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Ireland unveils €1.7 billion plan to beef up its weak defenses
DUBLIN — Neutral and poorly armed Ireland — long viewed as “Europe’s blind spot” — announced Thursday it will spend €1.7 billion on improved military equipment, capabilities and facilities to deter drones and potential Russian sabotage of undersea cables. The five-year plan, published as Defense Minister Helen McEntee visited the Curragh army base near Dublin,  aims in part to reassure European allies that their leaders will be safe from attack when Ireland — a non-NATO member largely dependent on neighboring Britain for its security — hosts key EU summits in the second half of next year. McEntee said Ireland intends to buy and deploy €19 million in counter-drone technology “as soon as possible, not least because of the upcoming European presidency.” Ireland’s higher military spending — representing a 55 percent increase from previous commitments — comes barely a week after a visit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy exposed Ireland’s inability to secure its own seas and skies. Five unmarked drones buzzed an Irish naval vessel supposed to be guarding the flight path of Zelenskyy’s plane shortly after the Ukrainian leader touched down at Dublin Airport. The Irish ship didn’t fire at the drones, which eventually disappeared. Irish authorities have been unable to identify their source, but suspect that they were operated from an unidentified ship later spotted in European Space Agency satellite footage. The Russian embassy in Dublin denied any involvement. Ireland’s navy has just eight ships, but sufficient crews to operate only two at a time, even though the country has vast territorial waters containing critical undersea infrastructure and pipelines that supply three-fourths of Ireland’s natural gas. The country has no fighter jets and no military-grade radar and sonar. Some but not all of those critical gaps will be plugged by 2028, McEntee pledged. She said Ireland would roll out military-grade radar starting next year, buy sonar systems for the navy, and acquire up to a dozen helicopters, including four already ordered from Airbus. The army would upgrade its Swiss-made fleet of 80 Piranha III armored vehicles and develop drone and anti-drone units. The air force’s fixed-wing aircraft will be replaced by 2030 — probably by what would be Ireland’s first wing of combat fighters. Thursday’s announcement coincided with publication of an independent assessment of Ireland’s rising security vulnerabilities on land, sea and air. The report, coauthored by the Dublin-based think tank IIEA and analysts at Deloitte, found that U.S. multinationals operating in Ireland were at risk of cyberattacks and espionage by Russian, Chinese and Indian intelligence agents operating in the country.
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The case for an Anglo-Irish defense union
Eoin Drea is senior research officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. Catherine Connolly’s election as Ireland’s next president highlights just how delusional the country has become when it comes to security. It should also serve as a wake-up call for other EU members in terms of the country’s unreliability on defense issues. Opposing Germany’s rearmament on the basis that it represents a “revitalization” of its “military industrial base” isn’t even Connolly’s most extreme position. To her, Berlin’s current spending plans are reminiscent of the military build-up in the 1930s. She’s critical of NATO, voted no to the Lisbon and Nice treaties in Irish referenda and has called Hamas “part of the fabric of the Palestinian people.” Yet, she romped home with nearly 65 percent of the vote. That’s because Connolly’s views aren’t fringe or some populist narrative — they actually represent mainstream political sentiment on the Emerald Isle. As the EU starts focusing on rearmament, Ireland’s traveling in the exact opposite direction. Even with war raging in Ukraine, America’s growing unpredictability and Russia probing undersea infrastructure in Irish waters, Dublin’s political culture remains mired in myths of neutrality and moral exceptionalism — and it is refusing to budge. This approach is no longer credible in Brussels. And it’s why only a defense union with Britain can save Ireland now. Despite bumper budget surpluses underpinned by surging receipts from U.S. tech and pharma companies, Ireland is refusing to spend more on its armed forces. The country’s defense spending has barely risen above inflation since 2022. It’s capital budget for defense stands at a paltry €300 million for 2026 — and this is in an EU country with no fighter jets, navy ships with sporadically working guns and only enough sailors to send a single vessel on patrol per day. Dublin has demonstrably failed to seize the geopolitical moment, and is instead being scarily naïve. And given the circumstances, only a formal bilateral agreement