Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

BRUSSELS — In the midst of a geopolitical storm, Brussels is racing to put together a new plan by the end of this year to diversify European supply of so-called critical raw materials — such as lithium and copper — away from China.  The thing is: We’ve been here before. So far, the European Commission has provided few details on its new plan, beyond that it would touch upon joint purchasing, stockpiling, recycling of resources and new partnerships. It already addressed those measures two years ago in its first initiative on the issue, the Critical Raw Materials Act.  Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen has been forced to act by Beijing’s expansion and tightening of export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals this month, as trade tensions with Washington escalated. Europe was caught in the crossfire — China accounts for 99 percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, and 98 percent of its rare earth permanent magnets. The new “RESourceEU” plan is expected to follow a similar model to the REPowerEU plan, under which the Commission in 2022 proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.  That has European industry daring to hope that Brussels will do more than just recycle an old initiative and address the main obstacles to diversifying the bloc’s supply chains of minerals it needs for everything from renewable energy to defense applications. The biggest of them all? A lack of cash to back new mining, processing and manufacturing initiatives, both within and outside the EU. “It’s all still very much in its infancy,” said Florian Anderhuber, deputy director general of lobby group Euromines. “We hope that there will be a bigger push that goes beyond the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act,” he added. “It doesn’t help anyone if this is just a label for things that are already in the pipeline.” CODEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP The EU should not count on any trade reprieve that may result from U.S. President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Thursday. After all, Beijing has shown time and again that it has no reservations about weaponizing economic dependencies. The key question is whether, this time around, pressure will remain high enough for the EU to mobilize brainpower and assets at the kind of scale it did when it sought to break the bloc’s decades-old reliance on Russian oil and gas. “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. “We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials. So it is time to speed up and take the action that is needed.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. | Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images In the here and now, the EU wants to persuade a visiting Chinese delegation at talks in Brussels on Friday to speed up export approvals for its top raw materials importers. In parallel, energy and environment ministers from the G7 group of industrialized nations are slated to wargame how to de-risk their mineral supply chains in Toronto, Canada, on Thursday and Friday. MONEY, MONEY, MONEY When the Commission unveiled its first grand plan to break over-reliance on China in 2023 — the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) — industry leaders and analysts mostly lamented one thing: a lack of funding on the table.  “Money has been a real bottleneck for Europe’s raw materials agenda,” said Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Mining, processing, recycling, and stockpiling all need serious financing.” If the EU fails to free up more resources, experts warn that it is bound to fall short of the goal set in the CRMA, of extracting at least 10 percent of its annual consumption of select minerals by the end of the decade, with no more than 65 percent of some raw materials coming from a single country. It’s a steep target — especially for rare earths, where Beijing has over decades built up a de facto monopoly. While the EU executive has selected strategic projects both within and outside the EU that should benefit from faster permitting than their usual lead times of 10 to 15 years to production, those efforts are yet to bear fruit. “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report, calling for a “permanent European Minerals Investment Network.”  “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report. | Aris Oikonomou/AFP via Getty Images The REPowerEU plan — a package of documents, including legal acts, recommendations, guidelines and strategies — was mostly financed by loans left over from the bloc’s pandemic recovery program. Similarly, RESourceEU must become “resource strategy backed by real funding,” said Hildegard Bentele, a member of the European Parliament who’s been working on critical minerals for years.  “This requires a European Raw Materials Fund, modelled on successful instruments in several Member States, to support strategic projects across the entire value chain, from extraction to recycling,” the German Christian Democrat said. THAT’LL COST YOU It’s about more than just throwing money at the problem: The Commission’s haste in rolling out its plan is raising doubts that it will meet the needs of a highly complex market — along with concerns that environmental safeguards will be neglected. “As long as European industries can buy cheaper materials from China, other producers do not stand a chance,” warned Gehrke.  In Toronto, G7 ministers will launch a new Critical Minerals Production Alliance (CMPA), a Canadian-led initiative that seeks to secure “transparent, democratic, and environmentally responsible critical minerals,” and also to counter market manipulation of supply chains, said a senior Canadian government official.  This would suggest creating so-called standards-based markets that are ring-fenced to protect critical minerals produced responsibly, to agreed environmental and social standards. A price floor would be set within that market, while minerals produced elsewhere — at lower prices but also lower standards — would face a tariff.  Beyond the immediate funding issues, ramping up mining in the EU and its neighbourhood also comes at a high societal cost. With local resistance to new mines, usually linked to environmental and social concerns, being one of the key obstacles to new projects, investors are often hesitant to pour money into a project that risks being derailed shortly after. “The EU is choosing geopolitical expediency over human rights and ecological integrity, sacrificing frontline communities for a strategy that is neither sustainable nor just, instead of building a durable and values-based autonomy that invests in systemic circularity and rights-based partnerships,” said Diego Marin, a senior policy officer for raw materials and resource justice at the European Environmental Bureau, an NGO.  Jakob Weizman and Camille Gijs contributed reporting from Brussels. Zi-Ann Lum contributed reporting from Toronto, Canada.

