Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Wer regiert die Welt – und was treibt sie an? In unserem regelmäßigen Machthaber-Spezial geht es um die mächtigsten und umstrittensten Politikerinnen und Politiker unserer Zeit. Wir zeigen, wie sie denken, entscheiden – und was das für uns bedeutet. Eine Politikerin oder Politiker, alle zwei Wochen, ein Blick hinter die Kulissen der Macht. Die nächste Folge hört ihr am Dienstag, 30.12.2025. Dann mit einem Porträt der dänischen Ministerpräsidentin Mette Frederiksen. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. ⁠Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren.⁠ Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski:Instagram: ⁠@gordon.repinski⁠ | X: ⁠@GordonRepinski⁠. Legal Notice (Belgium) POLITICO SRL Forme sociale: Société à Responsabilité Limitée Siège social: Rue De La Loi 62, 1040 Bruxelles Numéro d’entreprise: 0526.900.436 RPM Bruxelles info@politico.eu www.politico.eu

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Der Bundestag steckt mitten im “Haushalts-Ironman”. Während der Etat 2025 erst beschlossen wird, rollt bereits die Debatte um den Haushalt 2026 an. Rasmus Buchsteiner analysiert die Lage im Finanzministerium, spricht über Sparvorgaben, Schuldenbremse und die offene Flanke bei Subventionen. Klar ist: Die härtesten Einschnitte drohen nicht jetzt – sondern 2027. Gleichzeitig steht die Außenpolitik unter Spannung: Polens Präsident Karol Nawrocki ist in Berlin, ohne Presse und ohne Charmeoffensive. Hans von der Burchard erklärt, warum Berlin mit dem neuen Staatsoberhaupt hadert, welche Rolle Sicherheitsfragen nach dem Drohnenvorfall spielen und warum eine engere Zusammenarbeit trotz Nawrockis Reparationsforderungen unausweichlich bleibt. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview plädiert Paul Ziemiak für eine ehrliche Debatte über Verantwortung, Sicherheit – und die Frage, ob es in deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen überhaupt je einen „Schlussstrich“ geben kann. Außerdem: Vorwärts-Fest im Prenzlauer Berg und die Frage, ob NRW noch die Herzkammer der SPD ist? Und: Eine Einladung zum Dinner mit Jonathan Martin von POLITICO in Washington, D.C. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

BRUSSELS — Friedrich Merz’s arrival as German chancellor in May rekindled the fading Franco-German love affair — and the lovebirds have already found a shared interest: killing Europe’s ethical supply chain dream. Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron joined forces this month to hobble new European Union rules aimed at boosting supply chain transparency, agreeing to mutual concessions that critics say have left the bill toothless.  The bilateral deal highlights a new era for the historical Franco-German relationship focused on a sharp pro-business agenda, some argue, thanks to a budding bromance between the two leaders. Adopted last year, the EU’s supply chain oversight law requires companies to police their supply chains for possible environmental and human rights violations. But the bill has yet to be implemented, having been selected as part of a whole set of EU rules currently subject to a massive simplification effort to cut the regulatory burden for businesses.  EU countries on Monday agreed on a dramatically watered-down version of the revolutionary rules in record time. Initially presented by the European Commission in February 2022, the new version — if endorsed by the EU as a whole — will only apply to a fraction of the European companies initially targeted. The new text “is possibly one of the first policy [deliveries] that is going to be restarting the Franco-German alliance,” said Alberto Alemanno, an EU law professor at HEC Paris. Amid escalating trade tensions and geopolitical turmoil, the European Union is on a mission to reinvent itself as a prosperous, pro-business, anti-red tape powerhouse. Macron and Merz are leading the charge in that mission. “It is a first success for the Franco-German couple,” said a French economy ministry official who was granted anonymity in line with the French government’s communication practices after the agreement among EU countries was announced.  That’s because Macron, a staunchly pro-business liberal, and Merz, an equally pro-business conservative, agreed on mutual concessions to make the text more palatable for the two countries, the same official explained. The affinity the two leaders share has not gone unnoticed. “There’s a bit of a honeymoon between Macron and Merz,” Alemanno said. “They really get along well because they have a very similar style of leadership. They are both very charismatic. They also say things that are quite unpopular, but they just say it.”  Last month, Macron told an audience of business executives that the due diligence directive ought “not just to be postponed for one year, but to be put off the table.” Emmanuel Macron told an audience of business executives that the due diligence directive ought “not just to be postponed for one year, but to be put off the table.” | Pool Photo by Benoit Tessier via EPA His comments followed a similar statement from Merz, who had called for a “complete repeal” of the law during a visit to Brussels.  