BRUSSELS — On Greenland’s southern tip, surrounded by snowy peaks and deep fjords, lies Kvanefjeld — a mining project that shows the giant, barren island is more than just a coveted military base. Beneath the icy ground sits a major deposit of neodymium and praseodymium, rare earth elements used to make magnets that are essential to build wind turbines, electric vehicles and high-tech military equipment. If developed, Greenland, a semi-autonomous part of Denmark, would become the first European territory to produce these key strategic metals. Energy Transition Minerals, an Australia-based, China-backed mining company, is ready to break ground. But neither Copenhagen, Brussels nor the Greenlandic government have mobilized their state power to make the project happen. In 2009, Denmark handed Greenland’s inhabitants control of their natural resources; 12 years later the Greenlandic government blocked the mine because the rare earths are mixed with radioactive uranium. Since then the project has been in limbo, bogged down in legal disputes. “Kvanefjeld illustrates how political and regulatory uncertainty — combined with geopolitics and high capital requirements — makes even strategically important projects hard to move from potential to production,” Jeppe Kofod, Denmark’s former foreign minister and now a strategic adviser to Energy Transition Minerals, told POLITICO. Kvanefjeld’s woes are emblematic of Greenland’s broader problems. Despite having enough of some rare earth elements to supply as much as 25 percent of the world’s needs — not to mention oil and gas reserves nearly as great as those of the United States, and lots of other potential clean energy metals including copper, graphite and nickel — these resources are almost entirely undeveloped. Just two small mines, extracting gold and a niche mineral called feldspar used in glassmaking and ceramics, are up and running in Greenland. And until very recently, neither Denmark nor the European Union showed much interest in changing the situation. But that was before 2023, when the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with the Greenland government to cooperate on mining projects. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed the same year, is an attempt to catch up by building new mines both in and out of the bloc that singles out Greenland’s potential. Last month, the European Commission committed to contribute financing to Greenland’s Malmbjerg molybdenum mine in a bid to shore up a supply of the metal for the EU’s defense sector.  But with United States President Donald Trump threatening to take Greenland by force, and less likely to offer the island’s inhabitants veto power over mining projects, Europe may be too late to the party. “The EU has for many years had a limited strategic engagement in Greenland’s critical raw materials, meaning that Europe today risks having arrived late, just as the United States and China have intensified their interest,” Kofod said. In a world shaped by Trump’s increasingly belligerent foreign policy and China’s hyperactive development of clean technology and mineral supply chains, Europe’s neglect of Greenland’s natural wealth is looking increasingly like a strategic blunder. With Donald Trump threatening to take Greenland by force, and less likely to offer the island’s inhabitants veto power over mining projects, Europe may be too late to the party. | Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images A HOSTILE LAND That’s not to say building mines in Greenland, with its mile-deep permanent ice sheet, would be easy. “Of all the places in the world where you could extract critical raw materials, [Greenland] is very remote and not very easily accessible,” said Ditte Brasso Sørensen, senior analyst on EU climate and industrial policy at Think Tank Europa, pointing to the territory’s “very difficult environmental circumstances.”  The tiny population — fewer than 60,000 — and a lack of infrastructure also make it hard to build mines. “This is a logistical question,” said Eldur Olafsson, CEO of Amaroq, a gold mining company running one of the two operating mines in Greenland and also exploring rare earths and copper extraction opportunities. “How do you build mines? Obviously, with capital, equipment, but also people. [And] you need to build the whole infrastructure around those people because they cannot only be Greenlandic,” he said.  Greenland also has strict environmental policies — including a landmark 2021 uranium mining ban — which restrict resource extraction because of its impact on nature and the environment. The current government, voted in last year, has not shown any signs of changing its stance on the uranium ban, according to Per Kalvig, professor emeritus at the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, a Danish government research organization. Uranium is routinely found with rare earths, meaning the ban could frustrate Greenland’s huge potential as a rare earths producer. It’s a similar story with fossil fuels. Despite a 2007 U.S. assessment that the equivalent of over 30 billion barrels in oil and natural gas lies beneath the surface of Greenland and its territorial waters — almost equal to U.S. reserves — 30 years of oil exploration efforts by a group including Chevron, Italy’s ENI and Shell came to nothing. In 2021 the then-leftist government in Greenland banned further oil exploration on environmental grounds.  