with the U.K. can deliver the territorial security that Ireland — and the EU’s western borders — desperately needs. This is realpolitik, not Celtic sentimentality. The case for a defense union rests on two inconvenient but undeniable truths. First, geography — not history — is destiny. Ireland and Britain share an island archipelago, as well as a free travel area. Despite Brexit, there remains no physical border between Southern and Northern Ireland. And the country has long prioritized maintaining its common travel zone with Britain over potentially joining the EU’s Schengen area. The current reality is that British jets already respond to threats in Irish airspace with the Irish government’s approval, and it’s the British Navy that hunts Russian threats in Irish waters. But Irish sovereignty would be better protected through structured partnership — one along the lines of the Belgian and Dutch naval forces — than through the kind of cheapskate dependence that currently exists. Second, the U.K. has what Ireland simply refuses to provide: fighters, frigates, satellites, cyber infrastructure and institutional depth. France and Germany lack both proximity and capability to consistently patrol the Irish Sea and North Atlantic. Continental European forces can’t scramble from nearby airfields or deploy from Ireland-adjacent ports on short notice. Catherine Connolly romped home with nearly 65 percent of the vote. | Niall Carson/PA Images via Getty Images The framework I’m talking about is rather simple: Joint Anglo-Irish responsibility for air policing and maritime surveillance in Irish zones, with Irish participation in joint command, training and procurement mechanisms. Ireland would also invest in complementary capabilities like patrol vessels, intelligence, cyber defense and infrastructure protection. And no Ireland-based British bases would be necessary; forward deployment and joint operation centers would suffice. Speaking more broadly, a formal Anglo-Irish agreement would also embed Britain in EU defense policy. A key objective in Brussels, considering the ongoing war in Ukraine and the uncertainty over future U.S. support. Such a union would intertwine the security objectives of London, Washington and the EU, and could also be narrowly tailored to placate the perennially disgruntled French. No foreign adventures. No NATO. Just credible security capabilities in Irish waters and skies. Ireland has long prided itself on being one of Europe’s most globalized economies. It hosts U.S. tech and pharma giants, and its economy is fueled by their corporate taxes. Dublin depends on free trade and stable institutions. Yet, the same political class celebrating such openness to global capital demands insularity when it comes to security. The cognitive dissonance is staggering. How can one host Apple, Google, and Pfizer while playing neutral on defense? Of course, opposition will undoubtedly come from the “1916 Brigade,” who worship neutrality as doctrine rather than policy, and see any British security cooperation as treasonable. But this position is neither principled nor rational. The 1916 Brigade dreams of Western prosperity without Western security obligations — that is not neutrality. It is nativism wrapped in nationalist mythology. Austria — the neutrality model some invoke — spends about three times Ireland’s defense percentage and maintains real military capability. Simply put, Ireland’s military helplessness has been subsidized by British and NATO-member taxpayers for far too long. It’s time for the country to focus on the present, not the past.
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Germany’s new €377B military wish list
BERLIN — Friedrich Merz said the quiet part out loud back in May: Germany intends to build the Bundeswehr into “the strongest conventional army in Europe,” pledging to give it “all the financial resources it needs.” Five months later, the German chancellor aims to add the hardware to that ambition, according to new internal government documents seen by POLITICO.  The sprawling 39-page list lays out €377 billion in desired buys across land, air, sea, space and cyber. The document is a planning overview of arms purchases that will be spelled out in the German military’s 2026 budget, but many are longer-term purchases for which there is no clear time frame. Taken together, it’s a comprehensive roadmap for Germany’s long-overdue defense overhaul, anchored firmly in domestic industry. Politically, the timing tracks with Merz’s shift to a new financing model. Since the spring, Berlin has moved to carve out defense from Germany’s constitutional debt brake, allowing sustained multiyear spending beyond the nearly exhausted €100 billion special fund set up under former Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s tenure. Items on the list will eventually appear, in smaller tranches, when they’re mature enough for a parliamentary budget committee vote. All procurements valued over €25 million need the committee’s sign-off. HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS The documents show that the Bundeswehr wants to launch about 320 new weapons and equipment projects over the next year’s budget cycle. Of those, 178 have a listed contractor. The rest remain “still open,” showing that much of the Bundeswehr’s modernization plan is still on the drawing board. German companies dominate the identifiable tenders with around 160 projects, worth about €182 billion, tied to domestic firms.  