The leaders of France and Germany issued a joint call Friday for cuts to EU water pollution and chemical safety rules, in a bid to help European industry.   In a joint statement adopted at the 25th Franco-German Council of Ministers in Toulon, France, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz backed calls for a revision of REACH — the EU’s chemical legal framework — that’s focused on “reducing burdens” by “streamlining procedures.”  It comes months before the European Commission is due to present its long-delayed revision of REACH. The EU executive has signaled that the revision’s primary aim would be to simplify rules and speed up procedures for industry — to the dismay of civil society groups.  The two governments also pushed for an easing of financial constraints for Europe’s struggling chemicals industry. Merz and Macron pushed for an easing of recently-revised urban wastewater rules, which require cosmetics and pharmaceuticals companies to bear the bulk of the costs of cleaning up micropollutants in urban wastewater from the end of 2028. The Commission has already committed to producing an updated study on impacts of the extended producer responsibility scheme, following strong industry pushback.   The statement from the EU’s two biggest economies sends a strong message to Brussels to push ahead with its drive to cut red tape. “To unleash our companies’ full potential of growth and productivity it is … urgent to substantially ease the complexity and simplify the European Union’s regulatory environment,” the document states.  MATERIALS RECYCLING FOCUS  The two leaders repeated calls for better rules to facilitate the recycling and reuse of critical raw materials (CRM), as EU countries scramble to reduce dependency on Chinese minerals essential in defense and the energy transition.   Paris and Berlin committed to “work together on the design of the CRM aspects of the Circular Economy Act and coordinate their efforts” in the hope of “reaping the benefits” of the policy proposal, the draft reads.   The Circular Economy Act is expected in 2026 and aims to facilitate the transfer of materials waste between EU countries to boost recycling and reuse across European industries.   Back in 2023, the two EU countries had already pledged further cooperation on critical raw materials alongside Italy, including by setting up working groups for new extraction, processing and recycling projects.   Giorgio Leali contributed reporting.

Policymakers are overlooking a $370 billion market that will determine whether climate goals succeed or fail.  In the grand narrative of the clean energy transition, materials like lithium, rare earths and silicon dominate headlines. Yet the most strategically important materials for this transition may be hiding in plain sight, dismissed by policymakers as environmental villains rather than recognized as the enablers of human progress they truly are. The $370 billion blind spot Polyolefins — the family of materials that includes polyethylene and polypropylene — represent perhaps the greatest strategic oversight in contemporary clean industry policy Here is a reality check. Polyolefins represent a global market approaching $370 billion, growing at over 5 percent annually.1,2 They make up nearly half of all plastics consumed in Europe.3 By 2034, global production is expected to hit 371 million tons.4  Yet in the European Union’s Clean Industrial Deal — a €100 billion strategy for industrial competitiveness — polyolefins receive barely a mention.4 This represents a profound strategic miscalculation. While policymakers focus on securing access to exotic critical materials like lithium and cobalt, they overlook the fact that polyolefins are already critical materials— they simply happen to be abundant rather than scarce. In the infrastructure-intensive clean energy transition ahead, abundance is not a weakness; it is the ultimate strategic advantage. > While policymakers focus on securing access to exotic critical materials like > lithium and cobalt, they overlook the fact that polyolefins are already > critical materials. The EU’s REPowerEU plan calls for 1,236 GW of renewable capacity by 2030 — more than double today’s levels.4 Every offshore wind farm, solar array and electric grid connection depends on polyolefins. They insulate cables, protect components and form structural parts of turbines and solar panels. Every solar panel relies on polyolefin elastomers to protect its inner workings for up to 30 years, even in harsh weather.8 And every grid connection depends on polyethylene-insulated cables to carry electricity efficiently across long distances. 