BERLIN — Friedrich Merz embarks on his first trip to the Persian Gulf region as chancellor on Wednesday in search of new energy and business deals he sees as critical to reducing Germany’s dependence on the U.S. and China. The three-day trip with stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates illustrates Merz’s approach to what he calls a dangerous new epoch of “great power politics” — one in which the U.S. under President Donald Trump is no longer a reliable partner. European countries must urgently embrace their own brand of hard power by forging new global trade alliances, including in the Middle East, or risk becoming subject to the coercion of greater powers, Merz argues. Accompanying Merz on the trip is a delegation of business executives looking to cut new deals on everything from energy to defense. But one of the chancellor’s immediate goals is to reduce his country’s growing dependence on U.S. liquefied natural gas, or LNG, which has replaced much of the Russian gas that formerly flowed to Germany through the Nord Stream pipelines. Increasingly, German leaders across the political spectrum believe they’ve replaced their country’s unhealthy dependence on Russian energy with an increasingly precarious dependence on the U.S. Early this week, Merz’s economy minister, Katherina Reiche, traveled to Saudi Arabia ahead of the chancellor to sign a memorandum to deepen the energy ties between both countries, including a planned hydrogen energy deal. “When partnerships that we have relied on for decades start to become a little fragile, we have to look for new partners,” Reiche said in Riyadh. ‘EXCESSIVE DEPENDENCE’ Last year, 96 percent of German LNG imports came from the U.S, according to the federal government. While that amount makes up only about one-tenth of the country’s total natural gas imports, the U.S. share is set to rise sharply over the next years, in part because the EU agreed to purchase $750 billion worth of energy from the U.S. by the end of 2028 as part of its trade agreement with the Trump administration. The EU broadly is even more dependent on U.S. LNG, which accounted for more than a quarter of the bloc’s natural gas imports in 2025. This share is expected to rise to 40 percent by 2030. German politicians across the political spectrum are increasingly pushing for Merz’s government to find new alternatives. “After Russia’s war of aggression, we have learned the hard way that excessive dependence on individual countries can have serious consequences for our country,” said Sebastian Roloff, a lawmaker focusing on energy for the center-left Social Democrats, who rule in a coalition with Merz’s conservatives. Roloff said Trump’s recent threat to take over Greenland and the new U.S. national security strategy underscored the need to “avoid creating excessive dependence again” and diversify sources of energy supply. The Trump administration’s national security strategy vows to use “American dominance” in oil, gas, coal and nuclear energy to “project power” globally, raising fears in Europe that the U.S. will use energy exports to gain leverage over the EU. Last year, 96 percent of German LNG imports came from the U.S, according to the federal government. | Pool photo by Lars-Josef Klemmer/EPA That’s why Merz and his delegation are also seeking closer ties to Qatar, one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of natural gas as well as the United Arab Emirates, another major LNG producer. Last week, the EU’s energy chief, Dan Jørgensen, said the bloc would step up efforts to to reduce it’s dependence on U.S. LNG., including by dealing more with Qatar. One EU diplomat criticised Merz for seeking such cooperation on a national level. Germany is going “all in on gas power, of course, but I can’t see why Merz would be running errands on the EU’s behalf,” said the diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. ‘AUTHORITARIAN STRONGMEN’ Merz will also be looking to attract more foreign investment and deepen trade ties with the Gulf states as part of a wider strategy of forging news alliances with “middle powers” globally and reduce dependence on U.S. and Chinese markets. The EU initiated trade talks with the United Arab Emirates last spring. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia also have their own concerns about dependencies on the U.S., particularly in the area of arms purchases. Germany’s growing defense industry is increasingly seen as promising partner, particularly following Berlin’s loosening of arms export restrictions. “For our partners in the region, cooperation in the defense industry will certainly also be an important topic,” a senior government official with knowledge of the trip said.  But critics point out that leaders of autocracies criticized for human rights abuses don’t make for viable partners on energy, trade and defense. Last week, the EU’s energy chief, Dan Jørgensen, said the bloc would step up efforts to to reduce it’s dependence on U.S. LNG., including by dealing more with Qatar. | Jose Sena Goulao/EPA “It’s not an ideal solution,” said Loyle Campbell, an expert on climate and energy policy for the German Council on Foreign Relations. “Rather than having high dependence on American LNG, you’d go shake hands with semi-dictators or authoritarian strongmen to try and reduce your risk to the bigger elephant in the room.” Merz, however, may not see a moral contradiction. Europe can’t maintain its strength and values in the new era of great powers, he argues, without a heavy dollop of Realpolitik. “We will only be able to implement our ideas in the world, at least in part, if we ourselves learn to speak the language of power politics,” Merz recently said. Ben Munster contributed to this report.

BRUSSELS — Hungary says it has asked the European Union’s top court to annul a new law banning the import of Russian gas into the bloc, filing the challenge within hours of the new law taking effect. “Today, we took legal action before the European Court of Justice to challenge the REPowerEU regulation banning the import of Russian energy and request its annulment,” Hungary’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Péter Szijjártó said on X. Member countries agreed to the outright ban on Russian gas late last year in response to the country’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The law passed despite Hungary’s opposition. Szijjártó said Hungary’s case was based on three arguments. “First, energy imports can only be banned through sanctions, which require unanimity. This regulation was adopted under the guise of a trade policy measure,” he said. “Second, the EU Treaties clearly state that each member state decides its choice of energy sources and suppliers. “Third, the principle of energy solidarity requires the security of energy supply for all member states. This decision clearly violates that principle, certainly in the case of Hungary.” Slovakia has also said it will challenge the law in court.

