarly pragmatic, even Schoof’s predecessor Mark Rutte was ultimately cautious, wary of treaty reform and collective borrowing. But Jetten signals a readiness to go further, as D66 sees the Netherlands as a natural bridge-builder and a key player in European integration. Moreover, part of the Schoof government’s weakness was its lack of European experience. A technocrat without party backing, he struggled to build political capital in Brussels. Jetten, by contrast, is well-connected. Like Rutte, he belongs to Renew Europe group, the liberal alliance associated with French President Emmanuel Macron — a link that once amplified Dutch influence beyond its size. And if D66 leader Rob Jetten can succeed in becoming the party’s first prime minister, it would mark a decisive shift in the country’s policy toward the bloc. | Pierre Crom/Getty Images Of course, today even this network has become fragile. Macron’s domestic troubles have diminished his clout in Brussels, and with it, the gravitational pull of the liberal camp. Meanwhile, Brussels itself is more fragmented than ever. European politics has become a patchwork of competing national priorities, with southern members demanding more collective investment, northern countries — including the Netherlands — still preaching fiscal discipline, eastern members prioritizing defense and security, and western governments focused on industrial policy and competitiveness. Then, there are the external pressures to consider: The U.S. expects Europe to shoulder more of its own defense, while China is forcing the bloc to rethink its economic dependencies. In such a fragmented landscape, speaking with one European voice is hard enough — acting in unison is harder still. Ultimately, though, how the next Dutch government positions itself in this European maze, and Jetten’s ability to deliver, will largely depend on domestic politics and the coalition he can forge. The irony here is that if the center-left Green–Labor alliance or the Christian Democrats had emerged as the largest party, alignment with Europe’s dominant political currents might have been easier, finding natural allies in Spain’s Pedro Sánchez or German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. But with D66 securing less than 20 percent of the vote, Jetten will have to govern in a broad coalition that includes parties far less enthusiastic about Europe. Still, even a Jetten-led coalition could boost Dutch influence precisely because it would span multiple European party families at once. In Brussels, where informal networks often matter just as much as votes, that could give the Netherlands renewed diplomatic weight. Facing the strategic dilemma of reconciling domestic compromise with European ambition, Jetten’s political style — pragmatic, conciliatory and consensus-driven — may also prove to be an asset here. During election-night coverage, one journalist even called him “the new Rutte” due to their shared instinct for timing and coalition-building. But Jetten couples this with a much clearer European vision. In his post-election remarks to POLITICO, the D66 leader left little room for doubt: “Europe must evolve into a serious democratic world power, with the means and authority to do what citizens expect — protect our borders from Putin, grow our economy and safeguard the climate,” he said. For years now, Dutch politics have been oscillating between pragmatic euro-realism and latent Euroskepticism. But this election may finally signal the pendulum’s slow return toward a more pro-Europe center, rooted in the quiet understanding that the Netherlands and the EU rise and fall together.

BRUSSELS — Wednesday’s election in the Netherlands should surely go down as one of the best days Europe’s centrists have enjoyed in years. Geert Wilders, the far-right populist who touted leaving the EU on his way to a shock victory in the 2023 election, lost nearly a third of his voters after 11 chaotic months for his Party for Freedom (PVV) in coalition.  At the same time, the fervently pro-European liberal Rob Jetten surged in the final days of the campaign and stands a good chance of becoming prime minister. At 38, he would be the youngest person to hold the office since World War II and the first openly gay candidate ever to do so.  “Many in the Brussels bubble will welcome the rise of a mainstream, pro-governing and reform-oriented party,” said one EU diplomat, granted anonymity because the subject is politically sensitive. “The Dutch have a lot to contribute to the EU.” But even as they exhale with relief at the end of the Wilders interlude, the inhabitants of Europe’s dominant liberal center-ground — those Brussels officials, diplomats and ministers who run the EU show — would be well advised not to celebrate too hard. If previous years are any guide, the final shape of the next government and its policy plans will not become clear for months. Who knows what will have happened in Ukraine, the Middle East, or in Donald Trump’s trade war with China in that time? “It is essential for European cooperation that a new government is stable and able to make bold decisions, given the current geopolitical challenges that Europe is facing,” the same diplomat said. Even when the new coalition finally begins its work, this election should worry Europe’s liberal centrists almost as much as it delights them. JETTEN INTO EUROPE  Jetten’s Democracy 66 party has never done so well at a Dutch election: Assuming he gets the job he wants, he’ll be the party’s first prime minister. This week he told POLITICO he wanted to move the Netherlands closer to the EU.  