Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Kyiv is moving to step up pressure on Moscow with new operations targeting Russia, following a week of Russian attacks that knocked out power to Ukrainian cities as freezing temperatures set in. “Some of the operations have already been felt by the Russians. Some are still underway,” Zelenskyy said in his nightly address Saturday. “ I also approved new ones.” Zelenskyy said Ukraine’s actions include deep strikes and special measures aimed at weakening Russia’s capacity to continue the war. “We are actively defending ourselves, and every Russian loss brings the end of the war closer,” he said. He declined to provide details, saying it was “too early” to speak publicly about certain operations, but stressed that Ukraine’s security services and special forces are operating effectively. As part of Kyiv’s efforts to reduce Russia’s offensive capabilities, Ukrainian forces attacked the Zhutovskaya oil depot in Russia’s Volgograd region overnight Saturday, the General Staff said in a post on social media. Zelenskyy’s comments come after a week of escalating Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which left the regions of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk without electricity and heating as temperatures plunged well below zero. In the capital, renewed attacks killed at least four people and injured 25 others. The city’s mayor urged residents who could leave to do so, as roughly half of Kyiv’s apartment buildings were left without power or heat. Russia also launched a nuclear-capable Oreshnik ballistic missile at Ukraine’s Lviv region on Thursday, striking near the EU and NATO border as part of a massive barrage.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Die USA lassen Venezuelas Machthaber Nicolás Maduro festnehmen und bringen ihn nach New York. Donald Trump setzt damit erneut auf militärische Macht und überrascht Verbündete wie Gegner gleichermaßen. Jonathan Martin von POLITICO in Washington ordnet ein, wie diese Aktion auch in den USA diskutiert wird, warum selbst der Kongress übergangen wurde und welche Risiken ein solcher Eingriff für die internationale Ordnung birgt. Parallel erlebt Berlin eine eigene Krise. Ein Brandanschlag auf zentrale Stromkabel legt große Teile des Südwestens der Stadt lahm. Zehntausende Menschen sitzen im Winter ohne Strom da. Rasmus Buchsteiner schildert die Lage vor Ort und analysiert, warum Politik und Sicherheitsbehörden so lange brauchten, um den Ernst der Situation öffentlich anzuerkennen. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht Berlins Wirtschafts- und Energie-Senatorin Franziska Giffey (SPD) über die Hintergründe des Anschlags, die Verwundbarkeit kritischer Infrastruktur und die politischen Konsequenzen. Sie erklärt, warum absolute Sicherheit nicht möglich ist und welche Maßnahmen nun folgen müssen. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. Legal Notice (Belgium) POLITICO SRL Forme sociale: Société à Responsabilité Limitée Siège social: Rue De La Loi 62, 1040 Bruxelles Numéro d’entreprise: 0526.900.436 RPM Bruxelles info@politico.eu www.politico.eu

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

BRUSSELS — The military should get involved in the green transition to ensure that Russia doesn’t exploit new vulnerabilities brought about by the move to renewable energy sources, a top EU body said in a document obtained by POLITICO. The bloc has made efforts in recent years to end dependence on Russian fuels and move toward cleaner technology, and is set to ban Russian gas imports entirely under its broader REPowerEU roadmap. However, a letter drafted by the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU and sent on Nov. 28 to EU ambassadors argued that the transition also introduces “new layers of complexity” as Europe’s old energy architecture — including petrol stations, pipelines, refineries and other infrastructure — is phased out. That complicates supply chains on which militaries depend, requiring “enhanced energy independence and engagement in the green transition” by the transatlantic military alliance NATO. The letter, first reported on by Contexte, also calls for stronger coordination between NATO and the EU on energy policy. In particular, officials ought to look at how to protect Europe’s energy infrastructure amid an increase in “physical sabotage and cyberattacks targeting pipelines, cables, ports, and power grids,” it said. The digitization of many energy sources, it added, also requires “strong security measures throughout all phases of infrastructure planning, design, and operation.” The initiative will be discussed by energy ministers on Dec. 15.

