KYIV — The Russian army attacked Ukraine with more than 90 killer drones in the early hours of Thursday morning, causing complete blackouts in the key industrial regions of Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv’s energy ministry reported. “While energy workers managed to restore power in the Zaporizhzhia region in the morning, some 800,000 households in the nearby Dnipro region were still without electricity and heating on Thursday morning,” Artem Nekrasov, acting energy minister of Ukraine, said during a morning briefing. In Dnipro, eight coal mines stopped working because of a power outage. All the miners were safely evacuated to the surface, Nekrasov added. Power outages were also reported in Chernihiv, Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava and other regions. Freezing weather is coming to Ukraine over the next three days, with temperatures forecast to drop to minus 20° C during the night, when Russia often launches massive missile and drone attacks. Precipitation and cold could cause additional electricity supply disruptions due to snow accumulating on power lines, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said Wednesday evening. “Ukraine’s energy system is under enemy attack every day, and energy workers work in extremely difficult conditions to provide people with light and heat. Deteriorating weather conditions create additional stress on critical infrastructure. We are working to minimize the consequences of bad weather,” Svyrydenko added. Local governors in the eastern regions of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro reported that hospitals and other critical infrastructure had to turn to emergency power supplies because of the latest Russian attack. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy thanked Ukrainian energy workers for the speedy power restoration in Zaporizhzhia, and used the opportunity to remind Kyiv’s partners around the world they need to respond “to this deliberate torment of the Ukrainian people by Russia.” “There is absolutely no military rationale in such strikes on the energy sector and infrastructure that leave people without electricity and heating in wintertime. This is Russia’s war specifically against our people, against life in Ukraine — an attempt to break Ukraine,” Zelenskyy added.

BERLIN — An extreme left-wing group has claimed responsibility for an arson attack that caused a blackout affecting about 45,000 households and more than 2,000 businesses in Berlin over the weekend. “This isn’t just arson or sabotage. It’s terrorism,” Berlin’s Mayor Kai Wegner said Sunday of the attack, which burned through a cable connected to one of the city’s largest gas-fired power plants. Members of the so-called Vulkan Group, known for similar attacks on critical infrastructure in the past, claimed responsibility for the sabotage in a letter titled: “Cutting off power to those in power,” which was published online. “In the greed for energy, the earth is being depleted, sucked dry, burned, ravaged, burned down, raped, destroyed,” the group, which is listed by Berlin’s intelligence services as a left-wing extremist organization, said in the letter. “The aim of the action is to cause significant damage to the gas industry and the greed for energy,” its authors wrote. The group has used similar means to communicate in the past, and Berlin police believed the letter to be genuine. With temperatures below freezing in the German capital, schools and kindergartens in the southern districts affected by the power outage remained closed on Monday morning. Around 30,000 households and approximately 1,700 businesses were still without power on the third day of the power outage. Full restoration of supply is expected to take until Thursday. The city’s energy senator, Franziska Giffey told POLITICO’s Berlin Playbook Podcast on Monday that Berlin’s critical infrastructure needed better protection. “There is a great deal of public information about our critical infrastructure that we need to publish and make transparent. In the future, we will have to consider how we can handle this differently and how we can protect ourselves even better against these issues,” she said. In a separate interview with Berlin’s public broadcaster rbb, Giffey said prosecutors at the national level would need to assist with the investigation. “The question is, are these just left-wing activist groups acting on behalf of ideology, or is there more to it than that? That absolutely must be investigated,” said the politician from the center-left Social Democratic Party that governs Berlin in a coalition with Wegner’s conservatives. “This is not just an attack on our infrastructure, but also an attack on our free society.” Josh Groeneveld and Rixa Fürsen contributed to this report.