As their leaders were making bold public statements about scrapping the rules altogether, behind the scenes the French and German delegations in Brussels negotiated to effectively hollow out the file. After the agreement was reached, Paris hailed the outcome as a joint win for Europe’s most powerful leaders, while Berlin stayed mum. “The German government will not publicly comment on statements made by other governments or information based on anonymous sources,” a German government spokesperson said. Civil society groups, meanwhile, question whether Europe’s supply chain oversight rules still make a difference. “We’re getting to the point of, is it even worth having this law?” said Richard Gardiner, interim head of EU policy at the ShareAction NGO, arguing that if “badly written” rules are then enshrined in law, companies will have no incentive to do better. A LONG TIME COMING The French and German positions come on the back of a tumultuous start to Ursula von der Leyen’s second term as European Commission president, during which she pledged to answer EU leaders’ calls to cut red tape for business. One of the first concrete measures the new Commission took was an “omnibus” bill, an “unprecedented simplification effort” that watered down several green laws from the previous mandate, including the corporate sustainability reporting directive and the supply chain law. The Commission wanted these changes to be fast-tracked. “I have never seen them move this fast on a piece of legislation,” said ShareActions’s Gardiner, describing the policymaking process in Brussels as having gone from a “technocratic [process] to essentially a personality-based, knee-jerk reaction.” Among the key changes to the rules is the number of companies that will be impacted. While the Commission’s proposal was to exclude 80 percent of European companies from having to comply with both the sustainability reporting and the supply chain rules, EU countries ultimately backed a French proposal to limit the scope of the latter to companies with more than 5,000 employees and €1.5 billion in net turnover. In other words, fewer than 1,000 European companies would be subject to them. Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron joined forces this month to hobble new European Union rules aimed at boosting supply chain transparency, agreeing to mutual concessions that critics say have left the bill toothless. | Olivier Hoslet/EPA And that’s what the French wanted. “I think that this alignment between France and Germany allowed [us] to progress,” said the French official quoted above. In particular, the French agreed to concessions on civil liability — a main concern of German companies, which did not want to be liable for breaches of the law at the EU level. In exchange, Berlin agreed to back the higher threshold that determines which companies are subject to the new rules to ensure they align with those that already exist in French law.  On the French side, there was a “prioritization of the topic of the threshold,” said a Parliament official familiar with the details. THE BACKSTORY Berlin especially has long been at the forefront of the political war against the supply chain oversight law, with liberal and conservative politicians turning their opposition into a core component of electoral politics at a time of economic downturn, warnings of de-industrialization and global trade wars.  Even well before the Commission presented its rules, Germany was pressing Brussels to follow its lead and exempt companies with fewer than 1,000 employees. Back in 2022 the bill was already falling short of what progressive lawmakers and green groups were requesting.  After all three EU institutions managed to clinch a deal in December 2023 — overcoming an attempt by center-right European People’s Party (EPP) lawmakers to kill the file, and having already agreed to carve out the financial sector to win France over — the horse-trading intensified. Germany’s liberals, back then the smallest party in the three-party coalition of former Chancellor Olaf Scholz, launched a last-ditch push to kill the heavily lobbied and controversial file altogether, despite major disagreements within the national coalition government. France and Italy both jumped on the bandwagon.  Despite all this, the measure made it through.   Now, the survival of EU supply chain oversight rules is part of the new coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats (SPD) in Berlin. In principle, the agreement binds the German chancellor to protect the bill, albeit with a promise to trim the bureaucratic burden in the text. But tensions are simmering beneath the surface. Now, the survival of EU supply chain oversight rules is part of the new coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats (SPD) in Berlin. | Filip Singer/EPA “Many people would have benefited from the law, but their voices were not loud enough — while the bureaucracy debate overshadowed the debate,” said one German government official, granted anonymity to speak freely about internal political dynamics.  