High energy prices, risks on CBAM enforcement and promotion of lead markets, as well as increasing carbon costs are hampering domestic and export competitiveness with non-EU producers. The cement industry is fundamental to Europe’s construction value chain, which represents about 9 percent of the EU’s GDP. Its hard-to-abate production processes are also currently responsible for 4 percent of EU emissions, and it is investing heavily in measures aimed at achieving full climate neutrality by 2050, in line with the European Green Deal. Marcel Cobuz, CEO, TITAN Group  “We should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry in EU stays competitive domestically and its export market shares are maintained.” However, the industry’s efforts to comply with EU environmental regulations, along with other factors, make it less competitive than more carbon-intensive producers from outside Europe. Industry body Cement Europe recently stated that, “without a competitive business model, the very viability of the cement industry and its prospects for industrial decarbonization are at risk.” Marcel Cobuz, member of the Board of the Global Cement and Concrete Association and CEO of TITAN Group, one of Europe’s leading producers, spoke with POLITICO Studio about the vital need for a clear policy partnership with Brussels to establish a predictable regulatory and financing framework to match the industry’s decarbonization ambitions and investment efforts to stay competitive in the long-term. POLITICO Studio: Why is the cement industry important to the EU economy?  Marcel Cobuz: Just look around and you will see how important it is. Cement helped to build the homes that we live in and the hospitals that care for us. It’s critical for our transport and energy infrastructure, for defense and increasingly for the physical assets supporting the digital economy. There are more than 200 cement plants across Europe, supporting nearby communities with high-quality jobs. The cement industry is also key to the wider construction industry, which employs 14.5 million people across the EU. At the same time, cement manufacturers from nine countries compete in the international export markets. PS: What differentiates Titan within the industry?  MC: We have very strong European roots, with a presence in 10 European countries. Sustainability is very much part of our DNA, so decarbonizing profitably is a key objective for us. We’ve reduced our CO2 footprint by nearly 25 percent since 1990, and we recently announced that we are targeting a similar reduction by 2030 compared to 2020. We are picking up pace in reducing emissions both by using conventional methods, like the use of alternative sources of low-carbon energy and raw materials, and advanced technologies. TITAN/photo© Nikos Daniilidis We have a large plant in Europe where we are exploring building one of the largest carbon capture projects on the continent, with support from the Innovation Fund, capturing close to two million tons of CO2 and producing close to three million tons of zero-carbon cement for the benefit of all European markets. On top of that, we have a corporate venture capital fund, which partners with startups from Europe to produce the materials of tomorrow with  very low or zero carbon. That will help not only TITAN but the whole industry to accelerate its way towards the use of new high-performance materials with a smaller carbon footprint. PS: What are the main challenges for the EU cement industry today?  MC: Several factors are making us less competitive than companies from outside the EU. Firstly, Europe is an expensive place when it comes to energy prices. Since 2021, prices have risen by close to 65 percent, and this has a huge impact on cement producers, 60 percent of whose costs are energy-related. And this level of costs is two to three times higher than those of our neighbors. We also face regulatory complexity compared to our outside competitors, and the cost of compliance is high. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) cost for the cement sector is estimated at €97 billion to €162 billion between 2023 and 2034. Then there is the need for low-carbon products to be promoted ― uptake is still at a very low level, which leads to an investment risk around new decarbonization technologies. > We should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry in the EU > stays competitive domestically and its export market shares are maintained.” All in all, the playing field is far from level. Imports of cement into the EU have increased by 500 percent since 2016. Exports have halved ― a loss of value of one billion euros. The industry is reducing its cost to manufacture and to replace fossil fuels, using the waste of other industries, digitalizing its operations, and premiumizing its offers. But this is not always enough. Friendly policies and the predictability of a regulatory framework should accompany the effort. PS: In January 2026, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will be fully implemented, aimed at ensuring that importers pay the same carbon price as domestic producers. Will this not help to level the playing field? MC: This move is crucial, and it can help in dealing with the increasing carbon cost. However, I believe we already see a couple of challenges regarding the CBAM. One is around self-declaration: importers declare the carbon footprint of their materials, so how do we avoid errors or misrepresentations? In time there should be audits of the importers’ industrial installations and co-operation with the authorities at source to ensure the data flow is accurate and constant. It really needs to be watertight, and the authorities need to be fully mobilized to make sure the real cost of carbon is charged to the importers. Also, and very importantly, we need to ensure that CBAM does not apply to exports from the EU to third countries, as carbon costs are increasingly a major factor making us uncompetitive outside the EU, in markets where we were present for more than 20 years. > CBAM really needs to be watertight, and the authorities need to be fully > mobilized to make sure the real cost of carbon is charged to the importers.” PS: In what ways can the EU support the European cement industry and help it to be more competitive? MC: By simplifying legislation and making it more predictable so we can plan our investments for the long term. More specifically, I’m talking about the revamping of the ETS, which in its current form implies a phase-down of CO2 rights over the next decade. First, we should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry stays competitive and its