DUBLIN — Neutral and poorly armed Ireland — long viewed as “Europe’s blind spot”
— announced Thursday it will spend €1.7 billion on improved military equipment,
capabilities and facilities to deter drones and potential Russian sabotage of
undersea cables.
The five-year plan, published as Defense Minister Helen McEntee visited the
Curragh army base near Dublin, aims in part to reassure European allies that
their leaders will be safe from attack when Ireland — a non-NATO member largely
dependent on neighboring Britain for its security — hosts key EU summits in the
second half of next year.
McEntee said Ireland intends to buy and deploy €19 million in counter-drone
technology “as soon as possible, not least because of the upcoming European
presidency.”
Ireland’s higher military spending — representing a 55 percent increase from
previous commitments — comes barely a week after a visit by Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelenskyy exposed Ireland’s inability to secure its own seas and
skies.
Five unmarked drones buzzed an Irish naval vessel supposed to be guarding the
flight path of Zelenskyy’s plane shortly after the Ukrainian leader touched down
at Dublin Airport. The Irish ship didn’t fire at the drones, which eventually
disappeared. Irish authorities have been unable to identify their source, but
suspect that they were operated from an unidentified ship later spotted in
European Space Agency satellite footage. The Russian embassy in Dublin denied
any involvement.
Ireland’s navy has just eight ships, but sufficient crews to operate only two at
a time, even though the country has vast territorial waters containing critical
undersea infrastructure and pipelines that supply three-fourths of Ireland’s
natural gas. The country has no fighter jets and no military-grade radar and
sonar.
Some but not all of those critical gaps will be plugged by 2028, McEntee
pledged.
She said Ireland would roll out military-grade radar starting next year, buy
sonar systems for the navy, and acquire up to a dozen helicopters, including
four already ordered from Airbus. The army would upgrade its Swiss-made fleet of
80 Piranha III armored vehicles and develop drone and anti-drone units. The air
force’s fixed-wing aircraft will be replaced by 2030 — probably by what would be
Ireland’s first wing of combat fighters.
Thursday’s announcement coincided with publication of an independent assessment
of Ireland’s rising security vulnerabilities on land, sea and air.
The report, coauthored by the Dublin-based think tank IIEA and analysts at
Deloitte, found that U.S. multinationals operating in Ireland were at risk of
cyberattacks and espionage by Russian, Chinese and Indian intelligence agents
operating in the country.
Tag - Naval vessels
Eoin Drea is senior research officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European
Studies.
Catherine Connolly’s election as Ireland’s next president highlights just how
delusional the country has become when it comes to security. It should also
serve as a wake-up call for other EU members in terms of the country’s
unreliability on defense issues.
Opposing Germany’s rearmament on the basis that it represents a “revitalization”
of its “military industrial base” isn’t even Connolly’s most extreme position.
To her, Berlin’s current spending plans are reminiscent of the military build-up
in the 1930s. She’s critical of NATO, voted no to the Lisbon and Nice treaties
in Irish referenda and has called Hamas “part of the fabric of the Palestinian
people.” Yet, she romped home with nearly 65 percent of the vote.
That’s because Connolly’s views aren’t fringe or some populist narrative — they
actually represent mainstream political sentiment on the Emerald Isle.
As the EU starts focusing on rearmament, Ireland’s traveling in the exact
opposite direction. Even with war raging in Ukraine, America’s growing
unpredictability and Russia probing undersea infrastructure in Irish waters,
Dublin’s political culture remains mired in myths of neutrality and moral
exceptionalism — and it is refusing to budge.
This approach is no longer credible in Brussels. And it’s why only a defense
union with Britain can save Ireland now.
Despite bumper budget surpluses underpinned by surging receipts from U.S. tech
and pharma companies, Ireland is refusing to spend more on its armed forces. The
country’s defense spending has barely risen above inflation since 2022. It’s
capital budget for defense stands at a paltry €300 million for 2026 — and this
is in an EU country with no fighter jets, navy ships with sporadically working
guns and only enough sailors to send a single vessel on patrol per day.
Dublin has demonstrably failed to seize the geopolitical moment, and is instead
being scarily naïve. And given the circumstances, only a formal bilateral
agreement with the U.K. can deliver the territorial security that Ireland — and
the EU’s western borders — desperately needs.
This is realpolitik, not Celtic sentimentality.
The case for a defense union rests on two inconvenient but undeniable truths.
