The European Commission is intensifying talks with the Belgian government to
secure a crucial €140 billion reparations loan to Kyiv as the clock ticks down
to Ukraine running out of money in spring.
But with Belgium’s Prime Minister Bart De Wever focused on a budget crisis at
home and the European Parliament likely to get a say in the reparations loan,
which would slow down approval, time is looking tight.
The latest round of negotiations on the mooted loan, which would be backed by
frozen Russian state assets held on Belgian soil, comes to a head Friday morning
when senior officials from the Commission’s economic and budgetary departments
will try to reassure the Belgian leadership that any financial and legal risks
associated with the loan are taken care of.
De Wever is standing in the way of the planned EU mega-loan, which aims to give
Kyiv three years’ financial breathing space. Ukraine currently faces a budget
shortfall of some $60 billion over the next two years, excluding the cost of
supporting the army.
Failure would force the bloc’s leaders to look to their own coffers to sustain
Kyiv’s defense against Russian forces — or risk leaving Kyiv to fall into
Moscow’s hands.
It’s the Commission’s job to assuage De Wever’s fears that Belgium will be on
the hook to repay Moscow if the war ends, or the Kremlin’s lawyers successfully
sue his government for using the immobilized assets, which are under the
stewardship of Brussels-based financial depository Euroclear.
The immobilized assets are under the stewardship of Brussels-based financial
depository Euroclear. | Ansgar Haase/Picture Alliance via Getty Images
One official, who like others in this article was granted anonymity to reveal
deals of confidential meetings, said there will be talks in the coming days at
all levels, including the highest.
But the negotiations come as De Wever faces a political pickle at home. His
government’s parties are locked in tense talks in an attempt to nail down the
country’s budget and make good on the coalition’s promise to cut €10 billion in
spending.
De Wever said Thursday that he asked Belgium’s King Philippe to give the
government until Christmas to hash out a budget deal after missing several
previous deadlines to do so, and stressed that it was the government’s final
shot at agreeing a budget.
IF BELGIUM AGREES, WHAT THEN?
Once Belgian concerns are satisfied, the Commission will formally propose
legislation on the reparations loan in the coming weeks, according to two
officials briefed on the plans.
Two other EU officials briefed on the plans told POLITICO that the Parliament
will likely also be involved in crafting the legislation. This could prolong the
process and threaten the Commission’s hopes of getting €140 billion before
April, when Kyiv is expected to run out of money.
Adding to the pressure is the fact that the International Monetary Fund’s
continued support for Ukraine hinges on the EU loan.
“The longer we now run delays, the more challenging it will become,” Economy
Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis told reporters in Sofia this week on the margins
of a conference. “It may open questions on some possible bridging solutions or
so. So sooner is better.”
As a safeguard, the Belgians are demanding that EU governments provide national
guarantees worth over €170 billion against the loan that can be paid out at a
moment’s notice. De Wever also wants assurances that using the cash value of the
Russian assets would also stand on legal ground.
The Commission’s lawyers have “very thoroughly assessed all the legal risks or
possible litigation risks,” which they see as “contained,” Dombrovskis said in
Sofia. He added that “in any case, guarantees to be provided to Belgium [are] to
cover potential financial risks Belgium may face” if Moscow’s lawyers sue the
government.
The goal is to have the bloc provide national guarantees against the loan “at
least for the next two years, which could be taken over by the EU guarantee” in
2028, when the next seven-year EU budget begins, said Dombrovskis.
The more difficult task is eliminating the veto threat to EU sanctions from
Kremlin-friendly countries, such as Hungary and Slovakia.
The Commission is considering a legal loophole that would keep Russian state
assets frozen until it ends the war and pays reparations to Ukraine. Otherwise,
the EU must unanimously reauthorize its sanctions against Russia every six
months. Unfreezing the Russian assets would force Euroclear to wire all
sanctioned cash back to the Kremlin.
Hanne Cokelaere contributed to this report.
Tag - Risk and compliance
BRUSSELS — The EU is ratcheting up pressure on governments reluctant to agree on
funding for war-ravaged Ukraine — telling them if they don’t force Russia to
foot the bill, they’ll have to do it themselves.
The European Commission is acutely aware that its plan B — joint EU borrowing
known as eurobonds — is even more unpalatable for funding a €140 billion
reparations loan for Kyiv than its idea of using frozen Russian state assets,
which hit a roadblock last week. Governments historically hostile to big
spending, especially Germany and the Netherlands, nicknamed the “frugals,”
loathe the prospect of piling greater debt onto taxpayers. Spendthrift nations,
France and Italy in particular, are too indebted to take on more.
But that’s the point. European officials are betting that Belgium, which houses
nearly all the assets and has expressed concerns about the legitimacy of seizing
them, along with other countries that have raised objections more quietly, will
be won over to the plan by the prospect of the joint borrowing alternative,
which they’ve long considered toxic.
