U.S. President Donald Trump’s increasingly overt attempts to bring down the Cuban government are forcing Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum into a delicate diplomatic dance. Mexico is the U.S.’s largest trading partner. It is also the primary supplier of oil to Cuba since the U.S. seized control of Venezuela’s crude. Now, Sheinbaum must manage her relationship with a mercurial Trump, who has at times both praised her leadership and threatened to send the U.S. military into her country to combat drug trafficking — all while appeasing her left-wing party Morena, factions of which have historically aligned themselves with Cuba’s communist regime. That balance became even more difficult for Sheinbaum this week following reports that Mexico’s state-run oil company, Pemex, paused a shipment of oil headed for Cuba, which is grappling with shortages following the U.S. military action earlier this month in Venezuela. Asked about the suspension, the Mexican president said only that oil shipments are a “sovereign” decision and that future action will be taken on a “humanitarian” basis. On Thursday, Trump ramped up the pressure, declared a national emergency over what he couched as threats posed by the Cuban government and authorized the use of new tariffs against any country that sells or provides oil to the island. The order gives the administration broad discretion to impose duties on imports from countries deemed to be supplying Cuba, dramatically raising the stakes for Mexico as it weighs how far it can go without triggering economic retaliation from Washington — or worse. “It’s the proverbial shit hitting the fan in terms of the spillover effects that would have,” said Arturo Sarukhán, former Mexican ambassador to the U.S., referring to the possibility of a Pemex tanker being intercepted. Sheinbaum still refuses to hit back too hard against Trump, preferring to speak publicly in diplomatic platitudes even as she faces new pressure. Her posture stands in marked contrast to Canada’s Mark Carney, whose speech at Davos, urging world leaders to stand up to Trump, went viral and drew a swift rebuke from the White House and threats of new tariffs. But the latest episode is characteristic of Sheinbaum’s approach to Trump over the last year — one that has, so far, helped her avoid the kinds of headline-grabbing public ruptures that have plagued Carney, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and French President Emmanuel Macron. Still, former Mexican officials say Trump’s threats — though not specific to Mexico — have triggered quiet debate inside the Mexican government over how much risk Sheinbaum can afford to absorb and how hard she should push back. “My sense is that right now, at least because of what’s at stake in the counter-narcotics and law enforcement agenda bilaterally, I think that neither government right now wants to turn this into a casus belli,” Sarukhán added. “But I do think that in the last weeks, the U.S. pressure on Mexico has risen to such a degree where you do have a debate inside the Mexican government as to what the hell do we do with this issue?” A White House official, granted anonymity to speak candidly about the administration’s approach, said that Trump is “addressing the depredations of the communist Cuban regime by taking decisive action to hold the Cuban regime accountable for its support of hostile actors, terrorism, and regional instability that endanger American security and foreign policy.” “As the President stated, Cuba is now failing on its own volition,” the official added. “Cuba’s rulers have had a major setback with the Maduro regime that they are responsible for propping up.” Sheinbaum, meanwhile, responded to Trump’s latest executive order during her Friday press conference by warning that it could “trigger a large-scale humanitarian crisis, directly affecting hospitals, food supplies, and other basic services for the Cuban people.” “Mexico will pursue different alternatives, while clearly defending the country’s interests, to provide humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people, who are going through a difficult moment, in line with our tradition of solidarity and respect for international norms,” Sheinbaum said. The Mexican embassy in Washington declined further comment. Cuba’s Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, in a post on X, accused the U.S. of “resorting to blackmail and coercion in an attempt to make other countries to join its universally condemned blockade policy against Cuba.” The pressure on Sheinbaum to respond has collided with real political constraints at home. Morena has long maintained ideological and historical ties to Cuba, and Sheinbaum faces criticism from within her coalition over any move that could be seen as abandoning Havana. At the same time, she has come under growing domestic scrutiny over why Mexico should continue supplying oil abroad as fuel prices and energy concerns persist at home, making the “humanitarian” framing both a diplomatic shield and a political necessity. Amid the controversy over the oil shipment, Trump and Sheinbaum spoke by phone Thursday morning, with Trump describing the conversation afterward as “very productive” and praising Sheinbaum as a “wonderful and highly intelligent Leader.” Sheinbaum’s remarks after the call point to how she is navigating the issue through ambiguity rather than direct confrontation, noting that the two did not discuss Cuba. She described it as a “productive and cordial conversation” and that the two leaders would “continue to make progress on trade issues and on the bilateral relationship.” With the upcoming review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement on trade looming, even the appearance of defying Trump’s push to cut off Cuba’s oil lifelines carries the potential for economic and diplomatic blowback. It also could undo the quiet partnership the U.S. and Mexico have struck on border security and drug trafficking issues. Gerónimo Gutiérrez, who served as Mexican ambassador to the U.S. during the first Trump administration, described Sheinbaum’s approach as “squish and muddle through.” “She obviously is trying to tread carefully with Trump. She doesn’t want to irritate him with this matter,” Gutiérrez said, adding that “she knows that it’s a problem.” Meanwhile, Cuba’s vulnerability has only deepened since the collapse of Venezuela’s oil support following this month’s