John Kampfner is a British author, broadcaster and commentator. His latest book
“In Search of Berlin” is published by Atlantic. He is a regular POLITICO
columnist.
One of the most common headlines in the German newspapers used to be a
reassuringly long compound noun: Koalitionsverhandlungen. Coalition and
negotiations — these were the two words Germany’s postwar democracy was based
on, as mainstream parties would come together to forge deals to run the country
and the Länder.
No group or individual would ever again get close to untrammeled power — a rule
that applied not only to the formation of governments but to each and every
measure, requiring committees to pore over details, cabinet meetings to discuss
the big picture and compromise, and then gain parliamentary approval. Plus, if
politicians overstepped, the courts could always restrain them.
This system of multiple checks and balances provided reassurance and stability
since the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949. But now, all this is
under threat.
In today’s new age, deliberative politics is regarded as the antithesis of what
is needed. It’s a reappraisal that’s affecting many liberal democracies in
Europe — but none more so than Germany, which long advertised the virtues of
compromise that are now denounced as vices.
Some Germans, particularly those on the right, now negatively compare their
government’s approach to domestic and foreign policy to that of U.S. President
Donald Trump, asking why Christian Democrat (CDU) Chancellor Friedrich Merz
can’t be more like the American leader. Why can’t he bulldoze his way to get
what he wants and then bask in the glory, rather than wheeling and dealing with
his coalition partners over everything from aid for Ukraine to unemployment
benefits.
It’s not just the politicians who complain about this supposed weakness either.
Much of the German media fulminates about it every day, as opposed to how they
embraced compromise before.
As a result, Merz has found himself wading through in the worst of both worlds.
When recently challenged by one of Germany’s top television hosts about watering
down so many of his party’s election promises, he responded: “I am no longer the
representative of the CDU. I am the representative of the government. And that
government is a coalition of two parties.”
That, alas, is no longer enough.
Instead, everyone must fight to get their own way in a new form of public
disputatiousness that took root during the last government’s three-party
“traffic light” coalition. Leading members battled over everything: The Social
Democrats (SPD) , then the largest party, pursued their welfare agenda; the
pro-market Free Democrats (FDP), which had barely scraped into parliament,
controlled the purse strings; and the only thing they could agree on was ganging
up on the Greens’ agenda.
It was dispiriting to watch, and it came crashing down when then-Chancellor Olaf
Scholz fired his minister of finance, FDP leader Christian Lindner, with
ostentatious acrimony.
All three parties were subsequently punished in last February’s general
election, ushering in the new era under Merz. But even before he took the seals
of office, Merz was being undermined by all sides — including within his own
ranks.
Both the CDU and SPD already agree on the reintroduction of military service in
some form, and the details being haggled over are just that — details. | Clemens
Bilan/EPA
The players might be different, but the fighting remains the same. Right before
parliament went into recess in July, for instance, several CDU MPs signaled
they’d vote against a judge nominated to the Constitutional Court — an
unprecedented break with protocol — prompted by a far-right storm portraying the
moderately liberal candidate as dangerously left-wing. The vote was postponed,
and the judge eventually withdrew her candidacy.
Amid fears that a Rubicon had been crossed, both ruling parties then vowed to
behave and better cooperate when the Bundestag resumed in September. But have
they? Yes and no.
In the age of social media, with its onus on brevity and bombast, German
politicians are having to relearn their craft. Dogged and discreet participation
in committees is no longer the route to success. Therefore, the negotiations
required for two or more parties to come together and strike a deal are
inevitably being portrayed in an argumentative manner. And it’s a shift that’s
taking place across pretty much all areas of government business.
For example, both the CDU and SPD already agree on the reintroduction of
military service in some form, and the details being haggled over are just that
— details. The fundamental question is what happens if the required threshold
isn’t met through voluntary recruitment. Is it a form of lottery — absurd, but
under consideration — or something else? And yet, the discussions led to a
public row between senior politicians.
What Merz promised was an “autumn of reforms,” and these are gradually being
rolled out. But instead of hailing what is being achieved, all sides are
publicly complaining they haven’t got what they wanted, and it’s taking up all
the oxygen.
Indeed, that is politics — but as ever, there’s also the looming specter of the
far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) to consider. Still riding high in the
polls, the party has five regional elections to look forward to in 2026,
including one in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt, where polls predict it
might even win an overall majority — an extraordinary prospect.