“The lack of fiscal discipline [in some EU countries] is so high that I don’t
believe that eurobonds will be accepted, certainly by the frugals over the next
10 years,” said Karel Lannoo, chief executive of the influential Centre for
European Policy Studies, a Brussels think tank. That’s why using the frozen
Russian assets looks like the only game in town. “€140 billion is a ton of money
and we have to use it. We have to show that we’re not afraid.”
European governments and the European Central Bank have slowly come round to
using seized Russian assets to fund the €140 billion. Initially they were wary,
considering snatching another country’s cash ― no matter how badly that country
had acted ― legally and morally dubious. But Ukraine’s pressing needs, and
Washington’s uncertain approach, has focused minds.
At last week’s summit of EU leaders, however, Belgium’s Bart De Wever refused to
budge on the plan, which needs the backing of all 27 governments, forcing the
bloc to postpone its approval until December at the earliest.
‘THIS IS DIPLOMACY’
Now the EU is in a race against time on two fronts. First, Ukraine is set to run
out of money by the end of March. And second, decision-making of any kind could
be about to become far tougher as Hungary looks to join forces with Czechia and
Slovakia to form a Ukraine-skeptic alliance. There’s a sense that it’s now or
never.
That means Commission officials are engaged in a delicate balancing act to get
the assets plan across the line, three EU diplomats said.
“This is diplomacy,” said one of the diplomats with knowledge of the
choreography, granted anonymity to speak freely about the plans. “You offer
people something they don’t want to do, so they accept the lesser option.”
A second diplomat familiar with the situation was equally dismissive of plan B.
“The idea that eurobonds could seriously be on the table is simply laughable,”
they said.
So although De Wever told his fellow leaders at the EU summit last week that the
Commission had underestimated the complexity of using Russian assets and the
legal knock-on effect it could have in Belgium, the EU doesn’t think he’ll hold
out past December, when leaders are scheduled to meet again.
The Russian asset-backed loan “is going to happen,” an EU official said. “Not a
question of if ― but when.”
STEP UP SUPPORT
Many European nations have long opposed the idea of eurobonds, believing they
shouldn’t be on the hook for indebted governments they perceive as unable to
keep their finances in order.
The Covid pandemic weakened their resolve, with governments agreeing to joint
borrowing to finance an €800 billion recovery fund to revive the bloc’s economy.
Brussels has continued to mutualize EU debt since then to fund other
initiatives, most recently involving a series of loans to help capitals procure
military contracts to bolster their defenses against Russia, but capitals are
still broadly against its widespread use.
“Support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia, that is ultimately what could bring
Putin to the table and that’s why it’s so important that the European countries
step up,” Swedish Europe Minister Jessica Rosencrantz told reporters after
Thursday’s summit. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images
There is a third option on the table: The EU could embark on a €25 billion
treasure hunt for Russian assets in other countries across the bloc.
This, though, is likely to take more time than Ukraine has so it could look as
if Europe is taking its foot off the gas.
“Support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia, that is ultimately what could bring
Putin to the table and that’s why it’s so important that the European countries
step up,” Swedish Europe Minister Jessica Rosencrantz told reporters after
Thursday’s summit.
COLLECTIVE RISK
The vast majority of the assets are under the guardianship of a financial
depository called Euroclear in Belgium, leaving the country with considerable
financial and legal risk.
“The Commission has engaged in intensive exchanges with the Belgian authorities
on the matter and stands ready to provide further clarifications and assurances
as appropriate,” a Commission spokesperson said. “Any proposal will build on the
principle of collective risk sharing. While we see no indication that the
Commission`’s original approach would lead to new risks, we certainly do agree
that any risk coming with our future proposal will of course have to be shared
collectively by member states and not only by one.”
The Commission has played down the risks to Belgium, stressing that the €140
billion would only be repaid to Russia if the Kremlin ends the war and pays
reparations to Ukraine. The chance of that happening is so remote that the money
is unlikely ever to be repaid.
But Belgium fears Moscow could send in an army of lawyers to get its money back,
especially considering the country signed a bilateral investment treaty with
Russia in 1989.
The officials and diplomats interviewed for this article remain confident of an
agreement.
“I really expect that at the next European Council [scheduled for Dec. 18] there
will be finally progress,” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys told
POLITICO.
Gerardo Fortuna contributed to this article.
Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the
award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO.
Seven years ago, Sweden made global headlines with “In Case of Crisis or War” —
a crisis preparedness leaflet sent to all households in the country.
Unsurprisingly, preparedness leaflets have become a trend across Europe since
then. But now, Sweden is ahead of the game once more, this time with a
preparedness leaflet specifically for businesses.
Informing companies about threats that could harm them, and how they can
prepare, makes perfect sense. And in today’s geopolitical reality, it’s becoming
indispensable.
I remember when “In Case of Crisis or War” was first published in 2018: The
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, or MSB, sent the leaflet out by post to
every single home. The use of snail mail wasn’t accidental — in a crisis, there
could be devastating cyberattacks that would prevent people from accessing
information online.
