CHIATURA, Georgia — Giorgi Neparidze, a middle-aged man from near the town of Chiatura in western Georgia, still has marks on his lips from where he sewed his mouth shut during a hunger strike last year. He says Georgian Manganese, a mining company with close links to the government, has wrought environmental devastation around his home and has ignored the rights of its workers. He is seeking compensation.  Europe, which imports Georgia’s manganese, is partly to blame for the black rivers and collapsing houses in Chiatura district, Neparidze says. The former miner-turned-environmental and civil rights activist claims that in one village, Shukruti, toxic dust from the pits is making people unwell. Filthy black water, laced with heavy metals, periodically spurts out of pumps there. Houses are collapsing as the tunnels underneath them cave in.  Manganese, a black metal traditionally used to reinforce steel, is crucial for Europe’s green energy transition as it is used in both wind turbines and electric car batteries. The metal is also vital for military gear like armor and guns. In 2022, the European Union bought 20,000 metric tons of manganese alloys from Georgia — almost 3 percent of its total supply. A year later the bloc added manganese to its list of critical minerals. But Chiaturans say their lives are being ruined so that Western Europeans can breathe cleaner air. “We are sacrificed so that others can have better lives,” Neparidze says. “There are only 40,000 people in Chiatura. They might feel ill or live in bad conditions but they are sacrificed so that millions of Europeans can have a cleaner environment.” Neparidze says cancer rates in the region are unusually high. Doctors at a hospital in Chiatura back up the observation, but no official study has linked the illnesses to the mines. An aerial view of Chiatura with the polluted Kvirila River running through the town | Olivia Acland Hope that things will improve appears dim. European companies often don’t know where their manganese is sourced from. As ANEV, Italy’s wind energy association, confirms: “There is no specific obligation to trace all metals used in steel production.”  Last year the EU enacted a law that was meant to change that. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive obliges companies to run closer checks on their supply chains and clamp down on any human rights violations, poor working conditions and environmental damage.  But barely a year after it took effect, the European Commission proposed a major weakening of the law in a move to reduce red tape for the bloc’s sluggish industry. EU member countries, motivated by this deregulation agenda, are now pushing for even deeper cuts, while French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz want to get rid of the law altogether.  Meanwhile, Europe’s appetite for mined raw materials like manganese, lithium, rare earths, copper and nickel is expected to skyrocket to meet the needs of the clean energy transition and rearmament. Many of these resources are in poorly regulated and often politically repressive jurisdictions, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Indonesia and Georgia. Weakening the EU supply chain law will have consequences for communities like Neparidze’s. “Only an empty shell of the directive remains,” says Anna Cavazzini, a member of the European Parliament’s Green Party, adding that the legislature caved to pressure from businesses seeking to reduce their costs. “Now is not the time to abandon the defense of human rights and give corporations a free hand,” she says.  A resident of Chiatura standing on a collapsed house following a mining-related landslide in Itkhvisi village. | Olivia Acland As Georgia’s government pivots toward Russia and stifles dissent, life is becoming increasingly dangerous for activists in Chiatura. On April 29, four activists including Neparidze were arrested for allegedly assaulting a mine executive. A statement put out by Chiatura Management Company, the firm in charge of staffing Georgian Manganese’s underground operations, says that Tengiz Koberidze, manager of the Shukruti mine, was “verbally abused and pelted with stones.” Supporters call it a staged provocation in which Koberidze tried to incite violence, and say it’s part of a broader campaign to silence resistance. If convicted they face up to six years behind bars. Koberidze did not respond to requests for comment. Chiatura residents are protesting over two overlapping issues. On one side, miners are demanding safer working conditions underground, where tunnel collapses have long been a risk, along with higher wages and paid sick leave. When the mine was temporarily shut in October 2024, they were promised 60 percent of their salaries, but many say those payments never materialized. Workers are also raising concerns about mining pollution in the region. “The company doesn’t raise wages, doesn’t improve safety, and continues to destroy the natural environment. Its profits come not just from extracting resources, but from exploiting both workers and the land,” says one miner, David Chinchaladze. Georgian Manganese did not respond to interview requests or written questions. Officials at Georgia’s Ministry of Mines and the government’s Environment Protection and Natural Resources Department did not respond to requests for comment. A collapsing building in Shukruti. | Olivia Acland.  The second group of protesters comes from the village of Shukruti, which sits directly above the mining tunnels. Their homes are cracking and sinking into the ground. In 2020, Georgian Manganese pledged to pay between 700,000 and 1 million Georgian lari ($252,000 to $360,000) annually in damages — a sum that was meant to be distributed among residents. But while the company insists the money has been paid, locals — backed by watchdog NGO Social Justice — say otherwise. According to them, fewer than 5 percent of Shukruti’s residents have received any compensation.  Their protest has intensified in the last year, with workers now blocking the roads and Shukruti residents barring entry to the mines. But the risks are intensifying too. Since suspending EU accession talks last year amid deteriorating relations with the bloc, Georgia’s ruling party has shuttered independent media, arrested protestors and amplified propaganda. The country’s democracy is “backsliding,” says Irakli Kavtaradze, head of the foreign department of the largest opposition political party, United National Movement. Their tactics “sound like they come from a playbook that is written in the Kremlin,” he adds. ‘KREMLIN PLAYBOOK’ In the capital Tbilisi, around 200 kilometers east of Chiatura, protesters have taken to the streets every night since April 2, 2024 when the government unveiled a Kremlin-style “foreign agents” law aimed at muzzling civil society.  Many demonstrators wear sunglasses, scarfs and masks to shield their identities from street cameras, wary of state retaliation.  A scene from the 336th day of protests in Tbilisi in April 2025. | Olivia Acland. Their protests swelled in October last year after the government announced it would suspend talks to join the EU. For Georgians, the stakes are high: Russia already occupies 20 percent of the country after its 2008 invasion, and people fear that a more profound drift from the EU could open the door to further aggression. When POLITICO visited in April, a crowd strode down Rustaveli Avenue, the city’s main artery. Some carried EU flags while others passed around a loudspeaker, taking it in turns to voice defiant chants. “Fire to the oligarchy!” one young woman yelled, the crowd echoing her call. “Power lies in unity with the EU!” another shouted. They also called out support for protestors in Chiatura, whose fight has become something of a cause célèbre across the country: “Solidarity to Chiatura! Natural resources belong to the people!”  