7 Multiply these requirements across thousands of installations, and the strategic importance of polyolefins becomes undeniable. Yet, currently, the policy framework treats these materials as afterthoughts, focusing instead on the relatively small quantities of rare elements in generators and inverters while ignoring the massive volumes of polyolefins that make the entire system possible. Beyond energy: the hidden dependencies The strategic importance of polyolefins extends far beyond energy infrastructure. As one example, modern medical systems depend fundamentally on polyolefin materials for syringes, IV bags, tubing and protective equipment. Global food security increasingly depends on polyolefin-based packaging systems that extend shelf life, reduce waste and enable distribution networks — feeding billions of people. Meanwhile, water infrastructure relies on polyethylene pipes engineered for 100-year lifespans. These applications are rarely considered alongside energy priorities — a dangerous fragmentation of strategic thinking. The waste challenge and a circular solution Let’s be clear, plastic waste is a real environmental challenge demanding urgent action. However, the solution is not abandoning these essential materials, it is building the infrastructure to capture their full value in circular systems. The fundamental error in current approaches is treating waste as a material problem rather than a systems problem. Europe currently captures only 23 percent of polyolefin waste for recycling, despite these materials representing nearly two-thirds of all post-consumer plastic waste.3 That’s not because the material can’t be recycled. The infrastructure to do so isn’t at the scale needed to collect, sort and recycle waste to meet future circular feedstock needs. Polyolefins are among the most recyclable materials we have. They can be mechanically recycled multiple times. And with chemical recycling, they can even be broken down to their molecular building blocks and rebuilt into virgin-quality material. That’s not just circularity, it’s circularity at scale. This matters because the EU’s target of 24 percent material circularity by 20305 is unlikely to be met without polyolefins. However, current frameworks treat them as obstacles rather than enablers of circularity. The economic transformation The transition represents an economic transformation, creating competitive advantages for regions implementing it effectively. A region processing 100,000 tons of polyolefin waste annually could capture €100-130 million in additional economic value while creating up to 1,000 jobs.6 > A region processing 100,000 tons of polyolefin waste annually could capture > €100-130 million in additional economic value while creating up to 1,000 jobs. At the end of the day, the clean energy transition must be affordable. Polyolefins help make that possible. They’re cheaper, lighter and longer lasting than many alternatives. Manufacturers with access to cost-effective recycled feedstocks can reduce input costs by 20-40 percent compared with virgin materials. Polyethylene pipes cost 60-70 percent less than steel alternatives while lasting twice as long.9 These aren’t marginal gains. They’re system-level efficiencies that make the difference between success and failure at scale. The strategic choice The real challenge isn’t technical, it’s institutional. Polyolefins sit at the crossroads of materials, environmental and industrial policy, yet these areas are treated as separate domains. There’s also a geopolitical angle. Unlike lithium or rare earths, polyolefins can be produced from diverse feedstocks — natural gas, biomass and even captured CO2 — enabling domestic production and supply chain resilience. This flexibility is a major asset, but current policies largely overlook it. > The path forward requires recognizing polyolefins as strategic assets rather > than environmental problems. The path forward requires recognizing polyolefins as strategic assets rather than environmental problems. This means including them in critical materials assessments — not because they are scarce, but because they are essential. It means coordinating research and development efforts rather than leaving them to fragmented market forces. Most importantly, it means recognizing that the clean energy transition will succeed or fail based on our ability to build infrastructure at unprecedented scale and speed. And that infrastructure will be built primarily from materials that combine performance, abundance, sustainability and cost-effectiveness in ways only polyolefins can provide. The choice facing policymakers is clear: continue treating polyolefins as problems to be managed or recognize them as strategic assets enabling the clean energy future. The regions that understand this integration first will shape the global economy for decades to come. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Grand View Research. (2024). Polyolefin Market Size, Share, Growth | Industry Report, 2030. Retrieved from https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/polyolefin-market 2. Fortune Business Insights. (2024). Polyolefin Market Size, Share & Growth | Global Report [2032]. Retrieved from https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/polyolefin-market-102373 3. Plastics Europe. (2025). Polyolefins. Retrieved from https://plasticseurope.org/plastics-explained/a-large-family/polyolefins-2/ 4. European Commission. (2025). Clean Industrial Deal. Retrieved from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en 5. European Commission. (2022). Circular economy action plan. Retrieved from https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en 6. Watkins, E., & Schweitzer, J.P. (2018). Moving towards a circular economy for plastics in the EU by 2030. Institute for European Environmental Policy. Retrieved from https://ieep.