THE FRENCH U-TURN Macron’s position was far less consistent than Merz’s. He performed a spectacular U-turn to become the No. 1 opponent of a text he and his governments had advocated, at least publicly. Having been one of the first countries to enact a national law banning human rights abuses and environmental breaches from supply chains, France initially cast itself as a top supporter of the text and made it a priority when it held the rotating Council presidency back in 2022. Then, last year, Paris piggybacked on Berlin’s opposition, requesting that the law apply to fewer companies. Fast forward to 2025, and the French have become fierce critics of the text. Earlier this year, POLITICO revealed that Paris had asked the European Commission to indefinitely delay the text. That was before Macron told a roomful of business CEOs gathered in Versailles from all over the world that the text should be thrown out altogether.  While the president’s shift is music to the ears of France’s industry lobbies, it has also triggered an internal revolt from his allies who warned against sacrificing green and anti-forced labor rules under pressure from business.  And unlike about a year ago, Berlin and Paris are facing barely any pushback.  Last year, the Greens and the Social Democrats in the former German coalition government voiced their opposition to Berlin’s attempts to kill the bill, before giving in to pressure from the liberals. Now, the Social Democrats co-governing with Merz’ conservative party are mostly quiet. On Wednesday, the SPD-led labor ministry finally broke its silence, saying it was in “favor of reducing the administrative burden on companies and at the same time effectively protecting human rights.” Calls to alleviate the burden for businesses, it seems, have become the new political consensus. “The whole narrative has gotten out of hand. And no one is still up against it,” Gardiner said. Marianne Gros and Antonia Zimmermann reported from Brussels, Giorgio Leali reported from Paris and Laura Hülsemann reported from Berlin.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music CSU-Innenminister Alexander Dobrindt steht bei seiner ersten Innenministerkonferenz unter Beobachtung. Im Zentrum: Abschiebungen und Clan-Kriminalität. Rasmus Buchsteiner ordnet die Konfliktlinien zwischen Bund und Ländern ein. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview erklärt NRW-Innenminister Herbert Reul, warum Abschiebungen teils juristisch blockiert bleiben, Grenzkontrollen politisch wirken – und warum Symbolpolitik manchmal mehr ist als Symbolik. Und in Polen? Premier Donald Tusk stellt die Vertrauensfrage – und kämpft gegen Blockade, Präsident und ein fragiles Sechs-Parteien-Bündnis. Hans von der Burchard analysiert, was auf dem Spiel steht: EU-Milliarden, Rechtsstaatsreformen und Polens Rolle im Weimarer Dreieck. Und: Die Schuldenuhr wird 30 und läuft und läuft und läuft nahezu immer vorwärts. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig. Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo. Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland, Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:   Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

WARSAW — Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is expected to comfortably survive a confidence vote on Wednesday but the result will do little to assuage the challenges posed by the victory of conservative nationalist Karol Nawrocki in the June 1 presidential election. Tusk’s pro-EU centrist ruling coalition holds 242 seats in the 460-seat Sejm, or lower house, which means the vote itself will almost certainly go in his favor, but is unlikely to win him the political respite he craves in the NATO country of 37 million people. The prime minister now faces having to deal not only with Trump-aligned Nawrocki’s scuppering his reform agenda with presidential vetos at every turn, but also with fault lines in his own coalition, particularly among partners who think Tusk himself is losing them votes. Dorota Łoboda, a parliamentarian for Tusk’s Civic Coalition, the largest party in the government and spokesperson for its parliamentary caucus, said the aim of the vote was to dispel suggestions that Tusk’s administration was wobbling after Nawrocki’s wafer-thin win. “We want to end all speculation regarding the alleged loss of support for Donald Tusk’s government. We simply want to end external and internal discussions, and any attempts to undermine the mandate Donald Tusk has to lead the government, and just move forward,” she said. That, however, is easier said than done. Nawrocki’s victory directly threatens Tusk’s ability to enact his agenda, as the president can veto key reforms in areas including abortion, same-sex partnerships, the judicial system and social security payments for the self-employed. Nawrocki’s unexpected victory sent shockwaves through Tusk’s four-party coalition, which now promises to intensify efforts to deliver on the commitments made ahead of the 2023 general election. A lack of progress on the initiatives that helped bring the coalition to power two years ago is seen as a key factor behind the shift of voters away from it on June 1. Nawrocki is expected to chisel away at the government’s effectiveness and popularity ahead of the next general election in 2027. Tusk’s administration would have needed a three-fifths majority to override presidential vetoes, but falls well short. Indeed, polls already suggest the coalition would lose its majority to PiS and the far-right Konfederacja party, whose voters played a key role in securing Nawrocki’s victory. Ahead of the confidence vote, the coalition was embroiled