And the AfD’s promises, such as those to slash immigration, point to a wider
phenomenon — the simplification of political solutions — which, again, brings us
back to Trump. By riding roughshod over constitutional and societal norms, the
U.S. president has changed both the American and global landscape in less than a
year.
The German political system, which is nearly 80 years old now, was built to
withstand the exercise of muscular power. But if the very type of politics that
it introduced — the politics of compromise — is now scorned by so many, the onus
is on Merz and his ministers not just to deliver on policy but to clearly
demonstrate that all isn’t lost for the painstaking politics of reason.
Tag - German election 2025
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Was ist wirklich passiert beim politischen Wechsel in Berlin – und warum? In
dieser Sonderfolge spricht Gordon Repinski mit Journalist und Bestsellerautor
Robin Alexander über sein neues Buch. Es geht um die Lektionen aus dem
Ampel-Scheitern, den strategischen Stilwechsel unter Friedrich Merz – und wie
eine Reform der Schuldenbremse fast an Merz’ überholten Telefon-Gewohnheiten
scheiterte.
Das neue Buch von Robin Alexander „Letzte Chance – Der neue Kanzler und der
Kampf um die Demokratie“ erscheint am 25. Juni 2025 im Siedler Verlag und ist
hier erhältlich.
Alexander liest exklusive Passagen vor: von geheimen Treffen mit
CDU-Ministerpräsidenten bis zu kuriosen Wendepunkten im Machtkampf mit den
Grünen – inklusive eines Besuches beim Schalke-Spiel im Olympiastadion und
politischen Manövern zwischen Britta Haßelmann, Alexander Dobrindt und Jens
Spahn .
Außerdem: Warum Olaf Scholz als „pädagogischer Besserwisser“ scheiterte und
welche strukturellen Defizite die neue Regierung beerbt.
Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und
das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen
Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig.
Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis:
Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und
Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo.
Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland,
Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:
Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.
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Er wollte Arbeitsminister werden, ist aber lieber doch Generalsekretär der CDU
geblieben: Carsten Linnemann. Gordon Repinski war mit ihm spazieren und hat auf
einer Runde zwischen Konrad-Adenauer-Haus und Tiergarten über die wichtigen
Themen von Regierung bis Parteipolitik gesprochen. Linnemann spricht über die
Analyse des Wahlkampfs, die neue Rolle von Merz als Kanzler, den Anspruch als
Volkspartei immer noch 30 Prozent plus zu erreichen und um vertane Chancen und
neue Chancen geht es auch.
Außerdem erklärt der CDU-Generalsekretär, wie er aus der Parteizentrale eine
Denkfabrik machen will.
Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und
das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen
Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig.
Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis:
Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und
Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo.
Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland,
Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:
Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.
BERLIN — Lars Klingbeil’s leap to the highest rung of German politics began on a
day of unprecedented defeat for his center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD).
Klingbeil, as one of the SPD’s national leaders during the reign of former
Chancellor Olaf Scholz, undeniably bore much of the responsibility for the
party’s worst national election result in its modern history in a February snap
election. But instead of falling victim to his party’s failure, Klingbeil
emerged as the new face of the SPD and one of Germany’s most influential
politicians, serving as vice chancellor and finance minister in the new
coalition government led by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
At at time when Germany, the European Union’s biggest economy, is on the cusp of
a historic increase in borrowing and spending, Klingbeil’s control over the
purse strings gives him immense power to shape Europe’s course. The only
question is whether the cunning that enabled his stunning domestic rise will
allow Klingbeil — who has no real governing experience — to thrive in one of the
most important, difficult posts in European politics just as the continent faces
the immense challenges of war, a fraying alliance with the U.S. and great
economic uncertainty.
“When somebody concentrates all power into their hands, then of course that
person will be held responsible for their mistakes,” said one SPD politician,
speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss internal party matters. In the
past, Klingbeil could always blame the party’s failures on others — including
Olaf Scholz’s unpopularity — said the parliamentarian. But now, the
parliamentarian added, Klingbeil is “the one who has to deliver.”
‘ON THE EDGE OF THE CLIFF’
The son of a soldier and a retail clerk, Klingbeil grew up in the military town
of Munster in northern Germany — home to one of the German army’s largest bases.
Disapproving of the military’s hierarchical nature, he was one of the few men in
his high school class to forgo military service.
Rather, Klingbeil played guitar in rock bands growing up, including one called
Pflaumenmus, or “Plum Jam,” and once joked that he wanted to be a punk rock
star, but “somehow no one else wanted that.” The finance minister still keeps
his guitars on hand in his home and office, and playing them, he once said, “is
for me like meditation.”