Rheinmetall is by far the biggest winner. The Düsseldorf-based group and its affiliated ventures appear in 53 separate planning lines worth more than €88 billion. Around €32 billion would flow directly to Rheinmetall, while another €56 billion is linked to subsidiaries and joint ventures, such as the Puma and Boxer fighting vehicle programs run with KNDS. The document foresees a total of 687 Pumas, including 662 combat versions and 25 driver-training vehicles, to be delivered by 2035. Rheinmetall is by far the biggest winner. | Hannibal Hanschke/EPA In air defense, the Bundeswehr aims to procure 561 Skyranger 30 short-range turret systems for counter-drone and short-range protection — a program fully under Rheinmetall’s lead. Along with that come grenades and rifle rounds in the millions. Diehl Defence emerges as the Bundeswehr’s second major industrial anchor after Rheinmetall. The Bavarian missile manufacturer appears in 21 procurement lines worth €17.3 billion. The largest share comes from the IRIS-T family, which is set to form the backbone of Germany’s future air defense architecture. According to the document, the Bundeswehr aims to buy 14 complete IRIS-T SLM systems valued at €3.18 billion, 396 IRIS-T SLM missiles for about €694 million and another 300 IRIS-T LFK short-range missiles worth €300 million. Together, these lines alone amount to around €4.2 billion — making IRIS-T one of the most significant single air defense programs in the Bundeswehr’s planning. Drones are also gaining ground on the military wish list.  On the higher end, the Bundeswehr wants to expand its armed Heron TP fleet operated with Israel’s IAI, aiming to buy new munitions for around €100 million. A dozen new LUNA NG tactical drones follow at about €1.6 billion. For the navy, four uMAWS maritime drones appear in the plan for an estimated €675 million, which will include replacement parts, training and maintenance. Several of the Bundeswehr’s most expensive new projects sit not on land, sea or in the air — but in orbit. The list includes more than €14 billion in satellite programs, calling for new geostationary communications satellites, upgraded ground control stations and, most ambitiously, a low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation worth €9.5 billion to ensure constant, jam-resistant connectivity for troops and command posts. The push aligns with Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’ €35 billion plan to boost Germany’s “space security.” KEEPING THE CASH AT HOME One of the most politically charged plans on the Bundeswehr’s wish list is the potential top-up of 15 F-35 jets from Lockheed Martin, worth about €2.5 billion under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system.  These would keep Germany’s nuclear-sharing role intact but also retain its reliance on American maintenance, software and mission-data access. It could also signal a further German convergence on American weaponry it cannot replace, just as political tensions deepen over the Franco-German-Spanish sixth-generation fighter jet, the Future Combat Air System. The same U.S. framework appears across other high-profile projects.  The Bundeswehr plans to buy 400 Tomahawk Block Vb cruise missiles for roughly €1.15 billion, along with three Lockheed Martin Typhon launchers valued at €220 million — a combination that would give Germany a 2,000-kilometer strike reach.  The navy’s interim maritime-patrol aircraft plan, worth €1.8 billion for four Boeing P-8A Poseidons, also sits within the foreign military sales pipeline. One of the most politically charged plans on the Bundeswehr’s wish list is the potential top-up of 15 F-35 jets from Lockheed Martin. | Kevin Carter/Getty Images All three tie Berlin’s future strike and surveillance capabilities to U.S. export and sustainment control. Together, about 25 foreign-linked projects worth roughly €14 billion appear clearly in the Bundeswehr’s internal planning — less than 5 percent of the total €377 billion in requested spending.  Yet they account for nearly all of Germany’s strategic, nuclear-related and long-range capabilities, from nuclear-certified aircraft to deep-strike and maritime surveillance systems. By contrast, nearly half of the list is anchored in German industry, spanning armored vehicles, sensors and ammunition lines. In financial terms, domestic firms dominate; politically, however, the few foreign systems define the country’s most sensitive military roles.
