The world’s ice is disappearing — and with it, our planet’s memory of itself.  At a very southern ribbon-cutting ceremony on the Antarctic snowpack Wednesday, scientists stored long cores of ice taken from two dying Alpine glaciers inside a 30-meter tunnel — safe, for now, from both climate change and global geopolitical upheaval. Each ice sample contains tiny microbes and bubbles of air trapped in the ancient past. Future scientists, using techniques unknown today, might use the ice cores to unlock new information about virus evolution, or global weather patterns.  Extracting ice from glaciers around the world and carrying it to Antarctica involved complex scientific and diplomatic collaboration — exactly the type of work denigrated by the Trump Administration of the United States, said Olivier Poivre d’Arvor, a special envoy of France’s President Emmanuel Macron and ambassador to the Poles. Scientists are “threatened by those who doubt science and want to muzzle it. Climate change is not an hoax, as President Trump and others say. Not at all,” Poivre d’Arvor said during an online press conference Wednesday. Glaciers are retreating worldwide thanks to global warming. In some regions their information about the past will be lost forever in the coming decades, no matter what is done to curb the Earth’s temperature. “Our time machines are melting very quickly,” said Carlo Barbante, an Italian scientist who is the vice chair of the Ice Memory Foundation (IMF). The tunnel, known as the Ice Memory Sanctuary, is just under a kilometer from the French-Italian Concordia base in Antarctica. It rests on an ice sheet 3,200 meters thick and is a constant minus 52 degrees. Scientists said they believed the tunnel would stay structurally stable for more than 70 years before needing to be remade. As well as the two ice samples, which arrived by ship and plane this month, the scientists have collected cores from eight other glaciers from Svalbard to Kilimanjaro. These are currently in freezers awaiting transportation to Antarctica. Co-founder of the sanctuary Jérôme Chappellaz, a French sociologist, called for more such facilities to be opened across Antarctica, and said he expected China would soon create its own store for Tibetan ice. Poivre d’Arvor called for an international treaty that commits countries to donate ice to the Sanctuary and guarantee access for scientists. France and Italy have collaborated on building the sanctuary and provided resources to assist with the transportation of the samples. “This is not a short-term investment but a strategic choice grounded in scientific responsibility and international cooperation,” Gianluigi Consoli, an official from the Italian Ministry of Universities and Research. On the inside of the door that locks the ice away, someone had written in black marker “Quo Vadis?” Latin for “where are you going?” It’s a question that hangs over even the protected southern continent. Antarctica is governed by a 1959 treaty that suspended territorial claims and preserved the continent for the purposes of science and peace. With President Donald Trump’s grab for territory near the North Pole in Greenland, the internationalist ideals that have brought stability to the Antarctic for over half a century appear to no be longer shared by the U.S. But William Muntean, who was senior advisor for Antarctica at the State Department during Trump’s first term Trump and under President Joe Biden, said there had been “no sign” U.S. policy in Antarctica would change, nor did he expect it to. “The southern polar region is very different from the western hemisphere and from the Arctic,” Muntean said. The U.S. doesn’t claim sovereignty, military competition is negligible, nor are there commercially viable energy or mining projects at the South Pole. “Taking disruptive or significant actions in Antarctica would not advance any Trump administration priorities.” That said, he added, “you can never rule out a change.”

Croatian President Zoran Milanović has slammed France for selling Zagreb secondhand fighter jets while providing its rival Serbia with a brand-new fleet. “We look like fools,” he raged last week, “because the French sell new Rafales to the Serbs and used ones to us.” Zagreb finalized a government-to-government deal with Paris in 2021 to modernize its air force by purchasing a dozen Rafale fighters valued at €999 million. The final aircraft, which were procured from France’s own stocks, were delivered last April, replacing Croatia’s outdated Soviet-era MiG-21 fleet. In August 2024, Serbia signed a deal to buy 12 Rafale jets from French manufacturer Dassault Aviation fresh from the factory. That transaction has enraged the Croatian president. Croatia fought Serbia in the 1990s in the bloody wars that followed Yugoslavia’s disintegration. While relations between the two countries have improved dramatically since then, non-NATO Serbia’s close ties with Moscow are a worry to Zagreb, which joined the Atlantic alliance in 2009 and the EU in 2013. Serbia’s own EU candidacy has largely stalled, with Belgrade ditching a Western Balkans summit in Brussels last month. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos called on Serbia in November to “urgently reverse the backsliding on freedom of expression.” French Europe Deputy Minister Benjamin Haddad, who was in Zagreb on Monday to discuss defense cooperation, defended the Serbia contract, saying Croatia should be pleased Belgrade was “gradually freeing itself from dependence on Russia and strengthening its ties with Western countries.” But Milanović hit back that the deal was “implemented behind Croatia’s back and to the detriment of Croatia’s national interests,” and showed “that every country takes care of its own interests, including profits, first and foremost.” The left-wing president added that the Croatian government, led by center-right Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, had erred by not confirming “whether France would sell the same or even more advanced aircraft models to one of our neighboring countries outside NATO.” DOMESTIC SQUABBLES Croatian officials are split over whether the president was right to react the way he did. One Croatian diplomat told POLITICO that Milanović had a point and that France was wrong to sell the newer jets to Serbia after fobbing off Croatia with an older model. But a second Croatian official said the deal was a good one for Zagreb and noted that the Croatian government had signed a letter of intent in December with Paris to upgrade its Rafale jets to the latest F4 standard. “From France’s point of view, the signing of the letter of intent on December 8 in France by the minister [Catherine Vautrin] and her Croatian counterpart aims to support the partner in modernizing its Rafale fleet to the highest standard currently in service in France,” an official from the French armed forces ministry echoed. “The defense relationship with Croatia is dynamic and not set in stone in 2021.” Croatia’s defense ministry said Milanović’s remarks “show elementary ignorance of how the international arms trade works.” “Great powers — the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China — have been selling the same or similar weapons to countries that are in tense and even openly antagonistic relations for decades,” the ministry added. “The USA is simultaneously arming Israel and Egypt, Russia [is arming] India and Pakistan, while the West is simultaneously arming Greece and Turkey. This is the rule, not the exception.” In Croatia, the president is also the commander-in-chief of the military but shares jurisdiction over defense policy with the government, which is responsible for the budget and the day-to-day management of the armed forces. Milanović and Plenković are often at odds, a third Croatian official said, arguing the president was using the issue to hammer his political rival. DIRT-CHEAP FIGHTER JETS France has looked to strengthen defense ties with Croatia, which spends over 2 percent of its GDP on defense and is transitioning its Soviet-era military stocks to Western arms. Some of those purchases are coming from France. Plenković was in Paris in December to sign a separate deal with KNDS France for 18 Caesar self-propelled howitzers and 15 Serval armored vehicles, with the equipment to be purchased with the EU’s loans-for-weapons SAFE money.  In the original fighter jet deal, Croatia bought airplanes that were being used by the French air force, meaning they were cheaper than new stock and were available quickly. At the time the decision was criticized in Paris by parliamentarians arguing France was weakening its own air force to seal export contracts. Serbia, meanwhile, reportedly paid €2.7 billion for the same number of jets, which are expected to be delivered as of 2028. China and Russia provide the vast majority of Belgrade’s weapons, with France a distant third.