The leaflet — an updated version of the Cold War-era “In Case of War” —
contained information about all manner of possible harm, along with information
about how to best prepare and protect oneself. Then, there was the key
statement: “If Sweden is attacked, we will never surrender. Any suggestion to
the contrary is false.”
Over the top, suggested some outside observers derisively. Why cause panic among
people?
But, oh, what folly!
Preparedness leaflets have been used elsewhere too. I came to appreciate
preparedness education during my years as a resident of San Francisco — a city
prone to earthquakes. On buses, at bus stops and online, residents like me were
constantly reminded that an earthquake could strike at any moment and we were
told how to prepare, what to do while the earthquake was happening, how to find
loved ones afterward and how to fend for ourselves for up to three days after a
tremor.
The city’s then-Mayor Gavin Newsom had made disaster preparedness a key part of
his program and to this day, I know exactly what items to always have at home in
case of a crisis: Water, blankets, flashlights, canned food and a hand-cranked
radio. And those items are the same, whether the crisis is an earthquake, a
cyberattack or a military assault.
Other earthquake-prone cities and regions disseminate similar preparedness
advice — as do a fast-growing number of countries, now facing threats from
hostile states. Poland, as it happens, published its new leaflet just a few days
before Russia’s drones entered its airspace.
But these preparedness instructions have generally focused on citizens and
households; businesses have to come up with their own preparedness plans against
whatever Russia or other hostile states and their proxies think up — and against
extreme weather events too. That’s a lot of hostile activity. In the past couple
years alone, undersea cables have been damaged under mysterious circumstances; a
Polish shopping mall and a Lithuanian Ikea store have been subject to arson
attacks; drones have been circling above weapons-manufacturing facilities; and a
defense-manufacturing CEO has been the target of an assassination plot; just to
name a few incidents.
San Francisco’s then-Mayor Gavin Newsom had made disaster preparedness a key
part of his program. | Tayfun Coskun/Anadolu via Getty Images
It’s no wonder geopolitical threats are causing alarm to the private sector.
Global insurance broker Willis Towers Watson’s 2025 Political Risk Survey, which
focuses on multinationals, found that the political risk losses in 2023 — the
most recent year for which data is available — were at their highest level since
the survey began. Companies are particularly concerned about economic
retaliation, state-linked cyberattacks and state-linked attacks on
infrastructure in the area of gray-zone aggression.
Yes, businesses around Europe receive warnings and updates from their
governments, and large businesses have crisis managers and run crisis management
exercises for their staff. But there was no national preparedness guide for
businesses — until now.
MSB’s preparedness leaflet directed at Sweden’s companies is breaking new
ground. It will feature the same kind of easy-to-implement advice as “In Case of
Crisis or War,” and it will be just as useful for family-run shops as it is for
multinationals, helping companies to keep operating matters far beyond the
businesses themselves.
By targeting the private sector, hostile states can quickly bring countries to a
grinding and discombobulating halt. That must not happen — and preventing should
involve both governments and the companies themselves.
Naturally, a leaflet is only the beginning. As I’ve written before, governments
would do well to conduct tabletop preparedness exercises with businesses —
Sweden and the Czech Republic are ahead on this — and simulation exercises would
be even better.
But a leaflet is a fabulous cost-effective start. It’s also powerful
deterrence-signaling to prospective attackers. And in issuing its leaflet,
Sweden is signaling that targeting the country’s businesses won’t be as
effective as would-be attackers would wish.
(The leaflet, by the way, will be blue. The leaflet for private citizens was
yellow. Get it? The colors, too, are a powerful message.)
The European Union is about to use the cash value of €140 billion worth of
frozen Russian state assets to finance a mega loan to Ukraine. But the European
Commission still wants more, according to a document obtained by POLITICO.
The bulk of the frozen assets sit in a Belgium-based financial depository called
Euroclear. But an additional €25 billion lies in private bank accounts across
the bloc, and the EU executive wants to discuss using those funds to issue loans
to Kyiv as well.
“It should be considered whether the Reparations Loan initiative could be
extended to other immobilised assets within the EU,” reads the document, which
the Commission circulated to EU capitals ahead of a Friday ambassadorial meeting
on the topic.
“The legal feasibility of extending the Reparations Loan approach towards such
assets has not been assessed in detail,” the document continued. “Such an
assessment would need to take place before taking a decision on further steps.”
The document outlines the “design principles” for the Ukraine Reparations Loan
initiative that will be up for debate ahead of next week’s EU summit in
Brussels.
EU leaders are expected to have a broad discussion on the initiative and to call
on the Commission to present a proposal for the loan. EU officials expect the
bill to arrive quickly, and to serve as a platform for further talks on the
financial engineering needed to make it work.
Finance ministers will discuss the bill when they next meet in November.
GUARANTEES AND SPENDING TARGETS
Other design principles include national guarantees for the loan, a key demand
from Belgium, which fears Moscow could send an army of lawyers its way to
retrieve the sanctioned cash.