First, geography — not history — is destiny.
Ireland and Britain share an island archipelago, as well as a free travel area.
Despite Brexit, there remains no physical border between Southern and Northern
Ireland. And the country has long prioritized maintaining its common travel zone
with Britain over potentially joining the EU’s Schengen area.
The current reality is that British jets already respond to threats in Irish
airspace with the Irish government’s approval, and it’s the British Navy that
hunts Russian threats in Irish waters. But Irish sovereignty would be better
protected through structured partnership — one along the lines of the Belgian
and Dutch naval forces — than through the kind of cheapskate dependence that
currently exists.
Second, the U.K. has what Ireland simply refuses to provide: fighters, frigates,
satellites, cyber infrastructure and institutional depth. France and Germany
lack both proximity and capability to consistently patrol the Irish Sea and
North Atlantic. Continental European forces can’t scramble from nearby airfields
or deploy from Ireland-adjacent ports on short notice.
Catherine Connolly romped home with nearly 65 percent of the vote. | Niall
Carson/PA Images via Getty Images
The framework I’m talking about is rather simple: Joint Anglo-Irish
responsibility for air policing and maritime surveillance in Irish zones, with
Irish participation in joint command, training and procurement mechanisms.
Ireland would also invest in complementary capabilities like patrol vessels,
intelligence, cyber defense and infrastructure protection. And no Ireland-based
British bases would be necessary; forward deployment and joint operation centers
would suffice.
Speaking more broadly, a formal Anglo-Irish agreement would also embed Britain
in EU defense policy. A key objective in Brussels, considering the ongoing war
in Ukraine and the uncertainty over future U.S. support. Such a union would
intertwine the security objectives of London, Washington and the EU, and could
also be narrowly tailored to placate the perennially disgruntled French.
No foreign adventures. No NATO. Just credible security capabilities in Irish
waters and skies.
Ireland has long prided itself on being one of Europe’s most globalized
economies. It hosts U.S. tech and pharma giants, and its economy is fueled by
their corporate taxes. Dublin depends on free trade and stable institutions.
Yet, the same political class celebrating such openness to global capital
demands insularity when it comes to security.
The cognitive dissonance is staggering. How can one host Apple, Google, and
Pfizer while playing neutral on defense?
Of course, opposition will undoubtedly come from the “1916 Brigade,” who worship
neutrality as doctrine rather than policy, and see any British security
cooperation as treasonable. But this position is neither principled nor
rational.
The 1916 Brigade dreams of Western prosperity without Western security
obligations — that is not neutrality. It is nativism wrapped in nationalist
mythology. Austria — the neutrality model some invoke — spends about three times
Ireland’s defense percentage and maintains real military capability.
Simply put, Ireland’s military helplessness has been subsidized by British and
NATO-member taxpayers for far too long. It’s time for the country to focus on
the present, not the past.
BERLIN — Friedrich Merz said the quiet part out loud back in May: Germany
intends to build the Bundeswehr into “the strongest conventional army in
Europe,” pledging to give it “all the financial resources it needs.”
Five months later, the German chancellor aims to add the hardware to that
ambition, according to new internal government documents seen by POLITICO.
The sprawling 39-page list lays out €377 billion in desired buys across land,
air, sea, space and cyber. The document is a planning overview of arms purchases
that will be spelled out in the German military’s 2026 budget, but many are
longer-term purchases for which there is no clear time frame.
Taken together, it’s a comprehensive roadmap for Germany’s long-overdue defense
overhaul, anchored firmly in domestic industry.
Politically, the timing tracks with Merz’s shift to a new financing model. Since
the spring, Berlin has moved to carve out defense from Germany’s constitutional
debt brake, allowing sustained multiyear spending beyond the nearly exhausted
€100 billion special fund set up under former Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s tenure.
Items on the list will eventually appear, in smaller tranches, when they’re
mature enough for a parliamentary budget committee vote. All procurements valued
over €25 million need the committee’s sign-off.
HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS
The documents show that the Bundeswehr wants to launch about 320 new weapons and
equipment projects over the next year’s budget cycle. Of those, 178 have a
listed contractor. The rest remain “still open,” showing that much of the
Bundeswehr’s modernization plan is still on the drawing board.
German companies dominate the identifiable tenders with around 160 projects,
worth about €182 billion, tied to domestic firms.