“Overall, he’s a very friendly, sociable guy,” said Ralf Stegner, a senior SPD
parliamentarian who has known Klingbeil for over two decades. | Markus
Scholz/picture alliance via Getty Images
Klingbeil, by his own account, was the first person in his family to attend
university, studying political science in Hannover. For a stint, he interned at
an SPD-affiliated foundation in Manhattan, where he witnessed the 9/11 attacks,
an experience, he has said, that sparked a long-term interest in security
policy.
Klingbeil entered the German parliament for the first time as a 27-year-old with
an eyebrow ring. He was able to work his way up through the party ranks,
ultimately shedding the piercing, due to a unique combination of personal
attributes: the ability to be friendly, charming and persuasive, while also
acting as a ruthless power broker when needed, according to SPD members speaking
to POLITICO on condition of anonymity.
“Overall, he’s a very friendly, sociable guy,” said Ralf Stegner, a senior SPD
parliamentarian who has known Klingbeil for over two decades. “People who are
like that are easily underestimated, because that’s not the usual style in
politics.”
Klingbeil says his recovery following a tongue cancer diagnosis in 2014 has
shaped much of his outlook. “You look at life differently once you’ve been on
the edge of the cliff,” he said in a podcast interview.
CEMENTING POWER
During intensive negotiations to establish a coalition between conservatives and
the SPD, Klingbeil and Merz established a close personal connection, according
to people familiar with the talks.
It was during these negotiations that Klingbeil’s standing inside his own party
soared. Even before the coalition deal was announced, Klingbeil reached an
agreement with Merz to fulfill one of the SPD’s greatest wishes: the ability to
borrow massively to fund Germany’s defense and infrastructure. In addition, he
managed to get his SPD, the coalition’s junior partner, control of seven
ministries, including the influential finance, defense and labor posts.
Among those appointed are Boris Pistorius — Germany’s most popular politician
and the only minister from the previous government to have his mandate renewed.
Ahead of the coalition negotiations, it was unclear whether Pistorius or
Klingbeil would become the new face of the SPD. Klingbeil, however, has now
cemented his position as the party’s clear leader.
In order to do so, Klingbeil, who belongs to the conservative wing of the SPD,
selected many young and progressive SPD politicians for ministerial posts and
for party leadership positions, which had the effect of winning him broad-based
support within the ranks. Following the broad leadership reshuffle, Klingbeil is
one of the few survivors.
“He got representation for as many groups as possible to make himself less
vulnerable and because he knows that opponents can also be tied to him in this
way,” said one SPD parliamentarian on the party’s left flank. “There’ll always
be headwinds when there is this strong leadership figure to whom a party is
tailored,” the lawmaker added. “On the other hand, I also ask myself who else it
could be, because there are few, if any, alternatives.”
THE HARD PART BEGINS
The historic U-turn on German fiscal policy that Klingbeil negotiated with Merz
now unlocks hundreds of billions of euros that the new finance minister will
have to allocate. That’s an extraordinarily complex task for any finance
minister, let alone someone with no technocratic or governing experience.
Klingbeil also faces the more mundane immediate task of getting the budgets for
this year and next year over the line by the fall. That task became more
challenging on Thursday, as Klingbeil announced that the government, because of
the sluggish economy, is now expected to collect €33.3 billion less in tax
revenue by 2029 than previously forecast.
He’ll also have to juggle how to preside over a historic expansion in his
country’s fiscal policy while maintaining the EU fiscal rules the Germans have
long demanded other countries adhere to.
Klingbeil intends to stick to policy and political messaging while handing over
the finer financial details to his team of technocrats, according to a
Handelsblatt report. However, this is an approach that is doomed to failure,
according to ministry officials interviewed by the newspaper; a successful
minister, those officials argue, needs to have a good grasp of the technocratic
details.
But his biggest task may well be winning the trust of his counterparts in
Brussels.
At his first meeting with European finance ministers in Brussels, Klingbeil
appeared unprepared when confronted by reporters with tough questions about how
Germany’s spending plans can be reconciled with EU budget rules that limit
national deficits to 3 percent of gross domestic product.
“I ask for your understanding. This is my fifth day in office,” he told
reporters. “All these issues will be resolved in the next few weeks.”
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Europe’s political center is wobbling. Again.
