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Friedrich Merz steht zu Beginn des Jahres 2026 unter Zugzwang. Bei der
CSU-Klausur in Seeon muss er beweisen, ob er den Spagat zwischen
„Klingbeil-Versteher“ und Reformkanzler schafft. Rasmus Buchsteiner berichtet
aus dem Kloster, warum die Union jetzt Ergebnisse bei der Unternehmenssteuer
will und wie Merz seine Doppelbotschaft aus Sicherheit und Wirtschaft vermitteln
muss.
Im 200-Sekunden-Interview bezieht EU-Kommissar Magnus Brunner (ÖVP) Stellung zur
CSU-Forderung nach einer Abschiebeoffensive Richtung Syrien.
Er erklärt, warum Regeln eingehalten werden müssen, wie Brüssel künftig mit
„Return Hubs“ plant und warum Grenzkontrollen noch eine Weile bleiben dürften.
Ringen um die außenpolitischen Linien in der AfD: Weil Alice Weidel die
USA-Strategie besetzt, sucht Tino Chrupalla sein Profil in China.
Pauline von Pezold analysiert, wie die Reise ohne Fachexperten, aber mit PR
stattfindet und was das über den Riss in der Parteispitze verrät.
Außerdem: Ein Blackout in Berlin-Zehlendorf und ein Regierender Bürgermeister
auf dem Tennisplatz. Kai Wegners Freizeitgestaltung während der Krise sorgt für
Kopfschütteln.
Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski
und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international,
hintergründig.
Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis:
Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und
Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren.
Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski:
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Tag - EU-China relations
Anchal Vohra is a Brussels-based international affairs commentator.
On a smog-filled day in New Delhi, I watched as a few German cars struggled to
navigate a massive traffic jam. A British SUV was also in the mix, trailing not
so far behind.
Last year, these foreign cars accounted for only 0.1 percent of India’s imports,
with Germans in the lead and the British coming in a near second. However,
British businesses have gained an edge ever since the U.K. and India inked a
free trade agreement earlier this year, with India finally lowering its
protectionist guard.
Once this deal fully comes into effect, overall bilateral business is expected
to grow by more than 50 percent in about a decade-and-a-half, as New Delhi
slashes its car tariffs from 100 percent to 10 percent, and its tariffs on
scotch from 150 percent to 40 percent over a period of 10 years — all despite
the cost to its domestic industries.
It also gains particular advantage for its textile sector, which was hard hit by
U.S. President Donald Trump’s 50-percent tariff, removing tariffs on Indian
textiles exported to the U.K.
The EU, meanwhile, remains the single largest market in the world, with a much
higher chance of growing its exports to a country packed with over 1.46 billion
consumers. Yet, negotiations between New Delhi and Brussels are forever hitting
roadblocks, even as negotiators shuttle between the two capitals to get a deal
across the finish line — a deadline that’s now been postponed to Jan. 26.
And as these talks continue, the bloc could stand to learn from the flexibility
of its former member.
According to an Indian official in New Delhi, granted anonymity in order to
speak freely, the biggest barriers to an agreement are currently the EU’s
insistence on greater market access in the politically sensitive agriculture
sector, and its insistence on a carbon tax under the Carbon Border Adjustment
Mechanism (CBAM).
On top of all this, the bloc’s protectionist tendencies — displayed by its
higher tariffs on steel and its recent decision to curb rice imports from India
— are also unexpected hurdles.
In contrast to this rigidity, India’s concessions in its deal with the U.K.
emerged from the flexibility it was granted in the agriculture sector, which was
largely insulated from British products, the official said. “For all its faults,
[the U.K.] understands India and Indians better.”
Nearly half of Indians depend on agriculture for their livelihood, and farmers
make up a strong voting bloc that holds strong political clout. Back in 2021,
farmer protests even forced Prime Minister Narendra Modi to withdraw
agricultural reforms and apologize.