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China tightens its rare earth choke hold on Europe
BRUSSELS — As Beijing further weaponizes its control over the flow of minerals that Western countries need for their green, defense and digital ambitions, Europe has to face an uncomfortable truth: It won’t escape China’s dominance anytime soon. The Chinese government’s shock imposition earlier in October of sweeping export controls on rare-earth magnets and the raw materials needed to make them has escalated a running trade feud with the United States. The embargo threatens vast — and rapid — collateral damage on the European Union and has forced its way onto the agenda of a high-level summit on Thursday. “A crisis in the supply of critical raw materials is no longer a distant risk. It is on our doorstep,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a pre-summit speech to European lawmakers. “Now, we must accelerate decisively and urgently. We need faster, more reliable supply of critical raw materials, both here in Europe and with trusted partners. I will be ready to propose further measures to ensure Europe’s economic security and I will accelerate what we have already put in motion.” Beijing’s announcement this month drew a fierce rebuke from U.S. President Donald Trump, who threatened to hike tariffs on Chinese goods to 100 percent. Trump is due to hold a high-stakes meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific summit at the end of October. The EU, which imports nearly all of its rare earths and permanent magnets from the Middle Kingdom, is caught in the crossfire. “We have no interest in escalation,” Maroš Šefčovič, the EU’s trade chief, told reporters Tuesday. “However, this situation casts a shadow over our relationship. Therefore, a prompt resolution is essential.” China and the EU will “intensify contacts at all levels” on the issue, Šefčovič added. Wang Wentao, the Chinese trade minister, has accepted an invitation to come to Brussels in the coming days to discuss the restrictions, Šefčovič said after a two-hour call between the two. The EU is also consulting with the G7 group of industrialized nations on a coordinated response on critical minerals ahead of an Oct. 30-31 ministerial meeting in Canada. Yet, behind the talk of adequate diplomatic responses and potential retaliation there is no escaping the dominance in rare earths that China has built up over decades. For now at least. “In the short term there’s nothing you can do, except try and negotiate with the Chinese,” said Philip Andrews-Speed, senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.  HIT WHERE IT HURTS Beijing dominates the entire supply chain of rare earths — a group of 17 minerals used in permanent magnets found in everything from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. Under its new export controls, importers will need a government license to access not only those permanent magnets, but also the refined metals and alloys that go into them. China already weaponized its leading position in producing and refining critical raw materials — and specifically rare-earth elements like scandium, yttrium and dysprosium — in response to Trump’s first wave of punitive tariffs back in April. Eventually, the White House caved in. This time, again, the Chinese export controls are “a tit-for-tat for U.S. policy,” said a person from the Chinese business sector, granted anonymity to speak candidly. The EU is being hit, too: “The effects are direct and enormous, particularly for the defence sector,” Tobias Gehrke and Janka Oertel of the European Council on Foreign Relations wrote in a commentary. “The EU defence industry risks grinding to a halt as inventory shortfalls could leave it struggling to produce and deliver enough weapons for the war in Ukraine.” China accounts for 61 percent of rare earths extraction and 92 percent of refining, according to the International Energy Agency. It provides nearly 99 percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, as well as about 98 percent of its rare earth permanent magnets. UNDERDOG DIPLOMACY  In addition to its minerals monopoly, Beijing has built a legal foundation to capitalize on it — through an export control toolbox that mirrors the one Washington has used to cap exports of leading-edge technology to China. The EU lacks a comparable armory that would allow it to respond in kind. Whereas export controls are now a go-to option in Washington’s and Beijing’s trade negotiation strategies, to Brussels, protecting national security remains the sole legitimate justification to deploy such measures.  “The EU will need to find a way to live in this new reality,” said Antonia Hmaidi, senior analyst at think tank Merics, adding that the bloc may have to give up its belief in the rules-based trading system that characterized the post-World War Two era. “It could also mean that the EU chooses not to play that game, but then the EU needs a different game to play,” she said, adding that weaponizing EU market access could be a powerful alternative. Ahead of Thursday’s summit, calls are growing to ready the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), the only trade policy tool the EU can wield against economic coercion. Working mostly through deterrence, the bloc’s so-called trade bazooka seeks to prevent foreign powers from pressuring European countries — but only foresees action as a last resort. “It’s the usual sabre rattling from the usual subjects, but activating the ACI is not