President Donald Trump’s Cabinet officials are scheduling their first formal calls with oil company CEOs to press them to revive Venezuela’s flagging oil production, four people familiar with the conversations told POLITICO. Calls that Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum are planning with chief executives represent some of the first official outreach that the administration has made to the U.S. companies after months of informal discussions with people in the sector, these people said — days after President Donald Trump told reporters that “our very large United States oil companies” will “spend billions of dollars” in Venezuela. However, the companies’ executives remain wary of entering a socialist-ruled country that was plunged into political upheaval after U.S. forces took strongman Nicolás Maduro into custody over the weekend, following decades of neglect in its nationalized oil fields, according to market analysts and industry officials. Industry officials are also discussing what types of incentives would be needed to get them to return to the country, according to two industry officials familiar with the plans who were granted anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media. Those could include having the U.S. government signing contracts guaranteeing payment and security or forming public-private joint ventures. Even if they don’t yet have fully formed ideas for what would get them to invest in Venezuela, Trump’s insistence is difficult to ignore, said one former administration agency head who was granted anonymity to discuss the evolving matters. “Most companies have been thinking about this for a while. All of the big folks are probably thinking about it — and very, very, very hard,” the person said. “It’s a pretty powerful thing when the president of the United States says, ‘I need you to do this.’” Publicly, the White House expressed confidence. “All of our oil companies are ready and willing to make big investments in Venezuela that will rebuild their oil infrastructure, which was destroyed by the illegitimate Maduro regime,” spokesperson Taylor Rogers said in a statement. “American oil companies will do an incredible job for the people of Venezuela and will represent the United States well.” One person said the administration also “hopes” the American Petroleum Institute, the powerful trade association representing oil companies working in the United States, would form a task force to advise the White House on how best to revive Venezuelan oil production. “In nearly all cases, these calls are the first outreach from the administration on Venezuela,” the person said. API is “closely watching developments involving Venezuela and any potential implications for global energy markets,” group spokesperson Justin Prendergast said in response to questions. “Events like this underscore the importance of strong U.S. energy leadership. Globally, energy companies make investment decisions based on stability, the rule of law, market forces and long-term operational considerations,” Prendergast said. Trump told reporters on Sunday that he had spoken to U.S. oil companies “before and after” the military operation that seized Maduro and brought him to New York, where the former Venezuelan leader made his first court appearance on Monday. “And they want to go in, and they’re going to do a great job for the people of Venezuela, and they’re going to represent us well,” Trump continued. Industry executives on Monday told Reuters no such outreach had occurred to oil majors Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips and Chevron, all of which have experience working in Venezuela’s oil fields. Bringing Venezuela’s oil production — now around 1 million barrels a day — back to its glory-days’ height of 3 million barrels a day would require at least $183 billion and more than a decade of effort, industry analyst firm Rystad Energy said Monday. While the Venezuelan government might supply some of that money, international companies would need to spend $35 billion in the next few years to reach that goal. “Rystad Energy believes that around $53 billion of oil and gas upstream and infrastructure investment is needed over the next 15 years just to keep Venezuela’s crude oil production flat at 1.1 million” barrels a day, the firm said in a client note. “Going beyond 1.4 million [barrels a day] is possible but would require a stable investment of $8 [billion]-$9 billion per year from 2026 to 2040, on top of ‘hold-flat’ capital requirements.” ConocoPhillips spokesperson Dennis Nuss said in a statement that it would be “premature to speculate on any future business activities or investments,” but said the company is monitoring the “potential implications for global energy supply and stability” from the events in Venezuela. ConocoPhillips is continuing its efforts to collect more than $10 billion in compensation it was awarded in arbitration for the Venezuelan government’s seizure of the company’s assets in 2007, Nuss said. Exxon Mobil and Chevron did not respond to requests for comment. Oil field services companies Halliburton and Baker Hughes did not respond for comment, and SLB declined to comment. The only company to publicly indicate interest in Venezuela has been Continental Resources, a firm led by Trump ally and informal energy adviser Harold Hamm. Hamm told the Financial Times on Sunday that “with improved regulatory and governmental stability we would definitely consider future investment.” Continental, which played a key role in developing oil fracking technology, has never operated outside the United States — though it announced on Monday a deal in which it would buy assets in Argentina. People in the oil industry have said a major concern is that Venezuela is not stable enough to guarantee the safety of any workers and equipment they might send there. Companies are asking that the U.S. government contract directly with them before they commit to entering the country. “We need some boots-on-the-ground security and some financial security. That’s on top of the list,” said a second industry executive familiar with the talks who was granted anonymity to discuss private conversations. Trump’s decision to allow Maduro’s second-in-command, acting President Delcy Rodríguez, and other members of the regime to remain in charge of the country’s government has also made industry executives wary of taking on the job, this person added. Rodríguez and her family had been part of the Venezuelan government under Hugo Chávez in the mid-2000s when the regime seized the assets of foreign oil companies. Colombia, Canada, the EU and the United States have levied sanctions against her after accusing her of undermining the Venezuelan elections. “Who’s running the game here?” the second industry executive said. “If she’s going to be in charge — plus the guys who have been there all along — what guarantee can you give us that stuff is going to change? Those three issues — physical, financial and political security — have to be settled before anyone goes in.” Longtime Republican foreign policy hand Elliott Abrams, who served as Trump’s special envoy to Venezuela during his first term, said the president is “exaggerating” the likelihood that companies will return to the country, given the risk and capital required. “The president seems to suggest that he will make the decision, but that is not right — the boards of these companies will make the decisions,” said Abrams, who is now senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “I expect that you’ll see all of them now say, ‘This is fantastic, it’s a great opportunity, and we have a team ready to go to Venezuela,’ but that’s politics,” he added. “That doesn’t mean they’re going to invest.”