Last night, officials in Brussels privately welcomed the prospect of the Dutch and their highly regarded diplomats returning to their historic place at the center of EU affairs, after two years in which they lost some influence. It was always going to be tough for the outgoing PM Dick Schoof, a 68-year-old technocrat, to follow the long-serving Mark Rutte, an EU star who now runs NATO. Domestic divisions made his job even harder.  But pro-European spirits also rose because the disruptive Wilders had wanted to keep the EU at arm’s length. Jetten’s position could hardly be more different. In fact, he sounds like an EU federalist’s dream.  “We want to stop saying ‘no’ by default, and start saying ‘yes’ to doing more together,” Jetten told POLITICO this week. “I cannot stress enough how dire Europe’s situation will be if we do not integrate further.”  STAYING DUTCH In Brussels, officials expect the next Dutch administration to maintain the same broad outlook on core policies: restraint on the EU’s long-term budget; cracking down on migration; boosting trade and competitiveness; and supporting Ukraine, alongside stronger common defense. One area where things could get complicated is climate policy. Jetten is committed to climate action and may end up in a power-sharing deal with GreenLeft-Labor, which was led at this election by former EU Green Deal chief Frans Timmermans.  How any government that Jetten leads balances climate action with improving economic growth will be key to policy discussions in Brussels. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has been trimming climate measures amid center-right complaints that they are expensive for consumers and businesses. But she wants to secure backing for new targets to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2040.  Elsewhere, housing and migration — two areas often linked by far-right politicians — were central issues in the Dutch campaign. Both will continue to feature on the EU’s agenda, too.  For many watching the results unfold in Brussels, the biggest concerns are practical: Will the next Dutch government be more stable than the last one? And how long will it take to for the coalition to form? Seven months passed between the last election in November 2023 and Schoof taking office as prime minister in July 2024. “This is a historic election result because we’ve shown not only to the Netherlands but also to the world that it’s possible to beat populist and extreme-right movements,” Jetten told his supporters. “I’m very eager to cooperate with other parties to start an ambitious coalition as soon as possible.”  WILDERS Beneath the rare good news of a pro-European triumph and a far-right failure lurk more worrying trends for EU centrists.  First of all, there’s the sheer volatility of the result. Most voters apparently made up their minds at the last moment.  Wilders went from winning the popular vote and taking 37 of the 150 seats in the Dutch lower house in 2023 to a projected 26 seats this time. Jetten’s D66 party, meanwhile, went from just nine seats two years ago to a projected 26, according to a preliminary forecast by the Dutch news agency ANP. The center-right Christian Democratic Appeal took just five seats in 2023 but now stands to win 18, according to the forecast. With swings this wild, anything could happen next time. Most major parties say they won’t work with Wilders in coalition now, making Jetten the more likely new PM if the projections hold. But Wilders says he is a long way from finished. “You won’t be rid of me until I’m 80,” the 62 year-old told supporters. In fact, Wilders might find a period in opposition — free from the constraints and compromises required in government — the perfect place to resume his inflammatory campaigns against Islam, immigration and the EU.  Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage had all been written off before storming back into their respective political front lines. “We had hoped for a different outcome, but we stood our ground,” Wilders wrote on X. “We are more determined than ever.”  TIMM’S UP  The other cloud on the pro-European horizon is the fate of Timmermans.  His center-left ticket was expected to do well and had been polling second behind Wilders’ Freedom Party in the months before the vote. But per the preliminary forecast, GreenLeft-Labor will fall from 25 seats to 20. Timmermans — who also stood in 2023 — resigned as leader.  It wasn’t just a defeat for the party, but also in some ways for Brussels. Timmermans had served as the European Commission’s executive vice president during von der Leyen’s first term, and was seen by some, especially his opponents, as a creation of the EU bubble.  Others point to the fact the center-left is struggling across Europe.  “It’s clear that I, for whatever reason, couldn’t convince people to vote for us,” Timmermans said. “It’s time that I take a step back and transfer the lead of our movement to the next generation.” Jetten’s pro-Europeanism could also come back to haunt him by the time of the next election. If he fails to deliver miracles to back up his optimistic pitch to voters, his Euroskeptic opponents have a ready-made argument for what went wrong. Recent history in the Netherlands, and elsewhere, suggests they won’t be afraid to use it.  Eva Hartog, Hanne Cokelaere, Pieter Haeck and Max Griera contributed reporting.