BERLIN — Germany’s military planners are warning that recent cyberattacks, sabotage and disinformation campaigns could be the opening salvo in a new war, according to a confidential government document seen by POLITICO. That assessment is set out in the Operational Plan for Germany (OPLAN), a blueprint for how Berlin would organize the defense of German territory in a major NATO conflict. The planning reflects a broader shift in Germany — which has assumed a central role in logistics and reinforcement planning for the alliance — as Russia has grown increasingly belligerent toward European NATO countries following the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine almost four years ago. The document states that hybrid measures “can fundamentally serve to prepare a military confrontation.” Rather than treating cyber operations or influence campaigns as background pressure, the plan places them directly within the logic of military escalation. The assumption has concrete consequences for how Germany plans its role in a future conflict. The document frames Germany as an operational base and transit corridor for NATO troops that would come under pressure early, particularly because of its role as the alliance’s main hub for moving and sustaining forces. The 24-page document is classified as a so-called light version of the plan, which aims to coordinate civilian and military actors to define Germany’s role as a transit hub for allied forces.  In a conflict scenario, Germany would become “a prioritized target of conventional attacks with long-range weapon systems” directed against both military and civilian infrastructure, the document states. OPLAN lays out a five-phase escalation model, ranging from early threat detection and deterrence to national defense, NATO collective defense and post-conflict recovery. The document notes that Germany is currently operating in the first phase, where it is focused on building a shared threat picture, coordinating across government, and preparing logistics and protection measures. The plan also assigns a significantly expanded role to domestic military forces. Homeland security units are tasked with protecting critical infrastructure, securing troop movements across German territory, and supporting the maintenance of state functions while combat forces deploy elsewhere. Civilian structures are treated as essential to military success, with transport networks, energy supply, health services and private contractors repeatedly cited as required enablers. The document states that “numerous tasks require civilian support,” without which the plan can’t be implemented. In recent months, Germany and its allies have faced a stream of hybrid attacks that mirror the scenarios the planners describe in OPLAN. Federal authorities have documented rising Russian espionage, cyberattacks and influence efforts targeting political institutions, critical infrastructure and public opinion, with Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt describing the country as a “daily target of hybrid warfare.”

In the desolate Arctic desert of Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, Europeans are building defenses against a new, up-and-coming security threat: space hacks. A Lithuanian company called Astrolight is constructing a ground station, with support from the European Space Agency, that will use laser beams to download voluminous data from satellites in a fast and secure manner, it announced last month.  It’s just one example of how Europe is moving to harden the security of its satellites, as rising geopolitical tensions and an expanding spectrum of hybrid threats are pushing space communications to the heart of the bloc’s security plans. For years, satellite infrastructure was treated by policymakers as a technical utility rather than a strategic asset. That changed in 2022, when a cyberattack on the Viasat satellite network coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.   Satellites have since become popular targets for interference, espionage and disruption. The European Commission in June warned that space was becoming “more contested,” flagging increasing cyberattacks and attempts at electronic interference targeting satellites and ground stations. Germany and the United Kingdom warned earlier this year of the growing threat posed by Russian and Chinese space satellites, which are regularly spotted spying on their satellites.  EU governments are now racing to boost their resilience and reduce reliance on foreign technology, both through regulations like the new Space Act and investments in critical infrastructure. The threat is crystal clear in Greenland, Laurynas Mačiulis, the chief executive officer of Astrolight, said. “The problem today is that around 80 percent of all the [space data] traffic is downlinked to a single location in Svalbard, which is an island shared between different countries, including Russia,” he said in an interview. Europe’s main Arctic ground station sits in Svalbard and supports both the navigation systems of Galileo and Copernicus. While the location is strategic, it is also extremely sensitive due to nearby Russian and Chinese activities. Crucially, the station relies on a