export market shares are maintained, so a policy of more for longer should accompany the new ETS. > In export markets, the policy needs to ensure a level playing field for > European suppliers competing in international destination markets, through a > system of free allowances or CBAM certificates, which will enable exports to > continue.” We should look at it as a way of funding decarbonization. We could front-load part of ETS revenues in a fund that would support the development of technologies such as low-carbon materials development and CCS. The roll-out of Infrastructure for carbon capture projects such as transport or storage should also be accelerated, and the uptake of low-carbon products should be incentivized. More specifically on export markets, the policy needs to ensure a level playing field for European suppliers competing in international destination markets, through a system of free allowances or CBAM certificates, which will enable exports to continue. PS: Are you optimistic about the future of your industry in Europe?  MC: I think with the current system of phasing out CO2 rights, and if the CBAM is not watertight, and if energy prices remain several times higher than in neighboring countries, and if investment costs, particularly for innovating new technologies, are not going to be financed through ETS revenues, then there is an existential risk for at least part of the industry. Having said that, I’m optimistic that, working together with the European Commission we can identify the right policy making solutions to ensure our viability as a strategic industry for Europe. And if we are successful, it will benefit everyone in Europe, not least by guaranteeing more high-quality jobs and affordable and more energy-efficient materials for housing ― and a more sustainable and durable infrastructure in the decades ahead. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Titan Group * The advertisement is linked to policy advocacy around industrial competitiveness, carbon pricing, and decarbonization in the EU cement and construction sectors, including the EU’s CBAM legislation, the Green Deal, and the proposed revision of the ETS. More information here.

EU countries are taking a harder look at who builds, owns and works on key infrastructure like ports, IT and rail — and that concern is now spilling into a wave of legislation aimed at countries like China. Sweden is the latest to move, proposing this week to give local authorities new powers to block “hostile states” from bidding on infrastructure if their involvement could threaten national security. “It’s part of a defense issue,” a Swedish official told POLITICO, describing growing worries about countries like China gaining access to public infrastructure. “We are acting very quickly on that, since we see a risk that hostile states might try to infiltrate infrastructure such as ports, but also IT solutions and energy infrastructure.” It’s also a worry in Poland, Austria and inside EU institutions — all of which are rushing to put in safeguards to block, or at least monitor, third-country investment in key tech and transport infrastructure. What accelerated Sweden’s move was a recent EU court ruling involving Turkish and Chinese companies bidding on two railway projects. Judges concluded that suppliers from countries without a free-trade agreement with the EU do not enjoy the same rights as EU firms — a reading Stockholm took as both a green light and a warning signal. Sweden’s new rules are due to take effect in 2027. No specific cases were cited, but the investigation repeatedly pointed to China — which also sits at the center of very similar concerns in Poland. Warsaw has long been uneasy about the scale of Chinese involvement in its ports. A new draft bill put forward by the country’s president would “adapt the existing regulations concerning the operation of ports, and in particular the ownership of real estate located within the boundaries of ports.” The president argued that the current model — state-owned port authorities holding land and infrastructure and leasing it long-term to terminal operators — needs tightening if the country wants to maintain control over assets of “fundamental importance to the national economy.” Gen. Dariusz Łuczak, former head of Poland’s Internal Security Agency and now adviser to the Special Services Commission, told Polish media late last month that “the most important provisions are those concerning the early termination of perpetual use agreements.” However, it’s unclear if the legislation will pass as President Karol Nawrocki is broadly opposed to the government led by Prime Minster Donald Tusk. The EU is also moving. Ana Miguel Pedro, a Portuguese member of the European Parliament with the center-right European People’s Party, told POLITICO in the spring that the growing presence of Chinese state-owned companies in European port terminals “is not just an economic concern, but a strategic vulnerability.” Those concerns appear in the bloc’s new military mobility package, which calls for member countries to put in place “stricter rules on the ownership and control of strategic dual use infrastructure.” Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas also flagged the Chinese presence in ports and said it will feature in the European Commission’s upcoming ports strategy, due in 2026. Austria has also been pushed into the debate after long-distance trains built by Chinese state-owned manufacturer CRRC rolled onto the Vienna-Salzburg line for the first time — triggering a political backlash. The country’s Mobility Minister Peter Hanke said the EU must tighten procurement and digital-security rules for state-backed rail purchases — and Vienna plans to propose new legislation before the end of the year. The Commission did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Industry is pushing Brussels to go even further. The European Rail Supply Industry Association argued that the bloc’s procurement rules are relics of an earlier era and asked the Commission to update them so companies from countries that shut out EU bidders cannot freely compete for European contracts. Sweden’s investigators saw the same risks. “Third-country suppliers without an agreement should not be given a more advantageous position than they have today and than other suppliers have,” Anneli Berglund Creutz, who led the Swedish government’s procurement review, told reporters. Contracting authorities, she added, should have the ability “to take into account the nationality of suppliers and to select suppliers from hostile states” — possibly excluding them “when that protects national security.”