Hungary is looking to join forces with Czechia and Slovakia to form a Ukraine-skeptic alliance in the EU, a top political adviser to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán told POLITICO. Orbán is hoping to team up with Andrej Babiš, whose right-wing populist party won Czechia’s recent parliamentary election, as well as Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to align positions ahead of meetings of EU leaders, including holding pre-summit huddles, the aide said. While a firm political alliance remains some way off, the formation could significantly impede the EU’s efforts to support Ukraine financially and militarily. “I think it will come — and be more and more visible,” said the prime minister’s political director, Balázs Orbán, when asked about the potential for a Ukraine-skeptic alliance to start acting as a bloc in the European Council. “It worked very well during the migration crisis. That’s how we could resist,” he said of the so-called Visegrad 4 group made up of Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia and Poland at a time when the Euroskeptic Law and Justice Party was in power in Warsaw following 2015. Then-Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki led the charge as the alliance’s biggest member, with the “V4” group promoting pro-family policies as well as strong external borders for the EU, and opposing any mandatory relocation of migrants among member countries. The Visegrad 4 alliance split after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as Poland advocated hawkish positions toward Moscow and Hungary took the opposite stance. A new Visegrad alliance would count three rather than four members. Poland’s current center-right prime minister, Donald Tusk, is staunchly pro-Ukraine and is unlikely to enter any alliance with Orbán. Fico and Babiš, however, have echoed the Hungarian leader’s viewpoints on Ukraine, calling for dialogue with Moscow rather than economic pressure. Babiš has been criticized for his public skepticism on supporting further European aid to Kyiv, with Czechia’s current foreign minister warning in an interview with POLITICO that Babiš would act as Orbán’s “puppet” at the European Council table. Even so, it might take some time for any version of the Visegrad alliance to reform. While re-elected as Slovakia’s prime minister in 2023, Fico has stopped short of formally allying with the Hungarian leader on specific policy areas. Babiš has yet to form a government after his party’s recent election victory. BEYOND THE VISEGRAD 3 Hungary’s push for political alliances in Brussels goes beyond the European Council, Balázs Orbán said. The Hungarian prime minister’s Fidesz party — part of the far-right Patriots for Europe group — could expand its partnerships in the European Parliament, he said, naming the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists group, the far-right Europe of Sovereign Nations group and “some leftist groups” as potential allies. Orbán is hoping to team up with Andrej Babiš, whose right-wing populist party won Czechia’s recent parliamentary election. | Tomas Tkacik/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images Mainstream parties such as the center-right European People’s Party could sooner or later turn against European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, destroying the centrist majority that supported her re-election, the adviser said. “So this reconstruction of the [Visegrad 4] is going on. We have the third-largest European parliamentary faction. We have a think tank network, which is widely here [in Brussels], and it has a transatlantic leg as well. And we are looking for partners, allies on every topic.” The Mathias Corvinus Collegium, a think tank that receives most of its funding from allies of the Hungarian leader and is chaired by Balázs Orbán, has expanded its presence in Brussels since its launch in 2022. The Hungarian prime minister, who has been in power for the past 15 years, faces a re-election battle next year. Opposition leader Péter Magyar’s Tisza party is currently more popular than Orbán’s Fidesz party, according to POLITICO’s Poll of Polls. Asked about the coming election campaign, the aide said it would be “tough, just as always,” blaming Brussels for what he called an “organized, coordinated effort to try to push out the Hungarian government” which included “politically supporting the opposition.” The European Commission states that measures to withhold funds from Hungary stem from Budapest’s defiance of EU law rather than a political agenda. Asked whether Budapest continues to back Hungary’s Health Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi, who’s been alleged in media reports to have led the recruiting of spies in EU institutions when he was working as an EU diplomat, Orbán said the commissioner was “doing a great job.” “They are just … issues which are used to portray Hungary as some country which is not loyal to the institutions,” he added. “We want to be inside. We are part of the club.”