single undersea cable to connect to the internet, which has been damaged several times. “In case of intentional or unintentional damage of this cable, you lose access to most of the geo-intelligence satellites, which is, of course, very critical. So our aim is to deploy a complementary satellite ground station up in Greenland,” Mačiulis said. THE MUSK OF IT ALL A centerpiece of Europe’s ambitions to have secure, European satellite communication is IRIS², a multibillion-euro secure connectivity constellation pitched in 2022 and designed to rival Elon Musk’s Starlink system. “Today, communications — for instance in Ukraine — are far too dependent on Starlink,” said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the founding chairman of political consultancy Rasmussen Global, speaking at an event in Brussels in November. “That dependence rests on the shifting ideas of an American billionaire. That’s too risky. We have to build a secure communications system that is independent of the United States.” The European system, which will consist of 18 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, aims to provide Europe with fast and encrypted communication. “Even if someone intercepts the signal [of IRIS² ], they will not be able to decrypt it,” Piero Angeletti, head of the Secure Connectivity Space Segment Office at the European Space Agency, told POLITICO. “This will allow us to have a secure system that is also certified and accredited by the national security entities.” The challenge is that IRIS² is still at least four years away from becoming operational. WHO’S IN CHARGE? While Europe beefs up its secure satellite systems, governments are still streamlining how they can coordinate cyber defenses and space security. In many cases, that falls to both space or cyber commands, which, unlike traditional military units, are relatively new and often still being built out. Clémence Poirier, a cyberdefense researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, said that EU countries must now focus on maturing them. “European states need to keep developing those commands,” she told POLITICO. “Making sure that they coordinate their action, that there are clear mandates and responsibilities when it comes to cyber security, cyber defensive operations, cyber offensive operations, and also when it comes to monitoring the threat.” Industry, too, is struggling to fill the gaps. Most cybersecurity firms do not treat space as a sector in its own right, leaving satellite operators in a blind spot. Instead, space systems are folded into other categories: Earth-observation satellites often fall under environmental services, satellite TV under media, and broadband constellations like Starlink under internet services. That fragmentation makes it harder for space companies to assess risk, update threat models or understand who they need to defend against. It also complicates incident response: while advanced tools exist for defending against cyberattacks on terrestrial networks, those tools often do not translate well to space systems. “Cybersecurity in space is a bit different,” Poirier added. “You cannot just implement whatever solution you have for your computers on Earth and just deploy that to your satellite.”

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. It was hardly the kind of peace and cheer one hopes to see leading up to Christmas. But on Dec. 7, the second Sunday of Advent, a collection of telecoms masts in Sweden were the site of a strange scene, as a foreign citizen turned up and began taking photographs. The case became widely known two days later, when the CEO of Teracom, a state-owned Swedish telecom and data services provider, posted an unusual update on LinkedIn: Company employees and contracted security had helped detain a foreign citizen, CEO Johan Petersson reported. They had spotted the foreigner taking pictures of a group of Teracom masts, which are sensitive installations clearly marked with “no trespassing” signs. After being alerted by the employees, police had arrested the intruder. “Fast, resolute and completely in line with the operative capabilities required to protect Sweden’s critical infrastructure,” Petersson wrote. But his post didn’t end there: “Teracom continually experiences similar events,” he noted. “We don’t just deliver robust nets — we take full responsibility for keeping them secure and accessible around the clock. This is total defense in practice.” That’s a lot of troubling news in one message: a foreign citizen intruding into an area closed to the public to take photos of crucial communications masts, and the fact that this isn’t a unique occurrence. Indeed, earlier this year, Swedish authorities announced they had discovered a string of some 30 cases of sabotage against telecoms and data masts in the country. How many more potential saboteurs haven’t been caught? It’s a frightening question and, naturally, one we don’t have an answer to. It’s not just communications masts that are being targeted. In the past couple years, there have been fires set in shopping malls and warehouses in big cities. There have been suspicious drone sightings near defense manufacturing sites and, infamously, airports. Between January and