President Donald Trump has set his sights on several targets in the Western Hemisphere beyond Venezuela — from Mexico with its drug cartels to the political cause célèbre of Cuba. But one place is oddly missing from Trump’s list: Nicaragua. This is a country led not by one, but two dictators. A place where the opposition has been exiled, imprisoned or otherwise stifled so much the word “totalitarian” comes to mind. A place the first Trump administration named alongside Cuba and Venezuela as part of a “troika of tyranny.” Yet it’s barely been mentioned by the second Trump administration. That could change any moment, of course, but right now Nicaragua is in an enviable position in the region. That got me wondering: What is the regime in Managua doing right to avoid Trump’s wrath? What does it have that others don’t? Or, maybe, what does it not have? And what does Nicaragua’s absence from the conversation say about Trump’s bigger motives? Current and former government officials and activists gave me a range of explanations, including that the regime is making smart moves on battling drug trafficking, that it’s benefiting from a lack of natural resources for Trump to covet and that it doesn’t have a slew of migrants in the U.S. Taken together, their answers offer one of the strongest arguments yet that Trump’s actions in the Western Hemisphere or beyond are rarely about helping oppressed people and more about U.S. material interests. “The lesson from Nicaragua is: Don’t matter too much, don’t embarrass Washington and don’t become a domestic political issue,” said Juan Gonzalez, a former Latin America aide to then-President Joe Biden. “For an administration that doesn’t care about democracy or human rights, that’s an effective survival strategy for authoritarians.” Some Nicaraguan opposition leaders say they remain optimistic, and I can’t blame them. Trump is rarely consistent about anything. He’s threatening to bomb Iran right now because, he says, he stands with protesters fighting an unjust regime (albeit one with oil). So maybe he might direct some fury toward Nicaragua? “The fact that Nicaragua is not at the center of the current conversation doesn’t mean that Nicaragua is irrelevant,” Felix Maradiaga, a Nicaraguan politician in exile, told me. “It means that the geopolitical interests of the U.S. right now are at a different place.” Nicaragua is run by Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, a husband and wife who take the term “power couple” somewhat literally. They are now co-presidents of the Central American nation of 7 million. Over the years, they’ve rigged elections, wrested control over other branches of the government and crushed the opposition, while apparently grooming their children to succeed them. It has been a strange and circular journey for a pair of one-time Sandinista revolutionaries who previously fought to bring down a dynastic dictatorship. Hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans have fled the impoverished country, some to the United States. Meanwhile, the regime has enhanced ties to Russia, China and other U.S. adversaries, while having rocky relations with Washington. Nicaragua is part of a free trade agreement with Washington, but it has also faced U.S. sanctions, tariffs and other penalties for oppressing its people, eroding democracy and having ties to Russia. Even the current Trump administration has used such measures against it, but the regime hasn’t buckled. Nicaraguan officials I reached out to didn’t respond with a comment. Several factors appear to make Nicaragua a lower priority for Trump. Unlike Venezuela, Nicaragua isn’t a major source of oil, the natural resource Trump covets most. It has gold, but not enough of that or other minerals to truly stand out. (Although yes, I know, Trump loves gold.) It’s also not a major source of migrants to the U.S. Besides, Trump has largely shut down the border. Unlike Panama, another country Trump has previously threatened, it doesn’t have a canal key to global commerce, although there’s occasional talk of building one. Nicaragua may be placating the president and his team by taking moves to curb drug trafficking. At least, that’s what a White House official told me when I sought comment from the administration on why Nicaragua has not been a focus. “Nicaragua is cooperating with us to stop drug trafficking and fight criminal elements in their territory,” the official said. I granted the White House official anonymity to discuss a sensitive national security issue. It’s difficult to establish how this cooperation is happening, and the White House official didn’t offer details. In fact, there were reports last year of tensions between the two countries over the issue. A federal report in March said the U.S. “will terminate its Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations in Nicaragua in 2025, partly due to the lack of cooperation from Nicaragua’s agencies.” The DEA didn’t reply when I asked if it had followed up with that plan, but it’s possible the regime has become more helpful recently. The U.S. and Nicaragua’s cooperation on drugs has waxed and waned over the years. In any case, although drug runners use Nicaraguan territory, it’s not a major cartel hub compared to some other countries facing Trump’s ire, such as Mexico. Some Nicaraguan opposition activists have been hoping that U.S. legal moves against Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro would expose narcotrafficking links between Managua and Caracas, providing a reason for the U.S. to come down harder on the regime. They’ve pointed to a 2020 U.S. criminal indictment of Maduro that mentioned Nicaragua. But the latest indictment, unveiled upon Maduro’s Jan. 3 capture, doesn’t mention Nicaragua. When I asked the White House official why the newer indictment doesn’t mention Nicaragua, the person merely insisted that “both indictments are valid.” A spokesperson for the Department of Justice declined to comment. Nicaraguan opposition leaders say that although the new indictment doesn’t mention the country, they still hope it will come up during Maduro’s trial. My sense, though, is that Ortega and Murillo are cooperating just enough with the U.S. that the administration is willing to go easy on them for now. It probably also doesn’t hurt that, despite railing frequently against Washington, Ortega and Murillo don’t openly antagonize Trump himself. They may have learned a lesson from watching how hard Trump has come down on Colombia’s president for taunting him. Another reason Nicaragua isn’t getting much Trump attention? It is not a domestic political flashpoint in the U.S. Not, for example, the way Cuba has been for decades. The Cuban American community can move far more votes than the Nicaraguan American one. Plus, none of the aides closest to Trump are known to be too obsessed with Nicaragua. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has long denounced the Nicaraguan regime, but he’s of Cuban descent and more focused on that island’s fate. Cuba’s regime also is more dependent on Venezuela than Nicaragua’s, making it an easier target. Ortega and Murillo aren’t sucking up to Trump and striking deals with him like another area strongman, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. But, especially since the U.S. capture of Maduro, the pair seem bent on proving their anti-imperialist credentials without angering Trump. The results can be head-scratching. For example, in recent days, the regime is reported to have detained around 60 people for celebrating Maduro’s capture. But around the same time, the regime also reportedly freed “tens” of prisoners, at least some of whom were critics of Ortega and Murillo. Those people were released after the U.S. embassy in the country called on Nicaragua to follow in Venezuela’s recent footsteps and release political prisoners. However, the regime is reported to have described the releases as a way to commemorate 19 years of its rule. Alex Gray, a former senior National Security Council official in the first Trump administration, argued that one reason the president and his current team should care more about Nicaragua is its ties to U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China — ties that could grow if the U.S. ignores the Latin American country. Russia in particular has a strong security relationship with the regime in Managua. China has significantly expanded its ties in recent years, though more in the economic space. Iran also has warm relations with Managua. Nicaragua is the “poster child” for what Trump’s own National Security Strategy called the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which warns the U.S. will deny its adversaries the ability to meddle in the Western Hemisphere, Gray said. The White House official said the administration is “very closely” monitoring Nicaragua’s cooperation with U.S. rivals. But even that may not be enough for Trump to prioritize Nicaragua. Regardless of what his National Security Strategy says, Trump has a mixed record of standing up to Russia and China, and Nicaragua’s cooperation with them may not be as worrisome as that of a more strategically important country. With Trump, who himself often acts authoritarian, many things must fall in place at the right moment for him to care or act, and Nicaraguan opposition activists haven’t solved that Rubik’s Cube. Many are operating in exile. (In 2023, Ortega and Murillo put 222 imprisoned opposition activists on a plane to the U.S., then stripped them of their Nicaraguan citizenship. Many are now effectively stateless but vulnerable to Trump’s immigration crackdown.) It’s not lost on these activists that Trump has left much of Maduro’s regime in place in Venezuela. It suggests Trump values stability over democracy, human rights or justice. Some hope Ortega and Murillo will be weakened by the fall of their friend, Maduro. The two surely noticed how little Russia, China and others did to help the former leader. Maybe Nicaragua’s co-dictators will ease up on internal repression as one reaction. “When you get this kind of pressure, there are things that get in motion,” said Juan Sebastian Chamorro, a Nicaraguan politician forced out of the country. “They are feeling the heat.”

EU PARLIAMENT’S MOST TOXIC DUO BRINGS TROUBLE FOR VON DER LEYEN Social Democrat chief Iratxe García and center-right boss Manfred Weber’s dire relationship is Brussels’ worst-kept secret. By MAX GRIERA in Brussels Illustration by Natália Delgado/ POLITICO A confrontation six years ago poisoned a relationship at the heart of the EU that remains toxic to this day. Manfred Weber, the powerful German head of the center-right European People’s Party, the largest political family in Europe, knew something was wrong when Iratxe García walked into his office shortly after the 2019 EU election. García, a Spanish MEP who leads the center-left Socialists and Democrats group in the Parliament, was accompanied by Romanian former liberal chief Dacian Cioloș. The pair told Weber that they wouldn’t support his bid to become president of the European Commission, despite the Parliament’s longstanding position that the head of the party receiving the most votes in the election should get the job. While Cioloș is long gone from the EU political scene, García and Weber remain in post — and the animosity between them has only grown, especially now that the EPP is aligning with the far right to pass legislation.  García’s move killed Weber’s Commission ambitions, souring relations between the two and threatening Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen’s ability to deliver her second-term agenda, as she needs the support of senior MEPs to pass legislation. The pair are like “two toxic exes who had a good relationship, but Weber cheated on García with the far right, and this makes it hard for the Socialists,” said Manon Aubry, co-chair of The Left group in the Parliament. Today, the dire relationship between Weber and García is the talk of the town. For decades, the EPP and S&D — the two largest political families in Europe — have worked hand in hand to provide stable majorities in the Parliament, including backing a second term for von der Leyen at a time of unprecedented crises facing the bloc. Now that stability is in doubt. POLITICO spoke to 12 officials and lawmakers who are or have been close to the pair. Some say the problem is personal, while others blame politics and argue that anyone in their position would have the same relationship issues. “Weber and García have become a problem for von der Leyen,” said a senior Commission official, granted anonymity to speak freely, as were others in this piece. That’s because disagreements between their two groups could lead to less predictable voting in the Parliament, as happened in November with the simplification bill on green reporting rules for businesses, when the EPP sided with the far right rather than with the centrists. Tensions have also spilled toward von der Leyen herself, with García accusing her of “buying into Trump’s agenda” by pushing deregulation. Center-left MEPs have urged the Commission president to rein in Weber over his cooperation with the far right. RELATIONSHIP TAKES A DOWNTURN Verbal attacks in the Parliament’s hemicycle, tensions over Spanish politics, opposing views on the EU’s green ambitions and migration policy, and the fact that the EPP is voting for laws with the far right have eroded what started as a promising relationship. Weber “will never get over the big treason when Iratxe backstabbed him on the Commission presidency,” said a senior EPP MEP. “Everyone needs to stay calm and keep emotions out of it,” said a senior Socialist MEP, noting that many lawmakers, including commissioners, often express concern about the emotional undertones of the relationship. Manfred Weber “will never get over the big treason when Iratxe backstabbed him on the Commission presidency,” said a senior EPP MEP. | Filip Singer/EPA Publicly, both insist relations are just fine. “I really appreciate the strong leadership of Iratxe, she’s a tough representative,” Weber told POLITICO, describing the relationship as in a “great state.” “I can confirm that we have good and regular talks to each other, but we also see our different political positioning,” he added. García also played down the perceived friction, saying the pair have a “working relationship” and “try to understand each other,” while stressing that despite their differences, it is “much more normalized than you might think from the outside.” The reality, according to MEPs and staffers close to the pair, is that six years of working side by side have eroded trust. Weber sees García as incapable of delivering on