Rheinmetall is by far the biggest winner. The Düsseldorf-based group and its
affiliated ventures appear in 53 separate planning lines worth more than €88
billion. Around €32 billion would flow directly to Rheinmetall, while another
€56 billion is linked to subsidiaries and joint ventures, such as the Puma and
Boxer fighting vehicle programs run with KNDS.
The document foresees a total of 687 Pumas, including 662 combat versions and 25
driver-training vehicles, to be delivered by 2035.
Rheinmetall is by far the biggest winner. | Hannibal Hanschke/EPA
In air defense, the Bundeswehr aims to procure 561 Skyranger 30 short-range
turret systems for counter-drone and short-range protection — a program fully
under Rheinmetall’s lead. Along with that come grenades and rifle rounds in the
millions.
Diehl Defence emerges as the Bundeswehr’s second major industrial anchor after
Rheinmetall. The Bavarian missile manufacturer appears in 21 procurement lines
worth €17.3 billion.
The largest share comes from the IRIS-T family, which is set to form the
backbone of Germany’s future air defense architecture. According to the
document, the Bundeswehr aims to buy 14 complete IRIS-T SLM systems valued at
€3.18 billion, 396 IRIS-T SLM missiles for about €694 million and another 300
IRIS-T LFK short-range missiles worth €300 million. Together, these lines alone
amount to around €4.2 billion — making IRIS-T one of the most significant single
air defense programs in the Bundeswehr’s planning.
Drones are also gaining ground on the military wish list.
On the higher end, the Bundeswehr wants to expand its armed Heron TP fleet
operated with Israel’s IAI, aiming to buy new munitions for around €100 million.
A dozen new LUNA NG tactical drones follow at about €1.6 billion. For the navy,
four uMAWS maritime drones appear in the plan for an estimated €675 million,
which will include replacement parts, training and maintenance.
Several of the Bundeswehr’s most expensive new projects sit not on land, sea or
in the air — but in orbit. The list includes more than €14 billion in satellite
programs, calling for new geostationary communications satellites, upgraded
ground control stations and, most ambitiously, a low-Earth-orbit satellite
constellation worth €9.5 billion to ensure constant, jam-resistant connectivity
for troops and command posts.
The push aligns with Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’ €35 billion plan to boost
Germany’s “space security.”
KEEPING THE CASH AT HOME
One of the most politically charged plans on the Bundeswehr’s wish list is the
potential top-up of 15 F-35 jets from Lockheed Martin, worth about €2.5 billion
under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system.
These would keep Germany’s nuclear-sharing role intact but also retain its
reliance on American maintenance, software and mission-data access. It could
also signal a further German convergence on American weaponry it cannot replace,
just as political tensions deepen over the Franco-German-Spanish
sixth-generation fighter jet, the Future Combat Air System.
The same U.S. framework appears across other high-profile projects.
The Bundeswehr plans to buy 400 Tomahawk Block Vb cruise missiles for roughly
€1.15 billion, along with three Lockheed Martin Typhon launchers valued at €220
million — a combination that would give Germany a 2,000-kilometer strike reach.
The navy’s interim maritime-patrol aircraft plan, worth €1.8 billion for four
Boeing P-8A Poseidons, also sits within the foreign military sales pipeline.
One of the most politically charged plans on the Bundeswehr’s wish list is the
potential top-up of 15 F-35 jets from Lockheed Martin. | Kevin Carter/Getty
Images
All three tie Berlin’s future strike and surveillance capabilities to U.S.
export and sustainment control.
Together, about 25 foreign-linked projects worth roughly €14 billion appear
clearly in the Bundeswehr’s internal planning — less than 5 percent of the total
€377 billion in requested spending.
Yet they account for nearly all of Germany’s strategic, nuclear-related and
long-range capabilities, from nuclear-certified aircraft to deep-strike and
maritime surveillance systems.
By contrast, nearly half of the list is anchored in German industry, spanning
armored vehicles, sensors and ammunition lines. In financial terms, domestic
firms dominate; politically, however, the few foreign systems define the
country’s most sensitive military roles.
BRUSSELS — As Beijing further weaponizes its control over the flow of minerals
that Western countries need for their green, defense and digital ambitions,
Europe has to face an uncomfortable truth: It won’t escape China’s dominance
anytime soon.
The Chinese government’s shock imposition earlier in October of sweeping export
controls on rare-earth magnets and the raw materials needed to make them has
escalated a running trade feud with the United States. The embargo threatens
vast — and rapid — collateral damage on the European Union and has forced its
way onto the agenda of a high-level summit on Thursday.