Danish geologist Flemming Christiansen, who was deputy director of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland until 2020, said the failure had nothing to do with Greenland’s actual potential as an oil producer. Instead, he said, a collapse in oil prices in 2014 along with the high cost of drilling in the Arctic made the venture unprofitable. Popular opposition only complicated matters, he said. THE CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECT From the skies above Greenland Christiansen sees firsthand the dramatic effects of climate change: stretches of clear water as rising temperatures thaw the ice sheets that for centuries have made exploring the territory a cold, costly and hazardous business. “If I fly over the waters in west Greenland I can see the changes,” he said. “There’s open water for much longer periods in west Greenland, in Baffin Bay and in east Greenland.” Climate change is opening up this frozen land. Climate change is opening up this frozen land. | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images Greenland contains the largest body of ice outside Antarctica, but that ice is melting at an alarming rate. One recent study suggests the ice sheet could cease to exist by the end of the century, raising sea levels by as much as seven meters. Losing a permanent ice cap that is several hundred meters deep, though, “gradually improves the business case of resource extraction, both for … fossil fuels and also critical raw materials,” said Jakob Dreyer, a researcher at the University of Copenhagen.   But exploiting Greenland’s resources doesn’t hinge on catastrophic levels of global warming. Even without advanced climate change, Kalvig, of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, argues Greenland’s coast doesn’t differ much from that of Norway, where oil has been found and numerous excavation projects operate.     “You can’t penetrate quite as far inland as you can [in Norway], but once access is established, many places are navigable year-round,” Kalvig said. “So, in that sense, it’s not more difficult to operate mines in Greenland than it is in many parts of Norway, Canada or elsewhere — or Russia for that matter. And this has been done before, in years when conditions allowed.”    A European Commission spokesperson said the EU was now working with Greenland’s government to develop its resources, adding that Greenland’s “democratically elected authorities have long favored partnerships with the EU to develop projects beneficial to both sides.” But the spokesperson stressed: “The fate of Greenland’s raw mineral resources is up to the Greenlandic people and their representatives.” The U.S. may be less magnanimous. Washington’s recent military operation in Venezuela showed that Trump is serious about building an empire on natural resources, and is prepared to use force and break international norms in pursuit of that goal. Greenland, with its vast oil and rare earths deposits, may fit neatly into his vision. Where the Greenlandic people fit in is less clear.

President Donald Trump said he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had an “amazing meeting” in South Korea in October. More than two months later, there’s still no formal agreement, however, leaving the commitments from both sides fuzzy and lowering expectations for a broader trade deal in 2026. Trump labeled his Oct. 30 meeting with Xi “a 12” out of 10, and the White House announced a series of measures the two sides agreed to in an effort to cool their trade war. That included, crucially, restarting Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products like soybeans and the elimination of Beijing’s restrictions on critical minerals exports. In exchange, the U.S. agreed to extend a pause on triple-digit tariffs on Chinese goods. A Chinese Commerce Ministry statement, however, did not confirm those commitments, although it did acknowledge the U.S. tariff pause. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer in late October told reporters that negotiators were “moving forward to the final details” of an agreement. Weeks later, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the administration hoped to finalize the rare earth provisions of the deal by Thanksgiving. That deadline passed without any public text or announcement. The lack of written terms, affirmed by both sides, has allowed both the Trump administration and Chinese government wiggle room in how they implement their trade truce, but critics say it also leaves the commitments open to competing interpretations — and, inevitably, more conflict down the line. The absence of a wider U.S.