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Think-2030-A-circular-economy-for-plastics-by-2030-1. 7. Institute of Sustainable Studies (2025). EU Circular Economy Act aims to double circularity rate by 2030 EU Circular Economy Act – Institute of Sustainability Studies 8. López-Escalante, M.C., et al. (2016). Polyolefin as PID-resistant encapsulant material in PV modules. Solar Energy Materials and Solar Cells, 144, 691-699. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927024815005206 9. PE100+ Association. (2014). Polyolefin Sewer Pipes – 100 Year Lifetime Expectancy. Retrieved from https://www.pe100plus.com/PPCA/Polyolefin-Sewer-Pipes-100-Year-Lifetime-Expectancy-p1430.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BERLIN — German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said Tuesday that their countries would enhance collaboration on defense and critical minerals. “We are deepening our bilateral cooperation, and we are doing so with great gratitude and deep conviction,” Merz said during a joint press conference with Carney in Berlin. “Canada and Germany have a great deal in common.” The further cooperation comes as U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs hit both countries hard, while they also aim to shift their industries away from reliance on Russia and China. The countries’ economy ministers, looking toward that purpose, were set to sign an agreement on critical minerals, which was seen by POLITICO. The accord will focus on the development of lithium, rare earth elements, copper tungsten, gallium, germanium and nickel to counter China’s monopolistic control of materials needed to power everything from military equipment and electric vehicles to quantum computing. “One of the big vulnerabilities that’s been exposed by the Ukraine war, it was exposed by Covid, it’s been exposed by the changing global trade dynamics, [is] our vulnerabilities in supply chains including in critical metals and minerals,” said Carney. “Canada can play a role in accelerating that diversification for Germany and for Europe.” Just like Brussels, Berlin is keen to slash its dependence on China for the so-called critical minerals needed to power the bloc’s green, digital and defense ambitions. Ottawa is an attractive partner to achieve that — Canada has some 200 mines extracting a variety of minerals and metals, many of which are classified as critical raw materials. A number of Canadian Cabinet members, including Defense Minister David McGuinty, Industry Minister Mélanie Joly and Energy Minister Tim Hodgson traveled alongside Carney to Berlin. Carney announced he would visit Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems in the northern German city of Kiel later Tuesday, alongside Joly and McGuinty, while Hodgson was set to deliver a major speech to CEOs from the energy, manufacturing and defense industries. “We’re in the process of renewing our submarine fleet,” Carney said, adding that Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems was one of the two finalists to take on the project. Carney and Merz also said they discussed security guarantees for Ukraine, but did not provide concrete details. Camille Gijs contributed to this report from Brussels.

ATHENS — The European Union is investigating potential misuse of at least €11.9 million of EU funds in a recycling project in Greece, as the country’s notorious struggle to meet Brussels’ waste management standards shows no sign of ending. The probe follows EU-commissioned reports by Greek auditors that found irregularities with how much the project cost and how it’s run.   One of the reports, seen by POLITICO, found several problems with the way the recycling centers operate, including a total lack of controls over what happens to the waste that is collected. The EU investigation, led by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, comes on the back of Greece’s long-standing issues with implementing EU laws on waste management, which have resulted in massive fines imposed on the Mediterranean country. The project in question is a set of “recycling units” or kiosks built by Greek recycling company TEXAN and spread out across the Attica, Peloponnese and Crete regions. Locals can get money back for recycling plastic, metal and glass items in these kiosks that aren’t packaging. “There is no information from [Attica waste management body] EDSNA on what happens to the waste after their collection, except for a report on its placement in a TEXAN storage facility for the year 2023,” the report seen by POLITICO reads, adding that not all storage units have been installed. EPPO’s investigation is based on the findings of the audit committee’s reports, among other documents, according to an official familiar with the case. The €220 million project was co-financed by the EU via a European Operational Program.   In 2023, the financial audit committee had slapped a €2.9 million refund penalty on EDSNA after finding “serious irregularities” with the purchasing contract awarded to TEXAN. The company had won the tender for the project despite suggesting that the kiosks would be around five times more expensive than what it could cost based on market prices.  