Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Im März stehen die ersten zwei von insgesamt fünf Landtagswahlen an. Baden-Württemberg und Rheinland-Pfalz sind der Auftakt. In der CDU derweil sind Vorschläge zur Abschaffung der”Lifestyle-Teilzeit” und der Streichung von Kassenleistung für den Zahnarztbesuch derweil Anlass für Unruhe. Die einen äußern sich, die anderen sind verärgert und kassieren die Ideen so schnell ein, wie sie gemacht werden.  Eine Partei sucht öffentlich ihre Linie und das macht die Wahlkämpfer unglücklich. Rasmus Buchsteiner berichtet von der Flatterstimmung und dem Versuch, unter anderem vor und auf dem CDU-Parteitag in Stuttgart den Schaden zu begrenzen. Außerdem bespricht er mit Gordon, wie die ausbleibenden Fortschritte bei den versprochenen Reformen die Situation mit ausgelöst haben. Gleichzeitig geht es für die SPD in den Umfragen bergauf. Zumindest in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Dort ist die AfD der Hauptgegner für die amtierende Ministerpräsidentin Manuela Schwesig. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht sie darüber, wie sie den Moment für sich nutzen und für ihre Partei nutzen will. Außerdem: Der Kanzler bricht heute zu seiner ersten offiziellen Reise in die Golfregion auf. Tom Schmidtgen vom Pro-Newsletter ‘Industrie und Handel am Morgen’ über den neuen wichtigen Partner Saudi-Arabien, der sich nicht nur seiner strategisch guten Lage, sondern auch seiner wirtschaftlichen Stärke bewusst ist.  Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 information@axelspringer.de Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna

Yanmei Xie is senior associate fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. After Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke at Davos last week, a whole continent contracted leadership envy. Calling the rules-based order — which Washington proselytized for decades before stomping on — a mirage, Carney gave his country’s neighboring hegemonic bully a rhetorical middle finger, and Europeans promptly swooned. But before the bloc’s politicians rush to emulate him, it may be worth cooling the Carney fever. Appearing both steely and smooth in his Davos speech, Carney warned middle powers that “when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness.” Perhaps this was in reference to the crass daily coercion Canada has been enduring from the U.S. administration. But perhaps he was talking about the subtler asymmetry he experienced just days before in Beijing. In contrast to his defiance in Switzerland, Carney was ingratiating during his China visit. He signed Canada up for a “new strategic partnership” in preparation for an emerging “new world order,” and lauded Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a fellow defender of multilateralism. The visit also produced a cars-for-canola deal, which will see Canada slash tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles from 100 percent to 6.1 percent, and lift the import cap to 49,000 cars per year. In return, China will cut duties on Canadian canola seeds from 84 percent to 15 percent. In time, Ottawa also expects Beijing will reduce tariffs on Canadian lobsters, crabs and peas later this year and purchase more Canadian oil and perhaps gas, too. The agreement to launch a Ministerial Energy Dialogue will surely pave the way for eventual deals. These productive exchanges eventually moved Carney to declare Beijing a “more predictable” trade partner than Washington. And who can blame him? He was simply stating the obvious — after all, China isn’t threatening Canada with annexation. But one is tempted to wonder if he would have needed to flatter quite so much in China if his country still possessed some of the world’s leading technologies. The truth is, Canada’s oil and gas industry probably shouldn’t really be holding its breath. Chinese officials typically offer serious consideration rather than outright rejection out of politeness — just ask Russia, which has spent decades in dialogue with Beijing over a pipeline meant to replace Europe as a natural gas market. The cars-for-canola deal also carries a certain irony: Canada is importing the very technology that makes fossil fuels obsolete. China is electrifying at dizzying speed, with the International Energy Agency projecting its oil consumption will peak as early as next year thanks to “extraordinary” electric vehicle sales. That means Beijing probably isn’t desperate for new foreign suppliers of hydrocarbons, and the ministerial dialogue will likely drag on inconclusively — albeit courteously — well into the future. This state of Sino-Canadian trade can be seen as classic comparative advantage at work: China is good at making things, and Canada has abundant primary commodities. But in the not-so-distant past, it was Canadian companies that were selling nuclear reactors, telecom equipment, aircraft and bullet trains to China. Yet today, many of these once globe-spanning Canadian high-tech manufacturers have either exited the scene or lead a much-reduced existence. Somewhere in this trading history lies a cautionary tale for Europe. Deindustrialization can have its own self-reinforcing momentum. As a country’s economic composition changes, so does its political economy. When producers of