Nov. 19 of this year, there were more than 1,072 incidents involving 1,955 drones in Europe, and as a group of German journalism students have established, some of those drones were launched from Russian-linked ships. And of course, there has been suspicious damage to undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Taiwan. I’ve written before in this publication that Russia’s goal with such subversive operations may be to bleed our companies dry, and that China seems to be pursuing the same objective vis-à-vis certain countries. But when it comes to critical national infrastructure — in which I could include institutions like supermarkets — we need them to work no matter what. Imagine going a day or two or three without being able to buy food, and you’ll see what I mean. The upside to Teracom’s most recent scare was that the company was prepared and ultimately lost no money. Because its staff and security guards were alert, the company prevented any damage to their masts and operations. In fact, with the perpetrator arrested — whether prosecutors will decide to charge him remains to be seen — Teracom’s staff may well have averted possible damage to other businesses too. Moving forward, companies would do well to train their staff to be similarly alert when it comes to saboteurs and reconnaissance operators in different guises. We can’t know exactly what kind of subversive activities will be directed against our societies, but companies can teach their employees what to look for. If someone suddenly starts taking pictures of something only a saboteur would be interested in, that’s a red flag. Indeed, boards could also start requiring company staff to become more vigilant. If alertness can make the difference between relatively smooth sailing and considerable losses — or intense tangling with insurers — in these geopolitically turbulent times, few boards would ignore it. And being able to demonstrate such preparedness is something companies could highlight in speeches, media interviews and, naturally, their annual reports. Insurers, in turn, could start requiring such training for these very reasons. After serious cyberattacks first took off, insurers paid out on their policies for a long time, until they realized they should start obliging the organizations they insure to demonstrate serious protections in order to qualify for insurance. Insurers may soon decide to introduce such conditions for coverage of physical attacks too. Even without pressure from boards or insurers, considering the risk of sabotage directed at companies, it would be positively negligent not to train one’s staff accordingly. Meanwhile, some governments have understandably introduced resilience requirements for companies that operate crucial national infrastructure. Under Finland’s CER Act, for instance, “critical entities must carry out a risk assessment, draw up a resilience plan and take any necessary measures.” The social contract in liberal democracies is that we willingly give up some of our power to those we elect to govern us. These representatives are ultimately in charge of the state apparatus, and in exchange, we pay taxes and obey the law. But that social contract doesn’t completely absolve us from our responsibility toward the greater good. That’s why an increasing number of European countries are obliging 19-year-olds to do military service. When crises approach, we all still have a part to play. Helping spot incidents and alerting the authorities is everyone’s responsibility. Because the current geopolitical turbulence has followed such a long period of harmony, it’s hard to crank up the gears of societal responsibility again. And truthfully, in some countries, those gears never worked particularly well to begin with. But for companies, however, stepping up to the plate isn’t just a matter of doing the right thing — it’s a matter of helping themselves. Back in the day, the saying went that what was good for Volvo was good for Sweden, and what was good for General Motors was good for the U.S. Today, when companies do the right thing for their home countries, they similarly benefit too. Now, let’s get those alertness courses going.

BERLIN — Germany will launch a new federal counter-drone unit as concerns mount over a surge of suspicious drones overflying military sites and critical infrastructure, Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said Tuesday. The formation will be part of the federal police’s national special operations arm, and will be trained and certified specifically for drone detection and neutralization, Dobrindt said at an event outside Berlin. The unit will eventually grow to 130 officers, deployed across Germany and moved quickly to hot spots when needed. Germany has over €100 million budgeted this year and next for counter-drone technology, the minister said. The systems include sensors and jammers designed to disrupt hostile drone signals, with the capability to intercept or shoot them down if necessary. “It is an important signal that we are confronting hybrid threats,” Dobrindt said. “We are creating a clear mission to detect, intercept and, yes, also shoot down drones when necessary. We cannot accept that hybrid threats, including