U.S. operation that ousted President Nicolás Maduro. For years, Venezuelan crude served as a lifeline for the island, a gap Mexico has increasingly helped fill, putting the country squarely in Washington’s crosshairs as Trump squeezes Havana. With fuel shortages in Cuba triggering rolling blackouts and deepening economic distress, former U.S. officials who served in Cuba and regional analysts warn that Trump’s push to choke off remaining oil supplies could hasten a broader collapse — even as there is little clarity about how Washington would manage the political, humanitarian or regional fallout if the island tips over the edge. Trump has openly suggested that outcome is inevitable, telling reporters in Iowa on Tuesday that “Cuba will be failing pretty soon,” even as he pushed back on Thursday that the idea he was trying to “choke off” the country. “The word ‘choke off’ is awfully tough,” Trump said. “It looks like it’s not something that’s going to be able to survive. I think Cuba will not be able to survive.” The administration, however, has offered few details about what would come next, and Latin American analysts warn that the U.S. and Mexico are likely to face an influx of migrants — including to Florida and the Yucatán Peninsula — seeking refuge should Cuba collapse. There is no evidence that the Trump administration has formally asked Mexico to halt oil shipments to Cuba. Trump’s executive order leaves it to the president’s Cabinet to determine whether a country is supplying oil to Cuba and the rate at which it should be tariffed — an unusual deferral of power for a president for whom tariffs are a favorite negotiating tool. But former U.S. officials say that absence of an explicit demand to Mexico does not mean the pressure is theoretical. Lawrence Gumbiner, who served as chargé d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Havana during the first Trump administration, believes Washington would be far more likely to lean on economic pressure than the kind of military force it has used to seize Venezuelan oil tankers. At the same time, the administration’s push on Venezuela began with a similar executive order last spring. “There’s no doubt that the U.S. is telling Mexico to just stop it,” Gumbiner said. “I think there’s a much slimmer chance that we would engage our military to actually stop Mexican oil from coming through. That would be a last resort. But with this administration you cannot completely discount the possibility of a physical blockade of the island if they decide that it’s the final step in strangling the island.”

The center-right European People’s Party is eyeing “better implementation” of the Lisbon Treaty to better prepare the EU for what it sees as historic shifts in the global balance of power involving the U.S., China and Russia, EPP leader Manfred Weber said on Saturday. Speaking at a press conference on the second day of an EPP Leaders Retreat in Zagreb, Weber highlighted the possibility of broadening the use of qualified majority voting in EU decision-making and developing a practical plan for military response if a member state is attacked. Currently EU leaders can use qualified majority voting on most legislative proposals, from energy and climate issues to research and innovation. But common foreign and security policy, EU finances and membership issues, among other areas, need a unified majority. This means that on issues such as sanctions against Russia, one country can block agreement, as happened last summer when Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico vetoed a package of EU measures against Moscow — a veto that was eventually lifted. Such power in one country’s hands is something that the EPP would like to change.  As for military solidarity, Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty obliges countries to provide “aid and assistance by all the means in their power” if an EU country is attacked. For Weber, the formulation under European law is stronger than NATO’s Article 5 collective defense commitment. However, he stressed that the EU still lacks a clear operational plan for how the clause would work in practice. Article 42.7 was previously used when France requested that other EU countries make additional contributions to the fight against terrorism, following the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015.  Such ideas were presented as the party with a biggest grouping in the European Parliament — and therefore the power to shape EU political priorities — presented its strategic focus for 2026, with competitiveness as its main priority.  Keeping the pulse on what matters in 2026  The EPP wants to unleash the bloc’s competitiveness through further cutting red tape, “completing” the EU single market, diversifying supply chains, protecting economic independence and security and promoting innovation including in AI, chips and biotech, among other actions, according to its list 2026 priorities unveiled on Saturday. On defense, the EPP is pushing for a “360-degree” security approach to safeguard Europe against growing geopolitical threats, “addressing state and non-state threats from all directions,” according to the document. The EPP is calling for enhanced European defense capabilities, including a stronger defense market, joint procurement of military equipment, and new strategic initiatives to boost readiness. The party also stressed the need for better protection against cyberattacks and hybrid threats, and robust measures to counter disinformation campaigns targeting EU institutions and societies. On migration and border security, the EPP backs tougher asylum admissibility rules, faster returns, and strengthened external borders, including reinforced Frontex operations and improved digital systems like the Entry/Exit System.  The party also urged a Demographic Strategy for Europe amid the continent’s shrinking and aging population. The text, initiated by Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), member of the EPP, wants to see demographic considerations integrated into EU economic governance, cohesion funds, and policymaking, while boosting family support, intergenerational solidarity, labor participation, skills development, mobility and managed immigration.  Demographic change is “the most important issue, which is not really intensively discussed in the public discourse,” Weber said. “That’s why we want to highlight this, we want to underline the importance.” 