A fair, fast and competitive transition begins with what already works and then rapidly scales it up.  Across the EU commercial road transport sector, the diversity of operations is met with a diversity of solutions. Urban taxis are switching to electric en masse. Many regional coaches run on advanced biofuels, with electrification emerging in smaller applications such as school services, as European e-coach technologies are still maturing and only now beginning to enter the market. Trucks electrify rapidly where operationally and financially possible, while others, including long-haul and other hard-to-electrify segments, operate at scale on HVO (hydrotreated vegetable oil) or biomethane, cutting emissions immediately and reliably. These are real choices made every day by operators facing different missions, distances, terrains and energy realities, showing that decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones.  Building on this diversity, many operators are already modernizing their fleets and cutting emissions through electrification. When they can control charging, routing and energy supply, electric vehicles often deliver a positive total cost of ownership (TCO), strong reliability and operational benefits. These early adopters prove that electrification works where the enabling conditions are in place, and that its potential can expand dramatically with the right support. > Decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones chosen > daily by operators facing real-world conditions. But scaling electrification faces structural bottlenecks. Grid capacity is constrained across the EU, and upgrades routinely take years. As most heavy-duty vehicle charging will occur at depots, operators cannot simply move around to look for grid opportunities. They are bound to the location of their facilities.  The recently published grid package tries, albeit timidly, to address some of these challenges, but it neither resolves the core capacity deficiencies nor fixes the fundamental conditions that determine a positive TCO: the predictability of electricity prices, the stability of delivered power, and the resulting charging time. A truck expected to recharge in one hour at a high-power station may wait far longer if available grid power drops. Without reliable timelines, predictable costs and sufficient depot capacity, most transport operators cannot make long-term investment decisions. And the grid is only part of the enabling conditions needed: depot charging infrastructure itself requires significant additional investment, on top of vehicles that already cost several hundreds of thousands of euros more than their diesel equivalents.  This is why the EU needs two things at once: strong enablers for electrification and hydrogen; and predictability on what the EU actually recognizes as clean. Operators using renewable fuels, from biomethane to advanced biofuels and HVO, delivering up to 90 percent CO2 reduction, are cutting emissions today. Yet current CO2 frameworks, for both light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks, fail to recognize fleets running on these fuels as part of the EU’s decarbonization solution for road transport, even when they deliver immediate, measurable climate benefits. This lack of clarity limits investment and slows additional emission reductions that could happen today. > Policies that punish before enabling will not accelerate the transition; a > successful shift must empower operators, not constrain them. The revision of both CO2 standards, for cars and vans, and for heavy-duty vehicles, will therefore be pivotal. They must support electrification and hydrogen where they fit the mission, while also recognizing the contribution of renewable and low-carbon fuels across the fleet. Regulations that exclude proven clean options will not accelerate the transition. They will restrict it.  With this in mind, the question is: why would the EU consider imposing purchasing mandates on operators or excessively high emission-reduction targets on member states that would, in practice, force quotas on buyers? Such measures would punish before enabling, removing choice from those who know their operations best. A successful transition must empower operators, not constrain them.  The EU’s transport sector is committed and already delivering. With the right enablers, a technology-neutral framework, and clarity on what counts as clean, the EU can turn today’s early successes into a scalable, fair and competitive decarbonization pathway.  We now look with great interest to the upcoming Automotive Package, hoping to see pragmatic solutions to these pressing questions, solutions that EU transport operators, as the buyers and daily users of all these technologies, are keenly expecting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is IRU – International Road Transport Union  * The ultimate controlling entity is IRU – International Road Transport Union  More information here.

BRUSSELS — A U.S. clampdown on Russian oil that threatens to strangle Hungary’s supplies is leaving Budapest no choice but to turn somewhere it’s long shunned: Croatia. For three years, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has moaned the country cannot quit Russian oil without jeopardizing its energy security and risking exploding prices at the pump. But now — as U.S. sanctions threaten to cut off one of Hungary’s key Russian suppliers and Brussels plans to propose new tariffs on Moscow’s oil — Budapest will be forced to hunt elsewhere for imports. “Orbán has done everything he could to avoid giving up Russian oil,” said Péter Krekó, director of the independent Budapest-based Political Capital think tank. “If the sanctions go ahead, Hungary will have to start taking alternatives seriously.” Shifting away from Russia will require Budapest to bury the hatchet with Zagreb. Hungary has persistently accused Croatia of imposing extortionate transit fees on its exports, arguing that prevents it from switching suppliers. The country also claims Croatia’s pipeline system is not physically able to meet its oil needs — claims its neighbor vigorously disputes. “These accusations are long-standing and … 100 percent not true,” Croatian Economy Minister Ante Šušnjar told POLITICO. “This is just an excuse for buying Russian oil.” “We have no obstacles to providing the oil,” he said. “We [can be] ready in a matter of minutes.” Hungary’s conundrum comes as U.S. President Donald Trump grows increasingly frustrated with Russia over stalling efforts to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine. The EU, too, has doubled down in recent months on its campaign to phase out Russian energy imports to the bloc. For now, Hungary is scrambling to secure an exemption to Trump’s sanctions. But if the measures go forward as planned, Budapest will have no choice but to turn to Croatia. PROFITS OR PRICES  Ever since Vladimir Putin first ordered his troops into Kyiv over three years ago, Hungary has fought hard against efforts to end the EU’s historic energy ties to Russia.  