goods disappear, so does their political influence. And the center of lobbying gravity shifts toward downstream users and consumers who prefer readily available imports. Europe’s indigenous solar manufacturers have been driven to near extinction by much cheaper Chinese products | STR/AFP via Getty Images Europe already has its own version of this story: Its indigenous solar manufacturers have been driven to near extinction by much cheaper Chinese products over the span of two decades. Currently, its solar industry is dominated by installers and operators who favor cheap imports and oppose trade defense. Simply put, Carney’s cars-for-canola deal is a salve for Canadian consumers and commodity producers, but it’s also industrial policy in reverse. In overly simplified terms, industrial policy is about encouraging exports of finished products over raw materials and discouraging the opposite in order to build domestic value-added capacity and productivity. But while Canada can, perhaps, make do without industry — as Carney put it in Davos, his ambition is to run “an energy superpower” — Europe doesn’t have that option. Agri-food and extractive sectors aren’t enough to stand up the continent’s economy — even with the likes of tourism and luxury goods thrown in. China currently exports more than twice as much to the EU than it imports. In container terms, the imbalance widens to 4-to-1. Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs estimates Chinese exports will shave 0.2 percentage point or more of GDP growth in Germany, Spain and Italy each year through 2029. And according to the European Central Bank, cars, chemicals, electric equipment and machinery — sectors that form Europe’s industrial backbone — face the most severe job losses from China trade shock. Europe shares Canada’s plight in dealing with the U.S., which currently isn’t just an unreliable trade partner but also an ally turned imperialist. This is why Carney’s speech resonates. But U.S. protectionism has only made China’s mercantilism a more acute challenge for Europe, as the U.S. resists the bloc’s exports and Chinese goods keep pouring into Europe in greater quantities at lower prices. European leaders would be mistaken to look for trade relief in China as Carney does, and bargain away the continent’s industrial capacity in the process. Whether it’s to resist an expansionist Russia or an imperial U.S., Europe still needs to hold on to its manufacturing base.

ABOARD THE PRIME MINISTER’S PLANE TO BEIJING — Keir Starmer rejected his Canadian counterpart’s call for mid-sized countries to band together in the face of unpredictable global powers — and insisted his “common sense” British approach will do just fine. The British prime minister arrives in China Wednesday for a trip aimed at rebooting the U.K.’s relationship with the Asian superpower. He’s the latest Western leader to make the visit — which will include a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping — after trips by Carney and France’s Emmanuel Macron. Carney used a searing speech at the World Economic Forum last week to warn of the “rupture” caused by “great powers” acting in their own self-interest. While he did not namecheck Donald Trump’s administration, the speech riled the U.S. president, who insisted: “Canada lives because of the United States.” The Canadian PM had called for middle powers to work together to “build something bigger, better, stronger, more just.” Starmer was pressed on those remarks on board his flight to China Tuesday. Asked whether he agreed that the old global order is dead — and whether smaller powers need to team up to push back at the U.S. and China, Starmer defended his own policy of trying to build bridges with Trump, Xi and the European Union all at once. “I’m a pragmatist, a British pragmatist applying common sense, and therefore I’m pleased that we have a good relationship with the U.S. on defense, security, intelligence and on trade and prosperity,” he says. “It’s very important that we maintain that good relationship.” He added: “Equally, we are moving forward with a better relationship with the EU. We had a very good summit last year with 10 strands of agreement. “We’ll have another summit this year with the EU, which I hope will be iterative, as well as following through on what we’ve already agreed. “And I’ve consistently said I’m not choosing between the U.S. and Europe. I’m really glad that the UK has got good relations with both.” Starmer’s government — which faces pressure from opposition parties back home as it re-engages with China — has stressed that it wants to cooperate, compete with and challenge Beijing when necessary, as it bids to build economic ties to aid the sputtering U.K. economy. “Obviously, China is the second biggest economy in the world, one of our biggest trading partners,” the British PM — who is flying with an entourage of British CEOs and business reps — said Tuesday. “And under the last government, we veered from the golden age to the ice age. And what I want to do is follow through on the approach I’ve set out a number of times now … which is a comprehensive and consistent approach to China. “I do think there are opportunities, but obviously we will never compromise national security in taking those opportunities.”