TRIAL SEEN AS PART OF INCREASED BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UK AND TÜRKIYE ~ Tom Anderson ~ The trial of six members of London’s Kurdish community, charged with membership of the proscribed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is ongoing at the Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey) in London. They have all pleaded not guilty to the charges of being members of the banned organisation and some face additional allegations relating to arranging and addressing meetings in support of the PKK. On the day hearings started (5 January), the London Kurdish Community and their supporters demonstrated with banners outside the Old Bailey. The trial is due to take up to three months and the defendants are Ercan Akbal (56), Ali Boyraz (63), Agit Karatas (24), Berfin Kurban (31), Turkan Ozcan (60) and Mazlum (also known as Mucahit) Sayak (28). The home raids and arrests coincided with a simultaneous police raid on the Kurdish Community Centre (KCC) in Haringey, sparking protests and hunger strikes. A number of high profile arrests of Kurdish people had preceded this, as well as raids on Kurdish Community Centres and media organisations across Europe during 2024. This heightened repression of Kurdish movements in Europe came at a time when Türkiye was stepping up its air and ground assaults on the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan and drone attacks on North and East Syria. The arrests also took place just two days before the 29 November assault on Aleppo by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). Türkiye hoped to use this assault and subsequent takeover of power from Bashar Al-Assad to strengthen their influence in Syria and further the role of its Syrian National Army (SNA) proxies in efforts to destroy the Rojava revolution.  PKK has been a banned organisation in the UK since 2001, when the Blair government added it to the list of proscribed organisations following pressure from the Turkish state. The arrests came in the wake of a meeting in London between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy, when they announced new UK/Türkiye bilateral cooperation and trade ties. The PKK was founded in the 1970s as a Marxist-Leninist anti-colonial party aiming to end the Turkish state’s violence, discrimination, denial of identity and forced assimilation policies aimed at Kurdish people. In 1999, the movement embarked on a path toward its new paradigm based on three concepts: Women’s freedom, an ecological society and democratic confederalism, a form of stateless direct democracy. These ideas have inspired the movement ever since, and built a foundation for the Rojava revolution in North and East Syria, which began in 2012, and the struggle for democratic autonomy within Türkiye’s borders.  WHY NOW? The PKK and its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan have been trying to make peace with the Turkish state over the last year and the Party officially disbanded itself and ceremonially destroyed some of its weapons in 2025. The movement has never carried out any sort of armed operation on UK soil, and the Kurdish-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces received tactical support from the UK armed forces during their fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). In 2020, the Belgian Supreme Court ruled that EU anti-terrorism legislation cannot be applied to PKK.  The fact that the Crown Prosecution Service puts resources into criminalising members of the UK’s Kurdish community can be explained, just like in the case of last year’s proscription Palestine Action, in geopolitical terms. The complicity of the British police with the Israeli embassy over Palestine action is well documented, and details are still emerging. Türkiye, for its part, is a NATO member and a key UK and EU ally, despite Erdoğan’s efforts to strip away the vestiges of liberal democracy within Turkey and to centre authoritarian power around himself as President. The Turkish state wants to crush the Kurdish freedom movement, both within its borders and across the border in North and East Syria, whereas Keir Starmer appears to be keen to enact repressive policies at home to further what he sees as UK foreign policy interests. At the same time, Starmer’s Labour government has presided over a shift in the way dissent is being dealt with in the UK. For decades euphemisms like ‘domestic extremism’ or ‘aggravated activism’ have been used to criminalise radicals while differentiating them from those they dub terrorists. However, since the proscription of Palestine Action last year the state has seemed ready to straight-up call people terrorists. Obviously, the PKK has been on the proscribed list for a quarter of a century already, but there haven’t been many actual prosecutions related to it. The state’s readiness to use terrorism legislation to counter dissent is likely to have fed into the CPS decision to prosecute.  The Kurdish People’s Assembly of the UK in a public statement is calling for “sustained solidarity” as “a refusal of isolation and criminalisation, and an affirmation that political identity, association, and community organisation are not crimes.” The post Kurdish community members plead ‘not guilty’ to PKK charges appeared first on Freedom News.