“A solid guarantee and liquidity structure should be put in place to ensure that
the EU can always honour its obligations to Euroclear,” the document continued.
“For that purpose, it is suggested to build a system of bilateral guarantees
from Member States to the Union.”
These guarantees would ensure “access to the required liquidity when needed to
satisfy any guarantee call,” i.e. to enable an immediate payout.
The EU’s next seven-year budget from 2028 would take over the national
guarantees “with an adequate cover under the headroom,” a financial cushion that
ensures Brussels can meet its obligations.
Once the loan is issued, the money would go toward “the development of Ukraine’s
defence technological and industrial base and its integration into the European
defence industry,” as well as to support the country’s national budget, “subject
to appropriate conditionality.”
Russia will sue any EU country that dares to use its sanctioned cash to leverage
a mega loan to Ukraine, former president Dmitry Medvedev said on social media.
Medvedev, who served a four-year stint as Russia’s president from 2008, issued
the threat in response to a POLITICO article that reported on an idea that the
EU’s executive arm pitched to deputy finance ministers last week.
“If this happens, Russia will persecute the EU states, as well as
Euro-degenerates from Brussels and individual EU countries who will try to seize
our property, until the end of time,” Medvedev wrote Monday on the social media
platform, Telegram.
Russia would pursue them in “all possible international and national courts …
and in some cases, extrajudicially,” Medvedev said. His current function is
deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council.
The European Commission’s pitch, described by one official as “legally
creative,” is to take Russian cash that’s building up in a deposit account at
the European Central Bank. The cash stems from almost €200 billion worth of
Russia’s frozen state assets, held by a Brussels-based financial institution
called Euroclear, that reach maturity.
The Commission is considering swapping that cash with short-term zero-coupon
eurobonds as a way to avoid formally seizing Russia’s frozen assets, which could
trigger global lawsuits and set an uneasy precedent for the future.
Armed with this cash, the Commission would issue a multi-billion euro
“Reparations Loan” to Kyiv to help sustain its war effort against Moscow.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said last week that Ukraine would only
have to pay back the loan if Russia pays for reparations — a highly unlikely
scenario.
The cash-swap pitch is among several ideas on the table. Medvedev is having none
of it and pledged to sue anyone who follows through “in every possible way.”
Margot Wallström is a former vice president of the European Commission and
former foreign minister of Sweden. Jytte Guteland is member of the Swedish
parliament and former lead negotiator on EU climate law in the European
Parliament. Mats Engström is a former deputy state secretary at the Swedish
Ministry for the Environment.
The chemical industry is vital to Europe’s economy and employs millions of
workers across the bloc. However, too many hazardous substances remain on the
market, threatening humans and nature alike. For example, the use of a group of
chemicals known as PFAS — or “forever chemicals” — has contaminated thousands of
sites and can now be measured in our bloodstreams.
It is, therefore, worrying that after 18 years in force, the flagship of
Europe’s chemicals legislation — the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) — is becoming endangered.
What the European Commission has promised is to “simplify” REACH. But the
proposal presented to member country experts seems more akin to deregulation and
a lowering of ambitions. For instance, if put into action, the goal of phasing
out substances of very high concern would be severely diluted.
The main reason behind this revision is an intense lobbying campaign for
European “competitiveness.” But this approach is too narrow and short-sighted.
And while the intention of simplification may be good, undermining vital
legislation will harm people, the environment and the economy — not to mention
citizens’ confidence in the EU.
Among the authors of this article, one of us proposed and negotiated REACH in
the early 2000s, and another was the European Parliament’s lead negotiator on
the EU’s climate law. In both cases, we witnessed intense lobbying to slow
progress, with industry pressure to weaken REACH described as “the largest ever
lobbying campaign in Europe.”
The situation today seems widely similar in terms rolling back legislation.
According to the EU Transparency Register, industry lobbying on REACH and PFAS
has been very intense in recent years.
However, there’s no evidence that regulation is the main cause of the chemical
industry’s current problems — not to mention that substituting the most
hazardous substances would provide a competitive advantage in future global
markets. It would also help other industries, such as textiles, furniture and
recycling, and several companies in these sectors have already called for a
stronger REACH rather than a watered-down one.
More crucially, though, what the Commission is indicating would cause harm. It
would limit the authorization procedure for substances of very high concern —
for example, by excluding those with widespread uses — which would result in
more such substances remaining on the market and increasing risks.
The Commission is also reversing its position on the 2020 Chemicals Strategy for
Sustainability. This is particularly evident in its weakened approach to the
rapid phaseout of substances with well-established generic risks, such as
neurotoxicity, or are persistent in the environment (“forever chemicals”).
Essentially, this new approach would reduce regulatory incentive to replace
these substances. But we know from experience that voluntary approaches fail to
deliver results, with the burden of regulation increasingly falling on national
authorities — something that could lead to fragmentation of the internal market.