The fight in Chiatura is a microcosm of the country’s broader struggle: The activists are not just taking on a mining company but a corporate giant backed by oligarchs and the ruling elites.  Georgian Manganese’s parent company, Georgian American Alloys, is registered in Luxembourg and counts Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky as a shareholder. He is in custody in Kyiv over allegations that he hired a gang to kill a lawyer who threatened his business interests in 2003. Kolomoisky has also been sanctioned by the United States for his alleged involvement in siphoning billions out of PrivatBank, Ukraine’s largest bank.  Giorgi Kapanadze — a businessman closely connected with the ruling Georgian Dream party of Bidzina Ivanishvili — is listed as general manager of Georgian American Alloys.  Until recently, Kapanadze owned Rustavi TV, a channel notorious for airing pro-government propaganda. The European Parliament has called on the EU to hit Kapanadze with sanctions, accusing him of propping up the country’s repressive regime. Kolomoisky and Kapanadze did not respond to POLITICO’s requests for comment. The government swooped in to help Georgian Manganese in 2016 when a Georgian court fined it $82 million for environmental destruction in the region. The state placed it under “special management” and wrote off the fine. A new government-appointed manager was tasked, on paper, with cleaning up the mess. He was supposed to oversee a cleanup of the rivers that flow past the mines, among other promises. Manganese mining pit in Chiatura region, Georgia. | Olivia Acland But POLITICO’s own tests based on four samples taken in April 2025 from the Kvirila River, which runs through Chiatura, as well as its tributary, the Bogiristiskali, which were examined in a U.K. licensed laboratory, show the manganese levels in both rivers are over 10 times the legal limit. Iron levels are also higher than legally permitted. Locals use the polluted water to irrigate their crops. Fishermen are also pulling in increasingly empty nets as the heavy metals kill off aquatic life, according to local testimonies. The water from the Kvirila River flows out into the Black Sea, home to endangered dolphins, sturgeons, turtles and sharks.  A 2022 analysis by the Georgian NGO Green Policy found even worse results, with manganese in the Kvirila River averaging 42 times the legal limit. The group also detected excessive levels of iron and lead. Chronic manganese exposure can lead to irreversible neurological damage — a Parkinson’s-like condition known as manganism — as well as liver, kidney and reproductive harm. Lead and iron are linked to organ failure, cancer and cardiovascular disease. On Georgian Manganese’s website, the company concedes that “pollution of the Kvirila River” is one of the region’s “ecological challenges,” attributing it to runoff from manganese processing. It claims to have installed German-standard purification filters and claims that “neither polluted nor purified water” currently enters the river. Protesters like Neparidze aren’t convinced. They claim the filtration system is turned on only when inspectors arrive and that for the rest of the time, untreated wastewater is dumped straight into the rivers. BLOCKING EXPORTS Their protests having reaped few results, Chiaturans are taking increasingly extreme measures to make their voices heard.  Gocha Kupatadze, a retired 67-year-old miner, spends his nights in a tarpaulin shelter beside an underground mine, where he complains that rats crawl over him. “This black gold became the black plague for us,” he says. “We have no choice but to protest.” Kupatadze’s job is to ensure that manganese does not leave the mine. Alongside other protesters he has padlocked the gate to the generator that powers the mine’s ventilation system, making it impossible for anyone to work there. Kupatadze says he is only resorting to such drastic measures because conditions in his village, Shukruti, have become unlivable. His family home, built in 1958, is now crumbling, with cracks in the walls as the ground beneath it collapses from years of mining. The vines that once sustained his family’s wine-making traditions have long since withered and died. Gocha Kupatadze, an activist sleeping in a tarpaulin tent outside a mine. | Olivia Acland. For over a year, protesters across the region have intermittently blocked mine entrances as well as main roads, determined to stop the valuable ore from leaving Chiatura. In some ways it has worked: Seven months ago, Chiatura Management Company, the firm in charge of staffing Georgian Manganese’s underground operations, announced it would pause production.  “Due to the financial crisis that arose from the radical protests by the people of Shukruti village, the production process in Chiatura has been completely halted,” it read. Yet to the people of Chiatura, this feels more like a punishment than a triumph.  Manganese has been extracted from the area since 1879 and many residents rely on the mines for their livelihoods. The region bears all the hallmarks of a mining town that thrived during the Soviet Union when conditions in the mines were much better, according to residents. Today, rusted cable cars sway above concrete buildings that house washing stations and aging machinery.   While locals had sought compensation for the damage to their homes, they now just find themselves out of work.  Soviet-era buildings and mining infrastructure around Chiatura. | Olivia Acland.  Making matters worse, Georgian Manganese, licensed to mine 16,430 hectares until 2046, is now sourcing much of its ore from open pits instead of underground mines. These are more dangerous to the communities around them: Machines rip open the hillsides to expose shallow craters, while families living next to the pits say toxic dust drifts off them into their gardens and houses.  MORE PITS The village of Zodi is perched on a plateau surrounded by gently undulating hills, 10 kilometers from Chiatura. Many of its residents rely on farming, and cows roam across its open fields. “It is a beautiful village with a unique microclimate which is great for wine-making,” says Kote Abdushelishvili, a 36-year-old filmmaker from Zodi.  Mining officials say the village sits on manganese reserves. In 2023, caterpillar trucks rolled into Zodi and began ripping up the earth. Villagers, including Abdushelishvili, chased them out. “We stopped them,” he says, “We said if you want to go on, you will have to kill us first.” A padlocked gate to the mine’s ventilation system. | Olivia Acland Abdushelishvili later went to Georgian Manganese’s Chiatura office to demand a meeting with the state-appointed special manager. When he was turned away, he shouted up to the window: “You can attack us, you can kill us, we will not stop.” Two days later, as Abdushelishvili strolled through a quiet neighborhood in Tbilisi, masked men jumped out of a car, slammed him to the pavement and beat him up. Despite the fierce resistance in Chiatura, Georgian Manganese continues to send its metal to European markets. In the first two months of 2025, the EU imported 6,000 metric tons of manganese from Georgia. With the bloc facing mounting pressures — from the climate crisis to new defense demands — its hunger for manganese is set to grow. As the EU weakens its corporate accountability demands and Georgia drifts further into authoritarianism, the voices of Chiatura’s people are growing even fainter.  “We are not asking for something unreasonable,” says activist Tengiz Gvelesiani, who was recently detained in Chiatura along with Neparidze, “We are asking for healthy lives, a good working environment and fresh air.” Georgian Manganese did not respond to requests for comment. This article was developed with the support of Journalismfund Europe.