-China deal going forward will make the irritants that roiled trade ties in 2025 — tit-for-tat tariff hikes, export curbs on key items and targeted import shutdowns — potential tripwires for fresh economic chaos in the coming year. “This is not complicated,” said Cameron Johnson, a senior partner at Shanghai-based supply chain consultancy Tidalwave Solutions. “The Chinese may or may not be slow rolling this but this is Diplomacy 101 — what have you agreed to and what’s the time frame?” They also say it bodes poorly for the type of sweeping trade realignment between the world’s two largest economies that Trump promised at the start of his term. The president has touted an upcoming visit to Beijing in April as the next step in the talks. “If they can’t even agree to something along the lines of what the U.S. fact sheet was and what the broad outlines of the commitments are, it raises concern about how much of a joint understanding there is about the follow through,” said Greta Peisch, a partner at Wiley Rein law firm in D.C. and former general counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative under President Joe Biden. The White House, nonetheless, remains upbeat about the prospects for U.S.-China trade ties. “President Trump’s close relationship with President Xi is helping ensure that both countries are able to continue building on progress and continue resolving outstanding issues,” the White House said in a statement, adding that the administration “continues to monitor China’s compliance with our trade agreement.” A USTR official pointed to previously released statements outlining the administration’s expectations from China. The Treasury Department did not respond to a request for comment. Allies of the president argue that leaving the October understanding unwritten is not a failure but a feature of Trump’s strategy, giving both sides flexibility to manage tensions without triggering disputes over minor compliance disagreements. “The Chinese don’t want a real, definitive agreement, and on Trump’s side, in some ways, he’s better off as well, assuming that they live up to their spoken commitments,” said Wilbur Ross, who served as Commerce secretary in Trump’s first term. But there are already signs of confusion. The White House fact sheet released Nov. 1 said China had agreed to buy 12 million tons of U.S. soybeans by the end of 2025. The Chinese Commerce Ministry statement referred only to “expanding agricultural trade,” rather than a specific soybean target. Beijing has begun buying U.S. soybeans again, totaling at least 4 million metric tons since late October, well off pace to meet the 12 million mark in 2025. Greer told senators last month that the White House fact sheet reflected a “discrepancy” in timing, saying the initial purchases were intended to occur over the current crop year — generally understood to run into mid- to late 2026 — rather than within a single calendar year. The spokesperson for the Chinese embassy, Liu Pengyu, declined to comment on whether China would meet its soybean purchase commitment. U.S. soybean farmers worry, meanwhile, that China’s purchase commitments are vulnerable if there’s a fresh rupture in trade ties. The deal’s lack of transparency is also hitting industries that rely on China’s rare earth magnet supplies. Rare earths are essential for producing everything from washing machines and iPhones to medical equipment. When China announced sweeping new export restrictions in October, it set off alarms across global manufacturing supply chains. The White House says China agreed to keep rare earths and magnets flowing, but companies say shipments are still gated by licensing and remain unpredictable. “Supply chains are slowing down and certain investments that potentially could be made aren’t being made because business doesn’t have certainty of what the [rare earths] road map looks like,” Johnson said. Meanwhile U.S. trade sweeteners for Beijing just keep coming. Trump on Dec. 8 announced that Nvidia would be allowed to sell its powerful H200 artificial intelligence chip in China — despite concerns the move could give Beijing a technological edge at U.S. expense. There has been no sign of reciprocal moves by Beijing. It’s prompted warnings from national security hawks that Beijing will feel emboldened to demand the U.S. lift similar restrictions on cutting-edge tech in future trade talks. “President Trump has taken more direct control of China policy in a way that he hadn’t in his first term, so we’re seeing his own personal inclination manifesting more clearly than before,” said Christopher Adams, former senior coordinator for China affairs at the Treasury Department and now senior adviser at Covington and Burling. “And he prioritizes transactional dealmaking over pushing national security concerns.” It also could disincentivize Beijing from pursuing more ambitious trade goals with the U.S. over the coming year and from putting things on paper going forward, said Peter Harrell, former senior director for international economics on Biden’s national security council. “The Chinese understand that as long as they meet some minimal expectations on soybeans and rare earth exports, they’re not going to face a ton of immediate pressure to be nailed down on final texts,” he said. That falls short of what the administration pitched when it launched its “Liberation Day” tariff campaign in April, with Bessent predicting the pressure of Trump’s steep “reciprocal” tariffs would force China to shift away from its export-driven economic model. That same month Trump predicted Beijing would rush to negotiate trade terms to avoid being locked out of the U.S. market. What ensued was a cycle of