One month into nationwide protests, the Iranian people are still making history — at the cost of their lives. The free world can no longer credibly claim uncertainty about events on the ground, nor can they claim neutrality in the face of what has occurred. Iranians aren’t asking others to speak for them but to empower them to finish what they’ve started. And the urgency for international action has only intensified. This week, the European debate finally shifted. Italy formally joined calls to condemn the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and with that decision, the EU’s political landscape narrowed. France and Spain are now the only two member countries preventing the bloc from collectively designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization. The question for Brussels is no longer whether the conditions for this are met — it’s whether the bloc will act once they are. For decades, the Iranian people have been subject to systematic violence by their own state. This isn’t law enforcement. It’s a unilateral war against a civilian population, marked by extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, confessions, torture, mass censorship and the deliberate use of deprivation as a tool of repression. On one side stands a totalitarian state; on the other, unarmed citizens. As videos and eyewitness testimonies continue to emerge despite severe communications blackouts, the scale of the violence is no longer in doubt. Supported by investigative reporting, sources inside Iran warn that more than 36,500 people may have been killed by regime forces since protests began on Dec. 28. Leading human rights organizations have verified thousands of deaths, cautioning that all available figures are almost certainly undercounts due to access restrictions and internet shutdowns. The scale, organization and intent of this repression meets the legal threshold for crimes against humanity as defined under the 1998 Rome Statute that founded the International Criminal Court. And under the U.N.’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) — a principle seeking to ensure populations are protected from mass atrocity crimes, which the EU has formally endorsed — this threshold triggers obligation. At this point, inaction ceases to be restraint and becomes moral, political and legal failure. The risks here are immediate. Thousands of detained protesters face the imminent threat of execution. Senior Iranian judicial authorities have warned that continued protest, particularly if citing alleged foreign support, constitutes moharebeh, or “waging war on God” — a charge that carries the death penalty and has historically been used to justify mass executions after unrest. Arbitrary detention and the absence of due process place detainees in clear and foreseeable danger, heightening the international community’s obligations. The Iranian people are bravely tackling the challenge placed before them, demonstrating agency, cohesion and resolve. Under the pillars of R2P, responsibility now shifts outward — first to assist and, where necessary, to take collective action when a state itself is the perpetrator of atrocity crimes. Six actions directly follow from these obligations: First, civilians must be protected by degrading the regime’s capacity to commit atrocities. This requires formally designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization given its central role in systematic violence against civilians both inside and outside of Iran. This is in line with European legal standards. Italy has moved on it. Now France and Spain must follow, so the EU can act as one. France and Spain are now the only two member countries preventing the bloc from collectively designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization. | Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA Second, the bloc must impose coordinated and sustained economic measures consistent with the R2P. This includes globally freezing regime assets under EU sanctions frameworks, as well as identifying, seizing and dismantling the shadow fleet of “ghost tankers” that finance repression and evade sanctions. The third obligation is guaranteeing the right to information. Iran’s digital blackout constitutes a grave violation of freedoms protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. Free, secure and continuous internet access needs to be ensured through the large-scale deployment of satellite connectivity and secure communication technologies. Defensive cyber measures should prevent arbitrary shutdowns of civilian networks. Fourth, the EU must move to end state impunity through legal accountability. This means expelling regime representatives implicated in the repression of citizens from European capitals, and initiating legal proceedings against those responsible for crimes against humanity under universal jurisdiction — a principle already recognized by several EU member countries. Fifth, the bloc must demand the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, who were detained in clear violation of Iran’s international human rights obligations. Finally, Europe must issue a clear ultimatum, demanding that independent nongovernmental humanitarian and human rights organizations be granted immediate, unrestricted and time-bound access on the ground inside Iran. If this access isn’t