drones, become a danger to our security.” Dobrindt said Germany will procure systems from both German and Israeli manufacturers, with further purchases expected in the coming months. This week, Germany’s state interior ministers are also due to decide whether to establish a joint federal-state counter-drone center, bringing together federal and state police forces and the military to coordinate detection and response. Berlin’s new unit marks its most significant move so far toward a standing national counter-drone capability. German security agencies have tracked hundreds of suspicious drone flyovers this year, including near barracks, naval facilities and critical infrastructure. Officials warn that small, commercially available drones are increasingly deployed in Europe for espionage, probing defenses and hybrid operations. Some European governments have pointed the finger of blame at Russia, but so far proof is lacking. Airports across Europe have also been forced to close thanks to overflying drones. Last month, the U.K., France and Germany sent staff and equipment to help Belgium counter drone incursions around sensitive facilities. Many countries are trying to figure out how to deal with the drones in a safe and legal way, as shooting them down could endanger people on the ground.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “These are the times that try men’s souls,” wrote pamphleteer Thomas Paine in the dark days of December 1776, as America’s war to free itself of the British seemed doomed. In a bid to lift flagging spirits, he continued: “Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.” That victory was sorely in doubt for much of the war, but the revolutionaries persevered, and with French assistance — which has often been downplayed since — they triumphed after eight years of brutish conflict. Ukraine’s struggle has been longer. In effect, the country has been fighting to be free of Russia since 2014, and right now, these times are, indeed, trying Ukrainian souls. As it stands, there is scant grounds for optimism that, for all its heroism, Ukraine can turn things around. The country is unlikely to emerge from its most perilous winter of the war in a stronger position, better able to withstand what’s being foisted upon it. In fact, it could be in a much weaker state — on the battlefield, the home front, and in terms of its internal politics. Indeed, as it tries to navigate its way through America’s divisive “peace plan,” this might be the best Ukraine can hope for — or at least some variation that doesn’t entail withdrawing from the territory in eastern Ukraine it has managed to retain. On the battlefield, Ukraine’s forces are currently hard pressed and numerically disadvantaged. Or, as lawmaker Mariana Bezuhla recently argued: “Ukrainian commanders simply can’t keep up” and are “being jerked around within a framework set by the enemy.” Meanwhile, on the home front, pummeling Russian drone attacks and airstrikes are degrading the country’s power system and wrecking its natural gas infrastructure, which keeps 60 percent of Ukrainians warm during the frigid winter months. The country is also running out of money. It’s hard to see a Europe mired in debt providing the $250 billion Kyiv will need in cash and arms to sustain the fight for another four years — and that’s on top of the $140 billion reparations loan that might be offered if Belgium lifts its veto on using Russia’s immobilized assets held in Brussels. If all that weren’t enough, Ukraine is being roiled by a massive corruption scandal that appears to implicate Ukrainian presidential insiders, sapping the confidence of allies and Ukrainians alike. It’s also providing those in the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and the MAGA movement with ammunition to argue that Washington should be done with Ukraine. And now, of course, Kyiv is having to cope with a contentious U.S. effort to end Russia’s war, which has been advanced in such a chaotic diplomatic process that it wouldn’t be out of place in an episode of “The West Wing.” At times, negotiations have descended into farce, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio forswearing the original peace plan one minute, saying it came from Russia and not a Trump administration proposal, only to swiftly backtrack. And earlier this week, a Reuters report suggested the 28-point plan was, in fact, modeled on a Russian proposal that Kremlin officials shared with their U.S. counterparts in mid-October. Meanwhile, on the home front, pummeling Russian drone attacks and airstrikes are degrading the country’s power system and wrecking its natural gas infrastructure. | Mykola Tys/EPA But for all the buffoonery — including reports that Special Envoy Steve Witkoff coached high-ranking Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov on how Russian President Vladimir Putin should speak to Trump — a tweaked 19-point version of the “peace plan” may well be the best Ukraine can realistically expect, even though it heavily favors Russia. As this column has argued before, a Ukrainian triumph was always unlikely — that is if by triumph one means the restoration of the country’s 1991 borders and NATO membership. This isn’t