BRUSSELS — Hungarian Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi has said he didn’t know anything about a spy ring that allegedly operated out of Budapest’s embassy to the EU while he was in charge. When quizzed on the scandal by EU lawmakers on Monday, Várhelyi said he hadn’t been approached by intelligence services to pass on secret information. “Have I been approached by the Hungarian or any other services? No, I have not,” he told MEPs in a European Parliament committee meeting. A joint investigation by Hungarian outlet Direkt36, Germany’s Der Spiegel, Belgian daily De Tijd and others reported in October that Hungarian intelligence officials disguised as diplomats had tried to infiltrate EU institutions and recruit spies between 2012 and 2018. At the time the reports surfaced, Várhelyi told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that he was “not aware” of the alleged Hungarian efforts, a denial he repeated on Monday. “I had no knowledge of this claim which was made in the press,” he told MEPs in response to a question from Greens lawmaker Daniel Freund. Freund had asked the commissioner if he had known of any of the activities supposedly run out of the Hungarian permanent representation to the EU, which he worked at from 2011 and ran from 2015. Hungarian officials working in the EU institutions at the time described the network to POLITICO as an open secret in the Belgian capital. Following the media reports, Hungarian opposition leader Péter Magyar — who also worked at the Hungarian permanent representation under Várhelyi — accused him of withholding information about his time as an ambassador. “In my opinion, Olivér Várhelyi, the current EU Commissioner and former EU Ambassador (and my former boss), did not reveal the whole truth when he denied this during the official investigation the other day,” Magyar wrote in a Facebook post. “It was a common fact at the EU Embassy in Brussels, that during the period of János Lázár’s ministry in 2015-2018, secret service people were deployed to Brussels,” he continued. The Commission last year set up an internal group to look into the claims that Hungarian officials had spied on the EU institutions. Commission spokesperson Balazs Ujvari told reporters on Monday that its work is “ongoing.” Gerardo Fortuna contributed to this report.

In the desolate Arctic desert of Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, Europeans are building defenses against a new, up-and-coming security threat: space hacks. A Lithuanian company called Astrolight is constructing a ground station, with support from the European Space Agency, that will use laser beams to download voluminous data from satellites in a fast and secure manner, it announced last month.  It’s just one example of how Europe is moving to harden the security of its satellites, as rising geopolitical tensions and an expanding spectrum of hybrid threats are pushing space communications to the heart of the bloc’s security plans. For years, satellite infrastructure was treated by policymakers as a technical utility rather than a strategic asset. That changed in 2022, when a cyberattack on the Viasat satellite network coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.   Satellites have since become popular targets for interference, espionage and disruption. The European Commission in June warned that space was becoming “more contested,” flagging increasing cyberattacks and attempts at electronic interference targeting satellites and ground stations. Germany and the United Kingdom warned earlier this year of the growing threat posed by Russian and Chinese space satellites, which are regularly spotted spying on their satellites.  EU governments are now racing to boost their resilience and reduce reliance on foreign technology, both through regulations like the new Space Act and investments in critical infrastructure. The threat is crystal clear in Greenland, Laurynas Mačiulis, the chief executive officer of Astrolight, said. “The problem today is that around 80 percent of all the [space data] traffic is downlinked to a single location in Svalbard, which is an island shared between different countries, including Russia,” he said in an interview. Europe’s main Arctic ground station sits in Svalbard and supports both the navigation systems of Galileo and Copernicus. While the location is strategic, it is also extremely sensitive due to nearby Russian and Chinese activities. Crucially, the station relies on a single undersea cable to connect to the internet, which has been damaged several times. “In case of intentional or unintentional damage of this cable, you lose access to most of the geo-intelligence satellites, which is, of course, very critical. So our aim is to deploy a complementary satellite ground station up in Greenland,” Mačiulis said. THE MUSK OF IT ALL A centerpiece of Europe’s ambitions to have secure, European satellite communication is IRIS², a multibillion-euro secure connectivity