Volodymyr Zelenskyy is under mounting pressure from critics to keep the lights and heating on while Vladimir Putin ramps up his military assault on Ukraine’s energy supply. The Ukrainian president is fearful of a public backlash over likely prolonged blackouts this winter and is trying to shift the blame, said the former head of Ukraine’s state-owned national power company. Thirty-nine-year-old Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, who led Ukrenergo until he was forced to resign last year amid infighting over political control of the energy sector, said he’s one of those whom the President’s Office is looking to scapegoat. During an exclusive interview with POLITICO, he predicted Ukraine will face a “very difficult winter” under relentless Russian bombardment — and argued Kyiv’s government has made that worse through a series of missteps. Adding fuel to his clash with Zelenskyy’s team, Kudrytskyi was charged last week with embezzlement, prompting an outcry from Ukraine’s civil society and opposition lawmakers.  They say Kudrytskyi’s arraignment involving a contract — one of hundreds — he authorized seven years ago, when he was a deputy director at Ukrenergo, is a glaring example of the aggressive use of lawfare by the Ukrainian leadership to intimidate opponents, silence critics and obscure their own mistakes. Kudrytskyi added he has no doubt that the charges against him would have to be approved by the President’s Office and “could only have been orchestrated on the orders of Zelenskyy.” Zelenskyy’s office declined to respond to repeated requests from POLITICO for comment. Before his arrest, Kudrytskyi said he was the subject of criticism “by anonymous Telegram channels that support the presidential office with false claims I had embezzled funds.” He took that as the first sign that he would likely be targeted for harsher treatment. Kudrytskyi, who was released Friday on bail, said the criminal charges against him are “nonsense,” but they’ve been leveled so it will be “easier for the President’s Office to sell the idea that I am responsible for the failure to prepare the energy system for the upcoming winter, despite the fact that I have not been at Ukrenergo for more than a year now.” “They’re scared to death” about a public outcry this winter, he added. COMPETING PLANS That public backlash against leadership in Kyiv will be partly justified, Kudrytskyi said, because the struggle to keep the lights on will have been exacerbated by tardiness in rolling out more decentralized power generation. Kudrytskyi said Ukraine’s energy challenge as the days turn colder will be compounded by the government’s failure to promptly act on a plan he presented to Zelenskyy three years ago. The proposal would have decentralized energy generation and shifted away, as quickly as possible, from a system based on huge Soviet-era centralized power plants, more inviting targets for Russian attacks.   Thirty-nine-year-old Volodymyr Kudrytskyi said he’s one of those whom the President’s Office is looking to scapegoat. | Kirill Chubotin/Getty Images The plan was centered on the idea that decentralizing power generation would be the best way to withstand Russian missile and drone attacks. Those have redoubled to an alarming scale in recent weeks with, some days, Russia targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure with 500 Iranian-designed drones and 20 to 30 missiles in each attack. Instead of quickly endorsing the decentralization plan, Zelenskyy instead approved — according to Kudrytskyi — a rival scheme backed by his powerful Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak to “create a huge fund to attract hundreds of millions of foreign investment for hydrogen and solar energy.” Last year the government shifted its focus to decentralization, eventually taking up Kudrytskyi’s plan. “But we lost a year,” he said.  He also said the slow pace in hardening the country’s energy facilities to better withstand the impact of direct hits or blasts — including building concrete shelters to protect transformers at power plants — was a “sensational failure of the government.” Ukrenergo, Kudrytskyi said, started to harden facilities and construct concrete shelters for transformers in 2023 — but little work was done by other power generation companies. DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING Kudrytskyi was abruptly forced to resign last year in what several Ukrainian energy executives say was a maneuver engineered by presidential insiders determined to monopolize political power. His departure prompted alarm in Brussels and Washington, D.C. — Western diplomats and global lenders even issued a rare public rebuke, breaking their normal public silence on domestic Ukrainian politics. They exhorted Kyiv to change tack. So far, international partners have made no public comments on Kudrytskyi’s arrest and arraignment. But a group of four prominent Ukrainian think tanks issued a joint statement on Oct. 30, the day after Kudrytskyi’s arraignment, urging authorities to conduct investigations with “the utmost impartiality, objectivity, and political neutrality.”  