her promises due to the S&D’s internal divisions and weakness, as it has lost power and influence across Europe; García views Weber as power-hungry and willing to empower the far right at the expense of the center. PERSONAL ATTACKS In her September 2025 State of the Union address, von der Leyen tried to bridge the widening rifts between the EPP and the Socialists by giving policy wins to both sides and calling for unity. But her efforts came to nothing as Weber and García exchanged personal attacks on the hemicycle floor, each blaming the other for the instability of the pro-European coalition. Weber accused Garcia and the Socialists of “harming the European agenda.” During her remarks, the S&D chief shot back: “You know who is responsible for the fact that this pro-European alliance … does not work in this Parliament? It has a name and surname. It is called Manfred Weber.” The exchange reflected a relationship under strain, as the EPP pushed deregulation, weaker green rules, and a crackdown on migration backed by far-right votes after the 2024 election shifted the Parliament to the right. Sidelined by that new math, the Socialists have increasingly felt alienated and have hardened their attacks on von der Leyen for embracing a right-wing deregulation agenda, and on Weber for empowering the far right in general. “The only way for Iratxe to survive is to be more aggressive with EPP and with Manfred,” said a former centrist lawmaker, who argued that García is leaning on rhetoric to rally her base as concrete wins are in such short supply. For his part, Weber is unapologetic about sidelining traditional centrist allies, arguing that the end — tackling policy issues the far right has weaponized against the EU, notably migration and overregulation — justifies the means. “He could not be Commission president so he has been pushing to be a power broker from the Parliament, which means he needs to show he can push for whatever EPP wants, which includes using the far right,” a second senior EPP MEP said of Weber. BETRAYAL Weber and García started their collaboration after the election in 2019, when the latter was chosen as the group leader of S&D after serving as an MEP since 2004 and chair of the committee on women’s rights between 2014 and 2019. For the first two years they were united in their goals of delivering on the Green Deal and addressing the Covid-19 pandemic, but the relationship began to deteriorate in the second half of the term. In a mid-term reshuffle of the Parliament’s top posts, Weber struck a backroom deal with the liberals of Renew and The Left to keep the powerful position of the Parliament’s secretary-general in the hands of the EPP. García had wanted the job for S&D because the previous secretary-general was from the EPP, as is Roberta Metsola, who was about to become the Parliament’s president. Ursula von der Leyen tried to bridge the widening rifts between the EPP and the Socialists by giving policy wins to both sides and calling for unity. | Ronald Wittek/EPA “This was a moment of tension because she really thought she would get it … she took it very personally,” said the senior Socialist MEP. “Her position in the group was also affected by that; she got a lot of criticism.” Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s reelection in 2023 further strained relations. Weber has for years been betting on the fall of Sánchez, backing Spain’s EPP-aligned opposition (the People’s Party, or PP) and giving them free rein in the Parliament to attack the Spanish Socialist Party, knowing that the EPP would be boosted with an EPP party in power in Madrid. “He does everything the People’s Party wants,” said a liberal Parliament official, who added that “every time Spain is on the agenda, it becomes a nightmare, everyone screaming.” The most recent example came in November, when the EPP sided with far-right groups to cancel a parliamentary visit to Italy to monitor the rule of law in the country, while approving one to Spain — sparking an outcry from García, whom EPP MEPs frame as Sánchez’s lieutenant in Brussels. “It generates a toxic dynamic,” echoed the first senior EPP MEP. BREAKING POINT The Spanish issue came to the fore during the 2024 hearings for commissioners, when MEPs grill prospective office-holders to see if they are up to the task. Under pressure from his Spanish peers, Weber and the EPP went in hard on Sánchez’s deputy Teresa Ribera, blaming her for deadly floods in Valencia in October 2024. While the EPP wanted to take down Ribera, the Socialists hoped to make life difficult for Italy’s Raffaele Fitto, who was put forward by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. While Fitto is not from the EPP (he’s from the European Conservatives and Reformists), his nomination was supported by Weber. In the end, the S&D went easier on Fitto in order to save Ribera from further attacks. After weeks of tensions — with both Weber and García visibly furious and blasting each other in briefings to the press — both Ribera and Fitto were confirmed as commissioners. The struggle highlighted that the old alliance between the EPP and the S&D was cracking, with Weber snubbing García and instead teaming up with the far right.   While they still meet to coordinate parliamentary business — often alongside Renew leader Valérie Hayer and von der Leyen — the partnership is far less effective than before. “It’s very clear they’re no longer running Parliament the way they used to,” said The Left’s Aubry. The breakdown has injected instability into the Parliament, with the once well-oiled duo no longer pre-cooking decisions, making outcomes more unpredictable. Aubry said meetings of group leaders used to take place with a deal already struck — “political theater,” as she put it. “Now we walk in and don’t know where we’ll end up,” Aubry added. “While they get along personally, the results of that cooperation are not that good,” said the second EPP MEP, adding that the alliance between the EPP and the S&D has “not really delivered.” LOOKING AHEAD TO YET MORE BATTLES The next reshuffle of top Parliament jobs is in 2027, and Weber and García are already haggling over who will get to nominate the next Parliament president. The EPP is expected to try to push for Metsola getting a third term, but the Socialists claim it’s their turn per a power-sharing agreement after the 2024 election. Officials from the EPP deny such an agreement exists while officials from Renew and the S&D say it does, although no one could show POLITICO any documentation. The EPP is expected to try to push for Roberta Metsola getting a third term, but the Socialists claim it’s their turn per a power-sharing agreement after the 2024 election. | Ronald Wittek/EPA That’s a major headache for García. The S&D’s Italian and German delegations are itching to get leadership positions, and if the Parliament presidency is off the table they could try to replace her as party chief. With tensions simmering, one Parliament official close to the pair half-joked that García and Weber should settle things over an after-work drink — but it seems the détente will have to wait. “I’d definitely go for a drink,” Weber said with a nervous laugh before noting that both are “so busy” it probably won’t happen. García, also laughing, was even less committal: “I’ve become a real homebody. I don’t go out for drinks anymore.”