in internal disputes, with MPs accusing Tusk and his party of serious errors during the final phase of the campaign of their candidate: Warsaw’s liberal Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski. They even criticised Tusk for putting himself forward as the prominent face of the campaign. “In the campaign, Prime Minister Donald Tusk took over communication at a crucial moment! Someone finally has to say this: Prime minister, over their eight years in power, [PiS] EFFECTIVELY gave you a bad image [and] you haven’t changed that,” Joanna Mucha, an MP for the Third Way, a centrist-conservative group allied with Tusk’s coalition, wrote on social media last week. They even criticised Tusk for putting himself forward as the prominent face of the campaign. | Marcin Gadomski/EFE via EPA Facing these ructions with partners, Tusk is expected to deliver a policy statement resulting from intense talks within the coalition on how to avoid losing power in the 2027 election. Each party in the coalition has put forward its own priorities during these discussions. “We must deliver on things like civil partnerships, affordable housing and health care,” Anita Kucharska-Dziedzic, an MP for the Left, told POLITICO. The Third Way has publicly outlined five points it wants the coalition to address: Making public media truly independent from the government, ending the informal spoils system over the control of state-owned companies, allocating funds to people assisting the disabled, allocating funds for housing, and banning smartphone use in primary schools. According to Łoboda, Tusk’s speech will also seek common ground with Nawrocki. Warsaw wants to reassure its allies that Tusk and Nawrocki are at least aligned in opposition to Russia and can agree on big military budgets. “Defense and security is one area where it’s possible to reach an agreement with the new president. Then issues concerning the economy, including deregulation,” Łoboda said. Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka, Tusk’s deputy EU minister, said the administration now had until 2027 to regain public trust. “For the moment we see all the parties in the coalition will vote in favor … for the government. We are living in times which are unstable globally, so we need to work together and I hope the new president will cooperate.”  Gabriel Gavin contributed reporting.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Schlechte Nachrichten aus dem Gesundheitswesen: Der GKV-Spitzenverband warnt vor weiter steigenden Beiträgen – bei vielen Kassen, in kurzer Zeit. Für Gesundheitsministerin Nina Warken ein Kaltstart unter Druck. Rasmus Buchsteiner hat sich die Zahlen und Hintergründe erläutern lassen – und analysiert, warum Warken auf kaum auf ein Entgegenkommen von Finanzminister Lars Klingbeil hoffen kann. Ihr Problem: Wenig Zeit, wenig Spielraum – und ein „Too little, too late“. Außerdem im Podcast: Der Wahlsieg des rechtskonservativen Karol Nawrocki in Polen. Johanna Sahlberg erklärt, was der neue Präsident blockieren könnte – und wieso sein Erfolg auch bei Friedrich Merz zu politischen Kopfschmerzen führen wird. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig. Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo. Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland, Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:   Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

When top figures in President Donald Trump’s orbit descended on a small town in southeastern Poland this week to rally support for the right-wing candidate in that country’s presidential election on Sunday, they put MAGA’s ambitions abroad on full display. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem called Karol Nawrocki “just as strong a leader” as Trump, declaring “he needs to to be the next president of Poland.” Matt Schlapp, chair of the pro-Trump Conservative Political Action Conference, which hosted the gathering, said electing candidates like Nawrocki is “so important to the freedom of people everywhere,” while John Eastman, who aided Trump’s effort to overturn the 2020 election, said Poland under Nawrocki would play “a critical role in defeating [the] threat to Western civilization.” But if the conservative confab ahead of Poland’s vote was an indication of how hard Trump’s allies have been working to expand the MAGA brand across the globe, the results of recent elections, including in Romania, Poland and Canada, suggest Trump’s influence in some cases may not be helping. “Just like domestically, you see one step forward, two steps back sometimes,” said Matthew Bartlett, a GOP strategist and State Department appointee in Trump’s first administration. “The thought of Trump and MAGA is sometimes more powerful than the reality.” He said, “His thumbprint can help push in certain regions and countries, but there can also be some pushback.” Trump’s election to a second term in November emboldened far-right movements abroad. It gave Trump’s allies hopes of putting like-minded leaders into positions of power, boosting parties that share his priorities and spreading his populist, hard-right politics beyond the U.S. Meanwhile, conservative politicians in other countries yoked themselves directly or stylistically to his brand. In the months since, far-right parties have performed strongly