Take the debate on PFAS, which are endocrine disruptors and possible
carcinogens. Two of us writing this piece had blood tests done a few years ago,
and as expected, the results showed widespread PFAS variants at levels typical
of individuals of a similar age. Other potentially dangerous chemicals, such as
polychlorinated alkanes, were also present.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has promoted the “One Health approach”
— which links human well-being to that of animals, plants and the wider
environment. | Ronald Wittek/EFE via EPA
These levels are remarkably high, and their presence is frightening because
there are many gaps in research on the effects they might have. Moreover, it’s
almost impossible for individuals to do anything about this, as we’re constantly
exposed to these chemicals from so many different sources, including drinking
water and food.
This is why we need legislation and standards.
So far, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has promoted the “One Health
approach” — which links human well-being to that of animals, plants and the
wider environment — in a very positive way. But we also need an ambitious policy
on hazardous substances that is guided by the precautionary principle.
Instead, this potential weakening of chemicals legislation is yet another
example of how “simplification” often means deregulation. It also makes the
commitment to “stay the course on the Green Deal” in the new Commission’s policy
guidelines increasingly meaningless.
The Commission’s own estimates show that the cost of cleaning up PFAS
contamination across the bloc will be between €5 billion and €100 billion per
year — that’s just one example of the human and economic cost of inaction when
it comes to hazardous substances.
As such, Europe’s competitiveness and its citizens would truly benefit from
stronger chemicals regulations. In order to achieve that, we must first close
the information gap, while the EU accelerates its phaseout of the most harmful
substances and ensures regulation is properly enforced in all member countries.
To restore the ambition of the EU’s chemicals policy and actually protect both
its people and the environment, we need urgent improvements to REACH. Only then
can the EU deliver on its commitments to a toxic-free environment.
As countries jostle to win the artificial intelligence race, Google’s former CEO
cautioned that AI could pose “extreme risks” if it falls into the wrong hands.
Tech billionaire Eric Schmidt told the BBC in an interview after the Paris AI
summit that the booming technology could even be used by terrorists or “rogue
states” to harm innocent people using weapons created with it.
“Think about North Korea, or Iran, or even Russia, who have some evil goal. This
technology is fast enough for them to adopt that they could misuse it and do
real harm,” Schmidt said, adding that it could even mean creating weapons to
facilitate “a bad biological attack.”
Schmidt noted the 9/11 attacks, in which Islamist terrorists hijacked planes and
flew them into the World Trade Center in New York: “I always worry about the
‘Osama bin Laden’ scenario, where you have a really evil person who takes over
some aspect of our modern life and uses it to harm innocent people.”
The former Google chief called for government oversight of private tech
companies developing AI models: “It’s really important that governments
understand what we’re doing and keep their eye on us.”
But Schmidt also warned that overregulation could hinder the pace of innovation,
citing Europe as a bad example, echoing remarks he made earlier this week in
Paris.
“The AI revolution, which is the most important revolution in my opinion since
electricity, is not going to be invented in Europe,” Schmidt said, accusing the
EU of overregulating and driving away industry investment.
The French energy giant TotalEnergies welcomed a Mozambican government offer to
allow an investigation into allegations of a massacre at its gas megaproject in
northern Mozambique — and urged an inquiry be carried out “as soon as possible.”
The call comes after the company’s Mozambican subsidiary Mozambique LNG said it
had conducted its own “extensive research” and “not identified any information
nor evidence that would corroborate the allegations of severe abuses and
torture.”
POLITICO reported in September that a Mozambican military unit operating out of
TotalEnergies’ gas plant herded a group of between 180 and 250 people into
containers at the energy giant’s gatehouse and kept them there for three months.
Eleven survivors, plus two witnesses, testified that only 26 men survived the
ordeal. POLITICO published a summary of a survey that identified 97 victims, and
listed their causes of death as suffocation, being beaten to death, being shot,
being “disappeared” — taken away and presumably executed — and missing, presumed
dead after last being seen in the army’s custody.
Relatives of the victims told POLITICO they had kept silent about the massacre
out of fear of reprisals.
Work on the site was halted in 2021 as Islamist militants swept through the
region. TotalEnergies and the Mozambican authorities have denied all knowledge
of the attack.
In a statement published Tuesday, Mozambique LNG noted that in October the
Mozambican Ministry of Defence expressed a “total openness and willingness to
accept a transparent and impartial investigation.”
“Mozambique LNG has invited the authorities of Mozambique to carry out such an
investigation as soon as possible,” the statement read. “Mozambique LNG will
keep following up with the Mozambican authorities as only they can take the
investigations further at this stage.”
On November 24, a joint investigation by the French newspaper Le Monde and the
investigative news outlet Source Material published similar findings.
Two weeks ago, protesters from the Afungi peninsula where the gas plant is
located began a blockade at Total’s front gates, holding up signs that read:
“Total, we don’t want war. We want our rights.”