In fact, I have been told by former Indian officials and experts that the U.S.
tariffs on India weren’t punishment for the country’s purchase of Russian oil,
as Trump has claimed, but rather for its refusal to let U.S. food products flood
the country.
Nearly half of Indians depend on agriculture for their livelihood, and farmers
make up a strong voting bloc that holds strong political clout. | Jagadeesh
Nv/EPA
“The interests of our farmers are top priority. India will never compromise on
the interests of its farmers, dairy farmers and fishermen,” Modi had said at the
time.
But these same differences now threaten the EU-India relationship before it even
properly takes off.
“The Europeans could learn from the British,” the Indian official noted. “They
excluded dairy, chicken and apples from the deal,” he explained, listing
products particularly important to India. “In exchange, we let them bring in
salmon, cod and lamb.” He also alluded that India could consider dropping
tariffs on cars and wine if the bloc kept out of agriculture: “In liquor, luxury
cars and wine, there is always room, since that doesn’t affect our most
vulnerable people.”
Instead of any such changes,, however, India is now growing peeved by what it
sees as last-minute pressure tactics by Brussels.
Just this month, the EU decided to “limit rice imports from India” and other
Asian countries to the benefit of domestic rice growers and millers. And the
bloc’s unexpected decision to spike tariffs on steel imports outside its quota
to up to 50 percent has rattled Indian negotiators.
New Delhi was already opposed to the EU’s incoming carbon tax, believing it
would make its steel exports uncompetitive. The Secretary of India’s Ministry of
Steel Sandeep Poundrik described the European carbon tax as a bigger threat to
Indian exports than Trump’s tariffs.
On top of all this, the bloc’s protectionist tendencies — displayed by its
higher tariffs on steel and its recent decision to curb rice imports from India
— are also unexpected hurdles. | Piyal Adhikary/EPA
Moreover, some experts like former trade negotiator for India Sangeeta Godbole
argue the EU stands to gain more from an FTA whereas India stands to lose if the
carbon tax provision isn’t reconsidered. “Nearly 80 percent of Indian exports to
the EU even now face miniscule tariffs below 1 percent,” she noted recently,
demanding India shield exports “from excessive environmental rules” the EU is
trying to impose.
To that end, the country has decried the bloc’s tax on carbon intensive imports
via CBAM as a violation of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)
principle, which doesn’t hold developing countries equally responsible for
climate change due to differences in historical contributions and the state of
their economic development.
And here, too, India argues, the understanding with the British could be
emulated. Although it failed to gain an exemption on the U.K.’s version of the
carbon tax, India has reserved the right to retaliate if the FTA’s benefits are
negated by this tax.
For its part, the EU claims the carbon tax is intended to encourage the use of
clean energy in heavy polluting industries. And as Commissioner for Trade Maroš
Šefčovič said back in September: “We also need an understanding from the Indian
side that we also have our constituency, we also have our audience” to consider
— especially after the farmer protests over the recent deal with Mercosur
nations.
Meanwhile, the EU is also concerned about whether a deal with India might end up
benefiting China. The bloc is desperately trying to reduce its dependence on
Beijing in strategically important sectors and hoping India could replace it,
but India itself is heavily reliant on China as well — for example, nearly half
of the components in Indian semiconductors are imported from there.
It also gains particular advantage for its textile sector, which was hard hit by
U.S. President Donald Trump’s 50-percent tariff, removing tariffs on Indian
textiles exported to the U.K. | Divyakant Solanki/EPA
However, speaking with a highly placed EU insider who was granted anonymity, I
learned the bloc is now ready to make concessions, offering to jointly
manufacture cars to encourage India to lower its tariffs, to leave out access to
certain agricultural products, and to possibly even relent on garment duties.
And last week, negotiators went through sector by sector once more, trying to
get a better deal for their domestic industries, trying to keep the balance
sheet even.
The truth is, India — home to a large number of people living below the poverty
line despite its rapid economic growth — needs an FTA with the single largest
market to attract foreign investment.