in European elections, including in Poland, Romania and Portugal, overperforming expectations and elevating their vote shares with electorates shifting to the right on issues like immigration. The hard-right in Europe, by most accounts, is surging. But they’re not vaulting into government like some Trump allies had predicted. “I wouldn’t say the right has ascended, I’d say it’s a mixed package,” said Kurt Volker, who served as Trump’s envoy for Ukraine during his first administration and ambassador to NATO under George W. Bush. “There is a movement effect where the far-right movements seem to draw energy from each other and do well. But there’s also this anti-Trump effect, where Trump has challenged a country or a leader and that has only backfired and helped them.” In Romania, hard-right presidential candidate George Simion, who spoke at this year’s CPAC in Washington and appeared on Trump ally Steve Bannon’s podcast just days before the country’s election this month, lost to a centrist challenger after dominating the first round of voting. In Albania, conservatives hired former Trump co-campaign manager Chris LaCivita to boost their fortunes, only to see their candidate get trounced anyway. And the movement is bracing for a close election on Sunday in Poland, where Nawrocki — who visited the White House earlier this month — is locked in a tight race with centrist candidate Rafal Trzaskowski after finishing behind him in the first round. “We have a lot of political leaders here in the U.S. who are camping out in Poland to try to tilt it,” said Randy Evans, who was ambassador to Luxembourg during Trump’s first term. “Whether or not that’s enough or not … I don’t know. I think it’s going to be very close.” Trump’s allies have been working since his first term to expand MAGA’s influence abroad. Bannon, who had managed Trump’s 2016 campaign, began traveling across Europe pitching himself as the mastermind behind a new global far-right alliance called “The Movement.” He even announced he would set up an academy to train future right-wing political leaders at a former monastery outside Rome. Those efforts largely fizzled at the time: Bannon’s planned academy got caught up in yearslong legal battles, and support for far-right parties across the continent tanked in the early months of the coronavirus pandemic. But rising inflation and growing concerns over immigration helped far-right parties gain back support as the pandemic faded. By the time Trump won the election last November, many of those parties were resurging — and his victory emboldened them further, with far-right allies quickly seeking to tie themselves to the incoming U.S. president and his orbit. When Vice President JD Vance chastised European leaders for “running in fear of [their] own voters” at the Munich Security Conference in February, he billed the Trump administration as an alternative model — the vanguard of a hard-right movement not only in the United States, but across the West. “Make Europe Great Again! MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,” Elon Musk, Donald Trump’s billionaire ally, posted on X earlier this year. In the months since the vice president’s appearance in Germany, hardline conservatives have had some success. In Portugal, the far-right Chega party surged. And Reform UK, the party led by pro-Brexit leader Nigel Farage, made big gains in the country’s local elections earlier this month. CPAC, which has been holding international conferences since 2017 — including in Japan, Australia, Brazil and Argentina — gathered supporters in Hungary following the Poland meeting this week. Schlapp did not respond to a request for comment. But he told NPR, “The one thing that’s undeniable is that everybody wants to know where Donald Trump is on the issues that matter to their country” and said, “They’re really rooting for Donald Trump to succeed.” But elsewhere abroad, MAGA-style politics not only has failed to spread — it has been a liability. In both Canada and Australia, Trump’s combative and unpredictable trade policy led to an anti-Trump wave that helped tank right-wing candidates who sought to emulate his rhetoric. Canada’s Pierre Poilievre ran on a “Canada First” slogan and Australia’s Peter Dutton proposed DOGE-style cuts to government. But Trump’s tariffs were deeply unpopular with voters in both countries, and even though Poilievre and Dutton distanced themselves from Trump in the final days of the campaign, voters punished them anyway. Vance’s speech in February “gave the impression that this is becoming a transatlantic right-wing alliance,” said Liana Fix, a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since then, the reality is … not as drastic as those worst-case scenarios. And that’s not because they’re not trying. You see how the White House is trying.” Trump’s allies went all-in on the May 18 election in Romania, which was the re-run of a November vote annulled over concerns that a Russian influence campaign on TikTok had affected the outcome. Trump allies had criticized the decision to cancel the original results and bar the winning candidate, ultranationalist Călin Georgescu, from running in the new election. MAGA loyalists spent months touting Simion, the hard-right candidate who promised to “Make Romania Great Again.” Less than two weeks before