When Brussels imposed sanctions on Russian oil in 2022, Hungary leveraged its veto power over the bill until it won a carve-out for supplies coming via the Druzhba pipeline, which transports oil from Russia through Ukraine to Central Europe. Since then, it has also repeatedly obstructed attempts to target Moscow’s nuclear and gas sectors.  As the share of Russian crude in the EU’s energy imports shriveled from 26 percent in 2021 to 3 percent last year, Hungary instead deepened its dependency, moving from a prewar share of 61 percent to 86 percent in 2024.  During that time, Budapest has consistently claimed its hands are tied.   As a landlocked country, Hungary’s main alternative is the Adria pipeline that picks up imported oil at Croatian ports and snakes its way through the country and into Hungary. But Budapest alleges that Zagreb’s raising of transit fees in recent years — supposedly to five times the European benchmark — would cause prices to soar back home.  Brussels’ effort to quit Russian energy would “destroy the security of our energy supply,” Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó warned this month. And Croatia, he said, is “trying to profit from the war in Ukraine.”  But experts aren’t convinced. That’s “complete nonsense,” said Tamás Pletser, an oil and gas analyst at Erste bank, since the final cost of fuel in Hungary is set not by crude, but rather more expensive fuels like diesel by the regional Mediterranean benchmark price. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has moaned the country cannot quit Russian oil without jeopardizing its energy security and risking exploding prices at the pump. | Isabella Bonotto/Getty Images As a result, when crude prices rise, that “doesn’t have a major impact on the end product prices,” he said. What it would mean, though, is “declining profit margins” for Hungary’s main oil importer MOL, Pletser said, and fewer tax revenues for Budapest.  In reality, “the most problematic financial aspect of rejecting Russian oil is related to … the Hungarian budget,” said Ilona Gizińska, a Hungary expert at the Centre for Eastern Studies think tank, which currently faces a yawning deficit. There’s no “political will” to quit Russian oil, she said, precisely because it is up to $30 per barrel cheaper than alternative supplies.  Hungary’s foreign ministry declined to comment. A spokesperson for MOL said its “main concern was security of supply” while adding that Croatia had “nearly doubled” its transit fees at the end of 2022.   This information is a commercial secret and is therefore unverifiable; Croatia denies the allegations. “The transit fees are the same before and now,” said Šušnjar. They represent just “2 percent” of the final price of oil, he added, and apply “equally to all partners.”  Others in the bloc agree. “We often don’t get an objective representation of the facts from Hungary,” said a diplomat from an EU country, who was granted anonymity to speak freely.  CAPACITY CRUNCH In recent weeks, the feud between Hungary and Croatia has somewhat cooled.  “Hungary will always give Croatia the historic respect it deserves,” Orbán said after meeting his counterpart Andrej Plenković this month. “We are committed to de-escalating tensions.”  But the two countries continue to squabble over a more technical issue: whether the Adria pipeline can feed enough oil to Hungary.  During a pipeline test last month, oil importer MOL claimed the link was only capable of ramping up its oil flows to sufficient levels for one-to-two hours due to “technical issues.” JANAF, Croatia’s partly state-owned pipeline operator, hit back, accusing MOL of demanding that flows be decreased.  Since then, the firms have held several rounds of talks on extending their transit deal for the pipeline, which expires at the end of the year.   But “we still have no reliable information about its condition and capacity,” a MOL spokesperson said, adding that while the firm is “open to reaffirming” its relationship with JANAF, it still needed “a detailed maintenance plan” relating to the pipeline.  Stjepan Adanić, board chairman at JANAF, dismissed the allegations. “JANAF is fully prepared — in terms of technical, organizational and all other conditions — to meet MOL Group’s … total annual requirements for crude oil” equalling “14.5 million tonnes,” he said.  “The fact is that MOL Group has a certain discount when buying Russian oil,” he told POLITICO. “It is in their business interest for the exceptions to European sanctions … to continue for as long as possible.”  Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last month announced the EU executive would present new tariffs on Russian oil as it seeks to speed up its phaseout before 2027. | Nicolas Economou/Getty Images Now, Zagreb wants Brussels to help mediate.  At the next technical test, “we are requesting the presence of the European Commission” to monitor the results, Šušnjar said.   The EU executive didn’t respond to a request for comment. But Brussels’ top energy official, Dan Jørgensen, this month told POLITICO he was willing to act as a “mediator” for “the countries who will be affected the most” by the bloc’s phaseout of Russian energy.  PINCER ATTACK  Despite its protests, Budapest will now have to act fast as it increasingly looks cornered.  Orbán will head to the U.S. next week in a bid to secure an exemption from Trump’s sanctions, which kick in on Nov. 21.  But Washington’s Russia hawks are keeping the pressure high. “Hungary,” warned U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham this week, “if you think we’re not watching your efforts to undercut U.S. sanctions on Russian oil, you are mistaken.”  At the same time, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last month announced the EU executive would present new tariffs on Russian oil as it seeks to speed up its phaseout before 2027.  “The sanction[s] … would be enough to push Hungary to decouple from Russian crude oil,” said Pletser, the analyst. And the tariffs “would make Russian hydrocarbons uncompetitive [relative] to other sources,” he added, if they are enforced.  As a result, Budapest will have to reconcile with Zagreb, which for now remains open to cooperation. “Croatia is capable and willing to support Hungary,” Šušnjar said.   But Hungarian politicians now “need to decide,” he added, “either we are members of the EU … or we are supporting the Russian aggression.”