through any fault of Ukraine, the David in the fight against Goliath, but rather that of Kyiv’s Western allies, who were never clear-sighted or practical in their thinking, let alone ready to do what was necessary to defeat Russia’s revanchism and vanquish a Putin regime heedless of the death toll of even its own troops. Despite their high-blown rhetoric, at no stage in the conflict have Ukraine’s allies agreed on any clear war aims. Some pressed for a debate, among them former Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who was worried about a mismatch between Western magniloquence and what the U.S. and Europe were actually prepared to do and give. “We talk about victory, and we talk about standing with Ukraine to the very end — but let’s also talk about this,” he told POLITICO in a 2023 interview. But that debate never happened because of fears it would disunite allies. Nonetheless, Western leaders continued to characterize the war as a contest between good and evil, with huge stakes for democracy. They cast it as a struggle not only for territory but between liberal and autocratic values, and as one with global consequences. But in that case, why be restrained in what you supply? Why hold back on long-range munitions and tanks? Why delay supplying F-16s? And why prevent Ukraine from using Western-supplied long-range missiles to strike deeper into Russia? Or, as Ukraine’s former top commander Gen. Valery Zaluzhny fumed in the Washington Post: “To save my people, why do I have to ask someone for permission what to do on enemy territory?” For former Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba, for all its talk of standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes, the West never really grasped the war’s importance or consequences: “You cannot win a war where Russia clearly knows what its strategic goal is in every detail; [where] Ukraine knows what its strategic goal is in every detail; but [where] the West, without whom Ukraine cannot win, does not know what it is fighting for,” he told POLITICO last year. “This is the real tragedy of this war.” At times, negotiations have descended into farce, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio forswearing the original peace plan one minute, saying it came from Russia and not a Trump administration proposal, only to swiftly backtrack. | Martial Trezzini/EPA The currently discussed 19-point plan is, of course, an improvement on the original 28-point plan — nonetheless, it is an ugly and shameful one. But this is what happens if you run down your military forces and arms production for decades, fail to draw enforceable red lines and don’t ask hard questions before making grand promises. For Ukraine, such a poor deal that leaves it with weak security guarantees, without 20 percent of its territory and prohibits it from joining NATO, will have great domestic consequences and carry the high likelihood of civil strife. It isn’t hard to see how the army and its veterans might react. Many of them will see it as a stab in the back, an enraging betrayal that needs to be punished. It will also mean rewarding Putin’s thuggishness and no real accountability for the bestial nature of his army’s atrocious behavior or the unlawful, detestable deportations from occupied parts of Ukraine to Russia. And it will, no doubt, embolden the axis of autocrats. The American Revolution had lasting global consequences — so, too, will this war.

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. Over the past two years, state-linked Russian hackers have repeatedly attacked Liverpool City Council — and it’s not because the Kremlin harbors a particular dislike toward the port city in northern England. Rather, these attacks are part of a strategy to hit cities, governments and businesses with large financial losses, and they strike far beyond cyberspace. In the Gulf of Finland, for example, the damage caused to undersea cables by the Eagle S shadow vessel in December incurred costs adding up to tens of millions of euros — and that’s just one incident. Russia has attacked shopping malls, airports, logistics companies and airlines, and these disruptions have all had one thing in common: They have a great cost to the targeted companies and their insurers. One can’t help but feel sorry for Liverpool City Council. In addition to looking after the city’s half-million or so residents, it also has to keep fighting Russia’s cyber gangs who, according to a recent report, have been attacking ceaselessly: “We have experienced many attacks from this group and their allies using their Distributed Botnet over the last two years,” the report noted, referring to the hacktivist group NoName057(16), which has been linked to the Russian state. “[Denial of Service attacks] for monetary or political reasons is a widespread risk for any company with a web presence or that relies on internet-based systems.” Indeed. Over the past decades, state-linked Russian hackers have targeted all manner of European municipalities, government agencies and businesses. This includes the 2017 NotPetya attack, which brought down “four hospitals in Kiev alone, six power companies, two airports, more than 22 Ukrainian banks, ATMs and card payment