Josep Borrell is the former high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former vice-president of the European Commission. In too many corners of the world — including our own — democracy is losing oxygen. Disinformation is poisoning debate, authoritarian leaders are staging “elections” without real choice, and citizens are losing faith that their vote counts. Even as recently as the Jan. 3 U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, we have seen opposition leaders who are internationally recognized as having the democratic support of their people be sidelined. None of this is new. Having devoted much of his work to critiquing the absolute concentration of power in dictatorial figures, the long-exiled Paraguayan writer Augusto Roa Bastos found that when democracy loses ground, gradually and inexorably a singular and unquestionable end takes its place: power. And it shapes the leader as a supreme being, one who needs no higher democratic processes to curb their will. This is the true peril of the backsliding we’re witnessing in the world today. A few decades ago, the tide of democracy seemed unstoppable, bringing freedom and prosperity to an ever-greater number of countries. And as that democratic wave spread, so too did the practice of sending impartial international observers to elections as a way of supporting democratic development. In both boosting voter confidence and assuring the international community of democratic progress, election observation has been one of the EU’s quiet success stories for decades. However, as international development budgets shrink, some are questioning whether this practice still matters. I believe this is a grave mistake. Today, attacks on the integrity of electoral processes, the subtle — or brazen — manipulation of votes and narratives, and the absolute answers given to complex problems are allowing Roa Basto’s concept of power to infiltrate our democratic societies. And as the foundations of pluralism continue to erode, autocrats and autocratic practices are rising unchecked. By contrast, ensuring competitive, transparent and fair elections is the antidote to authoritarianism. To that end, the bloc has so far deployed missions to observe more than 200 elections in 75 countries. And determining EU cooperation and support for those countries based on the conclusions of these missions has, in turn, incentivized them to strengthen democratic practices. The impact is tangible. Our 2023 mission in Guatemala, for example, which was undertaken alongside the Organization of American States and other observer groups, supported the credibility of the country’s presidential election and helped scupper malicious attempts to undermine the result. And yet, many now argue that in a world of hybrid regimes, cyber threats and political polarization, international observers can do little to restore confidence in flawed processes — and that other areas, such as defense, should take priority. In both boosting voter confidence and assuring the international community of democratic progress, election observation has been one of the EU’s quiet success stories for decades. | Robert Ghement/EPA I don’t agree. Now, more than ever, is the time to stick up for democracy — the most fundamental of EU values. As many of the independent citizen observer groups we view as partners lose crucial funding, it is vital we continue to send missions. In fact, cutting back support would be a false economy, amounting to silence precisely when truth and transparency are being drowned out. I myself observed elections as chair of the European Parliament’s Development Committee. I saw firsthand how EU observation has developed well beyond spotting overt ballot stuffing to detecting the subtleties of unfair candidate exclusions, tampering with the tabulation of results behind closed doors and, more recently, the impact of online manipulation and disinformation. In my capacity as high representative I also decided to send observation missions to controversial countries, including Venezuela. Despite opposition from some, our presence there during the 2021 local elections was greatly appreciated by the opposition. Our findings sparked national and international discussions over electoral conditions, democratic standards and necessary changes. And when the time comes for new elections once more — as it surely must — the presence of impartial international observers will be critical to restoring the confidence of Venezuelans in the electoral process. At the same time, election observation is being actively threatened by powers like Russia, which promote narratives opposed to electoral observations carried out by the organizations that endorse the Declaration of Principles on International Election Observation (DoP) — a landmark document that set the global standard for impartial monitoring. A few years ago, for instance, a Russian parliamentary commission sharply criticized our observation efforts, pushing for the creation of alternative monitoring bodies that, quite evidently, fuel disinformation and legitimize authoritarian regimes — something that has also happened in Azerbaijan and Belarus. When a credible international observation mission publishes a measured and facts-based assessment, it becomes a reference point for citizens and institutions alike. It provides an anchor for dialogue, a benchmark against which all actors can measure their conduct. Above all, it signals to citizens that the international community is watching — not to interfere but to support their right to a meaningful choice. Of course, observation must evolve as well. We now monitor not only ballot boxes but also algorithms, online narratives and the influence of artificial intelligence. We are strengthening post-electoral follow-up and developing new tools to verify data and detect manipulation, exploring the ways in which AI can be a force for good. In line with this, last month I lent my support to the DoP’s endorsers — including the EU, the United Nations, the African Union, the Organization of American States and dozens of international organizations and NGOs — as they met at the U.N. in Geneva to mark the declaration’s 20th anniversary, and to reaffirm their commitment to strengthen election observation in the face of new threats and critical funding challenges. Just days later we learned of the detention of Dr. Sarah Bireete, a leading non-partisan citizen observer, ahead of the Jan. 15 elections in Uganda. These recent events are a wake-up call to renew this purpose. Election observation is only worthwhile if we’re willing to defend the principle of democracy itself. As someone born into a dictatorship, I know all too well that democratic freedoms cannot be taken for granted. In a world of contested truths and ever-greater power plays, democracy needs both witnesses and champions. The EU, I hope, will continue to be among them.