constellation pitched in 2022 and designed to rival Elon Musk’s Starlink system. “Today, communications — for instance in Ukraine — are far too dependent on Starlink,” said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the founding chairman of political consultancy Rasmussen Global, speaking at an event in Brussels in November. “That dependence rests on the shifting ideas of an American billionaire. That’s too risky. We have to build a secure communications system that is independent of the United States.” The European system, which will consist of 18 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, aims to provide Europe with fast and encrypted communication. “Even if someone intercepts the signal [of IRIS² ], they will not be able to decrypt it,” Piero Angeletti, head of the Secure Connectivity Space Segment Office at the European Space Agency, told POLITICO. “This will allow us to have a secure system that is also certified and accredited by the national security entities.” The challenge is that IRIS² is still at least four years away from becoming operational. WHO’S IN CHARGE? While Europe beefs up its secure satellite systems, governments are still streamlining how they can coordinate cyber defenses and space security. In many cases, that falls to both space or cyber commands, which, unlike traditional military units, are relatively new and often still being built out. Clémence Poirier, a cyberdefense researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, said that EU countries must now focus on maturing them. “European states need to keep developing those commands,” she told POLITICO. “Making sure that they coordinate their action, that there are clear mandates and responsibilities when it comes to cyber security, cyber defensive operations, cyber offensive operations, and also when it comes to monitoring the threat.” Industry, too, is struggling to fill the gaps. Most cybersecurity firms do not treat space as a sector in its own right, leaving satellite operators in a blind spot. Instead, space systems are folded into other categories: Earth-observation satellites often fall under environmental services, satellite TV under media, and broadband constellations like Starlink under internet services. That fragmentation makes it harder for space companies to assess risk, update threat models or understand who they need to defend against. It also complicates incident response: while advanced tools exist for defending against cyberattacks on terrestrial networks, those tools often do not translate well to space systems. “Cybersecurity in space is a bit different,” Poirier added. “You cannot just implement whatever solution you have for your computers on Earth and just deploy that to your satellite.”

BERLIN — Far-right German politician Ringo Mühlmann has taken a noteworthy interest in exposing information his political opponents say could be of great interest to Russian intelligence. Using the rights afforded to him as a lawmaker for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the parliament of the eastern German state of Thuringia — where the AfD is the strongest party  — Mühlmann has repeatedly asked the regional government to disclose intricate details on subjects such as local drone defenses and Western arms transports to Ukraine. “What information does the state government have about the extent of military transit transports through Thuringia since 2022 (broken down by year, type of transport [road, rail], number of transits, and known stops)?” Mühlmann asked in writing in September. One day in June, Mühlmann — who denies he is doing Russia’s bidding — filed eight inquiries related to drones and the drone defense capabilities of the region’s police, who are responsible for detecting and fending off drones deemed a spy threat. “What technical systems for drone defense are known to the Thuringian police (e.g., jammers, net launchers, electromagnetic pulse devices), and to what extent have these been tested for their usability in law enforcement?” Mühlmann asked. Such questions from AfD lawmakers on the state and federal parliaments have led German centrists to accuse the far-right party’s lawmakers of using their seats to try to expose sensitive information that Moscow could use in its war on Ukraine and to help carry out its so-called “hybrid war” against Europe. “One cannot help but get the impression that the AfD is working through a list of tasks assigned to it by the Kremlin with its inquiries,” Thuringian Interior Minister Georg Maier, a member of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), told German newspaper Handelsblatt. “What struck me was an incredible interest in critical infrastructure and the security authorities here in Thuringia, especially how they deal with hybrid threats,” Maier subsequently told POLITICO. “Suddenly, geopolitical issues are playing a role in their questions, while we in the Thuringian state parliament are not responsible for foreign policy or defense policy.”  ‘PERFIDIOUS’ INSINUATIONS AfD leaders frequently take positions favorable to the Kremlin, favoring a renewal of economic ties and gas imports and a cease of weapons aid for Ukraine. Their political opponents, however, have frequently accused them of acting not from conviction alone — but at the behest of Moscow. Greens lawmaker Irene Mihalic, for instance, last month called the party Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “trojan horse” in Germany. AfD politicians deny allegations they are using their rising parliamentary power both nationally and in Germany’s states to try to pass on sensitive information to the Kremlin. Tino Chrupalla, one of the AfD’s national leaders, strongly pushed back against the allegations his party is attempting to reveal arms supply routes to benefit the Kremlin.   “Citizens have legitimate fears about what they see and experience on the highways every evening,” he said in a talk show last month when asked about Mühlmann’s inquiries. “These are all legitimate questions from a member of parliament who is concerned and who takes the concerns and needs of citizens seriously. You are making insinuations, which is quite perfidious; you are accusing us of things that you can never prove.” Tino Chrupalla, one of the AfD’s national leaders, strongly pushed back against the allegations his party is attempting to reveal arms supply routes to benefit the Kremlin.  | Thomas Lohnes/Getty Images Mühlmann, a former police officer, speaking to POLITICO, denied that he’s following an assignment list “in the direction of Russia.” Government ministers, while obligated to answer each parliamentary inquiry, are not obliged to reveal sensitive or classified information that could endanger national security, Mühlmann also argued. “It is not up to me to limit my questions, but up to the minister to provide the answers,” he said. “If at some point such an answer poses a danger or leads to espionage, then the espionage is not my fault, but the minister’s, because he has disclosed information that he should not have disclosed.” FLOOD OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS Marc Henrichmann, a conservative lawmaker and the chairman of a special committee in Germany’s Bundestag that oversees the country’s intelligence services, said that while the government is not obliged to divulge classified or highly sensitive information in its answers to parliamentary questions, Russian intelligence services can still piece together valuable insights from the sheer volume and variety of AfD inquiries. “Apart from insignificant inquiries and sensitive inquiries, there is also a huge gray area,” Henrichmann said. “And what I have regularly heard from various ministries is that individual inquiries are not really the problem. But when you look at these individual inquiries side by side, you get a picture, for example, of travel routes, aid supplies, and military goods to or in the direction of Ukraine.” Henrichmann said AfD parliamentary questions in the Bundestag on subjects such as authorities’ knowledge of Russian sabotage and hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea region as well as of the poisoning of the late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny had caught his attention and raised concerns. “Apart from insignificant inquiries and sensitive inquiries, there is also a huge gray area,” Marc Henrichmann said. | Niklas Graeber/picture alliance via Getty Images AfD factions in German state parliaments have submitted more than 7,000 security-related inquiries since the beginning of 2020, according to a data analysis by Spiegel — more than any other party and about one-third of all security-related inquiries combined. In Thuringia — where state intelligence authorities have labelled the AfD an extremist group — the party has submitted nearly 70 percent (1,206 out of 1,738) of all questions filed this legislative period. In the Bundestag, the parties parliamentary questions account for more than 60 percent of all inquiries (636 out of 1,052). The AfD’s strategic use of parliamentary questions is nothing new, experts say. Since entering the Bundestag in 2017, the party has deployed them to flood ministries and to gather information on perceived political adversaries, experts say “From the outset, the AfD has used parliamentary questions to obstruct, paralyze, and also to monitor political enemies,” said Anna-Sophie Heinze, a researcher at the University of Trier. With regard to the flood of inquiries related to national security, the question of what is driving the AfD is largely irrelevant, Jakub Wondreys, a researcher at the Technical University Dresden who studies the AfD’s Russia policy, said. “It’s not impossible that they’re acting on behalf of Kremlin. It’s also possible that they are acting on behalf of themselves, because, of course, they are pro-Kremlin. But the end result is pretty much the same. These questions are a potential threat to national security.”