systems in retailers and transport, and practically every federal agency,” as well as a string of multinationals, causing staggering losses of around $10 billion. More recently, Russia has taken to targeting organizations and businesses in other ways as well. There have been arson attacks, including one involving Poland’s largest shopping mall that Prime Minister Donald Tusk subsequently said was definitively “ordered by Russian special services.” There have been parcel bombs delivered to DHL; fast-growing drone activity reported around European defense manufacturing facilities; and a string of suspicious incidents damaging or severing undersea cables and even a pipeline. The costly list goes on: Due to drone incursions into restricted airspace, Danish and German airports have been forced to temporarily close, diverting or cancelling dozens of flights. Russia’s GPS jamming and spoofing are affecting a large percentage of commercial flights all around the Baltic Sea. In the Red Sea, Houthi attacks are causing most ships owned by or flagged in Western countries to redirect along the much longer Cape of Good Hope route, which adds costs. The Houthis are not Russia, but Russia (and China) could easily aid Western efforts to stop these attacks — yet they don’t. They simply enjoy the enormous privilege of having their vessels sail through unassailed. The organizations and companies hit by Russia have so far managed to avert calamitous harm. But these attacks are so dangerous and reckless that people will, sooner or later, lose their lives. There have been arson attacks, including one involving Poland’s largest shopping mall that Prime Minister Donald Tusk subsequently said was definitively “ordered by Russian special services.” | Aleksander Kalka/Getty Images What’s more, their targets will continue losing a lot of money. The repairs of a subsea data cable alone typically costs up to a couple million euros. The owners of EstLink 2 — the undersea power cable hit by the Eagle S— incurred losses of nearly €60 million. Closing an airport for several hours is also incredibly expensive, as is cancelling or diverting flights. To be sure, most companies have insurance to cover them against cyber attacks or similar harm, but insurance is only viable if the harm is occasional. If it becomes systematic, underwriters can no longer afford to take on the risk — or they have to significantly increase their premiums. And there’s the kicker: An interested actor can make disruption systematic. That is, in fact, what Russia is doing. It is draining our resources, making it increasingly costly to be a business based in a Western country, or even a city council or government authority, for that matter. This is terrifying — and not just for the companies that may be hit. But while Russia appears far beyond the reach of any possible efforts to convince it to listen to its better angels, we can still put up a steely front. The armed forces put up the literal steel, of course, but businesses and civilian organizations can practice and prepare for any attacks that Russia, or other hostile countries, could decide to launch against them. Such preparation would limit the possible harm such attacks can lead to. It begs the question, if an attack causes minimal disruption, then what’s the point of instigating it in the first place? That’s why government-led gray-zone exercises that involve the private sector are so important. I’ve been proposing them for several years now, and for every month that passes, they become even more essential. Like the military, we shouldn’t just conduct these exercises — we should tell the whole world we’re doing so too. Demonstrating we’re ready could help dissuade sinister actors who believe they can empty our coffers. And it has a side benefit too: It helps companies show their customers and investors that they can, indeed, weather whatever Russia may dream up.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. As Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, then head of Ukraine’s state-owned national power company Ukrenergo, was scrambling to keep the lights on. Somehow, he succeeded and continued to do so every year, earning the respect of energy executives worldwide by ensuring the country was able to withstand Russian missile and drone strikes on its power grid and avoid catastrophic blackouts — until he was abruptly forced to resign in 2024, that is. Kudrytskyi’s dismissal was decried by many in the energy industry and also prompted alarm in Brussels. At the time, Kudrytskyi told POLITICO he was the victim of the relentless centralization of authority that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his powerful head of office Andriy Yermak often pursue. He said he feared “corrupt individuals” would end up taking over the state-owned company. According to his supporters, it is that kind of talk — and his refusal to remain silent — that explains why Kudrytskyi ended up in a glass-enclosed cubicle in a downtown Kyiv courtroom last week, where he was arraigned on embezzlement charges. Now, opposition lawmakers and civil society activists are up in arms, labeling this yet another example of Ukraine’s leadership using lawfare to intimidate opponents