In Germany, a dramatic Bundestag vote leaves new Chancellor Friedrich Merz
bruised before he’s even begun. In Romania, the first round of the presidential
election wipes out the mainstream — and puts a Trump-admiring provocateur on
top.
EU Confidential breaks down a week of shaken coalitions, rising populists, and
what they all say about the shifting balance of power in Europe.
Host Sarah Wheaton is joined by Politico’s Nette Nöstlinger in Berlin, our
in-house Romanian expert Carmen Paun, and Chief Political Correspondent in
Europe and the U.K. Tim Ross to explore what’s driving the backlash against the
mainstream — and how Trump’s influence plays out very differently across the
map.
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Jetzt beginnt die Arbeit für den neuen Regierungschef, aber auch für die
Ministerinnen und Minister und Staatssekretäre. Rasmus Buchsteiner gibt den
Überblick, welche Rädchen jetzt ineinander greifen und wie der ein oder andere
ganz froh ist, dass Merz’ erster Arbeitstag vollgepackt ist mit Reisen.
Im 200-Sekunden-Interview ist Armin Laschet zu Gast. Gordon Repinski spricht mit
ihm über das gestrige Debakel für Merz im 1. Wahlgang im Bundestag und über die
außenpolitischen Herausforderungen, vor denen der neue Kanzler steht.
Hans von der Burchard ordnet die wichtigsten Themen ein, die Merz heute in Paris
und Warschau zu besprechen hat und wie gut das Verhältnis zwischen ihm und
Macron wirklich werden kann.
Und: Die frühere Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel weilt der Wahl von Friedrich Merz
anfangs zwar bei, gibt sich dann aber überraschend verschlossen.
Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und
das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen
Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig.
Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis:
Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und
Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo.
Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland,
Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:
Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.
As Europe’s frontline war leader, Volodymyr Zelenskyy spoke for millions of
Europeans when he congratulated Friedrich Merz on scraping into office — on his
second attempt — as the new chancellor of Germany.
“We sincerely hope that Germany will grow even stronger,” the Ukraine president
said, “and that we’ll see more German leadership in European and transatlantic
affairs.”
Keep hoping.
Zelenskyy’s message was diplomatic, but it contained an unmistakable critique of
the gaping hole at the heart of European politics: Germany’s weak leadership and
procrastination in the face of aggression from Russia and betrayal by Donald
Trump’s United States.
Tuesday, May 6 was to have been the day that changed all that, giving Germany a
strong new government and restoring Europe’s mojo. Instead, Bundestag members
humiliated Merz with an unprecedented insult, refusing to confirm him in office
even after his coalition deal was done.
It was the last thing the European Union’s centrists needed.
Even though Merz eventually won enough votes to become chancellor in a second
ballot, “the political damage is done,” Katja Hoyer, an academic and author of
“Beyond the Wall,” told POLITICO. “This is not the start of a confident, stable
government, but a sign of how deep the fissures of the German center ground
run.”
AWOL IN BERLIN
For the past three years, Germany has been reluctant to perform its traditional
European leadership role, if not shirking it altogether.
Merz’s predecessor Olaf Scholz talked a big game on defense but dragged his feet
on supplying Kyiv with weaponry such as tanks and long-range missiles that
Zelenskyy said he needed to repel Vladimir Putin’s invading army.
Leading a fractious three-party coalition, Scholz had little room to make big
moves and eventually could not keep his government from crumbling.
Zelenskyy noted that strong leadership from Merz would be “especially important
with the future of Europe at stake — and it will depend on our unity.”
Yet German politics is now deeply divided. Without “unity” at home, Merz will
struggle to drive the change he says Europe needs, from a surge in defense
spending to policies that can insulate German manufacturing from Trump’s tariffs
and the challenges posed by China.
Olaf Scholz had little room to make big moves and eventually could not keep his
government from crumbling. | Hannibal Hanschke/EPA
In February’s election, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) placed a
strong second with 21 percent of the vote behind Merz’s Christian Democrats and
ahead of the Social Democrats. It will remain a menace to the new government as
migration continues to dominate political debate. The German economy is
moribund, too, with traditional industry on the slide.
These structural challenges facing Merz’s coalition characterize a political
center ground that is losing its grip across Europe. The same could be said of
Britain, for example. Or, more critically for the EU, France.
MACRON’S MISSTEPS
Germany’s leadership is vital for the EU because the bloc’s second-biggest
economy can’t escape its own political entanglements.