LONDON — The U.K. government is “dragging its heels” on whether to classify China as a major threat to Britain’s national security, the parliament’s intelligence watchdog warned on Monday. Lawmakers on the Intelligence and Security Committee — which has access to classified briefings as part of its work overseeing Britain’s intelligence services — said they are “concerned” by apparent inaction over whether to designate Beijing as a top-level threat when it comes to influencing Britain. Ministers have been under pressure to put China on the “enhanced tier” of Britain’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme — a tool to protect the economy and society from covert hostile activity. Both Iran and Russia have been placed on the top tier, which adds a new layer of restrictions and accountability to their activities in Britain. The government has so far resisted calls to add China to that list, even though Beijing has been accused of conducting state-threat activities in the U.K. such as industrial espionage, cyber-attacks and spying on politicians.  In its annual report the Committee said British intelligence agency MI5 had previously told them that measures like the registration scheme would “have proportionately more effect against … Chinese activity.” The Committee said “hostile activity by Russian, Iranian and Chinese state-linked actors is multi-faceted and complex,” adding that the threat of “state-sponsored assassination, attacks and abductions” of perceived dissidents has “remained at a higher level than we have seen in previous years.”  It added that while there are “a number of difficult trade-offs involved” when dealing with Beijing, it has “previously found that the Government has been reluctant to prioritise security considerations when it comes to China.” “The Government should swiftly come to a decision on whether to add China to the Enhanced Tier of the [Foreign Influence Registration Scheme],” the Committee said, demanding that it be provided a “full account” to “ensure that security concerns have not been overlooked in favour of economic considerations.” The pressure comes as U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer prepares to visit China in January — the first British leader to visit the country since Theresa May in 2018.  A government spokesperson said: “National security is the first duty of this government. We value the [Intelligence and Security Committee]’s independent oversight and the thoroughness of their scrutiny. “This report underscores the vital, complex work our agencies undertake daily to protect the UK. “This Government is taking a consistent, long term and strategic approach to managing the UK’s relations with China, rooted in UK and global interests. We will cooperate where we can and challenge where we must.”

LONDON — On the face of it, the new MI6 chief’s first speech featured many of the same villains and heroes as those of her predecessors. But in her first public outing Monday, Blaise Metreweli, the first female head of the U.K.’s foreign intelligence service, sent a strong signal that she intends to put her own stamp on the role – as she highlighted a wave of inter-connected threats to western democracies. Speaking at MI6’s HQ in London, Metreweli, who took over from Richard Moore in October, highlighted a confluence of geo-political and technological disruptions, warning “the frontline is everywhere” and adding “we are now operating in a space between peace and war.” In a speech shot through with references to a shifting transatlantic order and the growth of disinformation, Metreweli made noticeably scant  reference to the historically close relationship with the U.S. in intelligence gathering — the mainstay of the U.K.’s intelligence compact for decades. Instead, she highlighted that a “new bloc and identities are forming and alliances reshaping.” That will be widely seen to reflect an official acknowledgement that the second Donald Trump administration has necessitated a shift in the security services towards cultivating more multilateral relationships. By comparison with a lengthy passage on the seriousness of the Russia threat to Britain, China got away only with a light mention of its cyber attack tendencies towards the U.K. — and was referred to more flatteringly as “a country where a central transformation  is  taking place this century.” Westminster hawks will note that Metreweli — who grew up in Hong Kong and  so knows the Chinese system close-up — walked gingerly around the risk of conflict in the  South China Sea and Beijing’s espionage activities targeting British politicians – and even its royals. In a carefully-placed line, she reflected that she was  “going to break with tradition and won’t give you a global threat tour.” Moore, her predecessor, was known for that approach, which delighted those who enjoyed a plain-speaking MI6 boss giving pithy analysis of global tensions and their fallout, but frustrated some in the Foreign Office who believed the affable Moore could be too unguarded in his comments on geo-politics. The implicit suggestion from the new chief was that China needs to be handled differently to the forthright engagement with “aggressive, expansionist and revisionist” Russia. The reasons may well lie in the aftermath of a bruising argument within Whitehall about how to handle the recent case of two Britons who were arrested for spying for China, and with a growth-boosting visit to Beijing by the prime minister scheduled for 2026. Sources in the service suggest the aim of the China strategy is to avoid confrontation, the better to further intelligence-gathering and have a more productive economic relationship with Beijing. More hardline interpreters of the Secret Intelligence Service will raise eyebrows at her suggestion that the “convening power” of the service would enable it to “ defuse tensions.” But there was no doubt about Metreweli’s deep concern at the impacts of social-media disinformation and distortion, in a framing which seemed just as worried about U.S. tech titans as conventional state-run threats:  “We are being contested from battlefield to boardroom — and even our brains — as disinformation manipulates our understanding of each other.” Declaring that “some  algorithms become as powerful as states,” seemed to tilt at outfits like Elon Musk’s X and Mark Zuckerberg’s Meta-owned Facebook. Metreweli warned that “hyper personalized tools could become a new vector for conflict and control,” pushing their effects on societies and individuals  in “minutes not months – my service must operate in this new context too.” The new boss used the possessive pronoun, talking about “my service” in her speech several times – another sign that she intends to put a distinctive mark of the job, now that she has, at the age of just 48,  inherited the famous green-ink pen in which the head of the service signs correspondence.  Metreweli is experienced operator in war zones including Iraq who spent a secondment with MI5, the domestic intelligence service, and won the job in large part because of her experience in the top job via MI6’s science and technology “Q”  Branch. She clearly wants to expedite changes in the service – saying agents must be as fluent in computer coding as foreign languages. She is also expected to try and address a tendency in the service to harvest information, without a clear focus on the action that should follow – the product of a glut of intelligence gathered via digital means and AI. She  was keen to stress that the human factor is at the heart of it all — an attempt at reassurance for spies and analysts wondering if they might be replaced by AI agents as the job of gathering intelligence in the era of facial recognition and biometrics gets harder.  Armed with a steely gaze Metreweli speaks fluent human, occasionally with a small smile. She is also the first incumbent of the job to wear a very large costume jewelry beetle brooch on her sombre navy attire. No small amount of attention in Moscow and Beijing could go into decoding that.