BRUSSELS — In the midst of a geopolitical storm, Brussels is racing to put together a new plan by the end of this year to diversify European supply of so-called critical raw materials — such as lithium and copper — away from China.  The thing is: We’ve been here before. So far, the European Commission has provided few details on its new plan, beyond that it would touch upon joint purchasing, stockpiling, recycling of resources and new partnerships. It already addressed those measures two years ago in its first initiative on the issue, the Critical Raw Materials Act.  Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen has been forced to act by Beijing’s expansion and tightening of export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals this month, as trade tensions with Washington escalated. Europe was caught in the crossfire — China accounts for 99 percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, and 98 percent of its rare earth permanent magnets. The new “RESourceEU” plan is expected to follow a similar model to the REPowerEU plan, under which the Commission in 2022 proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.  That has European industry daring to hope that Brussels will do more than just recycle an old initiative and address the main obstacles to diversifying the bloc’s supply chains of minerals it needs for everything from renewable energy to defense applications. The biggest of them all? A lack of cash to back new mining, processing and manufacturing initiatives, both within and outside the EU. “It’s all still very much in its infancy,” said Florian Anderhuber, deputy director general of lobby group Euromines. “We hope that there will be a bigger push that goes beyond the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act,” he added. “It doesn’t help anyone if this is just a label for things that are already in the pipeline.” CODEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP The EU should not count on any trade reprieve that may result from U.S. President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Thursday. After all, Beijing has shown time and again that it has no reservations about weaponizing economic dependencies. The key question is whether, this time around, pressure will remain high enough for the EU to mobilize brainpower and assets at the kind of scale it did when it sought to break the bloc’s decades-old reliance on Russian oil and gas. “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. “We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials. So it is time to speed up and take the action that is needed.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. | Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images In the here and now, the EU wants to persuade a visiting Chinese delegation at talks in Brussels on Friday to speed up export approvals for its top raw materials importers. In parallel, energy and environment ministers from the G7 group of industrialized nations are slated to wargame how to de-risk their mineral supply chains in Toronto, Canada, on Thursday and Friday. MONEY, MONEY, MONEY When the Commission unveiled its first grand plan to break over-reliance on China in 2023 — the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) — industry leaders and analysts mostly lamented one thing: a lack of funding on the table.  “Money has been a real bottleneck for Europe’s raw materials agenda,” said Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Mining, processing, recycling, and stockpiling all need serious financing.” If the EU fails to free up more resources, experts warn that it is bound to fall short of the goal set in the CRMA, of extracting at least 10 percent of its annual consumption of select minerals by the end of the decade, with no more than 65 percent of some raw materials coming from a single country. It’s a steep target — especially for rare earths, where Beijing has over decades built up a de facto monopoly. While the EU executive has selected strategic projects both within and outside the EU that should benefit from faster permitting than their usual lead times of 10 to 15 years to production, those efforts are yet to bear fruit. “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report, calling for a “permanent European Minerals Investment Network.”  “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report. | Aris Oikonomou/AFP via Getty Images The REPowerEU plan — a package of documents, including legal acts, recommendations, guidelines and strategies — was mostly financed by loans left over from the bloc’s pandemic recovery program. Similarly, RESourceEU must become “resource strategy backed by real funding,” said Hildegard Bentele, a member of the European Parliament who’s been working on critical minerals for years.  “This requires a European Raw Materials Fund, modelled on successful instruments in several Member States, to support strategic projects across the entire value chain, from extraction to recycling,” the German Christian Democrat said. THAT’LL COST YOU It’s about more than just throwing money at the problem: The Commission’s haste in rolling out its plan is raising doubts that it will meet the needs of a highly complex market — along with concerns that environmental safeguards will be neglected. “As long as European industries can buy cheaper materials from China, other producers do not stand a chance,” warned Gehrke.  In Toronto, G7 ministers will launch a new Critical Minerals Production Alliance (CMPA), a Canadian-led initiative that seeks to secure “transparent, democratic, and environmentally responsible critical minerals,” and also to counter market manipulation of supply chains, said a senior Canadian government official.  This would suggest creating so-called standards-based markets that are ring-fenced to protect critical minerals produced responsibly, to agreed environmental and social standards. A price floor would be set within that market, while minerals produced elsewhere — at lower prices but also lower standards — would face a tariff.  Beyond the immediate funding issues, ramping up mining in the EU and its neighbourhood also comes at a high societal cost. With local resistance to new mines, usually linked to environmental and social concerns, being one of the key obstacles to new projects, investors are often hesitant to pour money into a project that risks being derailed shortly after. “The EU is choosing geopolitical expediency over human rights and ecological integrity, sacrificing frontline communities for a strategy that is neither sustainable nor just, instead of building a durable and values-based autonomy that invests in systemic circularity and rights-based partnerships,” said Diego Marin, a senior policy officer for raw materials and resource justice at the European Environmental Bureau, an NGO.  Jakob Weizman and Camille Gijs contributed reporting from Brussels. Zi-Ann Lum contributed reporting from Toronto, Canada.

The European Commission will present a new plan to break the EU’s dependencies on China for critical raw materials, President Ursula von der Leyen announced on Saturday. The EU executive chief warned of “clear acceleration and escalation in the way interdependencies are leveraged and weaponized,” in a speech Saturday at the Berlin Global Dialogue. In recent months, China has tightened export controls over rare earths and other critical materials. The Asian powerhouse controls close to 70 percent of the world’s rare earths production and almost all of the refining. The EU’s response “must match the scale of the risks we face in this area,” von der Leyen said, adding that “we are focusing on finding solutions with our Chinese counterparts.” Brussels and Beijing are set to discuss the export controls issue during meetings next week. “But we are ready to use all of the instruments in our toolbox to respond if needed,” the head of the EU executive warned. This suggests that the Commission could make use of the EU’s most powerful trade weapon — the Anti-Coercion Instrument. This comes after French President Emmanuel Macron called on the EU executive to trigger the trade bazooka at a meeting of EU leaders on Thursday. His push has not met with much support from the other leaders around the table. NEW BREAKAWAY PLAN To break the EU’s over-reliance on China for critical materials imports and refining, the Commission will put forward a “RESourceEU plan,” von der Leyen said. She did not provide much detail about the plan, nor when it would be presented. But she said it would follow a similar model as the REPowerEU plan that the Commission introduced in 2022 to phase out Russian fossil fuels after Moscow’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Under REPowerEU, the Commission proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes, accelerate the deployment of renewables, improve grids interconnections across the bloc and boost the EU hydrogen market, among other measures. The EU executive also put forward a legislative proposal, which is currently under negotiations with the European Parliament and the Council, to ban Russian gas imports by the end of 2027. The aim of RESourceEU “is to secure access to alternative sources of critical raw materials in the short, medium and long term for our European industry,” von der Leyen explained. “It starts with the circular economy. Not for environmental reasons. But to exploit the critical raw materials already contained in products sold in Europe,” she said. She added that the EU “will speed up work on critical raw materials partnerships with countries like Ukraine and Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Chile and Greenland.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore. We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials,” von der Leyen said.