Last year, French President Emmanuel Macron took a gamble on a snap election in
an effort to crush the far-right National Rally (RN), but instead delivered a
hung parliament that is unable to agree on virtually anything. Recent polls
suggest the RN’s Jordan Bardella would have a good shot at winning the French
presidency in 2027.
“The whole of Europe looked to Berlin today in the hope that Germany would
reassert itself as an anchor of stability and a pro-European powerhouse. That
hope has been dashed. With consequences way beyond our borders,” said Jana
Puglierin, head of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign
Relations.
MERKEL’S REJECT
At the heart of all this is a question. How did Merz end up making such a mess
of what should have been a parliamentary formality? Was it a mistake by one or
two lawmakers who thought they could get away with a protest? Or was it a deeper
sign of a leader prone to political miscalculation?
During his brief time in the international spotlight so far, Merz has shown
himself to be impulsive and fallible. He took a gamble in relying on AfD votes
to pass migration measures in the Bundestag before the election, believing it
would strengthen his CDU party’s vote. Instead, the Christian Democrats slid,
while the AfD continued its march.
In astonishingly blunt statements after the polls closed on election night, Merz
laid into Trump and questioned the viability of NATO.
Merz’s critics point to a decision by former leader Angela Merkel to bar him
from powerful positions as evidence she knew he wasn’t good enough to hold high
office.
If they’re right, it might be that the only thing worse for Europe than a
weakened Chancellor Merz — would be a strong one.
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Friedrich Merz ist Bundeskanzler – aber mit Makel: Im ersten Wahlgang
durchgefallen. Das Update analysiert den dramatischen Tag im Bundestag, die
fehlenden Stimmen aus den eigenen Reihen und das politische Beben, das Merz’
Start überschattet.
Gordon Repinski und Rasmus Buchsteiner berichten: Wie kam es zur Verzögerung?
Wer hat Merz die Stimme verweigert? Und warum stand plötzlich Julia Klöckner im
Saal der Linksfraktion? Ein Tag voller Unsicherheiten, Gerüchte – und am Ende:
Erleichterung.
Jetzt beginnt die Amtszeit von Friedrich Merz. Doch der erste Eindruck bleibt:
Der Weg ins Kanzleramt war holprig.
Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und
das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen
Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig.
Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis:
Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und
Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo.
Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland,
Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:
Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.
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Dieser Tag steht ganz im Zeichen der Kanzlerwahl. Friedrich Merz ist an seinem
Ziel, dem wichtigsten Staatsamt, angekommen. Wie er dafür sorgen kann, dass ihm
seine Regierung gelingt, fasst Gordon Repinski zusammen.
Der Ex-FDP-Fraktionschef im Bundestag, Christian Dürr, ist Gast im
200-Sekunden-Interview und erklärt, warum er einen Kanzler Merz nicht seine
Stimme geben würde und wie es sich anfühlt heute nur noch Zuschauer zu sein, bei
dem was im Reichstagsgebäude passiert.
Rixa Fürsen berichtet, warum die CDU voraussichtlich Anspruch auf den Posten des
Wehrbeauftragten erheben wird und welcher Mann in der Union aktuell beste
Aussichten darauf hat.
Und: Großer Zapfenstreich für Olaf Scholz.
Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und
das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen
Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig.
Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis:
Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und
Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo.
Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland,
Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:
Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.
John Kampfner is a British author, broadcaster and commentator. His latest book
“In Search of Berlin” is published by Atlantic. He is a regular POLITICO
columnist.
Germany is good at doing things slowly.
Six months ago, the country’s last government collapsed, as small-time
politicians with big egos could no longer abide each other. Since then, we saw
Germany hold a general election, U.S. President Donald Trump come to power and
the world plunged into mayhem. In Berlin, however, things have carried on pretty
much as normal.
The outgoing cabinet continued to run the place in its usual fashion,
competently but with little sense of purpose. The economy stuttered on. And
political parties did what political parties do — connive against each other.
But finally, a new administration is set to launch today. So, will things now
change?
According to Friedrich Merz, the Federal Republic’s 10th chancellor, his first
100 days in office will be like no other. Germany, he said, will be turbocharged
into activity. And from within the ranks of his Christian Democratic Union party
(CDU), which was not necessarily brimming with talent, he has been able to
produce some surprising yet sensible ministerial choices.