President Donald Trump is withdrawing the United States from the world’s overarching treaty on climate change in a move that escalates his attempts to reverse years of global negotiations toward addressing rising temperatures. The announcement to sever ties with the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change came as Trump quit dozens of international organizations that the White House says no longer serve U.S. interests by promoting radical climate policies and other issues. It was outlined in a memo by the White House. Trump has called on other countries to abandon their carbon-cutting measures, and the move appears to be his latest attempt to destabilize global climate cooperation. The 1992 UNFCCC serves as the international structure for efforts by 198 countries to slow the rate of rising climate pollution. It has universal participation. The U.S. was the first industrialized nation to join the treaty following its ratification under former President George H.W. Bush — and it will be the only nation ever to leave it. The move also marks Trump’s intensifying efforts to topple climate efforts compared to his first term, when he decided against quitting the treaty. “Many of these bodies promote radical climate policies, global governance, and ideological programs that conflict with U.S. sovereignty and economic strength,” stated a White House fact sheet. The move comes as Trump tears down U.S. climate policies amid the hottest decade ever recorded and threatens other nations for pursuing measures to address global warming, which Trump has called a hoax and a “con job.” The U.S. did not send a delegation to Brazil for the climate talks, known as COP30, late last year. Instead, Trump officials have been working to strike fossil fuels deals with other nations. Trump captured Venezuela’s strongman president, Nicolás Maduro, in an assault using U.S. commandos on Saturday and said he would control the country’s vast oil resources. The plan to leave the UNFCCC stems from Trump’s order last February requiring Secretary of State Marco Rubio to identify treaties and international organizations that “are contrary to the interests of the United States” and recommend withdrawing from them. Trump has also pulled the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement, the landmark 2015 pact that’s underpinned by the UNFCCC. “This is a shortsighted, embarrassing, and foolish decision,” Gina McCarthy, a former EPA administrator under former President Barack Obama, said in a statement. “As the only country in the world not a part of the UNFCCC treaty, the Trump administration is throwing away decades of U.S. climate change leadership and global collaboration.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Wednesday that he planned to discuss a U.S. acquisition of Greenland with Danish officials next week, as the White House again asserted that President Donald Trump’s preference would be to acquire the territory through a negotiation. The U.S. would even consider purchasing the island. But press secretary Karoline Leavitt held out the possibility of a military takeover should diplomatic efforts fail and likened Trump’s approach to how he dealt with Iran and Venezuela, both of which he opted to attack after negotiations faltered. “Look at Venezuela. He tried ardently to strike a good deal with Nicolás Maduro. And he told him, ‘I will use the United States military if you do not take such a deal and you will not like it.’ And look at what happened,” Leavitt said. “He tried to have serious interest in a deal with the Iranian regime with respect to their nuclear capabilities, and so Operation Midnight Hammer happened.” That the White House makes no distinction between two longtime adversaries openly hostile to the United States with a Democratic ally and NATO member stands to only deepen the fear inside Europe that Trump could break the decades-old alliance. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned Monday that an American attack on another NATO country would mean “everything stops, including NATO and thus the security that has been established since the end of the Second World War.” Pressed on why Trump was openly bullying Denmark, which controls Greenland, instead of working to update existing security agreements and pursuing new economic cooperation with a longtime ally, Leavitt was coy. “Who said diplomacy isn’t taking place behind the scenes?” she said. But the panicked responses from Denmark’s leaders, not to mention several European heads of state who jointly declared on Tuesday that any U.S. violation of Greenland’s sovereignty would be a breach of the NATO charter, made it clear that officials in Copenhagen and Brussels, as well as Greenland’s capital of Nuuk, feel a rising threat. And as several Republican allies have tried to downplay the likelihood of any actual U.S. effort to take Greenland, the White House continues to insist that the president is serious about acquiring the territory — one way or another. “He’s not the first U.S. president that has examined or looked at how could we acquire Greenland,” Rubio said. “There’s an interest there. So, I just reminded [members] of the fact that not only did [President Harry] Truman want to do it, but President Trump’s been talking about this since his first term.” Longtime Senate GOP Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said in a statement on Wednesday that strengthening America’s foothold in the increasingly competitive Arctic region does not have to come at the expense of its oldest security alliance. “Close security cooperation between Americans, Danes, and Greenlanders is a tradition older than NATO, the most successful military alliance in human history,” McConnell said. “Threats and intimidation by U.S. officials over American ownership of Greenland are as unseemly as they are counterproductive. And the use of force to seize the sovereign democratic territory of one of America’s most loyal and capable allies would be an especially catastrophic act of strategic self-harm to America and its global influence.” Leavitt insisted the president maintains his stated commitment to NATO and its founding principle that an attack on any member amounts to an attack on all, pointing to a social media post from the president hours earlier that suggested it’s the alliance’s commitment to the U.S. that is in doubt. “I DOUBT NATO WOULD BE THERE FOR US IF WE REALLY NEEDED THEM,” Trump blasted on Truth Social, insisting the U.S. would still defend alliance members. “We will always be there for NATO, even if they won’t be there for us.” The one time NATO’s Article 5 was invoked was after 9/11, when allies, including Denmark, sent troops to fight alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan. “Past leaders have often ruled things out. They’ve often been very open about ruling things in and basically broadcasting their foreign policy strategies to the rest of the world, not just to our allies but most egregiously to our adversaries,” Leavitt said. “That’s not something this president does. All options are always on the table for President Trump.” Leo Shane III contributed to this report.