Friends of the Earth are among a raft of campaigners and lawmakers across Europe
calling for an independent United Nations investigation of the atrocity.
A spokesperson for the group in France said that by proposing that Mozambican
authorities investigate the military’s human rights abusers, TotalEnergies “once
again displays its collusion with the very same authorities whose role in and
responsibility for these alleged atrocities are currently being called into
question.”
“Our demand for a truly independent investigation is more needed and urgent than
ever,” she said, adding that TotalEnergies’ “complete dismissal of the voices
and pain of the victims … reflect very poorly on the company.”
LONDON — At London’s annual Frieze art fair, attendees trickle into a fake
sauna.
Inside, a screen shows a person dressed as a pink alien in fuchsia lingerie,
gyrating in an abandoned swimming pool. Thumping techno accompanies the
spectacle.
An employee speaks over the deep bass to lament Britain’s new anti-money
laundering art rules.
“It puts off rich people buying art in London because it’s a pain in the
backside,” the gallery employee, granted anonymity like others in this article
to speak freely about a sensitive topic, said.
London’s art market is the third largest in the world, accounting for 17 percent
of global sales in 2023, and just behind China, which mostly relies on Hong
Kong.
But experts fear Britain’s fresh anti-money laundering (AML) clampdown will send
the city tumbling down the list. Although they were introduced a few years ago,
it’s only in the past year that the British government has started to clamp down
aggressively, according to industry experts.
The United Kingdom taxman now requires art market participants to register with
them for money laundering purposes and follow strict new rules if they sell
works worth more than €10,000 — or if they operate a customs warehouse storing
works of art above that value.
At the heart of the financial crime rules, inherited from the European Union
after Brexit in 2020 but adapted to fit the U.K. art market in 2021, is an
obligation for sellers to know who their buyers are, requiring proof and
verification of identity.
“Commercial and personal confidentiality are an important feature of the art
market, and for good and valid reasons. However, these new rules are designed to
limit the risk of confidentiality being abused in order to hide illicit
activity,” say the 2023 guidelines provided by the British Art Market Federation
and approved by the U.K.’s Treasury.
Industry players, however, say this ruins not only the romance of art sales —
but makes them a little awkward too.
Frieze, held in London’s Regent’s Park, showcases some of the world’s most
expensive art, and has guests willing to meet those price tags.
The guest list boasts some of the world’s top A-list celebrities. Spotted on the
day POLITICO attended in early October was former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak,
alongside hordes of glamorous art world insiders.
London’s art market is the third largest in the world, accounting for 17 percent
of global sales in 2023. | Henry Nicholls/Getty Images
One gallerist at Frieze pointed out the particularly personal nature of the art
world.
“We have to ask the mates of our boss for their source of funds, ID, proof of
address. It makes that personal connection completely different. It’s
embarrassing — you don’t want to ask your friends for that.”
Meanwhile, the United States has no art market money laundering regulations,
despite New York coming out on top in the global art market rankings. China and
Hong Kong don’t include art in their own AML rules, according to an anti-money
laundering expert.
“Doing business in the U.K. is seen as quite complicated these days. And
perception is really important in a global market, where there are alternatives
that people can go to,” said Martin Wilson, chief general counsel at Phillips
auction house and chairman of the British Art Market Federation.
“The London art market is entrepreneurial, which basically means artwork comes
in, gets sold here, and then often leaves the country. For that to happen, you
need a really smooth process. You need it to be as smooth as your competitors,”
he said.
TRAVELING ART
But purchasing art and taking it out of the U.K. now involves a lot more red
tape.
At another stall at Frieze, a large canvas depicts a fluorescent meadow of
flowers, just out of reach, hidden behind a wire fence. The painting, a guide
tells a crowd of eager onlookers, is supposed to represent the American dream.
The freedom and opportunity of that ethos is something one cannot put a price
on.
The painting is on sale for £85,000.
Someone wanting to purchase that piece of art would now be asked where their
money came from. In 2020, the Treasury’s national risk assessment for money
laundering and terrorist finance determined the art market to be a “high risk”
for money laundering. It joins cash, property and other financial services
industries in the high-risk bracket.
“The size of the sector, combined with a previous lack of consistent regulation,
means the global art market has been an attractive option for criminals to
launder money,” the Treasury’s risk assessment said.
As a high-risk threat, sellers must follow new rules including registering with
tax authority HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), writing a risk assessment to state
how exposed they are to money laundering and carrying out customer due diligence
before a transaction is concluded.
“Art is moved easily across borders. That’s the big advantage of art: A house in
central London is a good investment, but you can’t take it with you,” explains
Angelika Hellwegger, legal director at law firm Rahman Ravelli.
Purchasing art and taking it out of the U.K. now involves a lot more red tape. |
Henry Nicholls/Getty Images
And although the rules began a few years ago, it’s this year that HMRC has
picked up the pace on compliance. “As a company, we have had about three times
as many clients receiving interventions from HMRC so far in 2024,” said the
expert who works in art and anti-money laundering.