Greece is also on track to fail on its obligation to recycle 55 percent of municipal waste and 65 percent of packaging waste this year. | Orestis Panagiotou/EPA “It cannot be confirmed whether EDSNA investigated what a reasonable budget for the recycling centers would be, given that the market research it conducted and referred to, did not concern at least two independent [companies], but two [companies] with a common interest and an exclusive relationship, which then, of course, submitted the only bid in the tender in question and won the contract,” a separate report said, according to local media reports at the time.  Following the second audit, completed in July and first revealed by Greece’s newspaper Kathimerini, a second €3 million fine was imposed, half the amount of EU funds used for the recycling centers in the three regions, as the report notes.  BAD STUDENTS  Greece’s poor track record with recycling and respecting EU laws on waste is notorious.   According to 2022 data from the European statistical office Eurostat, the municipal waste recycling rate in Greece hovered around 17 percent, compared to the EU average of 49 percent.  Greece is also on track to fail on its obligation to recycle 55 percent of municipal waste and 65 percent of packaging waste this year, the European Commission found in its 2025 environmental implementation review. The country had already “missed the 2020 target to recycle 50 percent of its municipal waste by a great margin” the review says.   In the EU, Greece is one of five members paying fines for not complying with environmental policies. To date, the country has sent about €230 million to Brussels to make up for these violations, according to the review.   Out of the 19 open infringement cases against Greece on environmental matters, six are related to waste management, from illegal landfilling to not properly applying laws on packaging waste. Local NGOs, meanwhile, have repeatedly warned of systemic disorders in the sector.  

Arms aloft, the president of the United Nations Environment Assembly triumphantly told delegates in Kenya: “Plastic pollution has grown into an epidemic. With today’s resolution, we are officially on track for a cure” in November 2023. Three years on, governments have not yet agreed on a global instrument to combat plastic waste, but the ambition and willingness remain. Success, however, is closely linked to systems change, which is urgently needed if we are to change the current trajectory.  Plastic remains closely intertwined with modern life. It keeps medicines and food safe and affordable, and it makes a vital contribution to the way we live, consume, work and travel. With it comes the issue of plastic waste. Yet, plastic waste is a solvable problem despite the scale and diversity of the challenge.   A future international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution could provide a coherent policy framework for industry, governments, civil society and financial institutions to carry out coordinated action. But that’s just the start. The key to success will be implementation of the instrument — deploying the solutions and funding the systems change needed to vastly improve waste management and increase recycling rates to drive a circular economy for plastics.  Prioritizing collaboration over compulsion  To achieve lasting change, the instrument must provide mechanisms to unlock financial support for waste management infrastructure and innovation. With an estimated $2.1 trillion needed by 2040 to eliminate plastic leakage into the environment, it is imperative that we look for innovative ways to mobilize capital from a diverse range of sources. Every dollar of capital committed to the right project can potentially catalyze ten times that amount from larger institutions.   > Every dollar of capital committed to the right project can potentially > catalyze ten times that amount from larger institutions. The Alliance to End Plastic Waste has direct experience of this. To provide just one example, we made a critical loan to a women-led social enterprise in Indonesia that allowed it to navigate equity requirements and to secure a $44.9 million Asian Development Bank loan to develop a bottle-to-bottle recycling plant in Java.  Our work on the ground has demonstrated the significant potential of coordinated action and a systems-based approach. For example, by providing our technical expertise and financial support to the ASASE Foundation — a Ghana-based social enterprise that supports women entrepreneurs in managing plastic waste collection and recycling businesses — the foundation successfully developed a functional system and became a recipient of the World Bank’s Plastic Waste Reduction-Linked Bond. The bond provides investors with a financial return linked to plastic and carbon credits expected to be generated, allowing the ASASE Foundation to benefit from financing that significantly exceeds our initial investment.  