His minister for economic affairs, former energy chief executive Katherina
Reiche, isn’t even in parliament, but she might know a thing or two about
getting things to work. His Minister for Foreign Affairs Johann Wadephul has
been strong on Ukraine and seems a popular choice around the world. Plus, the
Ministry of Defense is staying with Boris Pistorius who, during the fractious
years of outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz, was among the few to understand
Germany’s need for proper armed forces.
Interestingly, Merz’s entire worldview — and pitch to voters — turned on its
head in the middle of his election campaign. While he was all about austerity at
the start, Merz is now determined to spend his way out of Germany’s malaise. And
while he gave the initial impression he might emulate some of Trump’s
flourishes, that these two conservative private-sector “bros” would get on just
fine, now he’s all about preserving liberal democracy from authoritarians.
The remarkable turnaround was the result of U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s
infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference — the first time Europe
clocked that not only was the U.S. no longer its protector, but it might even be
an adversary.
However, Merz’s critics — and in his long and turbulent political life, there
have been many — say his U-turns were deliberate deceit, and that he had no
intention of sticking to the old spending rules in the first place. For
instance, the Greens, who opposed the “debt brake” rule that heavily restricted
borrowing, have every right to feel double-crossed, as they’re no longer in
government.
On the other hand, the CDU’s coalition partners, the Social Democrats (SPD), are
acting as if they won the February election, even though they suffered their
most ignominious result in over a century.
The coalition negotiations took less than two months, which in German terms is
supersonic. During that time, in his desire to ensure harmony, Merz gave the
party much of what it wanted: Seven cabinet posts is considerably more than the
SPD was due, and the commitment to continued high welfare suggests structural
reform will be minimal.
But much will depend on Merz’s relationship with “new-kid-on-the-block” Lars
Klingbeil. The SPD co-leader is the new vice chancellor and minister of finance,
and both he and Merz have taken note from their predecessors: Scholz’s
government collapsed because the man in charge of the finance ministry,
Christian Lindner, acted as an in-house opposition. They will seek to avoid that
fate.
Much will depend on Merz’s relationship with “new-kid-on-the-block” Lars
Klingbeil. | Clemens Bilan/EFE via EPA
Meanwhile, one area where Merz will undoubtedly shine is abroad. This won’t be
too hard, seeing as the charisma-free Scholz somehow managed to antagonize many
of his interlocutors — even those he should have been close to, like French
President Emmanuel Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. With
visits to Paris, Warsaw and Brussels scheduled in quick succession, followed by
one to London, Merz has pledged to restore Germany’s role as a major player on
the European and world stage.
It will be instructive to see how Merz’s somewhat acerbic nature copes with the
many crises Germany and the Western world will face. For example, just how
candid will he be with Trump when dealing with Ukraine and Russia? He’s already
said he’ll reverse the Scholz government’s approach and dispatch Taurus cruise
missiles to help Ukraine, which is bound to cause friction.
But the key question is how this government will spend its windfall — an
extra-budgetary vehicle of €500 billion to overhaul moribund infrastructure and
spend on the military, all to be paid somewhere down the line.
This extra cash will likely enable Germany to bounce out of recession, but as
one diplomat put it to me: “Growth today, modernization tomorrow.” Even though
the country’s struggling carmakers may swiftly reconfigure some plants to build
military hardware — which is desperately needed — overall, Germany’s still
struggling to embrace digital technology. A new ministry has been created with
this exact function, but how much it can break through old bureaucratic
practices will be the litmus test.
After all, this isn’t the first government that’s vowed to drag Germany into the
21st century.
Then, there’s the far right to contend with. Merz avowedly insists he’s not a
populist, yet we can see the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party’s influence
everywhere. The new configuration of the lower house parliament, the Bundestag,
has an alarmingly large bank of seats for the party, and latest opinion polls
put it neck-and-neck with the CDU.
Unsurprisingly, this is alarming many — but it’s still extremely early in the
political cycle. Early measures on immigration, starting with enhanced border
controls, will be designed to show the government is tough. The SPD will go
along with them too, mindful that the AfD has already decimated its vote.
This is the start of a new era that just might put a spring in Germany’s step —
though that isn’t the sentiment among the “Berlin bubble,” where politicians,
journalists and think tanks seem determined to write this government off before
it’s even begun. Instead, much talk is of democracy’s “last chance” before the
next general elections in 2029, where the AfD could emerge as the largest party.
But pessimism and self-denigration are the German national sport. And though the
Trump experience has taught us to never say never, Merz will be determined to
prove his compatriots wrong.