LONDON — The Palace of Westminster is contemplating tightening parliamentary access for Chinese visitors in the wake of a collapsed spying case, according to media reports. The Telegraph newspaper reported Sunday evening that House of Commons Speaker Lindsay Hoyle is looking to mirror measures introduced by the European Parliament, which banned lobbyists for Chinese tech company Huawei from the premises earlier this year. The European legislature also imposed restrictions on Chinese officials entering the buildings in April 2023 after tit-for-tat sanctions were imposed over human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Those restrictions were eventually lifted earlier this year. Speaker Hoyle discussed the situation with his European counterpart to learn how such restrictions could be practically imposed in the U.K., the Telegraph reported. Hoyle’s office did not respond immediately to a request for comment. The move comes amid intense scrutiny of Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s government and the Crown Prosecution Service after charges against two men — including a former researcher for a Conservative MP — accused of spying for China were dropped. It’s not the first time Hoyle has flexed his muscles on China. Beijing’s Ambassador to the U.K. Zheng Zeguang was banned from parliament in 2021 in retaliation for China imposing sanctions on British MPs critical of the country’s human rights record.

LONDON — The Chinese Communist Party laid into the British government Friday after it delayed a decision over a controversial proposed “super embassy” in London. Britain would “bear all consequences” if planning permission for the 20,000 square meter Chinese Embassy — expected to be the biggest embassy in Europe — near the Tower of London is refused, Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said. Beijing purchased the site for the planned embassy for £255 million in 2018. U.K. Communities Secretary Steve Reed must make a final decision to approve or reject the building application, which has proven deeply controversial with China hawks in the U.K. parliament. Significant security concerns have been raised over the site’s proximity to cables carrying communications to the City of London financial district, and Beijing’s refusal to present full internal layout plans to British authorities. Britain this week pushed the deadline for a final ruling on the building from Oct. 21 to Dec. 10, prompting “grave concern and strong dissatisfaction” from Beijing. Lin told a press conference in China Friday that the country had displayed “the utmost sincerity and patience” during talks over the site, and accused Britain of showing “disregard for contractual spirit, acting in bad faith and without integrity.” A decision was initially due by Sept. 9 after ministers took control of the application from Tower Hamlets Council in London, making this the second delay by the British government. The delay comes in a particularly sensitive week for U.K.-China relations. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has faced pressure over the collapsed prosecution of two men accused of spying for China. Lin demanded Britain “immediately fulfill its obligations and honor its commitments … otherwise the British side shall bear all consequences.”