BRUSSELS — The European Commission’s vice president Henna Virkkunen sounded the alarm about Europe’s dependence on foreign technology on Tuesday, saying “it’s very clear that Europe is having our independence moment.” “During the last year, everybody has really realized how important it is that we are not dependent on one country or one company when it comes to some very critical technologies,” she said at an event organized by POLITICO. “In these times … dependencies, they can be weaponized against us,” Virkkunen said. The intervention at the event — titled Europe’s race for digital leadership — comes at a particularly sensitive time in transatlantic relations, after U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent threats to take over Greenland forced European politicians to consider retaliation. Virkkunen declined to single out the United States as one of the partners that the EU must de-risk from. She pointed to the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as incidents that point to Europe’s “vulnerabilities.” She said the U.S. is a key partner, but also noted that “it’s very important for our competitiveness and for our security, that we have also our own capacity, that we are not dependent.” The Commission’s executive vice president for tech sovereignty swung behind the idea of using public contracts as a way to support the development of European technology companies and products. “We should use public procurement, of course, much more actively also to boost our own growing technologies in the European Union,” she said when asked about her stance on plans to “Buy European.” Those plans, being pushed by the French EU commissioner Stéphane Séjourné, in charge of European industy, to ensure that billions in procurement contracts flow to EU businesses, are due to be outlined in an upcoming Industrial Accelerator Act that has been delayed multiple times. “Public services, governments, municipalities, regions, also the European Commission, we are very big customers for ICT services,” Virkkunen said. “And we can also boost very much European innovations [and startups] when we are buying services.” Virkkunen is overseeing a package of legislation aimed at promoting tech sovereignty that is expected to come out this spring, including action on cloud and artificial intelligence, and microchips — industries in which Europe is behind global competitors. When asked where she saw the biggest need for Europe to break away from foreign reliance, the commissioner said that while it was difficult to pick only one area, “chips are very much a pre-condition for any other technologies.” “We are not able to design and manufacture very advanced chips. It’s very problematic for our technology customer. So I see that semiconductor chips, they are very much key for any other technologies,” she said.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Friedrich Merz steht zu Beginn des Jahres 2026 unter Zugzwang. Bei der CSU-Klausur in Seeon muss er beweisen, ob er den Spagat zwischen „Klingbeil-Versteher“ und Reformkanzler schafft. Rasmus Buchsteiner berichtet aus dem Kloster, warum die Union jetzt Ergebnisse bei der Unternehmenssteuer will und wie Merz seine Doppelbotschaft aus Sicherheit und Wirtschaft vermitteln muss. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview bezieht EU-Kommissar Magnus Brunner (ÖVP) Stellung zur CSU-Forderung nach einer Abschiebeoffensive Richtung Syrien. Er erklärt, warum Regeln eingehalten werden müssen, wie Brüssel künftig mit „Return Hubs“ plant und warum Grenzkontrollen noch eine Weile bleiben dürften. Ringen um die außenpolitischen Linien in der AfD: Weil Alice Weidel die USA-Strategie besetzt, sucht Tino Chrupalla sein Profil in China. Pauline von Pezold analysiert, wie die Reise ohne Fachexperten, aber mit PR stattfindet und was das über den Riss in der Parteispitze verrät. Außerdem: Ein Blackout in Berlin-Zehlendorf und ein Regierender Bürgermeister auf dem Tennisplatz. Kai Wegners Freizeitgestaltung während der Krise sorgt für Kopfschütteln. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 information@axelspringer.de Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna

Anchal Vohra is a Brussels-based international affairs commentator. On a smog-filled day in New Delhi, I watched as a few German cars struggled to navigate a massive traffic jam. A British SUV was also in the mix, trailing not so far behind. Last year, these foreign cars accounted for only 0.1 percent of India’s imports, with Germans in the lead and the British coming in a near second. However, British businesses have gained an edge ever since the U.K. and India inked a free trade agreement earlier this year, with India finally lowering its protectionist guard. Once this deal fully comes into effect, overall bilateral business is expected to grow by more than 50 percent in about a decade-and-a-half, as New Delhi slashes its car tariffs from 100 percent to 10 percent, and its tariffs on scotch from 150 percent to 40 percent over a period of 10 years — all despite the cost to its domestic industries. It also gains particular advantage for its textile sector, which was hard hit by U.S. President Donald Trump’s 50-percent tariff, removing tariffs on Indian textiles exported to the U.K. The EU, meanwhile, remains the single largest market in the world, with a much higher chance of growing its exports to a country packed with over 1.46 billion consumers. Yet, negotiations between New Delhi and Brussels are forever hitting roadblocks, even as negotiators shuttle between the two capitals to get a deal across the finish line — a deadline that’s now been postponed to Jan. 26. And as these talks continue, the bloc could stand to learn from the flexibility of its former member. According to an Indian official in New Delhi, granted anonymity in order to speak freely, the biggest barriers to an agreement are currently the EU’s insistence on greater market access in the politically sensitive agriculture sector, and its insistence on a carbon tax under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). On top of all this, the bloc’s protectionist tendencies — displayed by its higher tariffs on steel and its recent decision to curb rice imports from India — are also unexpected hurdles. In contrast to this rigidity, India’s concessions in its deal with the U.K. emerged from the flexibility it was granted in the agriculture sector, which was largely insulated from British products, the official said. “For all its faults, [the U.K.] understands India and Indians better.” Nearly half of Indians depend on agriculture for their livelihood, and farmers make up a strong voting bloc that holds strong political clout. Back in 2021, farmer protests even forced Prime Minister Narendra Modi to withdraw agricultural reforms and apologize. In fact, I have been told by former Indian officials and experts that the U.S. tariffs on India weren’t punishment for the country’s purchase of Russian oil, as Trump has claimed, but rather for its refusal to let U.S. food products flood the country. Nearly half of Indians depend on agriculture for their livelihood, and farmers make up a strong voting bloc that holds strong political clout. | Jagadeesh Nv/EPA “The interests of our farmers are top priority. India will never compromise on the interests of its farmers, dairy farmers and fishermen,” Modi had said at the time. But these same differences now threaten the EU-India relationship before it even properly takes off. “The Europeans could learn from the British,” the Indian official noted. “They excluded dairy, chicken and apples from the deal,” he explained, listing products particularly important to India. “In exchange, we let them bring in salmon, cod and lamb.” He also alluded that India could consider dropping tariffs on cars and wine if the bloc kept out of agriculture: “In liquor, luxury cars and wine, there is always room, since that doesn’t affect our most vulnerable people.” Instead of any such changes,, however, India is now growing peeved by what it sees as last-minute pressure tactics by Brussels. Just this month, the EU decided to “limit rice imports from India” and other Asian countries to the benefit of domestic rice growers and millers. And the bloc’s unexpected decision to spike tariffs on steel imports outside its quota to up to 50 percent has rattled Indian negotiators. New Delhi was already opposed to the EU’s incoming carbon tax, believing it would make its steel exports uncompetitive. The Secretary of India’s Ministry of Steel Sandeep Poundrik described the European carbon tax as a bigger threat to Indian exports than Trump’s tariffs. On top of all this, the bloc’s protectionist tendencies — displayed by its higher tariffs on steel and its recent decision to curb rice imports from India — are also unexpected hurdles. | Piyal Adhikary/EPA Moreover, some experts like former trade negotiator for India Sangeeta Godbole argue the EU stands to gain more from an FTA whereas India stands to lose if the carbon tax provision isn’t reconsidered. “Nearly 80 percent of Indian exports to the EU even now face miniscule tariffs below 1 percent,” she noted recently, demanding India shield exports “from excessive environmental rules” the EU is trying to impose. To that end, the country has decried the bloc’s tax on carbon intensive imports via CBAM as a violation of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle, which doesn’t hold developing countries equally responsible for climate change due to differences