“It feels like the honeymoon period is over. The pace has been definitely
accelerating, both in the number of galleries investigated and the strictness of
implementation. Previously, they would ask: ‘Are you registered and were you
doing the basics?’ And now their questions are much more aggressive and
assertive.”
Financial penalties have already been dished out. Under the new regulations,
between 2021 and spring 2023, 31 art market participants were fined for failing
to register with HMRC. Between spring and fall 2023, 32 fines were issued.
Figures for 2024 have not been released but art market participants speak of an
even greater intensity.
Penalties have been up to £13,000 so far and limited to registration failings.
But all art anti-money laundering experts POLITICO spoke to expect that HMRC
would begin fining galleries for money laundering faults imminently — a more
serious charge.
Even though some clients may have nothing to hide, the threat of increased
oversight — which could result in a fine or an investigation — puts some off.
“The money laundering regulations are the bane of my life. People who want to
buy art want it instantly, they don’t want to wait 22 days to have all their
details checked out,” said another gallery employee at Frieze.
Maria O’Sullivan, a lawyer who specializes in compliance in the art industry,
described the particularities of the art market which make regulation difficult:
“The art world is based on relationships, more than any other business that’s
got anti-money laundering regulation,” she said.
“The source of wealth is easier to establish than the source of funds. The
source of wealth you can nearly always find online, for example, if your client
is a major shareholder in a company. Asking about the source of funds is more
personal. Galleries don’t want to ask for that information.”
The rules, which were brought in under the former Conservative government,
threaten to further injure an already wounded art sector, which suffered
increased taxes and red tape in the wake of Britain’s departure from the EU.
“Between Brexit and these new money laundering regulations, the London market’s
been hit pretty hard,” said the art AML expert.
And as new Labour Chancellor Rachel Reeves prepares her first budget, which is
set to increase taxes on the wealthy’s assets, art lovers fear it could be
another nail in the coffin for London as a top destination for high-end art.
THE REAL OWNER
Across the Atlantic, the U.S. lacks regulation, despite art being well
documented as a vehicle for money laundering.
As new Labour Chancellor Rachel Reeves prepares her first budge, art lovers fear
it could be another nail in the coffin for London as a top destination for
high-end art. | Leon Neal/Getty Images
“The art industry currently operates under a veil of secrecy allowing art
advisers to represent both sellers and buyers masking the identities of both
parties, and as we found, the source of the funds. This creates an environment
ripe for laundering money and evading sanctions,” said Tom Caper, a U.S. senator
from Delaware, speaking in 2020 upon the release of a report, which found that
the art market was “the largest legal, unregulated market in the United States.”
It’s exactly that veil of secrecy that the U.K.’s rules seek to prevent.
Beneficial ownership rules, which concern who will ultimately own a piece of
art, include any companies or trusts that may be used to purchase it. It’s a key
tenet of the U.K.’s anti-money laundering plan.
For the U.K.’s Treasury, this isn’t a simple glance at an ID card. Conducting
customer due diligence means “exhausting all possible means to verify the
identity of the customer, or the ultimate beneficial owner,” it said in its risk
assessment.
“Criminals can conceal the ultimate beneficial owner of art, as well as the
source of funds used to purchase art. This can be achieved by using complex
layers of U.K. and offshore companies and trusts, agents or intermediaries, with
agents and intermediaries commonly used in the market,” the department adds.
While experts argue that the use of offshore trusts to purchase art is a thing
of the past, that doesn’t mean gallery employees are willing to find out.
“We’re not supposed to be detectives,” the first employee quoted above said. “We
take the information from the individual at face value. We wouldn’t go to the
authorities of a jurisdiction to check who the beneficial owner of a trust is,
for example.”
Another argued it is “misguided” to require small businesses to perform due
diligence that the financial services industry should do. “The regulations put
the onus on the galleries to jump through certain hoops. I think it’s like using
a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Banks are subject to money laundering checks, so
due diligence is already performed,” they said.
Wilson, meanwhile, defended the purpose of the regulations in trying to target
dodgy dealings. But the British Art Market Federation chairman also questioned
what he sees as a failure to distinguish between low- and high-risk
transactions. He pointed out, for example, that a painting sold by a seaside
gallery for £11,000 is viewed in the same way as a multimillion-dollar
transaction in an auction.
As a result, gallerists approach the rules with a “tick box” mentality, he
warned. “What’s dangerous is that everyone who ticks those boxes believes
they’ve eliminated the money laundering risk.”
BRUSSELS — A battle is brewing between Europe’s most powerful nations and the
European Central Bank (ECB) over control of a new monetary tool that both sides
fear could destabilize the continent’s banking system if mismanaged.
At the heart of the conflict lies the digital euro — a virtual counterpart to
euro coins and banknotes. For years, the ECB has been developing the instrument,
envisaging a pan-European payment challenger with the ability to rival United
States heavyweights like Visa and Mastercard.