In developed countries, where we are more focused on addressing plastic waste through technology, a coordinated approach has also been pivotal to progress. HolyGrail 2.0, a digital watermarking technology that we support, is a good example of this. The imperceptible codes contained in the watermarks and printed on plastic packaging carry information about the material and can be detected by high resolution cameras in sorting facilities to increase sorting accuracy and improve the quality of material bound for recycling. The project has involved significant collaboration across the plastics value chain, involving technology providers, sorting facilities, brands and governments, enabling the technology to be successfully proven in a series of industrial trials in Europe.    Reliable and consistent definitions and reporting metrics, both heavily discussed at the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee sessions, are fundamental to the future instrument’s long-term and lasting impact. These will not only establish how much plastic is used, its purpose, the levels of waste and where it ends up, but also allow businesses and governments to develop the most impactful responses and introduce accountability.    > Reliable and consistent definitions and reporting metrics […] are fundamental > to the future instrument’s long-term and lasting impact. They will also guard against a cumbersome ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that underestimates the complexity of the plastic waste challenge and puts progress at risk. Indeed, the flexibility of countries to design action plans that acknowledge and address specific national circumstances is vital, as is the need for the treaty to encourage greater collaboration between nations and actors across the entire plastics ecosystem.  Resetting the dial  As an organization that is focused on developing and implementing solutions, we have learnt a lot over the past five years. As the world looks for how to scale practical solutions to the challenges of plastic waste, the alliance is concentrating on larger-scale efforts in the Global South where underdeveloped waste management infrastructure represents an outsized opportunity for plastic waste reduction. These programs, aligned with countries’ national priorities, will begin in India, Indonesia and South Africa — each receiving at least $100 million in collective financing. The scale of these efforts and their ability to provide a practical model that other nations can replicate will help to move countries up the recycling maturity curve.  In parallel, we will be carrying out significant efforts to tackle systemic plastic waste issues in the Global North with a focus on film and flexible plastics. Commonly used in packaging and consumer goods, flexible packaging is notoriously difficult to recycle. This is a problem for every consumer packaging goods company, retailer and municipality. The key to success will be bringing together all the different stakeholders of this complex ecosystem around a cohesive strategy.  A time for action  A fully circular economy for plastics can only be achieved through systems change. We are optimistic that the delegates at the upcoming negotiations in Geneva will create a framework to catalyze collaborative progress, but this is just one piece of the puzzle. What countries really need is the ability to implement the right solutions and infrastructure, which is only possible with cooperation across the entire plastics ecosystem.   > What countries really need is the ability to implement the right solutions and > infrastructure, which is only possible with cooperation across the entire > plastics ecosystem. More details of the Alliance’s work can be found on our website. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BRUSSELS — As Beijing asserts itself amid global trade tensions, it is playing an ace it has kept up its sleeve for decades: control over the flow of minerals Western countries desperately need to fuel their green, digital and defense ambitions.  When U.S. President Donald Trump last week hailed a draft “framework” with Beijing to end their trade dispute, he singled out China’s export controls on seven rare earth elements — minerals deemed “critical” because they are used in the production of high-tech products such as magnets used in cars. “Our deal with China is done, subject to final approval with [Chinese] President Xi and me,” Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social. “Full magnets, and any necessary rare earths, will be supplied, up front, by China.” In return, the U.S. agreed to drop plans to revoke Chinese student visas. But the situation remains tense — at the G7 summit in Canada, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen accused China of “weaponizing” its leading position in producing and refining critical raw materials. At the summit, Western leaders were expected to pledge to implement a “G7 critical minerals action plan.” But their draft statement didn’t name-check China, instead obliquely mentioning “non-market policies and practices in the critical minerals sector.” “China has the upper hand in the short term,” said Philip Andrews-Speed, senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Beijing’s export controls are “much more powerful than a tariff that Trump is putting on,” he added.  Those controls — initially imposed in April and framed as a response to Trump’s tariffs — sparked outrage and alarm among industry bosses and officials in the U.S. and across the EU. They apply to all countries, requiring companies to be granted a license for each shipment.  Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič earlier this month called the situation “alarming” for the European car industry as well as for industry more broadly. “Rare earths and permanent magnets are absolutely essential for industrial production,” he argued, with the magnets an essential component in everything from smartphones, TVs and computers to car and wind turbine engines and defense applications.  DECADES IN THE MAKING It’s a gambit Beijing has skillfully crafted for decades — and one that projected market developments are only set to buttress. China has a virtual monopoly in the sector, dominating the entire supply chain from the extraction of rare earths to their processing and the manufacture of permanent magnets.  According to the International Energy Agency, the country accounts for some 61 percent of rare earths extraction and 92 percent of refining. Moreover, it provides nearly 99 percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, as well as about 98 percent of its rare earth permanent magnets. Global demand for these minerals is expected to increase by 50 to 60 percent by 2040. “Over the last few years, China has managed to build up this kind of defence system,” said a person from the Chinese business sector, granted anonymity to speak candidly. That gives Beijing “confidence” on the international stage, they added. Back in 1987, when the U.S. still dominated mining and the metals and minerals were of far less — and certainly not “critical” — importance, then-ruler Deng Xiaoping said: “The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.” Deng, China’s most important figure from the late 1970s until his death, was at the time touring Baotou in the interior of Mongolia, China’s rare earth center.  Since then, Beijing has heavily invested in growing its monopoly and capitalizing on it.  In 2020 it overhauled its export control regime, passing an Export Control Law that largely emulates U.S. legislation. Four years later it took another step in building a domestic legal foundation by introducing export control regulations for so-called dual-use items that can be used for military and civilian purposes. It has also shown it doesn’t shy away from using these tools. In 2010 China briefly restricted rare earth exports to Japan; more recently it has imposed export restrictions on gallium, germanium and antimony (which are also deemed critical minerals) and banned the export of rare earth processing equipment.  While the person from the Chinese business sector quoted above argued that the export control system is a “tit-for-tat measure for the U.S.,” Beijing decided — in its latest move — to target all countries rather than just the U.S. That’s also leaving a mark on European industry. “All export licenses now have to be re-approved and there has been a temporary de facto export ban, meaning we are experiencing a backlog in the approval of new export licenses, which is still affecting supply chains today,” said Stefan Steinicke, a raw materials expert at the Federation of German Industries, a business lobby group. The controls not only give the Middle Kingdom more leverage in trade talks with the EU by sending a warning to Brussels not to team up with Washington — they also afford it valuable insight into rare earth supply chains. Earlier this month Beijing agreed to set up a “green channel” for European companies to speed up the approval of licenses. CATCH ME IF YOU CAN In response, industry bodies are pushing for the EU to accelerate its own efforts to diversify supply away from China, alongside pursuing diplomatic efforts. James Watson, director general at metals lobby Eurometaux, called on Brussels to “continue to invest in international cooperation,” to “support recycling efforts and the circular economy in the EU,” and to push “domestic production of certain metals in the EU.” But as keen as the EU is to play catch-up and slash its dependence on China for the minerals — as recently exemplified by its designation of several rare earth extraction and processing projects within and outside the bloc as “strategic” — it faces a mammoth task.  Rare earths aren’t as rare to find as their name suggests — they are, however, difficult to extract and refine in economically viable quantities, with all of the biggest reserves found outside the bloc’s borders.  “The outlook for substantially denting China’s dominance in the next years is pretty grim,” said Andrews-Speed, the Oxford researcher. “Twenty, 30 years ahead, anything can happen with technology and trade.”  With more minerals set to be used as levers in the future, China’s chokehold on rare earth minerals is only the beginning.  Its sway over rare earths is an “extreme case,” but China also dominates a vast array of other minerals such as lithium and cobalt and is “increasingly moving … downstream in the value chain,” said Edoardo Righetti, a researcher in the energy, resources and climate change unit at the Centre for European Policy Studies think tank.  Giorgio Leali and Koen Verhelst contributed to this report from Kananaskis, Canada. This story has been updated.