LONDON — The threat from states such as China is as bad or worse as the threat of terrorism, the head of one of Britain’s top intelligence agencies warned Thursday. Giving his annual threat update speech from MI5 headquarters at Thames House in London, MI5 director general Ken McCallum called for the most profound change in the way British intelligence operates “since 9/11.” His comments come as Westminster continues to be engulfed by questions over the high-profile collapse of a case against two alleged Chinese spies. Both the British government and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) have faced scrutiny over the case after the CPS unexpectedly dropped the charges against the two men in question last month. Speaking Thursday, McCallum said his teams are running a “near-record” volume of investigations into terrorism, and have foiled 19 late-stage terrorism attacks since 2020. But he said that threats from states — including China — are now a “second menace of equal or even greater scale,” forcing “the biggest shifts in MI5’s mission since 9/11.” McCallum said that since his update last year state-based threats to the U.K. are “escalating,” with an increase in the number of people being investigated for state threat activity — such as espionage “against our Parliament.” FRUSTRATED THE CASE COLLAPSED Christopher Cash, 30, a former researcher for a Conservative MP, and Christopher Berry, a 33-year-old teacher, both denied allegations that they passed sensitive information to an alleged Chinese intelligence agent between 2021 and 2023. On Wednesday evening the British government published key witness statements from Matthew Collins, the deputy national security advisor, whose evidence was blamed by CPS for not providing enough grounds to prosecute the two men accused of spying for Beijing. Asked how he felt about the collapse of the China prosecution against the two men, McCallum said: “Of course I am frustrated when opportunities to prosecute national security-threatening activity are not followed through.” He added that in this specific event “the activity was disrupted” by MI5 and that his teams have “every right to feel proud” of the work they have done in the case. However he said that it is “far from unprecedented” for his officers to disrupt a threat to national security and for it not to result in a criminal conviction. Asked about Collins, the deputy national security advisor who submitted the witness statements to the CPS, McCallum said he would make a “rare exception” to speak about Collins’ integrity, having worked with him. “I do consider him to be a man of high integrity and a professional of considerable quality,” he said. McCallum was also careful not to criticize the work of the CPS, telling journalists: “Not only am I not a criminal prosecutor, I’m not a lawyer. And so for the same reason that the DPP (Director of Public Prosecutions) presumably wouldn’t stand up and comment on how to run covert intelligence operations, I’m not going to presume to appoint myself a temporary expert in the running of prosecutions.” The decision to replace Britain’s Official Secrets Act with a new National Security Act — pointed to by the current Labour government as a key reason the case collapsed — was praised by McCallum, who said it has “definitely has closed serious weaknesses that we have previously suffered from.” CHINA A WIDER THREAT The MI5 head said the relationship between Britain and China is “complex,” but his agency’s role “is not,” adding that the U.K, needs to become a “hard target” to “all the threats, including China, but not limited to China.” McCallum revealed that in the last week MI5 had “intervened operationally” against China, though this is not believed to be related to alleged spying on Parliament by Beijing. “Do Chinese state actors present a U.K. national security threat? And the answer is, of course, yes they do, every day,” he said. However, the MI5 chief would not “comment on the overall balance of U.K. bilateral foreign policy relationships with China.” “When it comes to China the U.K. needs to defend itself resolutely against security threats and seize the opportunities that demonstrably serve our nation,” he added, pointing that the U.K. and its Five Eyes allies including the U.S. share a “pragmatic approach” and that having a “substantive relationship with China” means Britain is in a “stronger position from which to push back.”

Viktor Orbán’s rival Péter Magyar has accused Hungarian Commissioner Oliver Várhelyi of holding back information about his time as an ambassador during a period when a spy ring is alleged to have operated out of his office. Reports last week by several media outlets alleged that Hungarian intelligence officials disguised as diplomats had tried to recruit European Union staffers as spies during Várhelyi’s time as Hungary’s envoy to Brussels. EU Health Commissioner Várhelyi told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen over the weekend that he was “not aware” of alleged efforts by Orbán’s government to recruit spies in Brussels, according to a Commission spokesperson. The Commission said last week it would probe the allegations. But Magyar, who holds a sharp lead on Orbán in current polling ahead of April’s parliamentary election, wrote in a Facebook post: “In my opinion, Olivér Várhelyi, the current EU Commissioner and former EU Ambassador (and my former boss), did not reveal the whole truth when he denied this during the official investigation the other day.” Várhelyi served as ambassador to Hungary’s permanent representation to the EU between 2015 and 2019, having previously worked as the deputy ambassador from 2011. Magyar worked at the permanent representation office in Brussels between 2011 and 2015. POLITICO contacted several members of Commissioner Várhelyi’s team about Magyar’s allegations, but did not receive a response. Magyar also named Hungarian government minister János Lázár in his Facebook post, writing it was “a common fact” that secret service people were deployed to Brussels during Lázár’s time overseeing EU affairs from 2012 to 2018. Lázár did not respond to POLITICO’s request for comment on Magyar’s post, but was quoted in the Hungarian press this week as saying: “I don’t recall the exact details — I’m not great at remembering — but my duty is to protect my country.” “If Hungarian intelligence had gone to Brussels … I would honor them, not reprimand them,” he said, adding: “That is their role: to defend the nation’s interests. … Their job is to safeguard the country’s independence.” Csongor Körömi contributed reporting.