and silence critics by accusing them of corruption or of collaboration with Russia. Zelenskyy’s office declined to comment. Others who have received the same treatment include Zelenskyy’s predecessor in office, Petro Poroshenko, who was sanctioned and arraigned on corruption charges this year — a move that could prevent him from standing in a future election. Sanctions have frequently been threatened or used against opponents, effectively freezing assets and blocking the sanctioned person from conducting any financial transactions, including using credit cards or accessing bank accounts. Poroshenko has since accused Zelenskyy of creeping “authoritarianism,” and seeking to “remove any competitor from the political landscape.” That may also explain why Kudrytskyi has been arraigned, according to opposition lawmaker Mykola Knyazhitskiy, who believes the use of lawfare to discredit opponents is only going to get worse as the presidential office prepares for a possible election next year in the event there’s a ceasefire. They are using the courts “to clear the field of competitors” to shape a dishonest election, he fears. Others, including prominent Ukrainian activist and head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center Daria Kaleniuk, argue the president and his coterie are using the war to monopolize power to such a degree that it threatens the country’s democracy. Kaleniuk was in the courtroom for Kudrytskyi’s two-hour arraignment, and echoes the former energy boss’s claim that the prosecution is “political.” According to Kaleniuk, the case doesn’t make any legal sense, and she said it all sounded “even stranger” as the prosecutor detailed the charges against Kudrytskyi: “He failed to show that he had materially benefited in any way” from an infrastructure contract that, in the end, wasn’t completed, she explained. The case in question is related to a contract Kudrytskyi authorized seven years ago as Ukrenergo’s then-deputy director for investments. But the subcontractor didn’t even begin work on the assigned infrastructure improvements, and Ukrenergo was able to claw back an advance payment that was made. Kaleniuk’s disquiet is also echoed by opposition lawmaker Inna Sovsun, who told POLITICO, “there’s no evidence that [Kudrytskyi] enriched himself.” “There was no damage done. I can’t help but think that this is all politically motivated,” she said. Sovsun turned up to the arraignment to offer herself as a bail guarantor if needed — two other lawmakers offered to act as guarantors as well, but the judge instead decided on another procedure to set Kudrytskyi free from pre-trial detention by requiring the payment of bail bond of $325,000.   One senior Ukrainian adviser, who asked not to be identified so they could speak about the case, dismissed the defense’s description of the case against Kudrytskyi as being politically motivated and claiming there was no substance to the embezzlement allegations. “People should wait on this case until the full hearing,” he added. But for former Deputy Prime Minister Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, the case “doesn’t look good from any angle — either domestically or when it comes to international partners.” The timing, she said, is unhelpful for Ukraine, as it coincides with Kyiv’s ongoing appeal for more European energy assistance ahead of what’s likely to be the war’s most perilous winter. With Russia mounting missile and drone strikes on a far larger scale than before, Ukraine’s energy challenge is likely to be even more formidable. And unlike previous winters, Russia’s attacks have been targeting Ukraine’s drilling, storage and distribution facilities for natural gas in addition to its electrical power grid. Sixty percent of Ukrainians currently rely on natural gas to keep their homes warm. Some Ukrainian energy executives also fear Kudrytskyi’s prosecution may be part of a preemptive scapegoating tactic to shift blame in the event that the country’s energy system can no longer withstand Russian attacks. Citing unnamed sources, two weeks ago Ukrainian media outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported that former energy executives fear they are being lined up to be faulted for failing to do enough to boost the energy infrastructure’s resilience and harden facilities. “They need a scapegoat now,” a foreign policy expert who has counseled the Ukrainian government told POLITICO. “There are parts of Ukraine that probably won’t have any electricity until the spring. It’s already 10 degrees Celsius in Kyiv apartments now, and the city could well have extended blackouts. People are already pissed off about this, so the president’s office needs scapegoats,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the matter freely. “The opposition is going to accuse Zelenskyy of failing Ukraine, and argue he should have already had contingencies to prevent prolonged blackouts or a big freeze, they will argue,” he added. Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Battleground Ukraine” Adrian Karatnycky also worries about the direction of political travel. “While he’s an inspirational and brave wartime leader, there are, indeed, worrying elements to Zelenskyy’s rule,” he said.