Mr. Marcin Laskowski | via PGE The European Union finds itself navigating an era of extraordinary challenges. From defending our shared values against authoritarian aggression to preserving unity in the face of shifting geopolitical landscapes, the EU is once again being tested. Covid-19, the energy crisis, the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine and renewed strains in international relations have taught us a simple lesson: a strong Europe needs capable leaders, resilient institutions and, above all, stable yet flexible financial frameworks. The debate on the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) is therefore not only about figures. It is, fundamentally, a debate about Europe’s security, resilience and its future. From the perspective of the power sector, the stakes are particularly high. Electricity operators live every day with the consequences of EU regulation, carrying both the costs of compliance and the opportunities of EU investment support. Data confirms that European funds channeled into the electricity sector generate immense value for the EU economy and consumers alike. Why? Because electrification is the backbone of Europe’s industrial transformation. The Clean Industrial Deal makes it clear: within a few short years, Europe must raise the electrification rate of its economy by 50 percent — from today’s 21.3 percent to 32 percent by 2030. That means the future of sectors as diverse as chemicals, steel, food processing and high-tech manufacturing is, in reality, a debate about electrification. If this transition is not cost-effective, Europe risks eroding its global competitiveness rather than strengthening it. > That means the future of sectors as diverse as chemicals, steel, food > processing and high-tech manufacturing is, in reality, a debate about > electrification. Electrification is also central to REPowerEU — Europe’s pledge to eliminate dependence on Russian fossil fuels. It is worth recalling that in 2024 the EU still paid more to Russia for oil and gas (€21 billion) than it provided in financial support to Ukraine (€19 billion). Only a massive scale-up of clean, domestic electricity can reverse this imbalance once and for all. But this requires a fresh approach. For too long, the power sector has been seen only through the lens of its own transition. Yet without power sector, no other sector will decarbonize successfully. Already today, electricity accounts for 30 percent of EU emissions but has delivered 75 percent of the reductions achieved from the Emissions Trading Scheme. As electrification accelerates, the sector — heavily reliant on weather-dependent renewables — faces growing costs in ensuring security of supply and system stability. This is why investments must also focus on infrastructure that directly enhances security and resilience, including dual-use solutions such as underground cabling of electricity distribution grids, mobile universal power supply systems for high/medium/low voltage, and advanced cyber protection. These are not luxuries, but prerequisites for a power system capable of withstanding shocks, whether geopolitical, climatic or digital. > For too long, the power sector has been seen only through the lens of its own > transition. Yet without power sector, no other sector will decarbonize > successfully. The European Commission estimates that annual investment needs in the power sector will reach €311 billion from 2031— nearly ten times more than the needs of industry sector. This is an unavoidable reality. The critical question is how to mobilize this capital in a way that is least burdensome for citizens and businesses. If mishandled, it could undermine Europe’s industrial competitiveness, growth and jobs. The MFF alone cannot deliver this transformation. Yet it can, and must, be a vital part of the solution. The European Parliament rightly underlined that completing the Energy Union and upgrading energy infrastructure requires continued EU-level financing. In its July proposal, the Commission earmarked 35 percent of the next budget — about €700 billion — for climate and environmental action. These funds must be allocated in a technology-neutral way, systematically covering generation, transmission, distribution and storage. Public-good investments such as power grids — especially local and regional distribution networks — should be treated as a top priority, enabling small and medium-sized enterprises and households to deploy renewables, access affordable energy and reduce energy poverty. > The debate is not only about money, it is also about the way it is spent. The debate is not only about money, it is also about the way it is spent.  A cautious approach is needed to the “money for reforms” mechanism. EU funds for energy transition must not be judged through unrelated conditions. Support for investments in energy projects must not be held hostage to reforms not linked to energy or climate. This caution should also apply to extending the “do no significant harm” principle to areas outside the scope of the Taxonomy Regulation, where it risks adding unnecessary complexity, administrative burden and uncertainty. The focus must remain firmly on delivering the infrastructure and investments needed for decarbonization and security. Moreover, EU budget rules must align with state aid frameworks, particularly the General Block Exemption Regulation, and reflect the long lead times required for power sector investments. At the same time, Europe cannot afford to lose public trust. The green transition will not succeed if imposed against citizens; it must be built with them. Europe needs more carrots, not more sticks. The next EU budget, therefore, must be more than a financial plan. It must be a strategic instrument to strengthen resilience, sovereignty and competitiveness, anchored in the electrification of Europe’s economy. Without it, we risk not only missing our climate targets but also undermining the very security and unity that the EU exists to defend.

BERLIN — Friedrich Merz’s historic spending plan for Germany hinges on the cooperation of a party many of his conservatives have often derided. It’s the Greens — the defeated, center-left party that came in fourth place in the Feb. 23 election — that hold the power to foil the election winner’s grand plans. And the party seems intent on either stopping Merz in what would be a stunning act of political retribution — or, as is more likely, using their new and unexpected leverage to force the conservative leader to accede to many of the Green policies he’s long railed against. On Monday, Green leaders upped the ante, vowing to reject the paradigm-shifting deal Merz and his conservative alliance struck with the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) to potentially unleash one trillion euros of new spending to bolster the military and invest heavily in the economy.  If Merz and the SPD “think that, because of the security threat posed by [Vladimir] Putin in the Kremlin — and, honestly, also Donald Trump in the White House — we will simply have to go along with this, then we reject that outright,” one of the Greens leaders, Felix Banaszak, said on Monday in Berlin. Should the Greens follow through on their repudiation of Merz’s plan, the decision would mark a stunning defeat for the chancellor-in-waiting just days after he announced a dramatic shift in German policy to embrace debt-fueled spending after many years of self-imposed austerity. More concretely, Merz and the SPD want to effectively exempt defense spending from the country’s constitutional debt brake, loosen borrowing rules for the country’s 16 states, and create a €500 billion infrastructure fund. Merz’s sense of urgency stems from the fact that he has no more than two weeks to push the package through the current parliament. If he fails, it will be even harder for him to get the votes he needs. When the newly elected Bundestag convenes by March 25 at the latest, the far-right, pro-Kremlin Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and The Left party, which opposes military spending, will have the strength to block the spending package. That means Merz is now dependent on the Greens, a party he often belittled ahead of the election, once vowing to pursue policies “for the majority of the population — those who think rationally and have all their marbles — not for some green and left-wing lunatics.” The Greens are now not particularly eager to make things easy for Merz. GREENS’ DEMANDS In particular, the Greens are demanding that Merz’s planned infrastructure fund be used for investments to speed Germany’s clean energy transition, even though Merz, ahead of the election, vowed to deprioritize climate policies. They also want a more expansive view of which defense expenditures could be exempted from the strictures of Germany’s debt brake, including military aid to Ukraine. Instead of throwing their support behind Merz’s plan for reforming the debt brake, the Greens have conceived their own draft law. Seen by POLITICO, the draft calls for defense and security spending above 1.5 percent of gross domestic product to be exempted from the restrictions of the debt brake. While Merz’s plan calls for spending above 1 percent of GDP to be exempted, the Greens’ draft sees defense spending as a far broader area, also constituting costs for intelligence services, foreign aid and counteracting cyber threats. Greens leaders in Berlin on Monday also criticized the conservative-SPD deal as lacking seriousness and “real” proposals for investment. “Who would have thought that