But the EU needs India too.
Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant
secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a
distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy
Policy and a former director general of the European Commission.
After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division
on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and
redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on
China.
This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance
and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic.
Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the
systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success
will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together,
starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy.
While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is
being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced
batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral
supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple
truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who
controls the next generation of energy systems.
But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not
just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base
behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and
in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as
airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems
that are resilient and interoperable by design.
The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to
shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has
watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian
attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on
exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming.
Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on
energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on
materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From
batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical
inputs.
This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability
for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of
the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised.
That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are
already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how
supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a
fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent.
So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary
dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead?
The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into
decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech
resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies,
sectors and alliances.
Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use
technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed
generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t
just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission
effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such
investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive
down costs.
Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted
manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for
collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure
shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to
strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the
recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how
partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience.
Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on
Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty
Images
Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on.
This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building
out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected.
Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance
on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward,
measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong
bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to
halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries
that enhance resilience and competitiveness.
This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in
parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both
will be strategically weaker as a result.
The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas
recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s
actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost
sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of
close to 800 million people.
The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational.
Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has
strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national
defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security,
energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile
energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the
U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another.
This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually
reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic
competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and
intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built
to protect.
BRUSSELS — Huawei was rushed back into the EU’s most influential solar panel
lobby after threatening legal action in reaction to its earlier expulsion over
its alleged involvement in a bribery and corruption scandal.
That’s outraging other solar power companies, worried that creating a special
membership category for Huawei could undermine the ability of SolarPower Europe
to effectively represent the industry in Brussels.
“The conduct reported … specifically the handling of Huawei’s membership has
seriously undermined both my personal confidence and that of our organization in
the governance of SPE,” Elisabeth Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß, CEO of Austrian
company Fronius, wrote in a letter to SPE, which was obtained by POLITICO.
Lawyers for Huawei and SolarPower Europe met at the end of May for negotiations,
an industry insider told POLITICO, which culminated in SPE sending a final
agreement to the Chinese company at the beginning of September.
Huawei argued that the European Commission’s decision to ban its lobbyists from
any meetings with the executive or the European Parliament was unlawful and did
not warrant a full expulsion from SPE, said the insider, who spoke on condition
of being granted anonymity over fears of retaliation for speaking out.
The ban on Huawei lobbyists was put in place in March after Belgian authorities
accused the company of conducting a cash-for-influence scheme and bribing MEPs
to ensure their support of Huawei’s interests.
At the time, Huawei maintained it has a “zero-tolerance stance against
corruption.”
During the Sept. 29 meeting to reinstate Huawei’s membership, SPE told its board
of directors that the organization wanted to avoid a lawsuit and a potentially
costly trial.
Instead, SPE proposed making Huawei a passive member that would not actively
participate in the group’s workstreams — an option the board accepted, POLITICO
reported earlier this month.
Huawei did not respond to a request for comment about its legal threat.
SPE acknowledged the threat in a letter to Fronius, one of its board members, on
Thursday.
“Based on legal advice and with the assistance of external lawyers, SolarPower
Europe held discussions with Huawei with a view to avoiding litigation and
protracted legal uncertainty regarding Huawei’s membership status, while
preserving SolarPower Europe’s uninterrupted and unrestricted access to the EU
Institutions and other relevant stakeholders,” reads the letter obtained by
POLITICO.
The SPE’s letter was a response to an Oct. 20 letter from the Austrian solar
panel manufacturer sent to the lobby after POLITICO’s story was published on
Oct. 9. Fronius called for full transparency over the reinstatement of Huawei
and action against any appearance of corruption.
The Austrian company’s concern is that SPE will be “unable to effectively
represent” the sector given the EU’s ban on direct contact with Huawei or groups
that lobby on its behalf, Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß told POLITICO in an email.