escalating tariffs that briefly hit triple digits and a weaponization of export curbs targeted at each other’s key economic vulnerabilities until Trump and Xi ceased hostilities in October. “We settled for a pretty limited bilateral deal without any kind of broad market access or structural reforms aimed at addressing unfair competition or Chinese [industrial] overcapacity,” said Barbara Weisel, a former U.S. trade negotiator from 1994 to 2017 now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The message from Capitol Hill on both sides of the aisle is clear: Get ready for U.S. relations with China to spiral all over again in the new year. The one-year trade truce brokered in October between President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping is already looking shaky. And lawmakers are preparing to reup clashes over trade, Taiwan and cyber-intrusions when they return in January. “It’s like a heavyweight fight, and we’re in that short time period in-between rounds, but both sides need to be preparing for what is next after the truce,” Rep. Greg Stanton (D-Ariz.), a member of the House Select Committee on China, said in an interview. POLITICO talked to more than 25 lawmakers, including those on the House Select Committee on China, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s East Asia subcommittee and the Congressional Executive Commission on China, for their views on the durability of the trade treaty. Both Republicans and Democrats warned of turbulence ahead. More than 20 of the lawmakers said they doubt Xi will deliver on key pledges the White House said he made in October, including reducing the flow of precursor chemicals to Mexico that cartels process into fentanyl and buying agreed volumes of U.S. agricultural goods. “China can never be trusted. They’re always looking for an angle,” Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) said. That pessimism comes despite an easing in U.S.-China tensions since the Trump-Xi meeting in South Korea. The bruising cycle of tit-for-tat tariffs that briefly hit triple digits earlier this year is currently on pause. Both countries have relaxed export restrictions on essential items (rare earths for the U.S., chip design software for China), while Beijing has committed to “expanding agricultural product trade” in an apparent reference to the suspension of imports of U.S. agricultural products it imposed earlier this year. This trend may continue, given that Trump is likely to want stability in the U.S.-China relationship ahead of a summit with Xi planned for April in Beijing. “We’re starting to see some movement now on some of their tariff issues and the fentanyl precursor issue,” Sen. Steve Daines (R-Mont.) said. But a series of issues have been brushed aside in negotiations or left in limbo — a status quo the Trump administration can only maintain for so long. The U.S.-China trade deal on rare earths that Bessent said the two countries would finalize by Thanksgiving remains unsettled. And the White House hasn’t confirmed reporting from earlier this month that Beijing-based ByteDance has finalized the sale of the TikTok social media app ahead of the Jan. 23 deadline for that agreement. “The idea that we’re in a period of stability with Beijing is simply not accurate,” said Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Shaheen has been sounding the alarm on China’s national security threats since she entered the Senate in 2009. But even some lawmakers who have been more open to engagement with Beijing — such as California Democratic Reps. Ro Khanna and Ami Bera — said that they don’t expect the armistice to last. The White House is more upbeat about the prospects for U.S.-China trade ties. “President Trump’s close relationship with President Xi is helping ensure that both countries are able to continue building on progress and continue resolving outstanding issues,” the White House said in a statement, adding that the administration “continues to monitor China’s compliance with our trade agreement.” It declined to comment on the TikTok deal. Still, the lawmakers POLITICO spoke with described four issues that could derail U.S.-China ties in the New Year: A SOYBEAN SPOILER U.S. soybean farmers’ reliance on the Chinese market gives Beijing a powerful non-tariff trade weapon — and China doesn’t appear to be following through on promises to renew purchases. The standoff over soybeans started in May, when China halted those purchases, raising the prospect of financial ruin across farming states including Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska and Indiana — key political constituencies for the GOP in the congressional midterm elections next year. The White House said last month that Xi committed to buying 12 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans in November and December. But so far, Beijing has only purchased a fraction of that agreed total, NBC reported this month. “What agitates Trump and causes him to react quickly are things that are more domestic and closer to home,” Rep. Jill Tokuda (D-Hawaii) said. China’s foot-dragging on soybean purchases “is the most triggering because it’s hurting American farmers and consumers, so that’s where we could see the most volatility in the