we, as Greens, would ever have to push back against a proposal that uses debt not for investment, but to create fiscal space for other projects that have nothing to do with the future?” party co-chief Banaszak said. “Who would have thought that we, as Greens, would ever have to push back against a proposal that uses debt not for investment, but to create fiscal space for other projects that have nothing to do with the future?” party co-chief Felix Banaszak said. | Ralf Hirschberger/AFP via Getty Images Other Greens’ leaders echoed that criticism. “Anyone who wants us to agree to more investment must also show that it is really about more investment in climate protection, more investment in the economy in this country,” said Katharina Dröge, co-chair of the Greens parliamentary group. ‘RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT WON’T HAPPEN’ Behind the scenes, many of the Greens’ gripes with Merz and the SPD are personal. While the conservatives and SPD have been in intensive talks over the future of their likely coalition government, many Greens politicians are frustrated that they have been, until now, left out of the negotiations on the massive spending deal. Many Greens politicians believe that they’re being presented with Merz’s plan as if it were a fait accompli, according to multiple people within the party. While the Greens’ strong rejection of Merz’s plan on Monday appeared to take many conservative and SPD leaders by surprise, they also continued to express optimism that they could reach an agreement with the Greens within days. The parliamentary leaders of the Greens were set to meet with Merz and SPD co-leader Lars Klingbeil on Monday evening to try to hash out the outlines of an agreement. “The top priority for me and Friedrich Merz in the coming days is that we achieve something together and I am not giving up the confidence that we can succeed,” Klingbeil told reporters on Monday. Because Merz’s deal with the SPD is made up out of three separate constitutional amendments — and thus three separate votes — it’s possible that only parts of the deal eventually make it through parliament. That, however, is something the conservatives and SPD want to avoid.  In the end, the promise of massive investment for defense and infrastructure — policies the Greens have long pushed for — may well prove too attractive for the Greens to reject the package outright. While the Greens are using their leverage to force Merz to make concessions, conservative lawmakers are also pressuring the Greens, arguing that failure to act now would damage Germany at one of the most sensitive moments in the country’s postwar history, with the transatlantic relationship on the rocks and Russian forces slowly gaining ground in Ukraine. “Anyone who considers not agreeing also bears responsibility for what won’t happen,” Thomas Silberhorn, a conservative lawmaker told POLITICO. “We clearly expect the Greens to assume their political responsibility for the security of our country even if they are entering into opposition.”

John Kampfner is a British author, broadcaster and commentator. His latest book “In Search of Berlin” is published by Atlantic. He is a regular POLITICO columnist. This is a tale of two cities, two streets and an unlikely divergence that speaks volumes about the state of politics in Europe today. Parisian authorities are forging ahead with plans to make the city 100 percent navigable by bike. On the Rue de Rivoli, one can pedal serenely in the knowledge that one lane is solely for cyclists, the other reserved for buses. Meanwhile, in Berlin, the first major decision taken by the incoming senate was to reopen one of the most famous thoroughfares, which had been partially closed off to vehicles. On Friedrichstrasse, where one could previously drink a coffee on wide wooden benches in the middle of the road, the cars have returned. So, as Germany heads to the polls on Feb. 23, the country once seen as a climate trailblazer is now in danger of becoming a laggard. And the Christian Democrats (CDU) — the party almost certain to lead the next government — is on a mission to dilute environmental targets, with leader Friedrich Merz framing all things green through the now-familiar “woke” and “anti-growth” lens. It’s no coincidence that environmental policies were barely mentioned in the first televised election debate between the CDU leader and Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Instead, the questions ranged from migration — which dominated the discourse — to cost of living, kindergarten locations and an arcane battle over the use of gender in the German language. In a recent stump speech in Bochum, the industrial heartlands of the Ruhr, Merz had already stated that the economic policy of recent years had been geared “almost exclusively toward climate protection. I want to say it clearly as I mean it: We will and we must change that.” Along these lines, the chancellor-in-waiting has vowed to scrap subsidies for environmentally friendly heat pumps (which brought the Greens so much political trouble last year). He has also described wind turbines as “ugly,” and vowed to bring back nuclear energy. Of course, some of this is clearly performative — technologically speaking, a nuclear comeback won’t happen — but it is central to Merz’s strategy to give the CDU a more distinctive conservative direction after the centrist era of former Chancellor Angela Merkel. And just how far he goes in rolling back some of the progress will depend on the party’s eventual coalition partner. Friedrich Merz is framing all things green through the now-familiar “woke” and “anti-growth” lens. | Maja Hitij/Getty Images As it stands, an alliance with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) — without Scholz — seems the most likely outcome, not least because they’re less likely to stand in Merz’s way on the environmental front. Across the Western world, the green movement is on a downward slide. It isn’t just the case in Donald Trump’s America — U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has signaled a British version of “grow, baby, grow” by approving plans to expand three of London’s airports. And though the mayor of Paris is pushing hard to green the capital city, French President Emmanuel Macron is showing far less enthusiasm than before. When Scholz assembled his “traffic light” coalition in December 2021, the Greens were a pivotal player. Having secured a record share of the vote, the party was joining the government for the first time since 2005. And as Robert Habeck — the party’s current candidate for chancellor — took over the country’s Ministry for Economic Affairs with an expanded environmental brief, expectations were high. Then, two months later, came Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Suddenly put on a war footing, Habeck’s task was to improvise a new energy policy and extricate Germany from Russia’s clutches. He was on the hunt for secure energy from anywhere, whatever the source, and that included going hat in hand to places like Qatar for supplies of LNG. The government’s record hasn’t exactly been disastrous, but it has, indeed, been patchy. It has secured some clear successes, particularly in renewable energy — wind and solar power provided 47 percent of Germany’s electricity in 2024, up from 31 percent in 2021. And emissions have steadily fallen, just not at the rate that was hoped for. As a result, Germany is expected to fail to meet its goal of cutting 65 percent of greenhouse gases by 2030, compared to 1990. According to a report by the country’s Council of Experts on Climate Change last week: “In light of the new geopolitical situation and the cyclical and structural weakness of the German economy, the conflicting objectives of climate protection policy with other policy areas are becoming increasingly apparent.” The language here is studiously diplomatic, but with the target of 1.5 degrees Celsius now a pipe dream, the commission also noted: “The comprehensive embedding of climate policy measures into an overall political strategy is now more important than ever.” The biggest problem here remains Germany’s car obsession. Too many combustion engine cars are being registered, while sales of electric vehicles fall — just like in other countries. Germany was asleep at the wheel in the first phase of electrification — one of its many failures in innovation. And as spending on infrastructure atrophied, the unreliability of the once-envied Deutsche Bahn has become embedded in the national psyche, leading more people to return to the roads. It would be unfair to suggest Merz is hostile to the green agenda, per se, but he’s using hostile rhetoric for a reason, trying to portray the cause as inimical to economic recovery. Truth is, he’ll only get so far. Many targets have already been embedded into the German economy and cannot be unpicked. Whether part of the next government or in opposition, the Greens aren’t going to just disappear — even as the Left party appears to have swallowed up a chunk of the Green vote in recent weeks. Indeed, the party has fallen from its high of 15 percent, but not by much. Acknowledging just how much the mood has turned, though, even the Greens themselves don’t mention climate protection that much on the campaign trail. They’d rather talk about housing and health care instead. Meanwhile, Habeck is caught in between, the whipping boy for both sides, denounced as metropolitan and “woke” by populists and as a sellout by the left. Much of the movement’s impetus has dissipated — for the moment at least.  