granted within a defined time frame, it must withdraw diplomatic recognition from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nonrecognition is a lawful response to a regime that has forfeited its legitimacy by systematically attacking its own population. It would also signal unambiguous support for the Iranian people’s right to representative and accountable government. Supporting Iranians is neither charity nor interference. Rather, it is realizing the legal and political commitments the EU has already made. The regime in Tehran has practiced state-sponsored terror, exported violence, destabilized the region and fueled nuclear threats for 47 years. Ending this trajectory isn’t ideological. It’s a matter of European and global security. For the EU, there’s no remaining procedural excuse. The evidence is overwhelming. The legal framework is settled. France and Spain are now all that stand between the bloc and collective action against the IRGC. What’s at stake isn’t diplomacy but Europe’s credibility — and whether it will enforce the principles it invokes when they’re tested by history. Nazenin Ansari Journalist, managing editor of Kayhan-London (Persian) and Kayhan-Life (English) Nazanin Boniadi Human rights activist, actress, board director of Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran, 2023 Sydney Peace Prize Laureate Ladan Boroumand Human rights activist, historian, co-founder of Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran Shirin Ebadi Lawyer, 2003 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Shéhérazade Semsar-de Boisséson Entrepreneur, former CEO of POLITICO Europe, chair of the board at Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran

BRUSSELS — If Donald Trump uses military force to take over Greenland, Denmark has options beyond NATO. The core of Denmark’s security rests on the transatlantic alliance — but that’s likely to be of little help in a confrontation with the U.S. as America dominates NATO. Instead, Denmark could trigger a little-known clause in the EU treaties: Article 42.7, the European Union’s common defense pact. While some analysts claim it’s actually stronger than NATO’s better-known Article 5 common defense provision, article 42.7 comes with a lot of caveats and unknowns. POLITICO took at look at five questions on the provision and whether it would make sense for Denmark to trigger it: 1. WHAT DOES IT SAY? “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” The clause was inserted into the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, aimed at giving EU members protection similar to that afforded by NATO. It does give neutral countries some wiggle room in opting out. For many analysts, the EU’s mutual assistance clause “is of a more compelling nature” as it states that member countries have “an obligation” to provide “all aid and assistance by all the means in their power.” NATO’s Article 5 includes the phrase “as it deems necessary” which leaves more room for national discretion. The EU version “is stronger in diplomatic language but the pool of forces is smaller than in the NATO framework,” said Alexander Mattelaer, an associate professor in international security at the Free University Brussels’ School of Governance. 2. HAS IT EVER BEEN USED? Only once. In 2015, France invoked the article in response to ISIS-led terrorist attacks. It allowed Paris to redeploy some of its troops out of Africa to use them to patrol French streets, while EU countries like Germany sent their soldiers to countries like Mali.  The request was supported unanimously by other EU defense ministers. Because the EU has no army, Paris had to negotiate with other EU countries for specific military help. 3. HOW DOES IT WORK? It would be up to Denmark to invoke it. Then, as was the case with France, it would have to be unanimously accepted by all the other member countries. But any EU response that requires unanimity means Denmark could run into problems if countries like Hungary veto its approval, two EU diplomats said. “I don’t think Denmark would invoke it without being sure it has unanimity because it would be a great risk,” said Antonio Missiroli, a former NATO assistant secretary-general who also worked at the European Commission. “Surely a country like Hungary would not take sides against the United States?” he added. There is also some ambiguity over whether it would apply to a crisis in Greenland, which withdrew from the predecessor of the EU in 1985, although it is still a part of the Kingdom of Denmark. On Sunday, EU defense chief Andrius Kubilius said 42.7 would “definitely” apply, with the European Commission last year suggesting the same. Commission spokesperson Anitta Hippe said: “Greenland is part of the territory of kingdom of Denmark and therefore in principle covered by the mutual solidarity clause in art. 42.7.” 