in historical contributions and the state of their economic development. And here, too, India argues, the understanding with the British could be emulated. Although it failed to gain an exemption on the U.K.’s version of the carbon tax, India has reserved the right to retaliate if the FTA’s benefits are negated by this tax. For its part, the EU claims the carbon tax is intended to encourage the use of clean energy in heavy polluting industries. And as Commissioner for Trade Maroš Šefčovič said back in September: “We also need an understanding from the Indian side that we also have our constituency, we also have our audience” to consider — especially after the farmer protests over the recent deal with Mercosur nations. Meanwhile, the EU is also concerned about whether a deal with India might end up benefiting China. The bloc is desperately trying to reduce its dependence on Beijing in strategically important sectors and hoping India could replace it, but India itself is heavily reliant on China as well — for example, nearly half of the components in Indian semiconductors are imported from there. It also gains particular advantage for its textile sector, which was hard hit by U.S. President Donald Trump’s 50-percent tariff, removing tariffs on Indian textiles exported to the U.K. | Divyakant Solanki/EPA However, speaking with a highly placed EU insider who was granted anonymity, I learned the bloc is now ready to make concessions, offering to jointly manufacture cars to encourage India to lower its tariffs, to leave out access to certain agricultural products, and to possibly even relent on garment duties. And last week, negotiators went through sector by sector once more, trying to get a better deal for their domestic industries, trying to keep the balance sheet even. The truth is, India — home to a large number of people living below the poverty line despite its rapid economic growth — needs an FTA with the single largest market to attract foreign investment. But the EU needs India too.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

BRUSSELS — Huawei was rushed back into the EU’s most influential solar panel lobby after threatening legal action in reaction to its earlier expulsion over its alleged involvement in a bribery and corruption scandal.   That’s outraging other solar power companies, worried that creating a special membership category for Huawei could undermine the ability of SolarPower Europe to effectively represent the industry in Brussels.  “The conduct reported … specifically the handling of Huawei’s membership has seriously undermined both my personal confidence and that of our organization in the governance of SPE,” Elisabeth Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß, CEO of Austrian company Fronius, wrote in a letter to SPE, which was obtained by POLITICO.  Lawyers for Huawei and SolarPower Europe met at the end of May for negotiations, an industry insider told POLITICO, which culminated in SPE sending a final agreement to the Chinese company at the beginning of September.   Huawei argued that the European Commission’s decision to ban its lobbyists from any meetings with the executive or the European Parliament was unlawful and did not warrant a full expulsion from SPE, said the insider, who spoke on condition of being granted anonymity over fears of retaliation for speaking out.  The ban on Huawei lobbyists was put in place in March after Belgian authorities accused the company of conducting a cash-for-influence scheme and bribing MEPs to ensure their support of Huawei’s interests.  At the time, Huawei maintained it has a “zero-tolerance stance against corruption.”  During the Sept. 29 meeting to reinstate Huawei’s membership, SPE told its board of directors that the organization wanted to avoid a lawsuit and a potentially costly trial.  Instead, SPE proposed making Huawei a passive member that would not actively participate in the group’s workstreams — an option the board accepted, POLITICO reported earlier this month.   Huawei did not respond to a request for comment about its legal threat.  SPE acknowledged the threat in a letter to Fronius, one of its board members, on Thursday. “Based on legal advice and with the assistance of external lawyers, SolarPower Europe held discussions with Huawei with a view to avoiding litigation and protracted legal uncertainty regarding Huawei’s membership status, while preserving SolarPower Europe’s uninterrupted and unrestricted access to the EU Institutions and other relevant stakeholders,” reads the letter obtained by POLITICO.  The SPE’s letter was a response to an Oct. 20 letter from the Austrian solar panel manufacturer sent to the lobby after POLITICO’s story was published on Oct. 9. Fronius called for full transparency over the reinstatement of Huawei and action against any appearance of corruption.  