BRUSSELS — First it was telecom snooping. Now Europe is growing worried that Huawei could turn the lights off. The Chinese tech giant is at the heart of a brewing storm over the security of Europe’s energy grids. Lawmakers are writing to the European Commission to urge it to “restrict high-risk vendors” from solar energy systems, in a letter seen by POLITICO. Such restrictions would target Huawei first and foremost, as the dominant Chinese supplier of critical parts of these systems. The fears center around solar panel inverters, a piece of technology that turns solar panels’ electricity into current that flows into the grid. China is a dominant supplier of these inverters, and Huawei is its biggest player. Because the inverters are hooked up to the internet, security experts warn the inverters could be tampered with or shut down through remote access, potentially causing dangerous surges or drops in electricity in Europe’s networks. The warnings come as European governments have woken up to the risks of being reliant on other regions for critical services — from Russian gas to Chinese critical raw materials and American digital services. The bloc is in a stand-off with Beijing over trade in raw materials, and has faced months of pressure from Washington on how Brussels regulates U.S. tech giants. Cybersecurity authorities are close to finalizing work on a new “toolbox” to de-risk tech supply chains, with solar panels among its key target sectors, alongside connected cars and smart cameras. Two members of the European Parliament, Dutch liberal Bart Groothuis and Slovak center-right lawmaker Miriam Lexmann, drafted a letter warning the European Commission of the risks. “We urge you to propose immediate and binding measures to restrict high-risk vendors from our critical infrastructure,” the two wrote. The members had gathered the support of a dozen colleagues by Wednesday and are canvassing for more to join the initiative before sending the letter mid next week.   According to research by trade body SolarPower Europe, Chinese firms control approximately 65 percent of the total installed power in the solar sector. The largest company in the European market is Huawei, a tech giant that is considered a high-risk vendor of telecom equipment. The second-largest firm is Sungrow, which is also Chinese, and controls about half the amount of solar power as Huawei. Huawei’s market power recently allowed it to make its way back into SolarPower Europe, the solar sector’s most prominent lobby association in Brussels, despite an ongoing Belgian bribery investigation focused on the firm’s lobbying activities in Brussels that saw it banned from meeting with European Commission and Parliament officials. Security hawks are now upping the ante. Cybersecurity experts and European manufacturers say the Chinese conglomerate and its peers could hack into Europe’s power grid.  “They can disable safety parameters. They can set it on fire,” Erika Langerová, a cybersecurity researcher at the Czech Technical University in Prague, said in a media briefing hosted by the U.S. Mission to the EU in September.  Even switching solar installation off and on again could disrupt energy supply, Langerová said. “When you do it on one installation, it’s not a problem, but then you do it on thousands of installations it becomes a problem because the … compound effect of these sudden changes in the operation of the device can destabilize the power grid.”  Surges in electricity supply can trigger wider blackouts, as seen in Spain and Portugal in April. | Matias Chiofalo/Europa Press via Getty Images Surges in electricity supply can trigger wider blackouts, as seen in Spain and Portugal in April. Some governments have already taken further measures. Last November, Lithuania imposed a ban on remote access by Chinese firms to renewable energy installations above 100 kilowatts, effectively stopping the use of Chinese inverters. In September, the Czech Republic issued a warning on the threat posed by Chinese remote access via components including solar inverters. And in Germany, security officials already in 2023 told lawmakers that an “energy management component” from Huawei had them on alert, leading to a government probe of the firm’s equipment. CHINESE CONTROL, EU RESPONSE  The arguments leveled against Chinese manufacturers of solar inverters echo those heard from security experts in previous years, in debates on whether or not to block companies like video-sharing app TikTok, airport scanner maker Nuctech and — yes — Huawei’s 5G network equipment. Distrust of Chinese technology has skyrocketed. Under President Xi Jinping, the Beijing government has rolled out regulations forcing Chinese companies to cooperate with security services’ requests to share data and flag vulnerabilities in their software. It has led to Western concerns that it opens the door to surveillance and snooping. One of the most direct threats involves remote management from China of products embedded in European critical infrastructure. Manufacturers have remote access to install updates and maintenance. Europe has also grown heavily reliant on Chinese tech suppliers, particularly when it comes to renewable energy, which is powering an increasing proportion of European energy. Domestic manufacturers of solar panels have enough supply to fill the gap that any EU action to restrict Chinese inverters would create, Langerová said. But Europe does not yet have enough battery or wind manufacturers — two clean energy sector China also dominates. China’s dominance also undercuts Europe’s own tech sector and comes with risks of economic coercion. Until only a few years ago, European firms were competitive, before being undercut by heavily subsidized Chinese products, said Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. China on the other hand does not allow foreign firms in its market because of cybersecurity concerns, he said. The European Union previously developed a 5G security toolbox to reduce its dependence on Huawei over these fears. It is also working on a similar initiative, known as the ICT supply chain toolbox, to help national governments scan their wider digital infrastructure for weak points, with a view to blocking or reduce the use of “high-risk suppliers.” According to Groothuis and Lexmann, “binding legislation to restrict risky vendors in our critical infrastructure is urgently required” across the European Union. Until legislation is passed, the EU should put temporary measures in place, they said in their letter.  Huawei did not respond to requests for comment before publication. This article has been updated.