4. WHAT HAPPENS THEN? If Denmark successfully invokes the clause, that would send a “very strong political and legal” message, said Sven Biscop, director general of the Egmont Institute think tank and a European security expert. The mechanism doesn’t require the EU itself to step in, leaving it up to the bloc’s capitals, and in particular to the country which invoked it, to determine the next steps. Options range from issuing statements in solidarity, to financial assistance and even military support, said one EU diplomat. Missiroli suggested that one of the options for Denmark could be to use this article “to ask another country to mediate.” While it’s “too early to say” what that response would look like in practice, said one European government official, “we will offer the support that we’d like to have” in a similar scenario. It could lay also the legal groundwork for proposing economic sanctions, Biscop said. Sergey Lagodinsky, a German member of the European Parliament and vice president of the Greens’ group, said the legislature should ready a “laundry list of possible countermeasures” if 42.7 is invoked, including kicking U.S. troops out of European bases, banning overflights of U.S. aircraft and restricting market access for American firms. Invoking the article could involve a limited troop deployment by the EU military committee and military staff — consultative bodies made up of the bloc’s top generals and Brussels-based military representatives, Biscop said. The probability of the EU going to war with the U.S. is zero, analysts agreed. And even if the bloc wanted to, it only has a “few dozen” military staff in Brussels, a miniature command structure able to direct “at most” 3,000 soldiers and limited experience aside from peacekeeping missions, Biscop said. However, member countries could decide on more substantial military assistance using their own resources. Meanwhile, the obligations on countries themselves remain undefined, meaning Denmark may face the “political reality” of some EU capitals making few concrete commitments to help. Because of those ambiguities over how to use the article, last month Kubilius told POLITICO he wants to open a discussion on “institutional defense readiness” this year, which could include revamping Article 42.7 to make it fully operational with a clear procedure and an integrated military command. 5. WHAT WOULD IT MEAN FOR NATO? Denmark has warned that a U.S. annexation of Greenland would spell the end of the alliance, although Trump disagrees. If the U.S. orchestrates a takeover, “it doesn’t necessarily mean … legally at least, the end of NATO, but it would mean politically the hollowing out of NATO’s credibility,” said Fabrice Pothier, CEO of Rasmussen Global, a political consultancy. That could lead to “some EU members [to] go for more EU solutions, maybe putting more flesh behind 42.7,” he added.  But that would involve creating a new security architecture for Europe without the U.S., which has been the continent’s crucial guarantor since World War II. “NATO is in charge of collective defense in the Euro-Atlantic area: it has the defense plans, command and control structures and capability targets,” said a NATO diplomat. “The EU, for its part, brings to the table its financial power, industrial policy and regulatory might.” Seb Starcevic contributed reporting. This article has been updated.

BERLIN — An extreme left-wing group has claimed responsibility for an arson attack that caused a blackout affecting about 45,000 households and more than 2,000 businesses in Berlin over the weekend. “This isn’t just arson or sabotage. It’s terrorism,” Berlin’s Mayor Kai Wegner said Sunday of the attack, which burned through a cable connected to one of the city’s largest gas-fired power plants. Members of the so-called Vulkan Group, known for similar attacks on critical infrastructure in the past, claimed responsibility for the sabotage in a letter titled: “Cutting off power to those in power,” which was published online. “In the greed for energy, the earth is being depleted, sucked dry, burned, ravaged, burned down, raped, destroyed,” the group, which is listed by Berlin’s intelligence services as a left-wing extremist organization, said in the letter. “The aim of the action is to cause significant damage to the gas industry and the greed for energy,” its authors wrote. The group has used similar means to communicate in the past, and Berlin police believed the letter to be genuine. With temperatures below freezing in the German capital, schools and kindergartens in the southern districts affected by the power outage remained closed on Monday morning. Around 30,000 households and approximately 1,700 businesses were still without power on the third day of the power outage. Full restoration of supply is expected to take until Thursday. The city’s energy senator, Franziska Giffey told POLITICO’s Berlin Playbook Podcast on Monday that Berlin’s critical infrastructure needed better protection. “There is a great deal of public information about our critical infrastructure that we need to publish and make transparent. In the future, we will have to consider how we can handle this differently and how we can protect ourselves even better against these issues,” she said. In a separate interview with Berlin’s public broadcaster rbb, Giffey said prosecutors at the national level would need to assist with the investigation. “The question is, are these just left-wing activist groups acting on behalf of ideology, or is there more to it than that? That absolutely must be investigated,” said the politician from the center-left Social Democratic Party that governs Berlin in a coalition with Wegner’s conservatives. “This is not just an attack on our infrastructure, but also an attack on our free society.” Josh Groeneveld and Rixa Fürsen contributed to this report.