Fronius is also raising questions about whether SPE can designate a company as a
passive member — a status that does not exist in the organization’s bylaws.
“To our knowledge, SPE’s status do not include such a membership category,”
Fronius’s letter to SPE reads. “We request a clear explanation of what this form
of membership is based on.”
SPE did not raise the issue of member status in its response to Fronius.
The lobbying practices of Huawei and other Chinese companies are under a
microscope over concerns around the influence they wield over crucial
technologies, including renewable energy and 5G mobile data networks.
While it is better known as a telecom giant, Huawei is also a leader in
manufacturing inverters, which turn solar panels’ electricity into current that
flows into the energy grid.
Cybersecurity experts warn inverters offer a back door for bad actors to hack
into the grid and tamper with or shut it down through remote access.
Two members of the European Parliament sent a letter to the European Commission
earlier this month warning of such risks and urging the executive to restrict
high-risk vendors like Huawei from investing in Europe’s critical
infrastructure.
“Inverters are the brain of a [solar panel] system, connected to the internet
and must be remotely controllable for updates. This applies regardless of who
the manufacturer is,” Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß said. “If European legislation
does not address the ‘manufacturer risk,’ then energy security in Europe will be
jeopardized, which I consider critical.”
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Außenminister Wadephul sagt seine China-Reise kurzfristig ab. Ein Vorgang, der
zeigt, wie sehr sich die Machtverhältnisse verschoben haben. Hans von der
Burchard analysiert, wie China Deutschland die Grenzen aufzeigt, warum die EU
zum Vermittler wird und welche Folgen die Eskalation hat.
Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht Markus Frohnmaier, außenpolitischer Sprecher
der AfD, über Pekings Rolle in der Welt, deutsche Interessen und warum er die
Regierung für „hypermoralisch“ hält.
Danach: Innenminister Alexander Dobrindt will Deutschland besser gegen
Cyberangriffe wappnen und erlaubt künftig auch digitale Gegenschläge. Rixa
Fürsen erklärt, wie schwierig das Konzept der Abwehr ist und warum
Zuständigkeiten zwischen Bund, Ländern und Bundeswehr so unklar sind.
Zum Schluss: Ein Blick auf die SPD, die in Bielefeld gegen den Kanzler und damit
die eigene Regierung demonstriert.
Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski
und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international,
hintergründig.
Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis:
Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und
Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren.
Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski:
Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul on Friday postponed an imminent
diplomatic trip to China, over a dearth of meetings on his schedule.
“The trip cannot take place at this time and will be postponed to a later date,”
said a spokesperson for Germany’s Federal Foreign Office. With the exception of
a sitdown with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, there were not enough meetings
with the Beijing side on his agenda, the spokesperson added.
Wadephul’s bombshell will likely roil relations between Berlin and Beijing. It
comes amid an increasing deterioration of Germany-China relations in recent
months over Beijing’s export curbs on rare earths and microchips, as well as
German criticism over China’s posture toward Taiwan and behavior in the South
China Sea.
A few hours earlier, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche announced that
Berlin was lodging a diplomatic protest against China for blocking semiconductor
shipments. “We have been hit hard by the chip shortage because the German
economy depends on these chips,” she said in Kyiv.
In August, Wadephul also noted that China was providing “crucial” support to
Russia that enabled President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing war against Ukraine.
The foreign minister was originally scheduled to depart for China on Sunday.
Wadephul had planned to press Beijing to ease export restrictions on rare earths
and semiconductors, he told Reuters on Thursday — and discuss pushing Russia
toward negotiations to end its war in Ukraine.
Brussels, for its part, is pressing ahead in talks with Beijing.
The European Commission on Friday told reporters that it “can confirm that both
in-person and virtual high-level technical meetings will take place next week”
after the bloc’s Commissioner for Trade Maroš Šefčovič spoke to his Chinese
counterpart Wang Wentao on Tuesday.
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It’s been a week where the politics of the Middle East and Britain’s relations
with China have loomed large over Westminster.