Donald Trump wants the U.S. to own Greenland. The trouble is, Greenland already belongs to Denmark and most Greenlanders don’t want to become part of the U.S. While swooping into Greenland’s capital, Nuuk, and taking over Venezuela-style seems fanciful ― even if the military attack on Caracas seems to have provided a jolt to all sides about what the U.S. is capable of ― there’s a definite pathway. And Trump already appears to be some way along it. Worryingly for the Europeans, the strategy looks an awful lot like Vladimir Putin’s expansionist playbook. POLITICO spoke with nine EU officials, NATO insiders, defense experts and diplomats to game out how a U.S. takeover of the mineral-rich and strategically important Arctic island could play out. “It could be like five helicopters … he wouldn’t need a lot of troops,” said a Danish politician who asked for anonymity to speak freely. “There would be nothing they [Greenlanders] could do.” STEP 1: INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN TO BOOST GREENLAND’S INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT Almost immediately upon taking office, the Trump administration began talking up independence for Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. An unshackled Greenland could sign deals with the U.S., while under the status quo it needs Copenhagen’s approval. To gain independence, Greenlanders would need to vote in a referendum, then negotiate a deal that both Nuuk and Copenhagen must approve. In a 2025 opinion poll, 56 percent of Greenlanders said they would vote in favor of independence, while 28 percent said they would vote against it. Americans with ties to Trump have carried out covert influence operations in Greenland, according to Danish media reports, with Denmark’s security and intelligence service, PET, warning the territory “is the target of influence campaigns of various kinds.” Felix Kartte, a digital policy expert who has advised EU institutions and governments, pointed to Moscow’s tactics for influencing political outcomes in countries such as Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. “Russia mixes offline and online tactics,” he said. “On the ground, it works with aligned actors such as extremist parties, diaspora networks or pro-Russian oligarchs, and has been reported to pay people to attend anti-EU or anti-U.S. protests. “At the same time, it builds large networks of fake accounts and pseudo-media outlets to amplify these activities online and boost selected candidates or positions. The goal is often not to persuade voters that a pro-Russian option is better, but to make it appear larger, louder and more popular than it really is, creating a sense of inevitability.” Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff, told CNN on Monday that “nobody is going to fight the U.S. militarily over the future of Greenland.” | Joe Raedle/Getty Images On Greenland, the U.S. appears to be deploying at least some of these methods. Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff, told CNN on Monday that “nobody is going to fight the U.S. militarily over the future of Greenland.” Last month, Trump created the position of special envoy to Greenland and appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry to the role. He declared his goal was to “make Greenland a part of the U.S.”  Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, on a visit to the territory in March, said “the people of Greenland are going to have self-determination.” He added: “We hope that they choose to partner with the United States, because we’re the only nation on Earth that will respect their sovereignty and respect their security.” STEP 2: OFFER GREENLAND A SWEET DEAL Assuming its efforts to speed up Greenland’s independence referendum come to fruition, and the territory’s inhabitants vote to leave Denmark behind, the next step would be to bring it under U.S. influence. One obvious method would be to fold Greenland into the U.S. as another state — an idea those close to the president have repeatedly toyed with. Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was on Monday forced to say that “the U.S. has no right to annex” Greenland after Katie Miller — the wife of Stephen Miller — posted to social media a map of the territory draped in a U.S. flag and the word “SOON.” A direct swap of Denmark for the U.S. seems largely unpalatable to most of the population. The poll mentioned above also showed 85 percent of Greenlanders oppose the territory becoming part of the U.S., and even Trump-friendly members of the independence movement aren’t keen on the idea. But there are other options. Reports have circulated since last May that the Trump administration wants Greenland to sign a Compact of Free Association (COFA) — like those it currently has with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. Under the deals, the U.S. provides essential services, protection and free trade in exchange for its military operating without restriction on those countries’ territory. The idea resurfaced this week. Kuno Fencker, a pro-independence Greenlandic opposition MP who attended Trump’s inauguration and met with Republican Congressman Andy Ogles last year, said he tries to “explain to [the Americans] that we don’t want to be like Puerto Rico, or any other territory of the United States. But a Compact of Free Association, bilateral agreements, or even opportunities and other means which maybe I can’t imagine — let them come to the table and Greenlanders will decide in a plebiscite.” Compared to Nuuk’s deal with Copenhagen, things “can only go upwards,” he said.  Referring to Trump’s claim that the U.S. has a “need” for Greenland, Fencker added: “Denmark has never said that they ‘needed’ Greenland. Denmark has said that Greenland is an expense, and they would leave us if we become independent. So I think it’s a much more positive remark than we have ever seen from Denmark.” But Thomas Crosbie, an associate professor of military operations at the Royal Danish Defense College that provides training and education for the Danish defense forces, warned that Greenland is unlikely to get the better of Trump in a negotiation. “Trump’s primary identity as a deal-maker is someone who forces his will on the people he’s negotiating with, and someone who has a very long track record of betraying people who he’s negotiated deals with, not honoring his commitments, both in private and public life, and exploiting those around him … I really see zero benefits to Greenlandic people other than a very temporary boost to their self esteem.” And, he added, “it would be crazy to agree to something in the hope that a deal may come. I mean, if you give away your territory in the hopes that you might get a deal afterwards — that would be just really imprudent.” STEP 3: GET EUROPE ON BOARD Europe, particularly Denmark’s EU allies, would balk at any attempt to cleave Greenland away from Copenhagen. But the U.S. administration does have a trump card to play on that front: Ukraine. As peace negotiations have gathered pace, Kyiv has said that any deal with Putin must be backed by serious, long-term U.S. security guarantees. Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, on a visit to the territory in March, said “the people of Greenland are going to have self-determination.” | Pool photo by Tom Brenner vis Getty Images The Americans have prevaricated on that front, and in any case, Kyiv is skeptical about security guarantees, given those it has received from both Russia and the West in the past have amounted to nothing. One potential scenario an EU diplomat floated would be a security-for-security package deal, under which Europe gets firmer assurances from the Trump administration for Ukraine in exchange for an expanded role for the U.S. in Greenland. While that seems like a bitter pill, it could be easier to swallow than the alternative, annoying Trump, who may retaliate by imposing sanctions, pulling out of peace negotiations — or by throwing his weight behind Putin in negotiations with Ukraine. STEP 4: MILITARY INVASION But what if Greenland — or Denmark, whose “OK” Nuuk needs to secede — says no to Trump? A U.S. military takeover could be achieved without much difficulty.  