relationship,” she said. That trigger could come on Feb. 28 — the new deadline for that 12 million metric ton purchase, which Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced earlier this month. The Chinese embassy in Washington declined to comment on whether Beijing plans to meet this deadline. The White House said one of the aspects of the trade deal it is monitoring is soybean purchases through this growing season. THE TAIWAN TINDERBOX Beijing’s threats to invade Taiwan are another near-term potential flashpoint, even though the U.S. hasn’t prioritized the issue in its national security strategy or talks between Xi and Trump. China has increased its preparations for a Taiwan invasion this year. In October, the Chinese military debuted a new military barge system that addresses some of the challenges of landing on the island’s beaches by deploying a bridge for cargo ships to unload tanks or trucks directly onto the shore. “China is tightening the noose around the island,” said Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), who joined a bipartisan congressional delegation to China in September and returned calling for better communications between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. Some of the tension around Taiwan is playing out in the wider region, as Beijing pushes to expand its military reach and its influence. Chinese fighter jets locked radar — a prelude to opening fire — on Japanese aircraft earlier this month in the East China Sea. “There is a real chance that Xi overplays his hand on antagonizing our allies, particularly Australia and Japan,” Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.) said. “There is still a line [China] cannot cross without making this truce impossible to sustain.” The U.S. has a decades-long policy of “strategic ambiguity” under which it refuses to spell out how the U.S. would respond to Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Trump has also adhered to that policy. “You’ll find out if it happens,” Trump said in an interview with 60 Minutes in November. MORE EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON THE WAY Beijing has eased its export restrictions on rare earths — metallic elements essential to both civilian and military applications — but could reimpose those blocks at any time. Ten of the 25 lawmakers who spoke to POLITICO said they suspect Beijing will reimpose those export curbs as a convenient pressure point in the coming months. “At the center of the crack in the truce is China’s ability to levy export restrictions, especially its chokehold on the global supply of rare earths and other critical minerals,” Rep. André Carson (D-Ind.) said. Others are worried China will choose to expand its export controls to another product category for which it has market dominance — pharmaceuticals. Beijing supplies 80 percent of the U.S. supply of active pharmaceutical ingredients — the foundations of common drugs to treat everything from high blood pressure to type 2 diabetes. “Overnight, China could turn off the spigot and many basic pharmaceuticals, including things like aspirin, go away from the supply chain in the United States,” Rep. Nathaniel Moran (R-Texas) said. China restarted exports of rare earths earlier this month, and its Commerce Ministry pledged “timely approval” of such exports under a new licensing system, state media reported. Beijing has not indicated its intent to restrict the export of pharmaceuticals or their components as a trade weapon. But the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission urged the Food and Drug Administration to reduce U.S. reliance on Chinese sources of pharmaceuticals in its annual report last month. The Chinese embassy in Washington didn’t respond to a request for comment. GROWING CHINESE MILITARY MUSCLE China’s drive to develop a world-class military that can challenge traditional U.S. dominion of the Indo-Pacific could also derail relations between Washington and Beijing in 2026. China’s expanding navy — which, at more than 200 warships, is now the world’s largest — is helping Beijing show off its power across the region. The centerpiece of that effort in 2025 has been the addition of a third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, which entered into service last month. The Fujian is two-thirds the size of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier. But like the Ford, it boasts state-of-the-art electromagnetic catapults to launch J-35 and J-15T fighter jets. The Trump administration sees that as a threat. The U.S. aims to insulate allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific from possible Chinese “sustained successful military aggression” powered by Beijing’s “historic military buildup,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said earlier this month at the Reagan National Defense Forum. Five lawmakers said they see China’s increasingly aggressive regional military footprint as incompatible with U.S. efforts to maintain a stable relationship with Beijing in the months ahead. “We know the long-term goal of China is really economic and diplomatic and military domination around the world, and they see the United States as an adversary,” Moran said. Daniel Desrochers contributed to this report.

Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

BRUSSELS — More than 80 percent of Europe’s companies will be freed from environmental-reporting obligations after EU institutions reached a deal on a proposal to cut green rules on Monday.   The deal is a major legislative victory for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her push cut red tape for business, one of the defining missions of her second term in office. However, that victory came at a political cost: The file pushed the coalition that got her re-elected to the brink of collapse and led her own political family, the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), to team up with the far right to get the deal over the line. The new law, the first of many so-called omnibus simplification bills, will massively reduce the scope of corporate sustainability disclosure rules introduced in the last political term. The aim of the red tape cuts is to boost the competitiveness of European businesses and drive economic growth. The deal concludes a year of intense negotiations between EU decision-makers, investors, businesses and civil society, who argued over how much to reduce reporting obligations for companies on the environmental impacts of their business and supply chains — all while the effects of climate change in Europe were getting worse. “This is an important step towards our common goal to create a more favourable business environment to help our companies grow and innovate,” said Marie Bjerre, Danish minister for European affairs. Denmark, which holds the presidency of the Council of the EU until the end of the year, led the negotiations on behalf of EU governments. Marie Bjerre, Den|mark’s Minister for European affairs, who said the agreement was an important step for a more favourable business environment. | Philipp von Ditfurth/picture alliance via Getty Images Proposed by the Commission last February, the omnibus is designed to address businesses’ concerns that the paperwork needed to comply with EU laws is costly and unfair. Many companies have been blaming Europe’s overzealous green lawmaking and the restrictions it places on doing business in the region for low economic growth and job losses, preventing them from competing with U.S. and Chinese rivals.   But Green and civil society groups — and some businesses too — argued this backtracking would put environmental and human health at risk. That disagreement reverberated through Brussels, disturbing the balance of power in Parliament as the EPP broke the so-called cordon sanitaire — an unwritten rule that forbids mainstream parties from collaborating with the far right — to pass major cuts to green rules. It set a precedent for future lawmaking in Europe as the bloc grapples with the at-times conflicting priorities of boosting economic growth and advancing on its green transition. The word “omnibus” has since become a mainstay of the Brussels bubble vernacular with the Commission putting forward at least 10 more simplification bills on topics like data protection, finance, chemical use, agriculture and defense. LESS PAPERWORK   The deal struck by negotiators from the European Parliament, EU Council and the Commission includes changes to two key pieces of legislation in the EU’s arsenal of green rules: The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD).  The rules originally required businesses large and small to collect and publish data on their greenhouse gas emissions, how much water they use, the impact of rising temperatures on working conditions, chemical leakages and whether their suppliers — which are often spread across the globe — respect human rights and labor laws.    Now the reporting rules will only apply to companies with more than 1,000 employees and €450 million in net turnover, while only the largest companies — with 5,000 employees and at least €1.5 billion in net turnover — are covered by supply chain due diligence obligations. They also don’t have to adopt transition plans, with details on how they intend to adapt their business model to reach targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.   Importantly the decision-makers got rid of an EU-level legal framework that allowed civilians to hold businesses accountable for the impact of their supply chains on human rights or local ecosystems. MEPs have another say on whether the deal goes through or not, with a final vote on the file slated for Dec. 16. It means that lawmakers have a chance to reject what the co-legislators have agreed to if they consider it to be too far from their original position.