BRUSSELS — After three years of reasoning, pleading and conceding, the EU has had enough. On Monday, the bloc’s 27 member countries are expected to back a new bill that will permanently cut Russian gas supplies to Hungary and Slovakia — whether they like it or not. Since Moscow launched its all-out war in Ukraine in 2022, the EU has weakened the Kremlin’s long-held grip over the bloc’s energy supply, all but eliminating its imports of Russian oil, coal and gas. But throughout that bitter energy divorce, Budapest and Bratislava have stubbornly refused to play ball. Repeatedly arguing that they have no real alternative, their Russia-friendly governments complained that quitting Moscow would mean exploding prices for consumers. Experts largely dispute those claims. And in any case, EU capitals are ready to overrule them. While Russia repeatedly pummels Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, “billions of euros have been paid … by Hungary and Slovakia to Russia,” said Lithuanian Energy Minister Žygimantas Vaičiūnas. “They are using this for their war machine … this is really not acceptable.”  “Now, it is time to demonstrate … political will on the EU level,” he told POLITICO. NO MORE EXCEPTIONS Since Vladimir Putin first ordered troops into Kyiv, Brussels has slapped an embargo on Russian crude, fuel and coal entering the bloc; it’s imposed a $47.60 per barrel price limit on Moscow’s global oil sales, below the market rate; and it’s whittled down the Kremlin’s share in the EU’s gas market from 45 percent to 13 percent.  But Hungary and Slovakia have repeatedly dug their heels in and held up sanctions, winning carve-outs that have allowed them to keep importing Russian crude via the Druzhba pipeline through Ukraine, and blocking efforts to target Moscow’s gas and nuclear sectors. In fact, the two countries are steadily increasing their fossil fuel payments to Moscow, according to Isaac Levi, Russia lead at the Helsinki-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air think tank. Budapest and Bratislava have paid Russia €5.58 billion for fossil fuel imports so far this year, he said, already beating the €5.56 billion they forked out last year. Realizing its consensual approach had hit a wall, the European Commission in June decided to change tack. The EU executive unveiled a legal proposal that would impose a ban on Russian gas, starting from next year for short-term contracts and ending in late 2027 for long-term deals. Unlike sanctions, which require unanimity from all EU countries, the proposal — billed as a trade measure — only needs a qualified majority of capitals to approve it, effectively removing Hungary and Slovakia’s veto power over the draft law. Since Vladimir Putin first ordered troops into Kyiv, Brussels has slapped an embargo on Russian crude, fuel and coal entering the bloc; it’s imposed a $47.60 per barrel price limit on Moscow’s global oil sales, below the market rate; and it’s whittled down the Kremlin’s share in the EU’s gas market from 45 percent to 13 percent.  | Contributor/Getty Images On Monday, EU energy ministers will rubber-stamp the bill, sending a signal that they are ready to override both nations before they enter final negotiations with the European Parliament. “We’ll reach an agreement despite their opposition,” said one senior EU diplomat, who, like others for this story, was granted anonymity to speak freely on closed-door discussions. “It’s not an easy subject, but I believe we’ll get there.” LANDLOCKED, NOT BLOCKED In the run-up to the vote, the two countries have pulled out all the stops in a bid to scupper a deal. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has vowed to block the EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia unless he wins concessions on the gas ban, otherwise known as REPowerEU. But EU countries are holding strong. “That’s always the case, that they are finding ways to make their exit strategies,” Vaičiūnas said, “but now we have to really take a strong [stance] on … REPower.” In the meantime, the two countries have continued to argue the law threatens their energy security, will raise prices for consumers and hurt their heavy industry. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has vowed to block the EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia unless he wins concessions on the gas ban, otherwise known as REPowerEU. | Contributor/Getty Images Hungary’s state-owned energy firm MVM currently has a long-term contract with Russia’s Gazprom until 2036, as well as shorter-term seasonal deals. Slovak firm SPP is bound by its deal with the Kremlin-controlled export monopoly until 2034.  After MEPs agreed on their negotiating stance on the bill last week, Budapest’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó called the text “a direct attack on Hungary’s energy security.”  It “sets back our economic performance, and threatens the low utility costs of Hungarian families,” he wrote on social platform X. “We won’t let this happen!!” “REPOWER IS A NONSENSICAL IDEOLOGICAL MOVE,” Fico fumed earlier this month. The Hungarian foreign ministry and the Slovak economy ministry did not respond to POLITICO’s requests for comment. But the industry isn’t as vociferous. The proposal is “probably not cataclysmic,” said one Hungarian oil and gas sector insider. “The government and politicians do cry wolf — let’s see if this wolf really comes.”  It is true the bill will likely raise prices in the region by “5 to 10 percent” in the midterm, said Tamás Pletser, an oil and gas analyst at Erste bank. But if the Commission works with countries to lower gas transit fees, that could eliminate “up to 40 percent” of the price hike, he added. Meanwhile, MVM is quietly signing new gas deals, Pletser added. Hungary can also find alternatives via liquefied gas from Western Europe and Greece, he said, as well as a new drilling project in Romania from mid-2027. The industry is “absolutely” ready, he said. The EU executive is nonplussed, too. “The measures have been designed to preserve the security of the EU’s energy supply while limiting any impact on prices,” said one Commission official. Whether or not it leads to price increases, EU capitals are ready to pull the trigger.  “They didn’t do much to diversify, sabotaged sanctions and had quite a lot of time,” said a second EU diplomat. “There is no other way [than] to make them.” “It’s not yesterday that we started talking about phasing out Russian gas,” said a third EU diplomat. “Russia is not a partner — it’s a problem. It’s time to stop pretending it is not.”