seriously under consideration at this stage,” said one EU diplomat, who was also granted anonymity. Asked whether the EU executive is looking at the ACI, the Commission’s deputy chief spokesperson Olof Gill said: “Right now we’re focused on engagement, and we’re not going to go down the road of speculating about any other possibility.” That engagement is delivering scant results. In June, Beijing agreed to set up a “green channel” for European companies to speed the approval of export licenses. And yet, Šefčovič said, only half of the 2,000 priority applications submitted by European companies to the Chinese authorities had been “properly addressed.” CATCHING UP  Moving forward, the EU needs to dramatically ramp up its diversification efforts. At a meeting with industry leaders on Monday, Industry Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné said the EU’s response must build on two pillars, according to his cabinet: a diplomatic solution and a more resilient supply chain. China accounts for 61 percent of rare earths extraction and 92 percent of refining, according to the International Energy Agency. | VCG/Gett Images That, however, won’t happen overnight. Especially since the EU executive unveiled its grand plan to diversify its supply of raw materials away from China two years ago, officials have been stressing the need to stockpile more of the metals and minerals, ramp up domestic mining and production and seal new partnerships. But concrete action is still lagging, with experts and industry alike lamenting the lack of funding being put on the table. James Watson, director general at metals lobby Eurometaux, welcomed the EU executive’s decision to award “strategic project” status to some 60 mines and refineries inside and outside the bloc, but added: “We still need dedicated funding for the sector, as well as addressing structural issues, such as higher energy costs and heavier administrative burdens, that put as at a competitive disadvantage compared with our global competitors.” Camille Gijs and Koen Verhelst contributed reporting.
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G7 scrambles to push back on Chinese rare-earth curbs
LONDON — The U.K., Canada and the EU are mulling a coordinated response at the G7 level to China’s expansion of export controls on critical minerals at a key meeting at the end of this month. With Canada due to host G7 ministers in Toronto at the end of October, the allies are seeking to accelerate efforts to diversify away from Beijing’s dominance in the rare-earth sector.  This comes after Beijing last week announced new restrictions on foreign access to rare-earth magnets and the refined metals and alloys needed to make them over national security concerns. The move immediately raised alarm from the EU and G7 allies over supply chain security for technologies ranging from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. China mines about 60 percent and processes about 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth metals.  Ministers from the G7 are “putting our shoulders to the task, buckling down and trying to get as many concrete steps taken as we can to create alternatives for the critical minerals that have been put on export restrictions,” Canadian Energy and Natural Resources Minister Tim Hodgson told POLITICO in an interview Thursday at the end of a three-day trip to London. “We had a meeting with the G7 envoys on critical minerals while I was here, all working towards further development of a coordinated, multilateral approach to dealing with the recent restrictions,” Hodgson said. “We’re working on those as we speak and we’ll hopefully have some announcements by the time we get to the minister’s meeting in Toronto at the end of the month.” The move immediately raised alarm from the EU and G7 allies over supply chain security for technologies ranging from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to F-35 fighter jets and naval vessels. | AFP via Getty Images According to one EU official briefed on the G7 discussions, the Canadians are working on a term sheet of measures to accelerate stockpiling, activate critical mineral partnerships, and build out mining activities in a more concerted approach. EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič this week urged the G7 to respond jointly. Šefčovič is expected to discuss the matter with Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao early next week.  The European Commission is seeking to foster coordinated measures against Beijing’s curbs, two other Commission officials told POLITICO. One of them said the EU executive would launch a study of the impact of the new bans on EU industry early next week.  “It’s coercion. We need to see how we will respond,” said the other Commission official, who like the others cited in the story was granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive discussions. CODEPENDENCY RISK China’s export curbs triggered an escalatory threat from President Donald Trump to hit Beijing with 100 percent tariffs. While Washington has since scaled back the confrontation, top U.S. officials are also drawing the consequences of Beijing’s lockdown on critical minerals. “China’s actions have once again demonstrated the risk of being dependent on them, on rare earths, and for that matter, anything,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said. “If China wants to be an unreliable partner to the world, then the world will have to decouple. The world does not want to decouple.” China’s export curbs triggered an escalatory threat from President Donald Trump to hit Beijing with 100 percent tariffs. | Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post via Getty Images Hodgson and Canadian Environment Minister Julie Dabrusin will host their G7 counterparts from top global economies, including the U.S., Japan, Italy, Germany, the U.K. and France, in Toronto from Oct. 30-31. Beijing’s new restrictions are an “amping up” of curbs on critical minerals China has announced this year, Hodgson said. G7 allies, he added, are working on “a number of actual contracts” with private sector firms that they hope to announce at the Toronto meeting. The G7 is encouraging international firms and other countries to use financial tools to increase global supplies of critical minerals. “That would include things like stockpiling agreements, that would include things like off-take agreements, that would include things like potentially contract for differences on critical minerals,” Hodgson said. Ottawa is working to implement these “in real terms” following the June G7 leaders meeting in Canada, where Prime Minister Mark Carney proposed a critical minerals buying group, Hodgson said. “Canada is a potential supplier of many of those critical minerals.”  Securing supply chains of critical minerals is playing an increasingly vital role in geopolitics as China tightens the tap on supplies. The U.K. renewed trade talks with Greenland this month, promising to secure critical minerals supply chains. And in Mumbai last week, Britain’s Keir Starmer and India’s Narendra Modi buckled down to collaborate on downstream processing and research projects to “strengthen and diversify critical mineral supply chains.” During his stay in London, Hodgson met U.K. Energy Secretary Ed Miliband and Britain’s critical minerals envoy, Industry Minister Chris McDonald. “We believe that multilateralism is the way to counter non-market activities by certain states,” Hodgson said, advocating for multilateralism in response to China’s crackdown. “We don’t believe using trade as a tool of state manipulation is in anyone’s interest.” Graham Lanktree reported from London, Camille Gijs and Bjarke Smith-Meyer from Brussels and Clea Caulcutt from Paris. Doug Palmer and Jacopo Barigazzi contributed reporting.
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We need to pay closer attention to Svalbard
Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. What happens in Svalbard doesn’t look like it’ll be saying in Svalbard. The archipelago is located nearly 1,000 kilometers from Norway’s northernmost city, Tromsø, and is home to just 3,000-or-so people. In recent years, however, Russia has repeatedly used it to experiment with different provocations. And now, the Kremlin has accused Norway of militarizing the archipelago, creating a potential pretext for military action. Svalbard is indisputably remote as well as cold, but the archipelago is strategically positioned, and Russia could well decide to use it as a test case — which means it’s time we start keeping a closer eye on Svalbard. Svalbard, or Spitsbergen as it’s also known, has been inhabited by humans ever since whalers discovered the archipelago in the 1600s. And after coal was discovered there in the late 1800s, the islands’ attractiveness grew further. In fact, it grew so much that the world’s nations had to decide which country Svalbard should belong to, and the winner was, unsurprisingly, Norway — the country located closest to it (though 930 kilometers is some distance away). In the Svalbard Treaty — which was signed by Norway, the U.S., the U.K., Sweden, Japan and a small number of other countries in 1920 — Norway was awarded the archipelago, and in exchange, it promised to allow citizens and companies from the other signatory countries to live, work and operate there. It also promised not to militarize Svalbard. The Soviet Union signed the treaty in 1935 and proceeded to organize a Soviet presence centered around the coal mines it ran there. In fact, the Soviets built a model village that functioned like a mini-Soviet Union until 1998, when Russia’s Arktikugol closed its Svalbard mines and the company town Pyramiden was hastily abandoned. (To this day, Pyramiden is a ghost town that looks pretty much the same way it did in 1988.) But Russia didn’t completely leave Svalbard. Rather, in recent years, Russian officials and other representatives have been conducting various manifestations on the archipelago. For example, in 2015, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin — who had been sanctioned by the West — landed on Svalbard without Norway’s permission and proceeded to mock Norwegians on social media. Then, on May 9 2023, Russians conducted a military-style Victory Day parade led by their consul general, the Barents Observer reported. Last year, Arktikugol’s director and others planted Soviet flags in Pyramiden. And now, the Kremlin has issued a complaint against what it calls Norwegian militarization of Svalbard. In a meeting with Norway’s ambassador to Russia earlier this month, senior officials from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that “contrary to the international legal regime established by the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which provides for the exclusively peaceful development of the archipelago and prohibits the use of its territory for military purposes, the area is increasingly involved in Norway’s military and political planning with the