LONDON — Brits voted for Brexit because of immigration. Now they want to turn back the clock. By a whopping two-to-one margin, voters now favor the pre-2021 immigration system to the one that has taken shape since leaving the EU, according to striking new polling commissioned by POLITICO. Some 41 percent of the public say they would prefer “Britain’s immigration policy prior to leaving the European Union” versus just 19 percent who want “Britain’s current immigration policy, implemented since leaving the European Union,” the polling conducted by More in Common found. Immigration loomed large in the 2016 EU referendum campaign, with the Leave camp’s “breaking point” posters and rows about free movement making headlines throughout the build-up to the vote. The idea was that leaving the bloc would give Britain back “control” of its borders and create a fairer system. But the widespread perception is that’s not how it turned out. Split by party, left-leaning Green voters are the most keen on turning the clock back, with 60 percent preferring the old system versus 16 percent the current one. Labour and the Lib Dems aren’t far behind, with 46 percent and 49 percent yearning for the pre-Brexit days respectively. But even the Euroskeptics backing Nigel Farage’s Reform party refuse to endorse the current arrangements, with 37 percent backing the pre-Brexit approach, just 21 percent favoring the post-Brexit system, and an unusually high 42 percent saying they don’t know. WISTFULLY LOOKING BACK? But the results don’t necessarily mean voters are desperate for a return to EU-style freedom of movement, according to researchers whom POLITICO asked about the figures. Since leaving the EU, the U.K. hasn’t just ditched free movement with the bloc, it has also significantly liberalized its rest-of-world visa system — resulting in a large increase in migration from other countries. Net migration to the U.K. was 431,000 in 2024 — significantly higher than rates in the 2010s when numbers “typically fluctuated between 200,000 and 300,000,” according to an analysis by Oxford University’s Migration Observatory. Even the Euroskeptics backing Nigel Farage’s Reform party refuse to endorse the current arrangements. | Jack Taylor/Getty Images Levels were even higher in 2022 and 2023, and some commentators have taken to calling this increase the “Boriswave” — after the PM who brought in the new system. According to Sophie Stowers, research manager at More in Common, the results are unlikely to be a reflection of people “wistfully looking back at a time of free movement.” Instead, she says, immigration “has risen in salience since 2020, partly because of increases in net migration caused by reforms to the migration system that people are unhappy with, but also because of the surge in small boat crossings.” As well as losing their reciprocal rights to live and work in other European countries, British voters haven’t even seen lower levels of migration to Britain — creating a situation where nobody of any political persuasion is happy. Marley Morris, associate director at the IPPR think tank, said the results appear to reflect “nostalgia from the public for our pre-Brexit immigration model,” but added it would be “rash to assume this means there is public appetite for a return to free movement of people.” “The overall preference for the pre-Brexit system is most likely the combined result of, on the one hand, the longstanding cohort of Remain supporters continuing to back a pro-EU position, alongside a wider frustration with recent immigration policy, including among those who voted leave.” So nobody’s happy, but not necessarily for the same reasons. RATING OUTCOMES Georgina Sturge, data consultant at Oxford’s Migration Observatory and author of the book “Bad Data: How Governments, Politicians and the Rest of Us Get Misled by Numbers,” said the results must be interpreted carefully. “The key question for us is to what extent people are rating immigration systems based on a robust understanding of their different features, and how much of it is just people going off a vague impression — in other words, which systems give them good and bad vibes?” she said. “People’s knowledge of the ins and outs of different immigration systems is very limited on the whole.” This much is obvious from More in Common’s results. POLITICO also had the pollster ask people what immigration systems they liked and disliked. The most popular was an “Australian-style points-based immigration system,” with a net 46 percent support. The least popular was “Britain’s current immigration policy,” with -39 percent support. Net migration to the U.K. was 431,000 in 2024 — significantly higher than higher than rates in the 2010s. | Krisztian Elek/Getty Images Just one problem: Since leaving the EU, the U.K.’s immigration policy has literally been an Australian-style points-based immigration system. “Getting people to rate these different options doesn’t necessarily tell us what system people would actually prefer but rather how positively or negatively they rate the association it conjures up in their mind,” Sturge said. “People’s understanding of the true differences between the two systems is limited. They’re rating outcomes.” “Even if people have a better impression of immigration in the pre-Brexit era, the government cannot turn back the clock,” Sturge added. “Most obviously, the small boats route did not exist for most of the pre-Brexit period, and successive governments have failed to eliminate it — and rejoining the EU would not eliminate it either. The same arguments against being part of EU free movement would no doubt also resurface if a serious discussion about rejoining were to start up.”