“A crisis in the supply of critical raw materials is no longer a distant risk.
It is on our doorstep,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said
in a pre-summit speech to European lawmakers.
“Now, we must accelerate decisively and urgently. We need faster, more reliable
supply of critical raw materials, both here in Europe and with trusted partners.
I will be ready to propose further measures to ensure Europe’s economic security
and I will accelerate what we have already put in motion.”
Beijing’s announcement this month drew a fierce rebuke from U.S. President
Donald Trump, who threatened to hike tariffs on Chinese goods to 100 percent.
Trump is due to hold a high-stakes meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on
the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific summit at the end of October.
The EU, which imports nearly all of its rare earths and permanent magnets from
the Middle Kingdom, is caught in the crossfire.
“We have no interest in escalation,” Maroš Šefčovič, the EU’s trade chief, told
reporters Tuesday. “However, this situation casts a shadow over our
relationship. Therefore, a prompt resolution is essential.”
China and the EU will “intensify contacts at all levels” on the issue, Šefčovič
added. Wang Wentao, the Chinese trade minister, has accepted an invitation to
come to Brussels in the coming days to discuss the restrictions, Šefčovič said
after a two-hour call between the two.
The EU is also consulting with the G7 group of industrialized nations on a
coordinated response on critical minerals ahead of an Oct. 30-31 ministerial
meeting in Canada.
Yet, behind the talk of adequate diplomatic responses and potential retaliation
there is no escaping the dominance in rare earths that China has built up over
decades. For now at least.
“In the short term there’s nothing you can do, except try and negotiate with the
Chinese,” said Philip Andrews-Speed, senior research fellow at the Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies.
HIT WHERE IT HURTS
Beijing dominates the entire supply chain of rare earths — a group of 17
minerals used in permanent magnets found in everything from electric vehicles
and wind turbines, to F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. Under its new export
controls, importers will need a government license to access not only those
permanent magnets, but also the refined metals and alloys that go into them.
China already weaponized its leading position in producing and refining critical
raw materials — and specifically rare-earth elements like scandium, yttrium and
dysprosium — in response to Trump’s first wave of punitive tariffs back in
April. Eventually, the White House caved in.
This time, again, the Chinese export controls are “a tit-for-tat for U.S.
policy,” said a person from the Chinese business sector, granted anonymity to
speak candidly.
The EU is being hit, too: “The effects are direct and enormous, particularly for
the defence sector,” Tobias Gehrke and Janka Oertel of the European Council on
Foreign Relations wrote in a commentary. “The EU defence industry risks grinding
to a halt as inventory shortfalls could leave it struggling to produce and
deliver enough weapons for the war in Ukraine.”
China accounts for 61 percent of rare earths extraction and 92 percent of
refining, according to the International Energy Agency. It provides nearly 99
percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, as well as about 98 percent of
its rare earth permanent magnets.
UNDERDOG DIPLOMACY
In addition to its minerals monopoly, Beijing has built a legal foundation to
capitalize on it — through an export control toolbox that mirrors the one
Washington has used to cap exports of leading-edge technology to China.
The EU lacks a comparable armory that would allow it to respond in kind. Whereas
export controls are now a go-to option in Washington’s and Beijing’s trade
negotiation strategies, to Brussels, protecting national security remains the
sole legitimate justification to deploy such measures.
“The EU will need to find a way to live in this new reality,” said Antonia
Hmaidi, senior analyst at think tank Merics, adding that the bloc may have to
give up its belief in the rules-based trading system that characterized the
post-World War Two era.
“It could also mean that the EU chooses not to play that game, but then the EU
needs a different game to play,” she said, adding that weaponizing EU market
access could be a powerful alternative.
Ahead of Thursday’s summit, calls are growing to ready the EU’s Anti-Coercion
Instrument (ACI), the only trade policy tool the EU can wield against economic
coercion. Working mostly through deterrence, the bloc’s so-called trade bazooka
seeks to prevent foreign powers from pressuring European countries — but only
foresees action as a last resort.
“It’s the usual sabre rattling from the usual subjects, but activating the ACI
is not seriously under consideration at this stage,” said one EU diplomat, who
was also granted anonymity.
Asked whether the EU executive is looking at the ACI, the Commission’s deputy
chief spokesperson Olof Gill said: “Right now we’re focused on engagement, and
we’re not going to go down the road of speculating about any other possibility.”