The think tanks also cautioned against conducting political persecutions. In their statement they said: “The practice of politically motivated actions against professionals in power in any country, especially in a country experiencing the extremely difficult times of war, is a blow to statehood, not a manifestation of justice.” The embezzlement case against Kudrytskyi has been described by one of the country’s most prominent anti-corruption activists, Daria Kaleniuk, head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center, as not making any legal sense. She argued that the prosecutor has failed to offer evidence that the former energy boss enriched himself in any way and, along with other civil society leaders, said the case is another episode in democratic backsliding. Overnight Sunday, Russia launched more attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, striking at regions across the country. According to Zelenskyy, “nearly 1,500 attack drones, 1,170 guided aerial bombs, and more than 70 missiles of different types were used by the Russians to attack life in Ukraine just this week alone.” Unlike previous wartime winters, Russian forces this time have also been attacking the country’s natural gas infrastructure in a sustained campaign.  Since being forced to resign from Ukrenergo, Kudrytskyi hasn’t been shy about highlighting what he says is mismanagement of Ukraine’s energy sector. For that he has been attacked on social media for being unpatriotic, he said. But he sees it differently. “Most Ukrainians understand the government should be criticized even during wartime for mistakes because otherwise it would cause harm to the country,” he said.

BRUSSELS — Huawei was rushed back into the EU’s most influential solar panel lobby after threatening legal action in reaction to its earlier expulsion over its alleged involvement in a bribery and corruption scandal.   That’s outraging other solar power companies, worried that creating a special membership category for Huawei could undermine the ability of SolarPower Europe to effectively represent the industry in Brussels.  “The conduct reported … specifically the handling of Huawei’s membership has seriously undermined both my personal confidence and that of our organization in the governance of SPE,” Elisabeth Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß, CEO of Austrian company Fronius, wrote in a letter to SPE, which was obtained by POLITICO.  Lawyers for Huawei and SolarPower Europe met at the end of May for negotiations, an industry insider told POLITICO, which culminated in SPE sending a final agreement to the Chinese company at the beginning of September.   Huawei argued that the European Commission’s decision to ban its lobbyists from any meetings with the executive or the European Parliament was unlawful and did not warrant a full expulsion from SPE, said the insider, who spoke on condition of being granted anonymity over fears of retaliation for speaking out.  The ban on Huawei lobbyists was put in place in March after Belgian authorities accused the company of conducting a cash-for-influence scheme and bribing MEPs to ensure their support of Huawei’s interests.  At the time, Huawei maintained it has a “zero-tolerance stance against corruption.”  During the Sept. 29 meeting to reinstate Huawei’s membership, SPE told its board of directors that the organization wanted to avoid a lawsuit and a potentially costly trial.  Instead, SPE proposed making Huawei a passive member that would not actively participate in the group’s workstreams — an option the board accepted, POLITICO reported earlier this month.   Huawei did not respond to a request for comment about its legal threat.  SPE acknowledged the threat in a letter to Fronius, one of its board members, on Thursday. “Based on legal advice and with the assistance of external lawyers, SolarPower Europe held discussions with Huawei with a view to avoiding litigation and protracted legal uncertainty regarding Huawei’s membership status, while preserving SolarPower Europe’s uninterrupted and unrestricted access to the EU Institutions and other relevant stakeholders,” reads the letter obtained by POLITICO.  The SPE’s letter was a response to an Oct. 20 letter from the Austrian solar panel manufacturer sent to the lobby after POLITICO’s story was published on Oct. 9. Fronius called for full transparency over the reinstatement of Huawei and action against any appearance of corruption.  The Austrian company’s concern is that SPE will be “unable to effectively represent” the sector given the EU’s ban on direct contact with Huawei or groups that lobby on its behalf, Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß told POLITICO in an email.   