Jean Pisani-Ferry and Simone Tagliapietra are senior fellows at Bruegel. Laurence Tubiana is the CEO of the European Climate Foundation. Since European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was reelected last July, her message on the future of the green transition has been clear and consistent: We will stay the course on the goals of the European Green Deal, and will put forward a strong Clean Industrial Deal — marrying decarbonization with industrial competitiveness — in order to ensure this happens. And with the new administration in Washington, delivering on these two promises is more important than ever. U.S. President Donald Trump’s fossil-fuel agenda might be in America’s interest, but it certainly has no content for a fossil-fuel poor continent like Europe. And accelerating decarbonization is the only structural way to reduce the bloc’s energy costs and increase energy security. It’s also important to remember that while the Trump presidency poses new challenges, it presents new opportunities as well — starting with the clean tech sector, which it has thrown into deep uncertainty. Europe has the potential to play an important role here, but it will have to move fast, and be smart and more united than before. The new Competitiveness Compass is a first step in this direction, identifying the Clean Industrial Deal as one of the three pillars of the EU’s new competitiveness strategy, alongside innovation and economic security. However, it’s high time the EU turned its strategic planning into real action. We will, of course, gain more clarity as to what lies ahead when the Clean Industrial Deal and the Omnibus Simplification Package are finally launched on Feb. 26. They will tell us just how far the EU is willing to go to deliver on von der Leyen’s green promises. And considering ongoing tensions between those who want to maintain Europe’s climate ambitions and those who would like to give the matter a substantial rethink — or “pause” — we can’t take the outcome for granted. That’s why, ahead of the expected flurry of proposals, we would like to suggest two key areas of focus that might help untangle the bloc’s direction of travel. First, when it comes to the Clean Industrial Deal, we suggest looking at financing. Simply put, it’s impossible to have a solid clean industrial strategy without credible investment to underpin it. Building on previous Commission analyses, we can estimate that delivering the deal’s objectives might entail additional annual investments to the order of €50 billion by 2030. And though this figure appears substantial, it might actually be quite conservative, as it doesn’t take into consideration the potential cost of escalating global trade tensions or the re-skilling programs necessary for workers during the transition. The private sector is expected to deliver most of the investment needed, but the public sector will continue to play an important role in de-risking and helping to unleash private capital. And doing so will be arduous, as both EU and national policymakers are set to face growing constraints, like the end of the NextGenerationEU recovery package, the lack of a green carve-out in the bloc’s reformed fiscal framework, and increasing pressure to refocus public resources on defense. That’s why the Clean Industrial Deal can’t come up empty handed on this. It can’t limit itself to general pledges on the future budget either — the new cycle won’t start until 2028, and it will already be an uphill battle to retain the current minimum share of climate-related spending. It needs be equipped with immediate financial firepower. Trump presidency poses new challenges, it presents new opportunities as well — starting with the clean tech sector. | Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images Next, with the Omnibus Simplification Package, we recommend examining whether or not “simplification” equates to dismantling green regulations. Reopening the core text of important green regulations — things like the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive or the Taxonomy Regulation — would inevitably water down these provisions substantially. It would hit investors who promptly started adapting to the new regulatory framework, as well as third countries that already started following the EU’s lead. Essentially, it would compromise the long-term regulatory stability and policy credibility that’s key for private investors. Therefore, it would be wiser for the Commission to focus on targeted actions at the technical level of these regulations instead — making the overall framework simpler, clearer and thus more effective. This package might be domestic, but it will have international repercussions in terms of the credibility of Europe’s climate policy. Watering down these provisions would cause major reputational damage to the EU — and it would fuel global anti-climate policy impulses at a time when the bloc must lead global climate momentum to fill the gap left by Trump.

LONDON — Nigel Farage’s Reform UK is surging in the polls. Buoyed by a trip to Washington for Donald Trump’s inauguration, the populist leader boasts he will be the U.K.’s next prime minister. Now he and his insurgent party, best known for staking out populist positions on immigration and cultural issues, have found a new way to gun for the Labour government: net zero. The U.K. is embarking on a “clean energy sprint” to bring down its carbon emissions, Energy Secretary Ed Miliband has promised, which means investing billions in green tech as well as moving rapidly to approve vast solar and wind farms and ban new gas drilling licenses. Green advocates say this is much-needed global climate leadership. Miliband’s political opponents paint it as expensive and divisive at a time when hard-pressed voters want the government to back off from their lives. Farage spies a political opportunity. “I think net zero is going to be an absolute catastrophe, electorally, for Labour,” he told the BBC in December. The rush to go green is “going to be a defining feature of the debate, I think — the political debate, locally and nationally, from now until the next election,” Reform Deputy Leader Richard Tice told POLITICO in an interview. That will be, in part, because his party puts it there. Miliband’s policies make him “the most dangerous man in Britain,” Tice told the party faithful at a rally this month. Fellow Reform MP Lee Anderson, speaking at the same event, branded Miliband “a lunatic.” UP AND UP Reform — which delivered five MPs to parliament in last summer’s general election — has pledged to scrap the country’s legally binding target of net zero carbon emissions by 2050 and ditch subsidies for clean tech companies. It backs more drilling for planet-warming fossil fuels in the North Sea. Tice said recent flooding in the U.K. had “nothing to do” with climate change — a view sharply at odds with climate science. These positions are not shared by voters, the majority of whom believe climate change is one of the biggest issues the country faces. They broadly support ministers’ plans for big, climate-friendly investments, according to polling by YouGov. Parties like the Greens, which have even stronger climate goals than Labour, also made gains in July. “It is definitely true that Reform voters prioritize climate change less than other groups of voters, but they also don’t vote Reform for that reason,” argued Luke Tryl, director of the think tank More in Common.  