At least 12 people are dead after two gunmen opened fire at Sydney’s famed Bondi Beach in an attack authorities said targeted the Jewish community during a major holiday celebration. One of the shooters is among the dead while the second is in a critical condition, local police said in a statement. More people have been injured, among them two police officers, authorities said. Police are investigating whether any other assailants were involved. “This attack was designed to target Sydney’s Jewish community, on the first day of Hanukkah,” said Chris Minns, the premier of the state of New South Wales. “What should have been a night of peace and joy celebrated in that community with families and supporters, has been shattered by this horrifying evil attack.” The attack occurred as hundreds of members of Sydney’s Jewish community gathered in Bondi Beach for the annual Hanukkah celebration, among the biggest events of the local Jewish calendar. The event, attended by many families, features the lighting of the menorah, a petting zoo, a children’s climbing wall and other activities. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his “thoughts are with every person affected.” Israel’s President Isaac Herzog called the attack terrorism: “Our hearts go out to our Jewish sisters and brothers in Sydney who have been attacked by vile terrorists as they went to light the first candle of Chanukah.” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sent “heartfelt condolences” and said “Europe stands with Australia and Jewish communities everywhere,” in a statement. “This appalling act of violence against the Jewish community must be unequivocally condemned,” said Kaja Kallas, the EU’s chief diplomat. The incident is Australia’s worst mass shooting in decades, after the nation’s gun laws were tightened in response to a 1996 massacre in the state of Tasmania.

President Donald Trump intends for the U.S. to keep a bigger military presence in the Western Hemisphere going forward to battle migration, drugs and the rise of adversarial powers in the region, according to his new National Security Strategy. The 33-page document is a rare formal explanation of Trump’s foreign policy worldview by his administration. Such strategies, which presidents typically release once each term, can help shape how parts of the U.S. government allocate budgets and set policy priorities. The Trump National Security Strategy, which the White House quietly released Thursday, has some brutal words for Europe, suggesting it is in civilizational decline, and pays relatively little attention to the Middle East and Africa. It has an unusually heavy focus on the Western Hemisphere that it casts as largely about protecting the U.S. homeland. It says “border security is the primary element of national security” and makes veiled references to China’s efforts to gain footholds in America’s backyard. “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity — a condition that allows us to assert ourselves confidently where and when we need to in the region,” the document states. “The terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence — from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined.” The document describes such plans as part of a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The latter is the notion set forth by President James Monroe in 1823 that the U.S. will not tolerate malign foreign interference in its own hemisphere. Trump’s paper, as well as a partner document known as the National Defense Strategy, have faced delays in part because of debates in the administration over elements related to China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pushed for some softening of the language about Beijing, according to two people familiar with the matter who were granted anonymity to describe internal deliberations. Bessent is currently involved in sensitive U.S. trade talks with China, and Trump himself is wary of the delicate relations with Beijing. The new National Security Strategy says the U.S. has to make challenging choices in the global realm. “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests,” the document states. In an introductory note to the strategy, Trump called it a “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history, and the home of freedom on earth.” But Trump is mercurial by nature, so it’s hard to predict how closely or how long he will stick to the ideas laid out in the new strategy. A surprising global event could redirect his thinking as well, as it has done for recent presidents from George W. Bush to Joe Biden. Still, the document appears in line with many of the moves he’s taken in his second term, as well as the priorities of some of his aides. That includes deploying significantly more U.S. military prowess to the Western Hemisphere, taking numerous steps to reduce migration to America, pushing for a stronger industrial base in the U.S. and promoting “Western identity,” including in Europe. The strategy even nods to so-called traditional values at times linked to the Christian right, saying the administration wants “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health” and “an America that cherishes its past glories and its heroes.” It mentions the need to have “growing numbers of strong, traditional families that raise healthy children.” As POLITICO has reported before, the strategy spends an unusual amount of space on Latin America, the Caribbean and other U.S. neighbors. That’s a break with past administrations, who tended to prioritize other regions and other topics, such as taking on major powers like Russia and China or fighting terrorism. The Trump strategy suggests the president’s military buildup in the Western Hemisphere is not a temporary phenomenon. (That buildup, which has included controversial military strikes against boats allegedly carrying drugs, has been cast by the administration as a way to fight cartels. But the administration also hopes the buildup could help pressure Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro to step down.) The strategy also specifically calls for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.” The strategy says the U.S. should enhance its relationships with governments in Latin America, including working with them to identify strategic resources — an apparent reference to materials such as rare earth minerals. It also declares that the U.S. will partner more with the private sector to promote “strategic acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region.” Such business-related pledges, at least on a generic level, could please many Latin American governments who have long been frustrated by the lack of U.S. attention to the region. It’s unclear how such promises square with Trump’s insistence on imposing tariffs on America’s trade partners, however. The National Security Strategy spends a fair amount of time on China, though it often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S. lawmakers — on a bipartisan basis — consider an