Josep Borrell Fontelles is the former EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. Guy Verhofstadt is a former prime minister of Belgium and president European Movement International. Domènec Ruiz Devesa is a former MEP and president of the Union of European Federalists. It’s become tradition for pro-Europeans to chart their political course from Ventotene, where Altiero Spinelli wrote the manifesto “For a Free and United Europe.” Recalling that spirit has never been more urgent than it is now. Our union appears dangerously fragmented and weak, stuck in a hostile internal and external environment. Home to just 5 percent of the global population and a widening economic gap with other major powers, Europe isn’t just facing up to a world of continental empires but is at real risk of becoming America’s vassal. This became apparent after the nonreciprocal concessions made to U.S. President Donald Trump on defense spending and trade, as well as Europe’s acceptance of a junior role in handling the war in Ukraine. Moreover, from Gaza to Nagorno-Karabakh, the EU’s involvement in conflicts abroad has become largely irrelevant, either due to its lack of credible international standing or unity. Domestically, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s second term has been counterintuitively marked by the undoing of the Green Deal — the flagship project of her first term — as if climate change isn’t getting worse. The Commission has also proposed an underwhelming Multiannual Financial Framework with no real increase, thus sacrificing cohesion policy to new priorities in defense products and research. Meanwhile, the Euroskeptic and Europhobic populist far right has never been stronger in member countries or EU institutions. The current EU chiefs suffer from a lack of long-term political vision, leadership and unity. For now, an unlikely alliance of Trump sympathizers and nostalgic Atlanticists appear to be dominating both the European Council and the Commission. Thus, the prevailing line has been to flatter and appease the U.S. president in the hopes of damage control, in turn fostering our political, strategic and even economic dependency on Washington — and it’s hardly working. For Trump, contracts only bind the other party — not him. And far from avoiding punitive tariffs or strengthening his support for Ukraine, agreeing to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and buy more U.S. weapons and natural gas hasn’t even increased his commitment to collective security. Instead, from minerals deals to weapons sales, this has largely become a purely transactional affair based on advancing U.S. economic gains — and luck. Paradoxically, the lack of serious engagement from Russian President Vladimir Putin in starting a negotiated settlement is preventing Trump’s attempted delivery of a deal on Moscow’s terms. Pool photo by Sergey Bobylev/Sputnik/Kremlin via EPA It should be clear by now that Trump isn’t, and never will be, an ally. His America constitutes a huge geopolitical, economic and cultural shock to Europe. But becoming a U.S. protectorate isn’t inevitable — especially given increasingly indignant public opinion over the series of concessions and humiliations we’re witnessing. There is an alternate path. A reinvigoration of a pro-European majority in the bloc’s three institutions — particularly the European Parliament — could still lead to the self-determination of our destiny. The Parliament has the constitutional role of controlling the Commission and could call for a new direction, as it holds the power to censure it. For a start, the Parliament could block the reduction of tariffs on U.S. products — a move that would surely be popular with voters and would signal that Europe’s readiness to stand up to blackmail. Furthermore, we need to strengthen our political union, overcome the veto-cracy that allows Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbàn to block the EU’s military assistance to Ukraine, and build our own defense system — one that isn’t reliant on the U.S. and can instill fear in the Kremlin. Once again, these decisions will be quite popular with most EU citizens. As former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said, we won’t be a geopolitical power just by relaunching our internal market and competitiveness agenda. We need to become a federal union that isn’t constrained by unanimity requirements or a lack of proper competencies in foreign and security policy. Leading member countries should immediately take the initiative to start activating its common defense clause and reform the Treaties in alliance with the Parliament, which holds the power to veto the budget. Otherwise, a coalition of the willing should launch a new “European Defense Community” with a parliamentary and fiscal dimension, and is open to all member countries interested in joining. If no action is taken, and we wait for the next crisis to improvise on hard decisions, Europe as a political project risks dying.