That engagement is delivering scant results.
In June, Beijing agreed to set up a “green channel” for European companies to
speed the approval of export licenses. And yet, Šefčovič said, only half of the
2,000 priority applications submitted by European companies to the Chinese
authorities had been “properly addressed.”
CATCHING UP
Moving forward, the EU needs to dramatically ramp up its diversification
efforts.
At a meeting with industry leaders on Monday, Industry Commissioner Stéphane
Séjourné said the EU’s response must build on two pillars, according to his
cabinet: a diplomatic solution and a more resilient supply chain.
China accounts for 61 percent of rare earths extraction and 92 percent of
refining, according to the International Energy Agency. | VCG/Gett Images
That, however, won’t happen overnight.
Especially since the EU executive unveiled its grand plan to diversify its
supply of raw materials away from China two years ago, officials have been
stressing the need to stockpile more of the metals and minerals, ramp up
domestic mining and production and seal new partnerships.
But concrete action is still lagging, with experts and industry alike lamenting
the lack of funding being put on the table.
James Watson, director general at metals lobby Eurometaux, welcomed the EU
executive’s decision to award “strategic project” status to some 60 mines and
refineries inside and outside the bloc, but added: “We still need dedicated
funding for the sector, as well as addressing structural issues, such as higher
energy costs and heavier administrative burdens, that put as at a competitive
disadvantage compared with our global competitors.”
Camille Gijs and Koen Verhelst contributed reporting.
LONDON — The U.K., Canada and the EU are mulling a coordinated response at the
G7 level to China’s expansion of export controls on critical minerals at a key
meeting at the end of this month.
With Canada due to host G7 ministers in Toronto at the end of October, the
allies are seeking to accelerate efforts to diversify away from Beijing’s
dominance in the rare-earth sector.
This comes after Beijing last week announced new restrictions on foreign access
to rare-earth magnets and the refined metals and alloys needed to make them over
national security concerns.
The move immediately raised alarm from the EU and G7 allies over supply chain
security for technologies ranging from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to
F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. China mines about 60 percent and processes
about 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth metals.
Ministers from the G7 are “putting our shoulders to the task, buckling down and
trying to get as many concrete steps taken as we can to create alternatives for
the critical minerals that have been put on export restrictions,” Canadian
Energy and Natural Resources Minister Tim Hodgson told POLITICO in an interview
Thursday at the end of a three-day trip to London.
“We had a meeting with the G7 envoys on critical minerals while I was here, all
working towards further development of a coordinated, multilateral approach to
dealing with the recent restrictions,” Hodgson said. “We’re working on those as
we speak and we’ll hopefully have some announcements by the time we get to the
minister’s meeting in Toronto at the end of the month.”
The move immediately raised alarm from the EU and G7 allies over supply chain
security for technologies ranging from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to
F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. | AFP via Getty Images
According to one EU official briefed on the G7 discussions, the Canadians are
working on a term sheet of measures to accelerate stockpiling, activate critical
mineral partnerships, and build out mining activities in a more concerted
approach.
EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič this week urged the G7 to respond jointly.
Šefčovič is expected to discuss the matter with Chinese Commerce Minister Wang
Wentao early next week.
The European Commission is seeking to foster coordinated measures against
Beijing’s curbs, two other Commission officials told POLITICO. One of them said
the EU executive would launch a study of the impact of the new bans on EU
industry early next week.
“It’s coercion. We need to see how we will respond,” said the other Commission
official, who like the others cited in the story was granted anonymity to
discuss the sensitive discussions.
CODEPENDENCY RISK
China’s export curbs triggered an escalatory threat from President Donald Trump
to hit Beijing with 100 percent tariffs. While Washington has since scaled back
the confrontation, top U.S. officials are also drawing the consequences of
Beijing’s lockdown on critical minerals.
“China’s actions have once again demonstrated the risk of being dependent on
them, on rare earths, and for that matter, anything,” Treasury Secretary Scott
Bessent said. “If China wants to be an unreliable partner to the world, then the
world will have to decouple. The world does not want to decouple.”
China’s export curbs triggered an escalatory threat from President Donald Trump
to hit Beijing with 100 percent tariffs. | Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post
via Getty Images
Hodgson and Canadian Environment Minister Julie Dabrusin will host their G7
counterparts from top global economies, including the U.S., Japan, Italy,
Germany, the U.K. and France, in Toronto from Oct. 30-31.