BRUSSELS — The European Union’s drive to cut red tape is creating uncertainty for business and chaos in the EU’s institutions, Executive Vice President Teresa Ribera said on Thursday, in comments that put her squarely at odds with her boss Ursula von der Leyen. “In too many occasions we have this sense that it is not simplification but [a] messy combination of things that end in uncertainty,” Ribera said in Brussels. The Commission’s dealings with EU member countries and lawmakers have degenerated into “a terrible political spectacle,” she added. The remarks by the Spanish socialist represent the most serious pushback by a top EU official since von der Leyen launched a massive effort to simplify the bloc’s regulatory rulebook after being confirmed for a second term a year ago. This has taken the form of a series of “omnibus” packages — on issues ranging from business supply chains to agriculture funding and migration — that have emerged from the EU’s policy machinery with little or no consultation. The EU ombudsman has slammed the Commission for procedural shortcomings in proposing the measures, saying they amounted to “maladministration.” Ribera, who ranks second at the EU executive behind its German president, acknowledged in a keynote speech that it was important to avoid duplication, align procedures, move faster and provide greater clarity to businesses. But this should not go too far. “Deregulation eliminates safeguards, it puts costs onto citizens and taxpayers, creates uncertainty, discourages investment,” she said at an event hosted by think tank Bruegel. “It’s a kind of Trumpist approach against being stable, reliable and predictable. It weakens our standards. It lowers the credibility of the single market, it enlarges inequalities and distortions.” Von der Leyen made the case for deregulation in a speech last month in Copenhagen. “When we look at simplification, we all agree we need simplification, we need deregulation,” she said. But Ribera cautioned against that on Thursday. “Simplifying rules is not the same as weakening protections or giving up on regulation,” she said. Lawmakers in the European Parliament earlier this month agreed to exempt more companies from green reporting rules after the center-right, right-wing and far-right groups allied to pass the EU’s first omnibus simplification package. Louise Guillot contributed reporting.

LONDON — The U.K. will break China’s stranglehold over crucial net zero supply chains, Energy Minister Chris McDonald has pledged. McDonald, a joint minister at the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the Department for Business and Trade, told POLITICO he is determined to bolster domestic access to critical minerals. Critical minerals like lithium and copper are used in essential net-zero technologies such as electric vehicles and batteries, as well as defense assets like F35 fighter jets. China currently controls 90 percent of rare earth refining, according to a government critical minerals strategy published last week. McDonald said China’s dominance of mineral processing risks driving up prices for the net zero transition.  The U.K. has made a legally-binding pledge to reduce planet-damaging emissions to net zero by 2050. McDonald fears China has become a “monopoly provider” of critical minerals and that its dominant role in processing allowed China to control the costs for buyers. “We want to capture this supply chain in the U.K. as part of our industrial strategy. To do that … means, ultimately, we’re going to have to wrest control of critical minerals back into a broad group of countries, not just China,” he said. The government’s critical minerals strategy includes a target that no more than 60 percent of U.K. annual demand for critical minerals in aggregate is supplied by any one country by 2035 — including China. “So, if there is an investment from China that helps with that, then that’s great. And if it doesn’t help with that, or it sort of compounds that issue that isn’t consistent with our strategy, then we judge it on that basis ultimately,” McDonald said. Additional reporting by Graham Lanktree.

BRUSSELS — The military should get involved in the green transition to ensure that Russia doesn’t exploit new vulnerabilities brought about by the move to renewable energy sources, a top EU body said in a document obtained by POLITICO. The bloc has made efforts in recent years to end dependence on Russian fuels and move toward cleaner technology, and is set to ban Russian gas imports entirely under its broader REPowerEU roadmap. However, a letter drafted by the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU and sent on Nov. 28 to EU ambassadors argued that the transition also introduces “new layers of complexity” as Europe’s old energy architecture — including petrol stations, pipelines, refineries and other infrastructure — is phased out. That complicates supply chains on which militaries depend, requiring “enhanced energy independence and engagement in the green transition” by the transatlantic military alliance NATO. The letter, first reported on by Contexte, also calls for stronger coordination between NATO and the EU on energy policy. In particular, officials ought to look at how to protect Europe’s energy infrastructure amid an increase in “physical sabotage and cyberattacks targeting pipelines, cables, ports, and power grids,” it said. The digitization of many energy sources, it added, also requires “strong security measures throughout all phases of infrastructure planning, design, and operation.” The initiative will be discussed by energy ministers on Dec. 15.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.