But as the project nears reality, a tug-of-war has erupted. Several European
Union governments, including France and Germany, argue the ECB has gained too
much control over one crucial aspect: how much digital currency citizens will be
allowed to hold in “wallets” backed by the central bank.
While it may seem like a dry technical issue, the stakes are enormous.
Politicians and technocrats worry that if the limit is set too high, citizens
could pull vast sums from traditional banks during a crisis, jeopardizing the
stability of the entire banking system. Some are also concerned that any cap
could infringe on personal financial freedom, stoking fears of a “Big Brother”
state, according to one diplomat, who like others mentioned in this piece was
granted anonymity to speak freely about a sensitive issue.
The struggle is raising a fundamental question: Where does the central bank’s
authority end and that of EU member countries begin? Thirty years after the ECB
became the bloc’s chief monetary guardian, the clash is forcing a reassessment
of the delicate balance between politics and central banking.
For some, it’s a necessary pushback against the ECB’s overreach. But in
Frankfurt, officials view it as political meddling in a realm that should be
free of it. At its core, as one diplomat candidly put it, the dispute is less
about technicalities and more about a “battle for power.”
TECHNOCRACY VS. DEMOCRACY
Over 100 central banks have explored the idea of creating a national digital
currency, spurred into action after Facebook’s ill-fated attempt to launch a
global cryptocurrency, Libra, in 2019 sent shockwaves through the financial
world.
While many of these efforts have since fizzled out, the ECB has remained
resolute, championing the digital euro as a game-changing alternative to
existing payment systems — one it hopes will loosen Europe’s dependence on
dominant U.S. and non-EU payment services, which currently handle around 70
percent of EU payments.
But the central bank’s relentless advance has also spooked key member countries,
which now view the project as dangerously technocratic. In Brussels, they’re
leveraging their political influence in an attempt to curb the Bank’s power in
ongoing negotiations over crucial aspects of the digital euro’s design.
Under the draft regulation being worked on by lawmakers and governments, the ECB
alone would decide how much digital currency citizens can hold in their
wallets.
Frankfurt sees this as consistent with its vision of the digital euro as an
expression of European monetary sovereignty. Moreover, officials familiar with
the discussions point out that the central bank is the only authority permitted
to adjust the money supply.
However, at least nine countries disagree. Before the summer, a group that
included Germany, France and the Netherlands argued that Frankfurt’s exclusive
monetary competence should not be used as an excuse to “limit their
decision-making power,” according to notes from a meeting shared with POLITICO.
Under the draft regulation being worked on by lawmakers and governments, the ECB
alone would decide how much digital currency citizens can hold in their
wallets. | Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP via Getty Images
Diplomats further asserted “political supremacy” over the matter, explaining the
digital euro was not just a monetary tool but a broader financial services
matter that could reshape how Europeans handle everyday payments.
The EU’s treaty gives the ECB very strong legal privileges on regulating money
supply, but only qualified ones over banking supervision and payments. It also
explicitly allows the Council of the EU and European Parliament to “lay down the
measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency” — albeit
“without prejudice to the powers of the European Central Bank.”
FINANCIAL STABILITY, HANDED DOWN FROM ON HIGH
Some member countries are also deeply concerned about how their citizens will
receive a project devised by technocrats they suspect as being out of touch.
“You can create something in an ivory tower,” said one Brussels-based executive
familiar with the discussions. “But will it actually be used in a market?”
Another area of concern is that allowing the ECB to set the limit would leave
the institution with exclusive influence over a new tool that could have
outsized effects on banking stability.
The ECB argues that ensuring the soundness of banks is a core part of its
supervisory responsibilities, given that such institutions are the main conduit
through which it conducts its monetary policy.
Many member countries, however, are not convinced. They argue it is the
legislature that defines many of those supervisory responsibilities. They also
don’t trust the ECB to cut slack with banks they feel it is their patriotic duty
to protect.
But Frankfurt, along with the European Commission, has warned that allowing
governments to set the limit could expose the independent central bank to
political pressure, according to two people familiar with the discussions.
Another European official worried that politicians might cave to popular demands
to raise the limit, hurting banks. Ironically, many bankers also now side with
the ECB, after it rolled out a number of features designed to reduce the threat
to their businesses.
Stephen Cecchetti, a professor at the Brandeis International Business School,
agreed that the digital euro was primarily a payment system infrastructure, but
said the holding limit should be decided by the same people deciding if EU
citizens can use €500 notes: the ECB’s Governing Council.
These kind of complaints suggest that “politicians don’t like the fact that the
technocrats in their countries took this role,” he said, adding if they have an
issue with that “they should complain to their central banks.”
But member countries haven’t given up. One possible compromise is to let
legislators set the parameters within which the ECB operates but to give the
Bank the final say.
Even so, that might not do much to resolve the broader worry — that a project
intended to save Europe from the overarching economic dominance of U.S. tech now
threatens to become a risk in its own right, should the ECB forge ahead without
adequate democratic support.