Beijing’s new restrictions are an “amping up” of curbs on critical minerals
China has announced this year, Hodgson said. G7 allies, he added, are working on
“a number of actual contracts” with private sector firms that they hope to
announce at the Toronto meeting.
The G7 is encouraging international firms and other countries to use financial
tools to increase global supplies of critical minerals. “That would include
things like stockpiling agreements, that would include things like off-take
agreements, that would include things like potentially contract for differences
on critical minerals,” Hodgson said.
Ottawa is working to implement these “in real terms” following the June G7
leaders meeting in Canada, where Prime Minister Mark Carney proposed a critical
minerals buying group, Hodgson said. “Canada is a potential supplier of many of
those critical minerals.”
Securing supply chains of critical minerals is playing an increasingly vital
role in geopolitics as China tightens the tap on supplies. The U.K. renewed
trade talks with Greenland this month, promising to secure critical minerals
supply chains. And in Mumbai last week, Britain’s Keir Starmer and India’s
Narendra Modi buckled down to collaborate on downstream processing and research
projects to “strengthen and diversify critical mineral supply chains.”
During his stay in London, Hodgson met U.K. Energy Secretary Ed Miliband and
Britain’s critical minerals envoy, Industry Minister Chris McDonald.
“We believe that multilateralism is the way to counter non-market activities by
certain states,” Hodgson said, advocating for multilateralism in response to
China’s crackdown.
“We don’t believe using trade as a tool of state manipulation is in anyone’s
interest.”
Graham Lanktree reported from London, Camille Gijs and Bjarke Smith-Meyer from
Brussels and Clea Caulcutt from Paris. Doug Palmer and Jacopo Barigazzi
contributed reporting.
Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the
award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO.
What happens in Svalbard doesn’t look like it’ll be saying in Svalbard.
The archipelago is located nearly 1,000 kilometers from Norway’s northernmost
city, Tromsø, and is home to just 3,000-or-so people. In recent years, however,
Russia has repeatedly used it to experiment with different provocations. And
now, the Kremlin has accused Norway of militarizing the archipelago, creating a
potential pretext for military action.
Svalbard is indisputably remote as well as cold, but the archipelago is
strategically positioned, and Russia could well decide to use it as a test case
— which means it’s time we start keeping a closer eye on Svalbard.
Svalbard, or Spitsbergen as it’s also known, has been inhabited by humans ever
since whalers discovered the archipelago in the 1600s. And after coal was
discovered there in the late 1800s, the islands’ attractiveness grew further. In
fact, it grew so much that the world’s nations had to decide which country
Svalbard should belong to, and the winner was, unsurprisingly, Norway — the
country located closest to it (though 930 kilometers is some distance away).
In the Svalbard Treaty — which was signed by Norway, the U.S., the U.K., Sweden,
Japan and a small number of other countries in 1920 — Norway was awarded the
archipelago, and in exchange, it promised to allow citizens and companies from
the other signatory countries to live, work and operate there. It also promised
not to militarize Svalbard.
The Soviet Union signed the treaty in 1935 and proceeded to organize a Soviet
presence centered around the coal mines it ran there. In fact, the Soviets built
a model village that functioned like a mini-Soviet Union until 1998, when
Russia’s Arktikugol closed its Svalbard mines and the company town Pyramiden was
hastily abandoned. (To this day, Pyramiden is a ghost town that looks pretty
much the same way it did in 1988.)
But Russia didn’t completely leave Svalbard.
Rather, in recent years, Russian officials and other representatives have been
conducting various manifestations on the archipelago. For example, in 2015,
Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin — who had been sanctioned by the West —
landed on Svalbard without Norway’s permission and proceeded to mock Norwegians
on social media. Then, on May 9 2023, Russians conducted a military-style
Victory Day parade led by their consul general, the Barents Observer reported.
Last year, Arktikugol’s director and others planted Soviet flags in Pyramiden.
And now, the Kremlin has issued a complaint against what it calls Norwegian
militarization of Svalbard.
In a meeting with Norway’s ambassador to Russia earlier this month, senior
officials from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that “contrary to the
international legal regime established by the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which
provides for the exclusively peaceful development of the archipelago and
prohibits the use of its territory for military purposes, the area is
increasingly involved in Norway’s military and political planning with the
participation of the US and NATO,” TASS reported.