For all the backslapping and goodwill of Sharm el-Sheikh, will the ceasefire and
exchange of hostages and prisoners in Gaza pave the way for a political
solution? What part could Britain play? And how will the row over the collapsed
Chinese spy case play out at home as the blame game between the government,
opposition and prosecutors continues to rumble on? What impact will it have on
Keir Starmer’s attempts to boost economic relations with China?
Anne McElvoy talks to one of Westminster’s most prominent figures on foreign
affairs, Emily Thornberry, who chairs the influential Foreign Affairs Select
Committee of MPs. As one of Labour’s most senior backbenchers and a former
shadow attorney general, she’s been unafraid to be a critical friend of Starmer.
She’s also joined by Tim Ross, POLITICO’s chief political correspondent for
Europe and the U.K., who’s been reporting on the reaction to President Trump’s
Gaza peace plan and gauging the mood in Westminster over the row about Chinese
espionage.
U.S. President Donald Trump said he is ready to impose “major sanctions” on
Moscow if NATO members stop purchasing Russian oil.
In a letter to alliance members, which he published on his social network Truth
Social, Trump wrote: “I am ready to do major Sanctions on Russia when all NATO
Nations have agreed, and started, to do the same thing, and when all NATO
Nations stop buying oil from Russia.”
He added that oil purchases by NATO states have been “shocking,” arguing that it
“greatly weakens your negotiating position, and bargaining power, over Russia.”
Trump said he believes ending Russian oil purchases, combined with the
imposition of tariffs on China of 50 percent to 100 percent — by NATO members
and the U.S. — would help bring an end to what he called a “ridiculous war.”
Trump, promised in his election campaign that he would end the war within a day,
concluded his statement Saturday by saying that if NATO followed his plan, the
war would “end quickly.”
Just this week, several European leaders were confident that they had convinced
Trump that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in ending the war
and has to be forced to the negotiating table, officials and diplomats told
POLITICO. In a flurry of diplomatic visits, the leaders discussed new financial
restrictions and plans to cut off the flow of Russian oil and gas.
MUNICH, Germany — Europe’s automakers are walking a tightrope at this year’s
Munich auto show: introducing cutting-edge EVs while pleading for leniency in
transitioning from combustion engines.
Mercedes-Benz unveiled the all-electric version of its best-selling GLC SUV,
which is slated to go on sale next year. BMW is touting its new electric iX3
SUV. Both have ranges of more than 720 kilometers and fast recharging times.
They’re aimed at cutting off the Chinese EV-makers recording rapid gains in the
European market.
“I’m convinced we’re on a journey towards zero emission, hence why we’re
investing massively into state-of-the-art electric technology in cars,” Mercedes
CEO Ola Källenius told reporters at the show.
At the same time, car executives are begging the EU to have mercy on them over
its rule banning the sale of new CO2-emitting cars from 2035.
Industry wants Brussels to show greater leniency by allowing hybrid vehicles and
alternative fuels to ensure at least a limited future for the combustion engine.
It’s getting strong backing on that from conservative politicians, including the
European People’s Party in the European Parliament.
Executives will be making that argument on Friday when Commission President
Ursula von der Leyen meets with the auto industry in yet another summit to
figure out how to save the troubled sector.
The Commission needs to take a “more market-oriented approach” in the 2035
regulation, Källenius said.
The argument is not without merit.
Car sales in Europe are lower than they were before the pandemic. Chinese
automakers have the best tech and batteries, and European brands continue to
lose market share in China, which was once a cash cow for them. On top of that,
U.S. President Donald Trump has unleashed a global trade war that is costing the
sector billions even after Brussels struck a trade deal with Washington.
Sales of electric vehicles are lower than expected, Källenius and his peers
complain, and sticking to the emissions targets will make them less competitive.
POLITICAL MANEUVERING
But those carmaker grumbles are far from sure to elicit any movement from the
Commission, especially after von der Leyen broke her silence on the matter
during her State of the European Union speech on Wednesday.