participation of the US and NATO,” TASS reported. The state-owned Russian news agency also quoted the ministry as claiming “dual-purpose facilities are operating on the archipelago, allowing, along with civilian tasks, to perform military ones, including combat operations on the territory of third countries.” The facts, however, are these: Svalbard isn’t involved in Norway’s “military and political planning.” There’s no Norwegian military use of the archipelago — and especially no such use by NATO or the U.S. The Svalbard Treaty prohibits naval bases and military fortifications, and there are no such installations on any of the islands — though Norwegian naval vessels do patrol the waters around the archipelago, and the Norwegian armed forces assist local authorities’ crisis response, as happened in 2017, when a Russian helicopter crashed near Svalbard’s largest town, Barentsburg. Although Svalbard may be extremely remote, what happens there won’t stay there. | Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP via Getty Images Rather, the party upsetting the apple cart is Russia, which seems to resent the demise of its Soviet glory days on Svalbard. More troublingly, the Kremlin also seems to view the archipelago as a place to test new ways of asserting itself and undermining the West. A sanctioned Russian official arriving on Svalbard without permission, the head of Arktikugol planting a Soviet flag and a Victory Day parade (even though the Nazis never occupied Svalbard) — these are all unsubtle provocations the Norwegian government can do little about. And now the Kremlin has upped the ante. In accusing Oslo of violating the Svalbard Treaty, Russia has given itself the option of responding to this alleged violation. It’s a move that follows Moscow’s playbook in Ukraine, where it has, at various points, claimed to be responding to Ukrainian misdeeds. And while Norway can insist it’s not violating the Svalbard Treaty, that’s hardly going to convince a regime that’s operationalized peddling untruths. How might Russia respond to Norway’s alleged infraction? It’s impossible to know. But one thing is certain: Although Svalbard may be extremely remote, what happens there won’t stay there. NATO members and other allies would do well to start thinking about how they’d respond if Russia took action against one of its most remote geographies. There are even things ordinary citizens can do too — such as visiting the archipelago to demonstrate they’re paying attention.
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Norway cool on Trump’s demand for a massive defense spending increase
OSLO — Norway is one of the world’s richest countries, but isn’t signing up for U.S. President Donald Trump’s demand that NATO members increase their defense budgets to 5 percent of GDP. “’I’m prepared for new discussions about targets. But I think you also have to note that among the 32 allies there will be different views on this and also different starting points. Not everyone is at 2 percent yet,” Norway’s Defense Minister Bjørn Arild Gram told POLITICO. The alliance’s current target is that its 32 member countries spend at least 2 percent of GDP on their militaries. It’s not that Norway isn’t spending more. The country, which has a high Arctic border with Russia, has been steadily increasing its defense budget since 2014, when NATO set the 2-percent-of-GDP goal. That year, Norway spent 1.54 percent of its GDP on its military, putting it in the middle of the pack among NATO allies. This year the country aims to spend 2.16 percent of GDP on defense, having from 2024 to 2025 increased its military budget by 19.2 billion krone (€ 1.6 billion) to 110.1 billion krone. “We are almost going to double our defense spending over the next couple of years,” Gram said, adding that the increase from last year had been Norway’s largest single increase since the “uplift of defense spending in the early 1950s due to the Korean War.” But going from 2 percent to 5 percent is a huge jump for almost all alliance members, even the U.S., which currently spends 3.4 percent of GDP on its military. “I think that this will also be a debate in the United States because they’re also far away from the 5 percent,” Gram said. He argued that spending as a percentage of GDP “is not everything.” “For Norway, the GDP varies a bit more than most countries because of the oil production and the prices,” Gram said. He noted that the fossil fuel exporter’s economy shrank during the pandemic as oil and gas prices plummeted thanks to the global slowdown in economic activity. “In the pandemic years, we reached 2 percent [of GDP], but that was not because the defense budget increased that much. It was because of the fall in the GDP,” he said. Despite that note of caution, Gram said Norway’s eventual goal is to increase its defense budget to 3 percent of the economy by the end of the decade. A big driver of higher spending is the country’s massive new frigate procurement program. Norway aims to procure five or six of the anti-submarine warships, which come equipped with onboard helicopters. “It’s such a huge procurement for us,” Gram said, citing a total cost of €20 billion to €30 billion. “This will be, in economic terms, the biggest procurement in modern Norwegian defense history … This is a huge thing.” Norway has approached France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States to discuss a potential strategic partnership to build the vessels, and will finalize its decision later this year.