Prime minister’s questions: a shouty, jeery, very occasionally useful advert for British politics. Here’s what you need to know from the latest session in POLITICO’s weekly run-through. What they sparred about: The collapsed China spy case, of course. Parliament’s security was at the front of MPs’ minds in the first joust between Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Tory Leader Kemi Badenoch since recess. They argued over who, exactly, should be blamed for the case not reaching trial. If you’ve had a news holiday: The criminal case against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who were accused of spying for Beijing, fell apart last month after the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) said the government provided insufficient evidence proving China was a threat to national security. Both men denied the charges, while Labour and the Tories had a predictable back-and-forth about who held responsibility. But first: The PM made a statement before Badenoch even had a chance to lay a blow, to some consternation from Tory MPs. Starmer reiterated he was “deeply disappointed” the case failed and ripped into “baseless accusations” from the Tories. The PM said that government policy under the Conservatives (when the alleged offenses took place) did not “describe China as an enemy,” which meant the prosecution test couldn’t be met. Powells apart: National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell’s role came under intense scrutiny — but Starmer insisted “no minister or special adviser” played any role in the provision of evidence. In a clear news line, the PM said he would publish witness statements that were being checked over. No surprise: Badenoch wasn’t happy. The Tory leader said Starmer’s spiel “answers no questions” and offered “only more obfuscation.” Calling the trial collapse “simply unbelievable,” Badenoch ran through quotes where the Tories were less than pally with Beijing (just don’t mention that pint). The PM, natch, threw those remarks back in her face, quoting her previous statement that the U.K. shouldn’t describe China “as a foe.” Flexing their muscles: Both parties tried painting themselves as Beijing’s biggest enemy — just not officially. Badenoch lambasted “whataboutery” and reiterated that the two individuals were “charged under a Conservative government, let off under Labour.” She probed whether Deputy National Security Adviser Matthew Collins actually dealt with the CPS without discussing the issue with Powell. Row at the bar: The PM said that was true, calling Collins “a civil servant of the utmost integrity” — but would double-check whether other conversations took place. Badenoch questioned what the point was of having a lawyer as a leader who “can’t even get the law right on a matter of national security.” Starmer said Badenoch was “clearly not a lawyer or a leader.” It’s the way they tell them. Chinese whispers: Badenoch, relying on the investigative work of weekend hacks, asked about a “secret” meeting last month reported by the Sunday Times involving Powell. Starmer admitted a meeting took place with Powell … but this didn’t involve evidence and took place after the final CPS statement was made in August. Great wall of China: The Tory leader remarked, “this all stinks of a cover-up,” and said the government was “too weak.” The PM called her comments “entirely baseless” and “slinging mud,” saying the Conservatives should have changed the Official Secrets Act earlier during their time in office. So that’s all helpful. Helpful backbench intervention of the week: East Worthing and Shoreham MP Tom Rutland celebrated the government’s ambition to get two-thirds of young people into an apprenticeship or university, asking the PM what other help he would provide. Starmer took that opportunity to outline his plans — a promotion in the next reshuffle is surely guaranteed. Totally unscientific scores on the doors: Starmer 6/10. Badenoch 7/10. Neither leader enjoyed a moment of glory as a serious topic descended into the usual party political knockabout. Badenoch attacked the holes in the government’s answers and grabbed the concession that witness statements will be published. While Starmer stuck to his script diligently, blaming the Conservatives will only work for so long when Labour is in government.