“No matter what, we all know the future will be electric, and Europe will be a
part of it,” she said while announcing the launch of the EU’s Small Affordable
Cars Initiative.
The words were barely past her lips when MEPs erupted in a chorus of boos,
particularly those in the EPP.
Although carmakers and their political backers were aghast, climate campaigners
saw hope.
“Von der Leyen’s clearest message today was that Europe’s future is electric,”
Chris Heron, the secretary-general of E-Mobility Europe, said after the speech.
“That’s a welcome sign the Commission wants to lock in investment certainty
around the 2035 target.”
In a media briefing Thursday, the Commission refused to give further details on
the EV effort, saying there would be more information after the Friday summit.
The industry was given a reprieve from this year’s tougher emissions targets
following the last dialogue with von der Leyen, but the fate of the 2035 ban is
a political discussion that will largely be determined by EU capitals.
“Instead of looking at what [carmakers] say, we have to look at what countries
say much more than we did before,” said Jean-Philippe Hermine, a director with
the IDDRI French think tank.
CHINA IN THE WINGS
While EU carmakers lobby Brussels, their Chinese rivals are making headway in
Europe despite the levy the bloc imposed on EV-makers as punishment for getting
subsidies from Beijing.
China’s electric car market is the world’s largest, and BYD has overtaken Tesla
as the world’s leading EV producer.
Chinese electric car producers were strutting their stuff in Munich, with brands
including BYD, Changan, Xpeng and Leapmotor, which has a partnership with
Italian-French-American automaker Stellantis, all displaying models.
They were also clear that the EU’s duties are not dissuading them from entering
Europe, though the taxes are shifting the types of models they’re importing.
Hybrids are not included in the duties, making them an attractive alternative to
all-electric versions.
In each of their media pitches, the Chinese brands said they were dedicated to
being “in Europe, for Europe.”
But for the most part, that means taking a model sold in China and tweaking the
tech and components to abide by European regulations, rather than building
models from the ground up with European audiences in mind, said Pedro Pacheco,
an auto expert at consulting firm Gartner.
The real test of whether Chinese carmakers see Europe as a viable long-term
market is if they create products designed for Europeans.
That’s already starting to happen.
BYD has announced that the first model to roll off production lines at its
Hungarian factory next year will be the Dolphin Surf, an electric station wagon
— a nod to European consumer preferences, given that station wagons are not
popular in other markets.
“BYD is in Europe to stay,” said Stella Li, BYD’s executive vice president.
BRUSSELS — Two of Europe’s tech powerhouses tied the knot on Tuesday in a
landmark deal that bolsters a push by politicians to reduce reliance on the
United States for critical technology.
Dutch microchips champion ASML confirmed it was investing €1.3 billion in French
AI frontrunner Mistral, one of the few European companies that is able to go
head-to-head with U.S. leaders like OpenAI and Anthropic on artificial
intelligence technology.
It’s a business deal soaked in politics.
Officials from Brussels to Paris, Berlin and beyond have called for Europe to
reduce its heavy reliance on U.S. technology — from the cloud to social media
and, most recently, artificial intelligence — under the banner of “tech
sovereignty.”
“European tech sovereignty is being built thanks to you,” was how France’s
Junior Minister for Digital Affairs and AI Clara Chappaz cheered the deal on X.
Europe has struggled to stand out in the global race to build generative AI ever
since U.S.-based OpenAI burst onto the scene in 2022 with its popular ChatGPT
chatbot. Legacy tech giants like Google quickly caught up, while China proved
its mettle early this January when DeepSeek burst onto the scene.
European politicians can showcase the ASML-Mistral deal as proof that European
consumers and companies still can rely on homegrown tools. That need has never
been more urgent amid strained EU-U.S. ties under Donald Trump’s repeated
attacks against EU tech regulation.