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Naval vessels
NATO sends a fleet to guard Baltic Sea cables
NATO will send around 10 ships to guard important underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea by the end of the week, Finnish newspaper Yle reported on Tuesday. The ships will remain at sea until April and be positioned near energy and data cables to deter any sabotage attempts. The decision to step up NATO engagement follows several disruptions in the Baltic Sea in recent months, most recently a broken power cable between Finland and Estonia and four telecommunications cables during Christmas. Finland is currently conducting a criminal investigation into the oil tanker Eagle S, part of Moscow’s ‘shadow fleet’ sanctions-busting flotilla, which is suspected of causing the damage. Finnish authorities said they found an anchor drag mark on the seabed, apparently from the Russia-linked vessel. Estonia launched its own naval operation to protect the Estlink-2 power cable, which sends electricity between Finland and Estonia. The incident sparked an uproar in Europe, with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte promising to “enhance the military presence in the Baltic Sea.” The U.K.-led grouping of mainly Baltic and Nordic countries that cooperate in defense, the Joint Expeditionary Force, announced on Monday it will increase monitoring of ship traffic by using artificial intelligence. Finland is currently conducting a criminal investigation into the oil tanker Eagle S, part of Moscow’s ‘shadow fleet’ sanctions-busting flotilla. | Jussi Nukari and Lehtikuva/Getty Images Several other disruptions have taken place in the recent months in the Baltic Sea, including a broken internet cable between Finland and Germany, and another one between Finland and Sweden.
Defense
Military
War in Ukraine
Technology
Data
Russian oil tankers in distress in Black Sea
Two Russian oil tankers with 29 crew members have been heavily damaged and are now leaking oil in the Black Sea, Russian authorities said on Sunday. “Today two tankers, Volgoneft 212 and Volgoneft 239, were damaged due to a storm in the waters of the Black Sea,” Russian state-owned news agency Tass reported. “There are 15 people on board one ship and 14 people on the other. The damage caused an oil spill emergency,” the agency said. Unverified footage on Telegram appears to show one of the vessels broken in half, with streaks of oil visible on the surface of the water. The incident occurred in the early hours of Sunday in the Kerch Strait waterway separating annexed Crimea and mainland Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a working group to be set up to “organize rescue operations and cleanup works after the oil spill,” his press secretary Dmitry Peskov said. Two rescue tugboats and two helicopters have been dispatched. The Russian emergencies ministry said one crew member died. Both vessels have a loading capacity of about 4,200 metric tons of oil products, according to Reuters.
Water
Fuels
Energy and Climate
Oil
Pollution
Israel destroys targets across Syria as Russian vessels desert Tartus naval base
Israel has conducted at least 350 airstrikes in the past 48 hours on targets in Syria as its military seeks to neutralize potential threats following the ouster of dictator Bashar Assad, Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee posted on X Tuesday. The strikes hit weapons production sites, anti-aircraft batteries and airfields, while Israel continued to move troops into the Golan Heights buffer zone on its border with Syria. The attacks have hit production sites in Damascus, Homs, Tartous, Latakia and Palmyra, Adraee wrote. During a visit to a naval base in Haifa, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the objective was to “destroy strategic capabilities that threaten the State of Israel.” The port city of Latakia on the Mediterranean Sea came under heavy attack, the BBC reported. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that “Israeli warplanes” had damaged or sunk about 10 Syrian naval vessels and levelled “the Barzeh scientific research center” in the town. That same facility was hit in 2018 by Western countries, with then-U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis describing it as part of Syria’s “chemical weapons infrastructure.” The wider Latakia region is also home to the Alawite minority religious group to which Assad belongs. “I warn here the leaders of the rebels in Syria: Anyone who follows Assad’s path will end up like Assad,” Katz said in Haifa. “We will not allow an extreme Islamic terrorist entity to act against Israel beyond its border, putting its citizens at risk.” But there were no reports of attacks on the port city of Tartus, some 100 kilometers to the south, where Russia has had a naval presence for five decades (most recently hosting three frigates, two auxiliary craft and a Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarine). Satellite images taken on Monday appeared to suggest the vessels had sailed, although Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said they were merely on naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Monday that Moscow was taking all “necessary steps to establish contact in Syria with those capable of ensuring the security of military bases.”
Borders
Defense
Military
Ports
Security