The U.K. is embarking on a “clean energy sprint” to bring down its carbon emissions, Energy Secretary Ed Miliband has promised. | Sean Gallup/Getty Images Instead, the party has found a way to weaponize green policy by tying it to an issue on which the government is already vulnerable: Sky-high energy bills. Labour frontbenchers, including Miliband, pledged during the election campaign to cut bills by up to £300 a year. Instead, energy costs have increased steadily since they took office and are set to rise again this spring. (Labour is now reluctant to repeat the £300 commitment.) Tice, whose party finished second to Labour in 89 seats last summer, is alive to the political opening. “It [net zero] is driving up bills,” he said. “January’s bill’s gone up, April’s bill is going to go up.” If bills don’t fall like Labour promised, “people are going to be very angry,” he predicted at the end of last year. By contrast, Reform’s net zero policies would save “over £30 billion pounds a year of taxpayers’ cash,” Tice claimed. The party did not respond to repeated queries about how it arrived at the number. ‘DO PEOPLE FEEL IT IS AFFORDABLE?’ Experts agree that moving away from volatile fossil fuel markets is key to cutting energy costs in the long-term. U.K. bills, while they include green levies, have been driven up mainly by soaring global gas prices since 2022. The transition to net zero will create a “more affordable and fairer energy system for consumers,” the International Energy Agency said. But that involves complicated policy trade-offs around those levies — which push up electricity costs to pay for other climate-friendly schemes — and overhauling electricity market pricing. In the meantime, said Tryl, Labour could leave the door open to Reform if ministers do not find a way to get bills under control. “This is a question which is a lot less about Reform and much more about: ‘Does [the green] transition go well and do people feel it is affordable, that it is being fair, that it is giving us energy security?’” he said. “If Ed Miliband’s department manages to deliver that, there won’t be an ‘in’ for Reform,” Tryl added. But if Farage and co. can land their attacks, their approach follows a populist playbook in Europe and the U.S., where ambitious green policies have come under attack for their impact on voters’ lives. Former President Joe Biden poured billions of dollars of Investment into clean tech jobs — but it did not save his party from defeat at the hands of pro-fossil fuel Donald Trump. LABOUR NERVES Labour MPs understand the risk, said one person familiar with government thinking, granted anonymity to speak candidly. “I think it’s right to feel nervous if we don’t get bills down. But there’s every reason to believe that we will get bills down,” they said. Reform backs more drilling for planet-warming fossil fuels in the North Sea. | Ian Forsyth/Getty Images “No one’s under any illusion that we’ve got a fight on our hands with Reform on a range of issues … Absolutely, it’s not lost on us — the damage that increased energy bills did to the last government,” the same person added. Nonetheless, ministers are “making the right argument for voters,” they insisted. Some MPs vulnerable to Reform’s rise will hope such optimism is well placed. “Wages are low in South West Norfolk and costs are high,” said Terry Jermy, the Labour MP who pinched the seat from Conservative former Prime Minister Liz Truss in July. “So naturally people are very cautious about anything that might cost them money, and that includes measures to reach net zero.” Reform came third in his constituency but trailed Jermy by less than 2,000 votes. He backs the green push nonetheless. Climate change will be “just as important in four years’ time, or of even greater importance,” he said. MORE THAN BILLS Reform is seizing on public disenchantment with other aspects of the green transition, too, including unpopular plans to build hundreds of miles of overhead electricity cables, crucial to hitting net zero goals. Voters in his Skegness constituency are “furious, absolutely furious” about the prospect of new pylons, Tice said. “I do think [Labour] should be worried, and I think Reform think [net zero] is an issue that they can make political hay with,” said Scarlett Maguire, director at JL Partners polling firm. “They were keen to push this before the election. They’re keen to push it after,” she added. People must “feel better off as a result of the changes that are happening,” said Bill Esterson, a Labour MP and chair of parliament’s Energy Security and Net Zero Committee. “People will support warmer homes, cleaner air and lower bills and the net zero that will follow. But the government must make [the] case for the practical benefits of its policies and take people with it.” GREEN WEDGE  Reform isn’t just targeting Labour. There is a growing green wedge at the heart of Westminster and the party has set its sights on the opposition Conservatives. “A quarter to a third of the existing [Conservative] parliamentary party would happily scrap net zero,” Tice said. “The rest are woke Liberal Democrats who think it’s the greatest thing since sliced bread — so they’ve got a massive problem.” The Tories did not respond to a request for comment. Under new leader Kemi Badenoch — who calls herself a “net zero skeptic” — the party has shifted away from some of the green policies it adopted in government, disowning one of their party’s biggest legacies: signing the net zero target into law under Prime Minister Theresa May in 2019. That was “a mistake,” Badenoch said. The government and opposition are both still struggling to get to grips with Reform, believes Tryl. “I don’t think the other two parties have found a very good way of holding Reform to account in the way that they would one another,” he said. One key thing for the government, he argued, is not straying into a “crouchy, defensive mode” when it comes under attack over net zero. Tryl said: “If they’re going to beat Reform on this — [and] indeed if the Tories become more climate skeptic — [Labour] have got to be quite robust about: ‘This is central to our mission and making the country a better place.’” Additional reporting from Leicester by Andrew McDonald.