increasingly assertive China the gravest long-term threat to America’s global power. But while the language the Trump strategy uses is tough, it is careful and far from inflammatory. The administration promises to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence.” But it also says “trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors” and even calls for “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” The strategy says the U.S. wants to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific — a nod to growing tensions in the region, including between China and U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. “We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” it states. That may come as a relief to Asia watchers who worry Trump will back away from U.S. support for Taiwan as it faces ongoing threats from China. The document states that “it is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” and to mitigate the risk of Russian confrontation with other countries in Europe. But overall it pulls punches when it comes to Russia — there’s very little criticism of Moscow. Instead, it reserves some of its harshest remarks for U.S.-allied nations in Europe. In particular, the administration, in somewhat veiled terms, knocks European efforts to rein in far-right parties, calling such moves political censorship. “The Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the [Ukraine] war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition,” the strategy states. The strategy also appears to suggest that migration will fundamentally change European identity to a degree that could hurt U.S. alliances. “Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” it states. “As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” Still, the document acknowledges Europe’s economic and other strengths, as well as how America’s partnership with much of the continent has helped the U.S. “Not only can we not afford to write Europe off — doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve,” it says. “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” it says. Trump’s first-term National Security Strategy focused significantly on the U.S. competition with Russia and China, but the president frequently undercut it by trying to gain favor with the leaders of those nuclear powers. If this new strategy proves a better reflection of what Trump himself actually believes, it could help other parts of the U.S. government adjust, not to mention foreign governments. As Trump administration documents often do, the strategy devotes significant space to praising the commander-in-chief. It describes him as the “President of Peace” while favorably stating that he “uses unconventional diplomacy.” The strategy struggles at times to tamp down what seem like inconsistencies. It says the U.S. should have a high bar for foreign intervention, but it also says it wants to “prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.” It also essentially dismisses the ambitions of many smaller countries. “The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations,” the strategy states. The National Security Strategy is the first of several important defense and foreign policy papers the Trump administration is due to release. They include the National Defense Strategy, whose basic thrust is expected to be similar. Presidents’ early visions for what the National Security Strategy should mention have at times had to be discarded due to events. After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s first-term strategy ended up focusing heavily on battling Islamist terrorism. Biden’s team spent much of its first year working on a strategy that had to be rewritten after Russia moved toward a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The EU is adding Russia to its blacklist of countries at high risk of money laundering and financing terrorism, according to two EU officials and a document seen by POLITICO. The global watchdog Financial Action Task Force (FATF) suspended Russia as a member after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but failed to blacklist it, despite evidence presented by the Ukrainian government, because of opposition from countries in the BRICS group of emerging economies, which includes Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. EU lawmakers called on the Commission many times to do what FATF was not able to. The Commission committed to complete a review by the end of 2025 to get their support to remove the United Arab Emirates and Gibraltar from the list earlier this year. POLITICO saw a draft of the Russia decision, which will be an annex to the list. In other internal documents, the Commission had said that the assessment was complicated by the lack of information-sharing with Moscow. The EU already has a wide range of sanctions heavily limiting access to EU financial services for Russian firms. The blacklisting is landing as the EU executive is trying to end Belgium’s resistance to using the revenues from Moscow’s frozen assets to fund Ukraine. The move will oblige financial institutions to strengthen due diligence on all transactions and force banks that have not already acted to further de-risk. The EU has usually aligned itself with FATF decisions, but from this year, it has its own Anti-Money Laundering Authority. AMLA will contribute to drafting the blacklist from July 2027. Dutch top official Hennie Verbeek-Kusters, a former chair of the financial intelligence cooperation body Egmont Group, is set to join the AMLA authority executive board after a positive hearing with lawmakers held behind closed doors, one of the EU officials said. A vote on the appointment is due on Dec. 15, said a third official.

LONDON — Three men were arrested Thursday on suspicion of assisting Russia’s foreign intelligence service. The Metropolitan Police arrested the men — aged 48, 45 and 44 — at addresses in west and central London. Searches are ongoing at those addresses as well as another west London address. The capital’s police force said the alleged offenses related to Russia. Counter Terrorism Policing London Commander Dominic Murphy said: “We’re seeing an increasing number of who we would describe as ‘proxies’ being recruited by foreign intelligence services and these arrests are directly related to our ongoing to efforts to disrupt this type of activity. “Anyone who might be contacted by and tempted into carrying out criminal activity on behalf of a foreign state here in the U.K. should think again.”  Murphy added: “This kind of activity will be investigated and anyone found to be involved can expect to be prosecuted and there are potentially very serious consequences for those who are convicted.”  Moscow was put on the enhanced tier of the U.K.’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme in July, meaning anyone working for the Russian state needs to declare their activity or risk jail. Three men were convicted earlier this year after an arson attack at a warehouse containing aid for Ukraine.