The Austrian company’s concern is that SPE will be “unable to effectively represent” the sector given the EU’s ban on direct contact with Huawei or groups that lobby on its behalf, Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß told POLITICO in an email.   Fronius is also raising questions about whether SPE can designate a company as a passive member — a status that does not exist in the organization’s bylaws.  “To our knowledge, SPE’s status do not include such a membership category,” Fronius’s letter to SPE reads. “We request a clear explanation of what this form of membership is based on.”  SPE did not raise the issue of member status in its response to Fronius.   The lobbying practices of Huawei and other Chinese companies are under a microscope over concerns around the influence they wield over crucial technologies, including renewable energy and 5G mobile data networks.  While it is better known as a telecom giant, Huawei is also a leader in manufacturing inverters, which turn solar panels’ electricity into current that flows into the energy grid.  Cybersecurity experts warn inverters offer a back door for bad actors to hack into the grid and tamper with or shut it down through remote access.  Two members of the European Parliament sent a letter to the European Commission earlier this month warning of such risks and urging the executive to restrict high-risk vendors like Huawei from investing in Europe’s critical infrastructure.  “Inverters are the brain of a [solar panel] system, connected to the internet and must be remotely controllable for updates. This applies regardless of who the manufacturer is,” Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß said. “If European legislation does not address the ‘manufacturer risk,’ then energy security in Europe will be jeopardized, which I consider critical.” 

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Außenminister Wadephul sagt seine China-Reise kurzfristig ab. Ein Vorgang, der zeigt, wie sehr sich die Machtverhältnisse verschoben haben. Hans von der Burchard analysiert, wie China Deutschland die Grenzen aufzeigt, warum die EU zum Vermittler wird  und welche Folgen die Eskalation hat. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht Markus Frohnmaier, außenpolitischer Sprecher der AfD, über Pekings Rolle in der Welt, deutsche Interessen und warum er die Regierung für „hypermoralisch“ hält. Danach: Innenminister Alexander Dobrindt will Deutschland besser gegen Cyberangriffe wappnen und erlaubt künftig auch digitale Gegenschläge. Rixa Fürsen erklärt, wie schwierig das Konzept der Abwehr ist und warum Zuständigkeiten zwischen Bund, Ländern und Bundeswehr so unklar sind. Zum Schluss: Ein Blick auf die SPD, die in Bielefeld gegen den Kanzler und damit die eigene Regierung demonstriert. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul on Friday postponed an imminent diplomatic trip to China, over a dearth of meetings on his schedule. “The trip cannot take place at this time and will be postponed to a later date,” said a spokesperson for Germany’s Federal Foreign Office. With the exception of a sitdown with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, there were not enough meetings with the Beijing side on his agenda, the spokesperson added. Wadephul’s bombshell will likely roil relations between Berlin and Beijing. It comes amid an increasing deterioration of Germany-China relations in recent months over Beijing’s export curbs on rare earths and microchips, as well as German criticism over China’s posture toward Taiwan and behavior in the South China Sea. A few hours earlier, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche announced that Berlin was lodging a diplomatic protest against China for blocking semiconductor shipments. “We have been hit hard by the chip shortage because the German economy depends on these chips,” she said in Kyiv. In August, Wadephul also noted that China was providing “crucial” support to Russia that enabled President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing war against Ukraine. The foreign minister was originally scheduled to depart for China on Sunday. Wadephul had planned to press Beijing to ease export restrictions on rare earths and semiconductors, he told Reuters on Thursday — and discuss pushing Russia toward negotiations to end its war in Ukraine. Brussels, for its part, is pressing ahead in talks with Beijing. The European Commission on Friday told reporters that it “can confirm that both in-person and virtual high-level technical meetings will take place next week” after the bloc’s Commissioner for Trade Maroš Šefčovič spoke to his Chinese counterpart Wang Wentao on Tuesday.