Børge Brende is president and CEO of the World Economic Forum. Arancha Gonzalez Laya is dean of the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po). Mark Leonard is director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Amid an unsettled geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, Europe stands at a crossroads. The strategic debate currently taking place in many of the continent’s capitals is largely focused on whether to continue down the road of interdependence with foreign partners, or to forge a new path of greater strategic autonomy. But to be truly secure today and remain well-positioned for tomorrow, Europe needs to opt for a middle ground. Embracing interconnectedness where prudent while building autonomy where it can, this is an approach that can be called “strategic interdependence.” Today, the imbalanced strategic status quo has been most salient when it comes to security. The war on Ukraine was a wake-up call, exposing Europe’s overreliance on the transatlantic partnership. But this realization doesn’t mean the EU should prioritize autonomy over alliances. U.S. nuclear deterrence and defense partnerships, including NATO, are indispensable, and Europe cannot take this defense arrangement for granted.  That’s why the bloc must become a stronger pillar within NATO — both for its own sake and for its partners. Tactical commitments to the transatlantic alliance need to be coupled with stronger European strategic structures. And one possible way to do this would be to set up an informal European Security Council, one comprising representatives from the Council of the EU and the European Commission, to streamline defense coordination and enable swift, decisive action. Meanwhile, on energy, Europe’s reliance on Russian gas revealed the perils of depending on a single provider. Before the war on Ukraine, over 40 percent of Europe’s natural gas imports came from Russia, which created a critical vulnerability. The EU has responded to the crisis by diversifying its energy imports, significantly increasing its liquefied natural gas supplies. But while this is a prudent approach in the near term, long-term resilience requires the continent to become more self-reliant on green sources. This means Europe should continue energy partnerships with allies for short-term needs, but it must also address its overreliance on external sources for green components. Instead of competing in mature technologies like solar panels, where China controls over 80 percent of global manufacturing, the EU should be targeting sectors where it can gain a competitive advantage. Emerging fields such as battery tech, where innovation is still up for grabs, are one possibility here. Moreover, to ensure stability in its green transition, a Critical Raw Materials Reserve akin to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve could act as a buffer against supply-chain shocks. When it comes to technology, Europe is losing its edge as well: 80 percent of semiconductor suppliers are located outside the bloc, while U.S. and Chinese firms are dominating AI, quantum computing and advanced chips. To turn this around, the EU must overhaul its regulatory landscape by cutting red tape, eliminating barriers and setting up one-stop shops to simplify digital compliance for businesses. Additionally, by introducing de-risking tools, such as loan guarantee programs that will facilitate investment, the bloc needs to ensure capital is flowing to critical industries. To be clear, this isn’t about a lack of money: The EU boasts a 2.5 percent of GDP annual current-account surplus, which it invests abroad. Alliances with countries around the world will be essential, including on trade where Europe must pursue an active agenda. The EU’s single market, representing 15 percent of global GDP and 450 million consumers, is its economic trump card, and Europe should use this to secure needed critical resources for its digital and green industries. Europe is losing its edge as well: 80 percent of semiconductor suppliers are located outside the bloc. | I-hwa Cheng/Getty Images Crucially, striking the right strategic balance will also necessitate human capital. Europe’s demographic clock is ticking, and by 2050, the bloc’s working-age population will shrink by 20 percent, with countries like Germany facing a gap of 7 million workers by 2035. That’s why migration policies need to be strategic and better tailored to labor-market needs. Public support hinges on reframing migration as an opportunity — a driver of innovation, labor market renewal and sustainable growth for Europe’s aging economies. Strategic interdependence is more than a policy framework, it’s a mindset — one that Europe’s leaders must embrace if they are to navigate the world as it is, not as they wish it to be. By investing in defense, accelerating the green transition, fostering innovation, deepening global trade ties and reforming migration policies, they can secure Europe’s place as a global leader. For the alternative is a fragmented, stagnant bloc, sidelined in great-power rivalries. The choice is clear: Adapt or get left behind. 

Bola Ahmed Tinubu is the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. At the United Nations Climate Change Conference COP29 in Baku, we’re set to establish a new climate finance goal — an upgrade to the $100 billion that developed nations had promised developing countries to help respond to climate change. Yet, without debt relief, injecting this capital will be like pedaling harder on a bicycle as its tires go flat. Africa is caught in a web of climate vulnerability and unsustainable debt. Of the 20 nations most threatened by the climate crisis, 17 of them are in Africa, and almost half of the continent’s countries are either in debt distress or are teetering on the brink of it. Uniquely exposed to risk, servicing past obligations is now coming at the cost of safeguarding our future. And the funds Africa requires to combat the climate crisis are fundamentally at odds with its debt burden. While some might attribute this situation to the imprudence in African governance, in truth, the total debt stock owed by all African governments is less than two-thirds of Germany’s. The continent’s average debt-to-GDP ratio is no higher than in the developed world either — it’s about half the G7 average. The issue lies not in the sum but in the structure of the debt. Most African debt is denominated in U.S. dollars. And as rising interest rates and the global flight of capital toward U.S. treasuries have strengthened the dollar, they’ve increased the debt servicing burden on African public finances. At the same time, with government revenues plunging due to Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine, many African governments were forced to refinance at steeper rates. Africa did little to cause the climate crisis, yet the debt-climate trap has saddled many of its nations with a tragic choice: Eschew repayments in order to fund adaptation to climate shocks and risk default — a financial purgatory where development indicators plummet; or honor obligations and compromise on resilience, thus entrenching vulnerability to development-shattering climate events. Of course, there’s another alternative: Take on more debt and sink even deeper into the trap. Yet, for those in need of funding, borrowing costs are typically higher than in the developed world — and prohibitively higher for those on the edge of debt distress. Even most climate aid comes in the form of loans. Is this what the architects of the Paris Agreement envisioned when they spoke of climate justice? This year alone, African governments will spend $163 billion to service debts, while receiving $30 billion for climate adaptation — that’s against annual needs of $227 billion. And unfortunately, a new, ambitious climate goal would be unlikely bridge this gap, or address the structural roots of the problem. For one, even though negotiators acknowledge the need for trillions to combat climate change, disagreements among contributors mean a figure in the hundreds of billions is much more likely — at least according to COP29 leaders. Then, once this figure is agreed upon, it must be funded. But even during a time of more significant global economic stability, developed countries failed to reach the comparatively modest figure of $100 billion. These funds must also be delivered swiftly, yet this is often a process snarled in bureaucracy. And if the private sector is supposed to make up the shortfall, unsustainable debt poses a structural impediment to such investment, as it raises perceptions of risk and, therefore, rates. Africa holds the critical minerals essential for the global energy transition. | Junior Kannah/Getty Images Given the problem’s urgency, debt relief would offer a swifter remedy. Some argue the opposite, claiming it would be complex and protracted. Yet, when fearing a wave of developing country defaults during the pandemic, the G20 was able to swiftly agree on and implement the Debt Service Suspension Initiative. Though temporary, this allowed nations to redirect their resources to the crisis at hand — it’s also a potential blueprint for future collaboration. If we are truly all in this together, a debt “haircut” now would ultimately be cheaper than the bill for reconstruction in the wake of disasters like typhoons and floods. Critically, it would also give nations greater autonomy over the measures taken to safeguard their futures. Africa contributes just 3 percent of global emissions but disproportionately bears the impacts. Meanwhile, climate finance too often skews toward projects that cut emissions rather than build resilience to climate shocks — a misallocation of resources. Expanding the fiscal space in African countries could help correct this imbalance. Climate-driven debt relief is already a familiar idea. But so far, it has only produced small-bore solutions. Debt-for-nature swaps — where lenders forgive debt in return for commitments to climate projects — have written off just $3.7 billion worldwide since the 1980s. Relief tied to specific projects for individual countries falls far short of today’s urgent needs. Africa and the wider developing world require a coordinated, large-scale approach to unlock funding at the speed and scale this moment demands.   This is sound economics and climate policy. Africa holds the critical minerals essential for the global energy transition, and nobody wants a wave of defaults that would block investment and engender instability, hampering extraction and processing. The good news is that none of this is inevitable. Africa needs relief, and the world needs Africa. 