The state-owned Russian news agency also quoted the ministry as claiming
“dual-purpose facilities are operating on the archipelago, allowing, along with
civilian tasks, to perform military ones, including combat operations on the
territory of third countries.”
The facts, however, are these: Svalbard isn’t involved in Norway’s “military and
political planning.” There’s no Norwegian military use of the archipelago — and
especially no such use by NATO or the U.S. The Svalbard Treaty prohibits naval
bases and military fortifications, and there are no such installations on any of
the islands — though Norwegian naval vessels do patrol the waters around the
archipelago, and the Norwegian armed forces assist local authorities’ crisis
response, as happened in 2017, when a Russian helicopter crashed near Svalbard’s
largest town, Barentsburg.
Although Svalbard may be extremely remote, what happens there won’t stay there.
| Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP via Getty Images
Rather, the party upsetting the apple cart is Russia, which seems to resent the
demise of its Soviet glory days on Svalbard. More troublingly, the Kremlin also
seems to view the archipelago as a place to test new ways of asserting itself
and undermining the West. A sanctioned Russian official arriving on Svalbard
without permission, the head of Arktikugol planting a Soviet flag and a Victory
Day parade (even though the Nazis never occupied Svalbard) — these are all
unsubtle provocations the Norwegian government can do little about.
And now the Kremlin has upped the ante.
In accusing Oslo of violating the Svalbard Treaty, Russia has given itself the
option of responding to this alleged violation. It’s a move that follows
Moscow’s playbook in Ukraine, where it has, at various points, claimed to be
responding to Ukrainian misdeeds. And while Norway can insist it’s not violating
the Svalbard Treaty, that’s hardly going to convince a regime that’s
operationalized peddling untruths.
How might Russia respond to Norway’s alleged infraction? It’s impossible to
know. But one thing is certain: Although Svalbard may be extremely remote, what
happens there won’t stay there.
NATO members and other allies would do well to start thinking about how they’d
respond if Russia took action against one of its most remote geographies. There
are even things ordinary citizens can do too — such as visiting the archipelago
to demonstrate they’re paying attention.
OSLO — Norway is one of the world’s richest countries, but isn’t signing up for
U.S. President Donald Trump’s demand that NATO members increase their defense
budgets to 5 percent of GDP.
“’I’m prepared for new discussions about targets. But I think you also have to
note that among the 32 allies there will be different views on this and also
different starting points. Not everyone is at 2 percent yet,” Norway’s Defense
Minister Bjørn Arild Gram told POLITICO.
The alliance’s current target is that its 32 member countries spend at least 2
percent of GDP on their militaries.
It’s not that Norway isn’t spending more.
The country, which has a high Arctic border with Russia, has been steadily
increasing its defense budget since 2014, when NATO set the 2-percent-of-GDP
goal.
That year, Norway spent 1.54 percent of its GDP on its military, putting it in
the middle of the pack among NATO allies.
This year the country aims to spend 2.16 percent of GDP on defense, having from
2024 to 2025 increased its military budget by 19.2 billion krone (€ 1.6 billion)
to 110.1 billion krone.
“We are almost going to double our defense spending over the next couple of
years,” Gram said, adding that the increase from last year had been Norway’s
largest single increase since the “uplift of defense spending in the early 1950s
due to the Korean War.”
But going from 2 percent to 5 percent is a huge jump for almost all alliance
members, even the U.S., which currently spends 3.4 percent of GDP on its
military.
“I think that this will also be a debate in the United States because they’re
also far away from the 5 percent,” Gram said.
He argued that spending as a percentage of GDP “is not everything.”
“For Norway, the GDP varies a bit more than most countries because of the oil
production and the prices,” Gram said.
He noted that the fossil fuel exporter’s economy shrank during the pandemic as
oil and gas prices plummeted thanks to the global slowdown in economic activity.
“In the pandemic years, we reached 2 percent [of GDP], but that was not because
the defense budget increased that much. It was because of the fall in the GDP,”
he said.
Despite that note of caution, Gram said Norway’s eventual goal is to increase
its defense budget to 3 percent of the economy by the end of the decade.
A big driver of higher spending is the country’s massive new frigate procurement
program. Norway aims to procure five or six of the anti-submarine warships,
which come equipped with onboard helicopters.
“It’s such a huge procurement for us,” Gram said, citing a total cost of €20
billion to €30 billion. “This will be, in economic terms, the biggest
procurement in modern Norwegian defense history … This is a huge thing.”