Election Day, Simion hosted CPAC’s Schlapp at a business roundtable in Bucharest, and two days before Romanian voters cast their ballots, Bannon hosted Simion on his “War Room” podcast. “George, you’ve got the entire MAGA movement here in the United States pulling for you,” Bannon said, predicting victory for the Trump-aligned candidate. But when the votes were counted, it wasn’t even close. Simion lost the electionby 7 points to Bucharest Mayor Nicușor Dan, a centrist candidate who promised closer ties with the European Union and NATO. In Albania’s May 11 parliamentary elections, where the conservative candidate, Sali Berisha, hired LaCivita to help his party make a political comeback, the party in interviews heralded Trump and Berisha’s “remarkably similar profiles” of being “persecuted by establishments” and “targeted by their countries’ justice systems.” Berisha’s supporters touted LaCivita’s involvement as proof Berisha was anointed by the MAGA movement. But on Election Day, Berisha’s party lost badly, handing incumbent Edi Rama and his Socialist Party another term in office. Rama wasted no time in gloating: Hiring Trump’s campaign strategist and thinking you can become Trump “is like hiring a Hollywood hairdresser and thinking you’ll become Brad Pitt,” he told POLITICO after the vote. LaCivita told POLITICO on Friday that the connection between MAGA in the U.S. and conservative movements abroad stems from a common concern about an “alignment of issues — governments using their judicial systems to prosecute political opponents, the rising cost of living, reduced opportunities and individual liberties.” “This alignment was defeated with President Trump’s win in 2024, and while that success may not always be repeated worldwide — once again America is being looked at to provide leadership in securing freedom,” he said in a text message. “Not through the barrel of a gun — but politics.” Trump spokesperson Anna Kelly said in a statement that Trump’s “message of restoring common sense, halting illegal immigration, and delivering peace resonates with not just Americans, but people around the world, which is why conservatives have been winning elections in all corners of the globe. He is simultaneously restoring America’s strength on the world stage, as evidenced by the 15 foreign leaders who have visited the White House this term.” Meanwhile, Trump’s allies have largely dismissed defeats abroad, with explanations ranging from blaming the “deep state” to arguing that losing politicians were not sufficiently Trumpian to win. “MAGA’s populist, nationalist, sovereignist right continues to rise despite the full force of the deep state being thrown against it,” Bannon told POLITICO in response to the spate of recent elections. “These people aren’t Donald Trump. They’re facsimiles,” Raheem Kassam, a former Farage adviser and ex-Breitbart London editor, said of Simion and Nawrocki, noting that their parties are both part of a faction on the European level that has its roots more in traditional conservatism than the MAGA-style populism of far-right parties in Germany, Austria, France and others. “They’re cheap copies that have been run through a copy machine 40 times,” he added. “It doesn’t work. It’s faded. It’s counterfeit Trumpism.” Poland, where leaders of the right-wing Law and Justice Party have long cultivated ties to Trump and MAGA loyalists, will offer the next test of whether an affiliation with Trump can help put like-minded candidates over the finish line. Nawrocki, the Law and Justice Party-backed candidate for president, has gone all-in on his efforts to tie himself to Trump — including flying to Washington in early May for a photo op at the White House. “President Trump said, ‘you will win,’” Nawrocki told the Polish broadcaster TV Republika. “I read it as a kind of wish for my success in the upcoming elections, and also awareness of it, and after this whole day I can say that the American administration is aware of what is happening in Poland.” But public opinion polling shows Poles, who have long been among the U.S.’ biggest fans in Europe, are souring on both the country and its current leader amid tariffs and Trump’s close ties to Russia — a tricky issue in a country where many people still view Russia as a threat. Asked by a Polish public polling agency in April whether the U.S. has a positive impact on the world, just 20 percent said yes — the lowest figure since the poll was first conducted in 1987, and down from 55 percent a year ago. And 60 percent of Poles said they were “concerned” about Trump’s presidency, compared with just 15 percent who were “hopeful.” “Trump is the most unpopular U.S. president in Europe,” said Milan Nic, an expert on Central and Eastern Europe at the German Council on Foreign Relations. “This means that to some supporters of Nawrocki, the photo from White House with Trump is no longer as powerful as it used to be.” Volker, the former Ukraine envoy, said right-wing parties need to walk a tightrope of embracing some of the MAGA zeal — but without linking themselves too closely to the polarizing U.S. president. “You have to think of Trump as like fire: You can’t be too close, but you can’t be too far away,” said Volker. “If you get too close to Trump you get burned, and if you’re too far away you’re not relevant.”