In the current debate on Europe’s industrial future, competitiveness and regulation are too often framed as being at odds. At Plastics Europe, we believe the opposite can be true: smart, evidence-based policy solution — designed with industry input and rooted in practical realities — can drive environmental progress while supporting economic resilience. The recent political agreement on the European Commission’s proposed legislation to prevent plastic pellet losses reflects this pragmatic approach to policymaking. It demonstrates how policies can be effective without being excessively burdensome, for example, by building on proven best practices and voluntary industry action. The European institutions now need to endorse the compromise reached in trialogue in early April. Plastics remain an essential material for the European economy and the green transition — from renewable energy infrastructure to electric vehicles and medical technologies. Despite the societal benefits enabled by plastics, there is a pressing need to reduce the volume of plastics pellets released to the environment. This is a complex challenge that successive European Commissions have worked to address. One example comes from Ursula von der Leyen’s presidency, which included a 30 percent reduction in microplastics released to the environment from various sources, including pellets, by 2030. These targets are ambitious but can be achieved when policy solutions are designed to work in the real world and considered through the current Commission’s prism of competitiveness. Plastic pellets play a vital role in the value chain, as they make conversion into products more energy and resource efficient. But if not properly handled, they can unintentionally escape into the environment. Hence, the Commission’s proposal for a regulation to prevent plastic pellet losses. > How the pellet loss reduction proposal has been developed, and currently > stands, is encouraging. How the pellet loss reduction proposal has been developed, and currently stands, is encouraging. It recognizes that solutions must be comprehensive and coordinated across the full value chain — from production and transport to storage, conversion and recycling. Equally, it acknowledges the diversity in how companies handle pellets. Factors like company size, facility design, level of automation, resin type and staffing all influence which mitigation measures are most effective. Given the considerable operational complexity of preventing pellet losses, there was a real risk that well-intentioned policymakers in Brussels’ offices would default to overly prescriptive solutions. Measures that could have been, at best, counterproductive when applied on-site or during transportation, and, at worst, would put European industry at a further competitive disadvantage versus the rest of the world. Instead, the recent political agreement seems to allow for tailored, risk management approaches backed by third-party auditing and certification — methods we know work from our experience with Operation Clean Sweep®, a voluntary initiative from the industry. A regulation that builds on voluntary action sends a strong message: Europe can reward and de-risk first movers and can build upon industry’s best practices. > This current downward trend is undermining Europe’s sustainability and > circularity ambitions — along with thousands of high-skilled jobs and the EU’s > strategic industrial autonomy. This is especially important as Europe’s plastics industry faces severe competitiveness pressures. Production in Europe is declining fast due to high energy costs, cheaper imports and regulatory uncertainty, which are halting novel investments in Europe. This current downward trend is undermining Europe’s sustainability and circularity ambitions — along with thousands of high-skilled jobs and the EU’s strategic industrial autonomy. Smart regulation — like the pellet loss compromise — can help ease some of these pressures. It can provide predictability, level the playing field across the value chain, and ensure that environmental protection, societal progress and industrial policy go hand-in-hand. For the environment, it marks a significant step forward by moving from voluntary efforts by some to mandatory requirements for all, ensuring consistent action across the entire value chain. Such a shift will enhance environmental protection, increase accountability and oversight, and establish more robust enforcement and a continuous improvement process. For economic operators, it enables them to meet these new obligations in an efficient and effective manner tailored to their specific circumstances. This approach also rewards early movers who have already invested in on-site pellet loss prevention measures and are well positioned to comply with the expected new regulatory requirements. > We now urge the European Parliament and Council to swiftly endorse the > compromise reached on this file. That is why we believe that the political agreement awaiting policymakers’ endorsement is a win-win. We now urge the European Parliament and Council to swiftly endorse the compromise reached on this file. Finalizing the legal text will give companies the certainty they need to invest in long-term solutions and help meet societal and environmental goals without sacrificing the EU’s industrial base. This proposal can be a model for future policymaking; one that delivers positive societal impact and helps de-risk (future) investments in Europe, without unintended consequences. It shows that with the right approach, Europe can and should be both clean and competitive. At a time when the European plastics industry is in fast decline — marked by production site closures, thousands of job losses and growing imports — any positive signal is worth celebrating. Hopefully to be continued; and fast.

BRUSSELS — Textiles, furniture, tires and mattresses will be subject to much stricter design standards to ensure they last longer, as the EU aims to stamp out wasteful consumption, the European Commission confirmed on Wednesday. Steel and aluminum will also be included in the first wave of regulations under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR), along with a range of electronic goods from mobile phones to fridges and washing machines. The ESPR is intended to embed durability, repairability and recyclability into the design of certain products, with the goal of reducing waste, improving energy efficiency, and boosting the EU’s circular economy. The framework legislation came into law last July, but requires delegated acts before it applies to specific products. The 2025-2030 working plan, adopted Wednesday, lays out a roadmap for the ESPR for the next five years, and includes a working plan for the related Energy Labelling Regulation. Chemicals, plastics and footwear had originally been included in the first wave of proposed rules, but were withdrawn earlier this year. The adoption of the working plan marks “a pivotal moment” that will “deliver significant benefits for all Europeans, create opportunities for businesses and employment, and protect the planet through proven impact on reducing emissions,” EU industry chief Stéphane Séjourné said in a statement. “These ecodesign rules apply to all products placed on our single market, regardless of their origin-country, ensuring that each of them meets the European Union’s ambitious goals,” he said. The Commission said the particular rules would now be said through delegated acts “on a product-by-product basis or for groups of similar products.”