LONDON — Britain’s undersea infrastructure is highly vulnerable to Russian sabotage. That’s the stark warning from defense and energy experts ahead of the country’s major strategic defense review, expected next week. They warn that critical gas pipelines, power lines and data cables are the “soft belly of British security” — leaving the country exposed to potentially “catastrophic” sabotage at the hands of Russia or other enemies. The British government — which is hiking defense spending — said last month that it will address the threat to pipelines and other undersea infrastructure as part of its review, expected Monday. It comes amid rising tensions with Putin’s Russia, and at a time when Europe is already on alert over a spate of potential sabotage incidents affecting subsea cables and pipelines. But U.K. experts, including former senior government officials, believe the dangers are being underestimated. In an interview with POLITICO, Grant Shapps, who served as both energy and defense secretary in the last U.K. government from 2022 to 2024, said “complacency” about the problem was “genuinely worrying.” “Our undersea infrastructure is a sort of soft belly of British security, and not enough is being done,” Shapps said.  “It’s not a question of if there’ll be a problem at some point, it’s when there’s a problem. This should be a much higher concern for the government. And I don’t just mean that it’s placed on a risk register somewhere. … [We need] a national endeavor, a national plan to protect our undersea infrastructure.” NORD STREAM STYLE Undersea infrastructure is “one area” the defense review will examine, ministers have said. The U.K. and its allies have already increased naval patrols and increased monitoring to combat threats to infrastructure. But while much of the political focus has centered on data cables, security and energy experts warned that the greatest risks could come from an attack on a gas pipeline — like the mysterious 2022 attack on the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea. The U.K. is more dependent than most G7 countries on gas to warm homes and provide electricity. More than half of demand is met by imports, chiefly from Norway, and most Norwegian imports come via a single pipeline — the 715-mile long Langeled, which was built in the 2000s and remains one of the country’s vital energy arteries. But while much of the political focus has centered on data cables, security and energy experts warned that the greatest risks could come from an attack on a gas pipeline — like the mysterious 2022 attack on the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea. | Stefan Sauer/EFE via EPA “Langeled is our single biggest point of weakness,” said Adam Bell, a former Whitehall head of energy strategy, now director of policy at the Stonehaven consultancy. “It doesn’t mean we would all keel over and die if it were blown up — but it means everything gets a lot more expensive quickly. You move toward a risk of rationing [the gas supply].” While the odds of an attack are “pretty low,” the impact would be “catastrophic,” said Jack Richardson, who was an adviser to former Energy Secretary Claire Coutinho under the last Conservative government and is now an associate fellow at the Council for Geostrategy and head of policy at Octopus Energy. “There is no other way of putting it. If Langeled gets knocked out we’re in massive trouble as a country,” he said. Sidharth Kaushal, a senior research fellow in sea power at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, said Putin’s Russia had “invested fairly considerable resources into capabilities that could be used to sabotage critical national infrastructure.” An open attack on U.K. infrastructure would be an act of war, meaning any such attempt by Russia would likely be covert. But the government should be alive to the risks that might unfold “on day one” of a potential conflict or “in the transition from crisis to conflict,” he said, should Russia seek to cripple the U.K.’s energy supply before hostilities even began. “Given that’s a narrow window of opportunity for them, they’d probably go after areas where they think there are minimal redundancies,” Kaushal added. “Langeled is an obvious example. … I definitely see that as an important part of their approach to the opening days of a conflict or the build-up from a crisis to a conflict.” NETWORK EMERGENCY The U.K.’s ability to weather any attack would largely depend on wider questions of supply and demand, including whether the country was experiencing a cold snap, how much gas was held in storage, and whether more liquefied natural gas (LNG) — super-cooled gas that can be traded around the world via tankers — could be procured on the international market. The U.K.’s biggest LNG supplier is the United States. “The big risk is that you lose Langeled and the U.S. stops sending LNG cargoes, which is painfully plausible,” said Bell. “We could probably endure one but not both without rationing.” The reliability of U.S. support in that scenario is “impossible to know” and “depends on what goes through Trump’s head at 3 a.m.,” Shapps said. If sufficient quantities of gas could not be found to replace lost supply — for example, in the event of an attack on multiple pipelines — a Network Gas Supply Emergency could be declared. These procedures are enshrined in law but have never been triggered since the U.K. gas network was built in the 1960s. Initially, gas power stations could be shut down, leading to power cuts. These could be turned back on again quickly when the gas supply returned to normal, but in more extreme scenarios, factories and businesses — and, as a last resort, some households — could be cut off from the gas network entirely. The U.K.’s biggest LNG supplier is the United States. | Olivier Hoslet/EFE via EPA Energy industry experts, granted anonymity to discuss crisis planning, said in the event of such a drastic step, individual engineers would be required to reconnect each home to the gas network safely. It could take months before the network was back to normal, they said.  Ireland, which is dependent on gas imports from Britain, would also be badly affected. The U.K.’s latest National Risk Register, published earlier this year, contains a “reasonable worst-case scenario” of a terror attack on gas infrastructure that leads to “rolling power cuts lasting up to three hours,” and predicts that “restoration of the affected gas infrastructure could take approximately three months.” Asked what he considered the most dangerous sabotage scenarios for the U.K., Shapps said he was “cautious about saying what my ‘lay awake at night’ greatest fears were, because it would lead somebody to the answer.” “It’s unlikely that all our gas pipelines will be cut at the same time. But [let’s] argue in this case they were and we had zero gas — you’d look to bring in more LNG, you try to compensate in a whole variety of different ways. I think the most serious attack [would be] a really combined attack of energy and on data cables — then you’re in a different level of difficult.” GET OFF GAS The U.K. still meets around half its gas demand through domestic supplies from the North Sea, but the quantities left in the ground are diminishing. Richardson and Bell both argue that in the long-term, the way for the U.K. to guarantee its gas security is to reduce dependence on these fossil fuels. The Labour government plans to cut gas from the power system almost entirely by 2030, but Richardson argued ministers should also “be doing way more on the consumption of gas, particularly for heat.” “The simple answer is, you’ve got to diversify as much as possible, including away from oil and gas,” Shapps agreed, but added that in the short term ministers should drop plans to ban new gas exploration licenses in the North Sea and eke out as much as possible from domestic supplies.  “It is completely idiotic and based on ideology to stop digging our own oil and gas,” he said. A government spokesperson said: “Our priority will always be maintaining our national security, and protecting subsea and offshore infrastructure.  “Alongside our NATO and Joint Expeditionary Force allies, we are strengthening our response to ensure ships and aircraft cannot operate in secrecy near the U.K. or NATO territory, harnessing new technologies like AI and coordinating patrols with our allies.” Gassco, the Norwegian firm that operates the Langeled pipeline, did not respond to a request for comment.