WARSAW — Numerous skeletons have tumbled out of Karol Nawrocki’s closet during Poland’s presidential election campaign, but the increasingly lurid accusations about his past aren’t harming his chances — and may even help the populist right-winger win Sunday’s nail-biter contest. The political temperature is boiling in the final stretch of the race. Donald Tusk, Poland’s pro-EU center-right prime minister, has accused the nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) opposition party of backing Nawrocki’s presidential bid despite knowing of his links to gangsters and prostitution. The candidate himself is also suggesting he took part in pitched battles of football hooligans, playing up his skills as a boxer.   It’s been a sensational escalation from the somewhat surreal accusations against Nawrocki in the earlier weeks of the campaign. In March it emerged that he had appeared on a TV show in disguise, blurred out and using a pseudonym, to promote a book he had written on organized crime and to praise himself. Matters took a more serious turn this month when the circumstances of Nawrocki’s acquisition of an apartment from an elderly man in the northern city of Gdańsk ignited a political controversy. But the accusations that he is linked to the underworld — which Nawrocki has adamantly denied as a media fabrication — have ratcheted up the debate over his fitness for the presidency. POLARIZED POLES The big question is whether any of this is moving the needle in Poland’s highly polarized society. Just like his political ally U.S. President Donald Trump, whom he met earlier in the campaign, Nawrocki is proving adept at deflecting the accusations against him as fantasies and lies from the liberal camp. Nawrocki’s campaign in fact shows no signs of buckling under the accusations, and POLITICO’s Poll of Polls puts the contest on a knife edge, with Nawrocki polling only one percentage point behind his rival, liberal Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski.   Poland is an important player in the EU and NATO, and the high-stakes election is being closely watched as a signal about the country’s trajectory. A win for Trzaskowski would allow Tusk to steer Warsaw back to the heart of the EU mainstream, whereas Nawrocki as president would be able to scupper much of Tusk’s reformist agenda.   Nawrocki is drawing parallels between himself and Trump as he hits back against his critics. “Media slander did not destroy President Trump. It will not destroy Karol Nawrocki, either,” he said on his campaign’s X account Wednesday. In addition to meeting Trump, the PiS-backed presidential candidate was also a speaker at MAGA’s CPAC conference in Poland, held Tuesday in the southeastern town of Jasionka. And just like Trump, Nawrocki has a solid base that is impervious to much of the noise about his past. “In a deeply polarized society, anything is possible and that is the most fitting answer as to why this is happening,” said Anna Siewierska-Chmaj, a political scientist from the University of Rzeszów. “These scandals may have actually helped Nawrocki since PiS abandoned the narrative of [his] being a ‘citizens’ candidate’ and closed ranks behind him as a de facto party candidate. This has put the unconvinced PiS voters firmly behind Nawrocki.” PULLING NO PUNCHES Tusk has pulled no punches in combatting Nawrocki, accusing PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński of backing an unsuitable candidate. “You knew about everything, Jarosław. About the connections with the gangsters, about ‘arranging for girls’ … about the apartment fraud and other matters still hidden. The entire responsibility for this catastrophe falls on you!” he wrote on X. The most serious accusations stem from testimony provided to Polish online portal Onet that Nawrocki had secured prostitutes at a luxury hotel on the Baltic Sea, where he was working for security. A member of parliament from Tusk’s party then appeared on television to vouch for the report. “I have knowledge that all the information presented … in the Onet article is simply true,” said Agnieszka Pomaska, who represents Gdańsk, the city on the Baltic Sea where the alleged offences took place. Karol Nawrocki has a solid base that is impervious to much of the noise about his past. | Albert Zawada/EFE via EPA Nawrocki emphatically denies the accusations, says he will sue Onet over the report, and is hitting back hard against Tusk and Trzaskowski. “Today in Poland the problem is political prostitution, which wants to give Poland away for foreign money … Media assistants of Tusk and Trzaskowski will not take away our victory!” he wrote on X. Conversely, when it comes to suggestions he was involved in mass brawls involving as many as 140 football hooligans, far from pushing back Nawrocki has embraced the notion, playing up his pedigree as a boxer and saying he took part in “sporting, noble fights.” Another allegation emerged in a report by Gazeta Wyborcza, a major liberal newspaper, over Nawrocki’s security clearance — something he needed for his job as the head of the Institute of National Remembrance, a state agency tracking Nazi and Communist crimes against Poles. The report claimed that Nawrocki’s assessment by the ABW counterintelligence agency was initially negative until the agency’s then-chief — now an aide to outgoing President Andrzej Duda — overrode it. Nawrocki’s campaign team had no response to the security clearance issue when contacted by POLITICO. But the election campaign attacks haven’t all been levelled at Nawrocki. PiS has also tried to undermine Trzaskowski, more recently by suggesting he is refusing to undergo drug testing because he has something to hide. When asked about that claim on Monday, Trzaskowski replied: “I am surprised that you are asking this kind of question, because it is Karol Nawrocki who clearly has a problem. It is like when someone has a car accident — they should examine themselves, not ask others to do it.”  PiS also said Wednesday that Trzaskowski could be implicated in a complex “garbage scandal” that has festered for years at Warsaw town hall. Poland’s National Prosecutor’s Office said it had charged 17 people — some close to municipal government in the capital — with corruption involving fake invoices related to the rental of waste management equipment. Trzaskowski, who has been mayor of Warsaw since 2018, has long denied any role and sued a PiS-linked newspaper over such allegations two years ago. TIED TO TUSK PiS’s main strategy has been to associate Trzaskowski with Tusk’s government, whose popularity is waning. An April poll by Opinia24 for private broadcaster Radio Zet showed 51 percent of Poles giving the government a negative assessment less than two years after it took power. Only 39 percent of respondents said they were happy with the Tusk administration. Monthly surveys gauging the mood in Poland showed supporters of the government at 34 percent of respondents in April, compared to 40 percent opposed. “In the final stretch of the election campaign … Donald Tusk is making it clear that he wants to install his puppet in the presidential palace,” Andrzej Śliwka, a member of parliament for PiS and an aide to Nawrocki’s campaign, told a press conference Wednesday. “Rafał Trzaskowski is Donald Tusk’s puppet, and Tusk wants a politician … who will be completely subservient to him. That is why Tusk will stop at nothing.” Siewierska-Chmaj fears the more feverish the campaign becomes, the greater the risk of an explosive backlash. “I would say we’re already at a point where this threatens to erupt — even, I would go so far as to say, into acts of violence. The level of polarization and mutual animosity is starting to translate into real aggression, and it’s becoming increasingly clear,” she said.