Norway has approached France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
to discuss a potential strategic partnership to build the vessels, and will
finalize its decision later this year.
NATO will send around 10 ships to guard important underwater infrastructure in
the Baltic Sea by the end of the week, Finnish newspaper Yle reported on
Tuesday.
The ships will remain at sea until April and be positioned near energy and data
cables to deter any sabotage attempts.
The decision to step up NATO engagement follows several disruptions in the
Baltic Sea in recent months, most recently a broken power cable between Finland
and Estonia and four telecommunications cables during Christmas.
Finland is currently conducting a criminal investigation into the oil tanker
Eagle S, part of Moscow’s ‘shadow fleet’ sanctions-busting flotilla, which is
suspected of causing the damage. Finnish authorities said they found an anchor
drag mark on the seabed, apparently from the Russia-linked vessel.
Estonia launched its own naval operation to protect the Estlink-2 power cable,
which sends electricity between Finland and Estonia.
The incident sparked an uproar in Europe, with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte
promising to “enhance the military presence in the Baltic Sea.”
The U.K.-led grouping of mainly Baltic and Nordic countries that cooperate in
defense, the Joint Expeditionary Force, announced on Monday it will increase
monitoring of ship traffic by using artificial intelligence.
Finland is currently conducting a criminal investigation into the oil tanker
Eagle S, part of Moscow’s ‘shadow fleet’ sanctions-busting flotilla. | Jussi
Nukari and Lehtikuva/Getty Images
Several other disruptions have taken place in the recent months in the Baltic
Sea, including a broken internet cable between Finland and Germany, and another
one between Finland and Sweden.
Two Russian oil tankers with 29 crew members have been heavily damaged and are
now leaking oil in the Black Sea, Russian authorities said on Sunday.
“Today two tankers, Volgoneft 212 and Volgoneft 239, were damaged due to a storm
in the waters of the Black Sea,” Russian state-owned news agency Tass reported.
“There are 15 people on board one ship and 14 people on the other. The damage
caused an oil spill emergency,” the agency said.
Unverified footage on Telegram appears to show one of the vessels broken in
half, with streaks of oil visible on the surface of the water. The incident
occurred in the early hours of Sunday in the Kerch Strait waterway separating
annexed Crimea and mainland Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a working group to be set up to
“organize rescue operations and cleanup works after the oil spill,” his press
secretary Dmitry Peskov said.
Two rescue tugboats and two helicopters have been dispatched. The Russian
emergencies ministry said one crew member died.
Both vessels have a loading capacity of about 4,200 metric tons of oil products,
according to Reuters.
Israel has conducted at least 350 airstrikes in the past 48 hours on targets in
Syria as its military seeks to neutralize potential threats following the ouster
of dictator Bashar Assad, Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee posted on
X Tuesday.
The strikes hit weapons production sites, anti-aircraft batteries and airfields,
while Israel continued to move troops into the Golan Heights buffer zone on its
border with Syria. The attacks have hit production sites in Damascus, Homs,
Tartous, Latakia and Palmyra, Adraee wrote.
During a visit to a naval base in Haifa, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the
objective was to “destroy strategic capabilities that threaten the State of
Israel.”
The port city of Latakia on the Mediterranean Sea came under heavy attack, the
BBC reported. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that “Israeli
warplanes” had damaged or sunk about 10 Syrian naval vessels and levelled “the
Barzeh scientific research center” in the town.
That same facility was hit in 2018 by Western countries, with then-U.S. Defense
Secretary Jim Mattis describing it as part of Syria’s “chemical weapons
infrastructure.”
The wider Latakia region is also home to the Alawite minority religious group to
which Assad belongs.
“I warn here the leaders of the rebels in Syria: Anyone who follows Assad’s path
will end up like Assad,” Katz said in Haifa. “We will not allow an extreme
Islamic terrorist entity to act against Israel beyond its border, putting its
citizens at risk.”
But there were no reports of attacks on the port city of Tartus, some 100
kilometers to the south, where Russia has had a naval presence for five decades
(most recently hosting three frigates, two auxiliary craft and a Kilo-class
diesel-electric attack submarine). Satellite images taken on Monday appeared to
suggest the vessels had sailed, although Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
said they were merely on naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Monday that Moscow was
taking all “necessary steps to establish contact in Syria with those capable of
ensuring the security of military bases.”