Crosbie, from the Royal Danish Defense College, said Trump’s strategists are likely presenting him with various options. “The most worrisome would be a fait accompli-type strategy, which we see a lot and think about a lot in military circles, which would be simply grabbing the land the same way Putin tried to grab, to make territorial claims, over Ukraine. He could just simply put troops in the country and just say that it’s American now … the United States military is capable of landing any number of forces on Greenland, either by air or by sea, and then claiming that it’s American territory.” According to Lin Mortensgaard, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies and an expert on Greenlandic security, Washington also has around 500 military officers, including local contractors, on the ground at its northern Pituffik Space Base and just under 10 consulate staff in Nuuk. That’s alongside roughly 100 National Guard troops from New York who are usually deployed seasonally in the Arctic summer to support research missions.  Greenland, meanwhile, has few defenses. The population has no territorial army, Mortensgaard said, while Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command in the capital includes scant and out-of-date military assets, largely limited to four inspection and navy vessels, a dog-sled patrol, several helicopters and one maritime patrol aircraft. As a result, if Trump mobilizes the U.S. presence on the ground — or flies in special forces — the U.S. could seize control of Nuuk “in half an hour or less,” Mortensgaard said. “Mr. Trump says things and then he does them,” said Danish Member of European Parliament Stine Bosse. “If you were one of 60,000 people in Greenland, you would be very worried.” Any incursion would have no “legal basis” under U.S. and international law, said Romain Chuffart, who heads the Washington, D.C.-based Arctic Institute, a security think tank. Any occupation beyond 60 days would also require approval from the U.S. Congress.  Meanwhile, an invasion would “mean the end of NATO,” he said, and the “U.S. would be … shooting itself in the foot and waving goodbye to an alliance it has helped create.” Beyond that, a “loss of trust by key allies … could result in a reduction in their willingness to share intelligence with the U.S. or a reduction in access to bases across Europe,” said Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. troops in Europe. “Both of these would be severely damaging to America’s security.” Reports have circulated since last May that the Trump administration wants Greenland to sign a Compact of Free Association (COFA) — like those it currently has with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. | Joe Raedle/Getty Images NATO would be left unable to respond, given that military action must be approved unanimously and the U.S. is the key member of the alliance, but European allies could deploy troops to Greenland via other groupings such as the U.K.-Scandinavian Joint Expeditionary Force or the five-country Nordic Defence Cooperation format, said Ed Arnold, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. But for now, NATO allies remain cool-headed about an attack. “We are still far from that scenario,” said one senior alliance diplomat. “There could be some tough negotiations, but I don’t think we are close to any hostile takeover.” Max Griera, Gerardo Fortuna and Seb Starcevic contributed reporting.

The Netherlands has pulled out of U.S.-led counter-drug missions in the Caribbean, a reaction to the rising death toll from American military attacks on vessels suspected of being used to smuggle narcotics. Speaking Monday evening in Aruba, Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans said Dutch forces would continue drug interdiction within Dutch territorial waters, but would not take part in U.S. operations on the high seas linked to Operation Southern Spear. The operation, launched in September, has killed more than 100 people in over 20 attacks on boats that the U.S. says  were ferrying drugs. “We have worked together with the Americans on counter-narcotics for many years, but in a different way,” Brekelmans said. “When we see drug smuggling, we try to arrest and prosecute those responsible. Not by shooting ships.” The move was first reported by the Dutch daily Trouw. The decision marks a break with past practice. For years, the Netherlands, which controls six islands in the Caribbean, cooperated closely with the United States and other partners in the region, including through the Joint Interagency Task Force South. Dutch defense forces and the coast guard worked with U.S. counterparts on surveillance, interdiction, arrests and extraditions. What has changed, Brekelmans said, is the method adopted by the Donald Trump administration. “Outside our territorial waters, we see that the Americans have now chosen a national route again,” he said. “The method and the operation the United States is carrying out now, they are really doing that themselves. We are not participating in that.” The move comes amid heightened tensions after the United States used military force to detain Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and escalate pressure on Caracas, prompting international criticism over violations of sovereignty and international law. Brekelmans said Dutch defense planners were closely watching developments between Washington and Caracas, but stressed there is currently no military threat from Venezuela toward the Dutch Caribbean islands. “We must always be prepared for different scenarios,” he said, noting that rising tensions can affect airspace and regional stability. “But you also have to look realistically at what the actual threats are.” Brekelmans made clear the Netherlands would not provide facilities, helicopters or other support if requested for Southern Spear. “If it is part of that operation, then that is not something we agree to,” he said. “For this operation, we are not making our facilities available.” CNN reported in November that London had suspended some intelligence sharing with the United States after Washington began launching lethal strikes on boats in the Caribbean.

PARIS —  U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner — U.S. President Donald Trump’s son-in-law — will travel to Paris and attend a meeting of Ukraine’s allies on Tuesday, an Elysée official told reporters on Monday. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will not be there “for obvious reasons,” the official added, referring to the situation in Venezuela. “We have strived to bring the Americans closer to us, never resigning ourselves to the U.S. abandoning Ukraine. We have succeeded in this exercise of reconvergence between Ukraine, Europe, and America,” the official stressed. Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Trump in Florida, with the Ukrainian leader pitching a 20-point peace plan that would see the U.S. provide security guarantees to Kyiv and the country’s eastern Donbas region turned into a free economic zone. On Tuesday, around 27 leaders, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte as well as the alliance’s top military officer, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, will gather in the French capital in the so-called Coalition of the Willing format. Paris and London, co-leading the Coalition of the Willing, want to discuss and find common ground on five points, according to the Elysée official: How a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine would be monitored; support for Ukraine’s military; a multinational reassurance force in Ukraine once the war ends; commitments to support Kyiv if a ceasefire is violated by Moscow; and long-term defense cooperation deals with Ukraine. Chiefs of defense also discussed security guarantees for Ukraine on Monday.