BRUSSELS — A bid to restart a long-stalled update of the EU’s scheme to compensate air passengers for delayed or canceled flights is in trouble thanks to blowback from a group of countries led by Germany. The Polish Council presidency hoped to make progress on a file that has been moribund since 2013, but a text negotiated over the last few months did not receive enough support during Wednesday’s meeting of EU ambassadors, several EU diplomats told POLITICO. Passengers currently receive compensation ranging from €250 to €600 — depending on the distance traveled — if they reach their destinations three or more hours later than originally scheduled. Airlines have long grumbled about the three-hour threshold, saying it leaves them too little time to resolve issues without facing steep compensation costs. In 2013, the European Commission proposed raising the minimum delay threshold for compensation to five hours for all EU flights or extra-EU trips of up to 3,500 kilometers, nine hours for flights between 3,500 km and 6,000 km, and 12 hours for flights over 6,000 km. The European Parliament approved its position on the file in 2014, but countries haven’t moved on the issue in over a decade. According to the Polish proposal, the compensation would vary from €300 to €500, depending on the length of the flight. | Leszek Szymanski/EFE via EPA The text proposed by the Polish presidency aims to increase the minimum delay required for passengers to receive compensation to four hours for flights of up to 3,500 km or within the EU, and to six hours for flights over 3,500 km. According to the Polish proposal, the compensation would vary from €300 to €500, depending on the length of the flight. But Berlin cobbled together a coalition of countries with enough weight to form a blocking minority. They want to maintain the current threshold of delay that gives passengers the right to compensation, but they also want to cap the amount that passengers can receive at €300. Warsaw is now trying to reach an agreement with some skeptical countries, such as Spain, on modifications that could garner enough support for a revamped text at the next ambassadors’ meeting on June 4 and then at the Transport Council on June 5. However, since the compensation threshold is at the heart of the dispute, some diplomats feel it won’t be easy to reach a compromise. “The Polish proposal is balanced. Changing the threshold for compensation to three hours would cause the other compromises reached on the text to fall apart,” said an EU diplomat. Airlines are also concerned that the new stalemate will once again kill the long-awaited reform. “Member states should now seize the opportunity to deliver meaningful reform and improve the flying experience for millions of Europeans,” said Ourania Georgoutsakou, managing director of the airline lobby A4E. “A4E’s analysis of Eurocontrol data shows that delay thresholds of five and nine hours would rescue 70 percent of rescuable flights, giving travellers clarity and genuine onward-travel options,” she added. A coalition of consumer rights groups instead believes that the three-hour threshold “has become a cornerstone of passenger protection” and lengthening it would be “an unacceptable step back from the current level of protection.”

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Those text messages Ursula von der Leyen didn’t want to share? The EU’s top court says that’s not OK. In a win for transparency advocates, Europe’s judges have ruled that the European Commission was wrong to hold back von der Leyen’s text exchanges with Pfizer’s CEO during vaccine contract negotiations. POLITICO health reporter Mari Eccles joins host Sarah Wheaton to unpack what the ruling means for Brussels, for von der Leyen’s leadership style, and for how the EU handles power behind the scenes. Then we turn to Poland, where voters are preparing for a high-stakes presidential election. Calling in from Warsaw is Andrzej Bobiński, managing director at Polityka Insight. Joining Sarah in the studio is Małgorzata Bonikowska, president of the Centre for International Relations, a Polish think tank. Together they break down what’s at stake for Donald Tusk’s government — and why this vote is seen as a bellwether for Europe’s political direction and a potential reshaping of regional alliances.