BERLIN — Amid all the commotion over the U.S. presidential election last week, you may have missed many of the details concerning another piece of significant news: the collapse of Germany’s ruling coalition. Just hours after it became clear that Donald Trump had won the U.S. vote, sending shockwaves across Europe, Chancellor Olaf Scholz appeared before cameras to announce the end of his battered, three-way alliance in rather dramatic fashion (at least by the staid standard of German politics). Scholz’s announcement set in motion a series of events that will lead to a German snap election within months, although the exact timing isn’t yet clear. Here’s a rundown to bring you up to speed on what just happened in Germany — and what to expect next. WHY DID THE RULING COALITION FALL? Germany’s three-party ruling coalition — consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens on the left side of the political spectrum, and the fiscally conservative Free Democratic Party (FDP) on the center right — was never a match made in heaven. Both the SPD and the Greens favor a strong social safety net and big investment to speed economic growth and the green energy transition. The FDP, on the other hand, believes in less government and less spending. You may ask yourself why this triad came together in the first place. Good question! Simply put, there weren’t a lot of options given Germany’s increasingly splintered political landscape, as the rise of upstart parties has made it more difficult for the big-tent parties — the SPD and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) — to form two-party coalition governments. The fragmentation has worsened with the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, now polling in second place nationally, and will continue with the arrival of populist-left newcomer Alliance Sarah Wagenknecht (BSW). Post-war Germany hasn’t had much experience of larger coalitions (Scholz’s fallen triad was the first three-way alliance in over six decades), but the ongoing division may make such coalitions — which tend to be more volatile — the new norm. The key moment in the early demise of Scholz’s coalition came a year ago, when Germany’s top court handed down a bombshell ruling that ended a workaround the government had been using to spend money without violating the country’s constitutional “debt brake.” In order to circumvent those self-imposed fiscal strictures, Scholz’s coalition had relied on a network of “special funds” outside the main budget. The court deemed the practice unlawful, blowing a €60 billion hole in the federal budget in the process. After that, Scholz’s coalition, which had relied on the free flow of money to paper over its major ideological differences, was not long for this world. A string of embarrassing election defeats and record-low approval ratings prompted the coalition parties to play to their bases to revive their political fortunes, worsening their incessant squabbling. FDP leader Christian Linder and his party colleagues repeatedly threatened to pull the plug on the coalition and force new elections. Last Wednesday night, Scholz beat Linder to the punch by firing him, prompting the FDP to quit the coalition. Not to pat ourselves on the back, but we forecast an early end for Scholz and company back in June. WHEN WILL THE ELECTION TAKE PLACE? That’s the $64,000 question. Germany, wary of repeating the crippling instability of the Weimar Republic of the early 20th century, doesn’t make it easy to hold a snap election. Before it happens, Scholz must call (and lose) a confidence vote in parliament, an outcome that is virtually certain. Germany’s president would then be allowed to dissolve the parliament within 21 days. A snap election would follow within another 60 days. The biggest question in German politics nowadays is when Scholz will call for the confidence vote. After he fired Lindner on national television, the chancellor said he intended to continue ruling with a minority government until Jan. 15, at which time he’d hold a confidence vote leading to a new election by the end of March. But after he proposed this timeline, his political opponents demanded he drastically accelerate the schedule. Friedrich Merz, the leader of the CDU and likely Germany’s next chancellor, based on current polling, called on Scholz to ensure an election happens before Trump takes office in the U.S. on Jan. 20, arguing the political urgency of the moment demanded haste. “We simply cannot afford to have a government without a majority in Germany for several months,” he said. For both leaders there is a clear political calculus. For the CDU, an earlier election would allow it to capitalize on its relatively strong current support — and give its opponents less time to rebuild. Scholz, meanwhile, wants time to improve his party’s chances and pass some popular legislation to preserve and bolster social benefits. In a Sunday television interview, Scholz appeared to bow to the pressure and said he was prepared to hold a vote of confidence before Christmas. That’s still far too late for Merz, however. But even if the political will can be found, Germany’s formidable bureaucracy — not known for its swift responses — might still stand in the way. The leader of the federal body that oversees elections reportedly warned in a letter to Scholz that an election in the first two months of 2025 would lead to “incalculable risks.” Practical impediments, the official wrote, included procuring enough paper and adequate printing services. WHO WILL WIN? Merz’s CDU and their conservative Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), are currently leading in polls by a wide margin, on 32 percent support, and will likely lead any future coalition government. Scholz’s SPD, on the other hand, is polling third on 16 percent, just behind the far-right AfD. Because the CDU has vowed not to form a federal coalition with the AfD, it is almost certain to form a coalition with Scholz’s SPD (which, by then, may well have a new leader at the top of its ticket — possibly this guy). Based on current polling and the country’s political fragmentation, the conservatives and the SPD may need a third party with which to govern. The two main contenders are familiar suspects that wouldn’t be a great fit. The Greens —currently polling at 10 percent — have become a favorite target of the conservatives for their policies on immigration and the climate. The FDP would be a better match for the conservatives, but not so much for the SPD, for obvious reasons. Besides, the FDP is now polling at 4 percent — below the threshold needed to make it into parliament — so they may not be an option anyway. However things shake out, in other words, the next coalition may be just as fractious as the last one. DOES ANY OF THIS MATTER? This is a question we often ask ourselves. As Germany’s leaders squabble over when to hold a confidence vote, some 50,000 Russian and North Korean troops appear to be preparing to launch an assault on Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region, while Russian forces continue to make advances along the front in Ukraine. In a nutshell, Ukraine is increasingly in trouble as it enters the critical winter months in the war, while the EU’s most powerful nations — Germany and France — look increasingly adrift due to the political weakness of their leaders. Couple that with the impending return of Donald Trump, who has not only threatened to cut U.S. aid to Ukraine, but has even encouraged Moscow to “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO members that don’t meet the alliance’s defense spending targets. Given those circumstances, Berlin — the second biggest contributor of military aid to Ukraine behind the U.S. — would naturally be the one to rally European capitals to send clear signals of support to Ukraine and to bolster their own defenses. Instead, Germany is consumed by domestic troubles and deadlock, and paralyzed by its inability even to pass a budget for 2025. It’s a particularly bad time for a leadership vacuum in Germany for other reasons as well: The country’s economy is contracting just as Trump takes office, having promised to increase tariffs — including on German cars. In a some months time, things may look quite different in Germany. Merz, the likely next chancellor, is far more hawkish when it comes to aid for Ukraine and says he has a free-market recipe for lifting the German economy out of its rut. At the same time, he has moved Germany’s conservatives much farther to the right compared to during the Angela Merkel years, and has expressed a desire to cut “deals” with Trump. But it will likely take several months for an election to take place and for a coalition to take shape after the vote. Given the immense challenges that confront Germany and Europe, that’s a long time to wait for the next German government.