Fronius is also raising questions about whether SPE can designate a company as a passive member — a status that does not exist in the organization’s bylaws.  “To our knowledge, SPE’s status do not include such a membership category,” Fronius’s letter to SPE reads. “We request a clear explanation of what this form of membership is based on.”  SPE did not raise the issue of member status in its response to Fronius.   The lobbying practices of Huawei and other Chinese companies are under a microscope over concerns around the influence they wield over crucial technologies, including renewable energy and 5G mobile data networks.  While it is better known as a telecom giant, Huawei is also a leader in manufacturing inverters, which turn solar panels’ electricity into current that flows into the energy grid.  Cybersecurity experts warn inverters offer a back door for bad actors to hack into the grid and tamper with or shut it down through remote access.  Two members of the European Parliament sent a letter to the European Commission earlier this month warning of such risks and urging the executive to restrict high-risk vendors like Huawei from investing in Europe’s critical infrastructure.  “Inverters are the brain of a [solar panel] system, connected to the internet and must be remotely controllable for updates. This applies regardless of who the manufacturer is,” Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß said. “If European legislation does not address the ‘manufacturer risk,’ then energy security in Europe will be jeopardized, which I consider critical.” 

KYIV — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wants to expand his military offensive against major oil facilities deep in the Russian interior. “We hit a certain number of their refineries; they’ve got a problem. When they started to restore and saw the queues of cars, they redistributed the volumes to other refineries,” Zelenskyy said during a meeting with a small group of journalists, including POLITICO, in Kyiv. “Therefore, our task is absolutely clear — to continue our work at other plants that have started to increase the volume, especially diesel. And we just have to work on it every day,” Zelenskyy added. Ukraine has reportedly struck 21 out of Russia’s 38 large oil refineries across the country since January, according to the BBC. Ukraine aims to cripple the Russian oil industry and cut the key source of revenue to Moscow’s war machine. And Zelenskyy believes that long-range oil strikes, plus U.S. sanctions and a mega loan to Kyiv from the EU financed by frozen Russian assets, could push Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table. Zelenskyy said that, even though Kyiv wants allies to continue providing long-range missiles, expanding domestic long-range capabilities is a key priority. He added that Ukraine conducts 90 percent of its deep strikes into Russia with its own long-range drones and cruise missiles, but sometimes Kyiv uses the U.K.’s Storm Shadow and French SCALP missiles to hit targets. “Long-range capability is a component of independence and will be the greatest component for ensuring peace,” Zelenskyy added in an evening address to the nation Monday. “All deep-strike goals must be fully locked in by year’s end, including expansion of our long-range footprint.” Earlier, he met with Ukrainian producers of long-range weapons and ordered the government to lock in 57 long-term contracts with makers of key long-range drones and missiles by the end of the year. Ukraine is also building a stockpile of its latest home-made cruise missiles, the Flamingo, “to launch a […] massive strike on Russia by the end of the year,” Zelenskyy warned. “We must work every day to weaken the Russians. Their money for the war comes from oil refining,” the Ukrainian president added. Zelenskyy said strikes on Russian energy facilities are just part of a pressure campaign he hopes can force Putin to end his full-scale invasion. A key part of that package of measures, Zelenskyy said, is the EU unfreezing €140 billion in Russian assets held in the bloc to use as a massive reparation loan to help Ukraine — and he’s keen for the EU to green-light that in December at a leaders’ summit. “For Putin, the scariest part in the whole Russian-assets-for-Ukraine story is that Europe would give a signal that there is no point for him to continue his war of attrition against Ukraine, as there will be no financial attrition,” Zelenskyy said. Zelenskyy said he was very grateful for American sanctions on Russia’s Lukoil and Rosneft oil companies and now hopes that U.S. President Donald Trump, during his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week, will be able to persuade Beijing to buy less oil from Moscow. “This is all the right direction to put pressure on Russia to be ready to end the war — sanctions, weapons, use of assets,” Zelenskyy said.