But the deal also illustrates that while Europe can excel in niche areas, like
industrial AI applications, winning the global consumer AI chatbot race is out
of reach.
EUROPE KEEPS CONTROL
Tuesday’s deal brings together two European companies that are most closely
watched by those in power.
ASML, a 40-year-old Dutch crown jewel, has grown into one of the bloc’s most
politically sensitive assets in recent years. The U.S. government has repeatedly
tried to block some of the company’s sales of its advanced microchips printing
machines to China in an effort to slow down Chinese firms.
Mistral is only two years old but has been politically plugged in from the
start, with former French Digital Minister Cédric O among its co-founders.
When the company faced the need to raise new funding this summer, several
non-European players were floated as potential backers, including the Abu
Dhabi-based MGX state fund. There were even rumors Mistral could be acquired by
Apple.
Apple’s acquisition of Mistral would have been “quite negative” for Europe’s
tech sovereignty aspirations, said Leevi Saari, EU policy fellow at the
U.S.-based AI Now Institute, which studies the social implications of AI. “The
French state has no appetite [for] letting this happen,” he added.
Getting financing from an Abu Dhabi-based fund, conversely, would have
reinforced the perception that Europe can provide the millions in venture
capital funding needed to start a company, but not the billions needed to scale
it.
With this week’s €1.7 billion funding round led by ASML, Europe’s tech
sovereignty proponents can breath a sigh of relief.
“European champions creating more European champions is the way to go forward
and it needs further backing from the EU,” said Dutch liberal European
Parliament lawmaker Bart Groothuis in a statement.
The deal is also what officials, experts and the industry want to see more of:
one where startups are backed by an established European corporation rather than
a venture capitalist.
“A European corporation finally investing massively in a European scale-up from
its industry, even [if] it [is] not directly tied to its core business,” said
Agata Hidalgo, public affairs lead at French startup group France Digitale,
on Linkedin.
A French government adviser, granted anonymity to speak freely on private deals,
said they felt “hyped” by the news after months of uncertainty due to Mistral’s
refusal to publicly deny talks with Apple.
The deal is also expected to avoid any close scrutiny from Europe’s powerful
antitrust regulators, which in the past have intervened in mergers and deals to
keep the market competitive. Tuesday’s deal is not a full takeover and does not
need merger clearance.
Nicolas Petit, a competition law professor at the European University Institute,
said there was “nothing to see here unless the EU wants to shoot itself in the
foot with a bazooka.”
“It’s a non-controlling investment, and neither ASML [nor] Mistral AI compete in
any product or service market,” he added.
REALITY CHECK
While the incoming Dutch investment goes a long way toward keeping Mistral in
European hands, it also determines the path forward for the French artificial
intelligence challenger.
Mistral had already been struggling “to keep up with the race for market share”
with other large language models, Saari claimed in a blogpost published last
week, in which he cited numbers suggesting that Mistral’s market share is
“around 2 percent.”
“Mistral was known to face challenges both technically and in finding a business
model,” said Italian economist Cristina Caffarra, who has been leading the
charge for European tech sovereignty through the Eurostack movement. “It’s great
they found a European champion anchor investor” that will, in part, “protect
them from the [venture capital] model.”
Tuesday’s deal could mean that Mistral will get more support to work on
industrial applications instead of a consumer-facing chatbot that venture
capitalists like to propagate.
“With Mistral AI we have found a strategic partner who can not only deliver the
scientific AI models that will help us develop even better tools and solutions
for our customers, but also help us to improve our own operations over time,”
ASML CEO Christophe Fouquet wrote in a post on Linkedin.
ASML’s main customers are the world’s biggest microchips manufacturers,
including Taiwan’s TSMC and America’s Intel. The company also has a wide network
of industrial suppliers, which could be leveraged as well.
For Mistral, catering to European industrial applications could strengthen its
business. But it could also be seen as a tacit admission that in the global AI
race, Europe has to pick its battles.
Francesca Micheletti and Océane Herrerro contributed reporting.