SIXTEEN ARRESTED AS MAIN CARAVAN REGROUPS IN GREECE (INTERVIEW)
~ Gabriel Fonten ~
Sixteen members of the People’s Caravan to Kobane, who were travelling inside
Turkey toward the Syrian border, were detained by Turkish police yesterday (28
January), said organisers. The group included many young people and several
female journalists, and it is unclear whether and when they will be deported. At
the same time, the main car convoy of the caravan was stopped at the
Greek-Turkish border and denied entry. Activists are currently considering their
next steps.
The caravan is drawing attention to the Syrian state’s attack on Kurdish Rojava,
with Western complicity.
Earlier, Freedom interviewed a participant in the Caravan, which left Vienna on
25 January.
Could you talk about the progress of the caravan so far, how many people have
joined and what organisations are involved?
We started from Cologne in two cars with ten people. This morning we met with
the other routes coming from Berlin and the south of Europe, we met in Vienna
and are now over 100 people.
So I would say that with each step and each city that we go through, we increase
in number and also morale and energy.
There are many different organisations inspired by the Kurdish freedom movement,
but also organisations that are connected to the cause like comrades from No
Borders.
We are travelling many hours each day in the car. At first in German cities we
were able to participate in demonstrations with many Kurdish comrades. We
stopped in feminist centres and community centres in general.
This morning we began our conference in Vienna and now we are heading to
Belgrade. I think this is like really a reflection of how much the revolution of
Rojava could inspire activists in Europe and how much it can make people leave
behind the inertia that the system lulls us into. So I think this is a really
important aspect of this journey. Of course our objective is to protect the
revolution and the people of Rojava. But at the same time it’s also something
for us to get out of passivity and to react to a world that is more and more
intense every day. Also it’s not just Europeans, but some Kurdish friends and
also some friends from Colombia. We are from Germany, France, Colombia and other
countries. Austria, UK, Ireland.
What are the aims of the Caravan?
The aim is also to break the silence that we find especially in European and
Western institutions and mainstream media about what is going on. It’s
unacceptable because, yes, it’s also the legitimation of the European Union that
made this (the attack on Rojava) happen. Obviously also the USA and Israel
also.
We are concerned here with developments like Ursula von der Leyen sending 260
million Euros to Al Jolani, the interim President of Syria. This is something
that legitimises this authority and is basically something we cannot accept.
I mean, there are different things we could say also. How much we should take
responsibility for what the revolutionaries in Rojava gave for the whole world
by defeating ISIS. So this also I think.
https://cdn.freedomnews.org.uk/news/2026/01/signal-2026-01-29-005014.mp4
12 years ago, four years in war against ISIS, many people gave their lives, and
now European institutions are legitimising the government that is opening the
prisons that were guarded by the comrades and freeing thousands of ISIS
militias.
So actually, our action to defend Rojava is an action to defend all of us from a
threat that just a few years ago was terrorising the whole world. It’s important
for us to remember this.
Why did you choose Kobane as your destination in Rojava?
I think the fact is Kobane is under siege. It’s surrounded by the forces of the
enemy and the villages around it are attacked by jihadist forces and the city
itself is at risk of falling in the hands again of jihadist forces such as the
HTS, the militia that is at the head of the Syrian transitional government.
Also, Kobane is an important symbol of resistance for the Rojava revolution. It
was freed 11 years ago on the 26th January by the revolutionaries of the
Autonomous Administration from the Islamic State. And I think it was, if I’m not
wrong, one of the first big victories also against the Islamic State. And so it
has big meaning also that Kobane stays free. And so that is why we are we’re
going towards Kobane and trying to break the siege of Kobane.
At this moment the situation is really difficult. There are there are a lot of
people that have had to move (to Kobane) from other areas, so it’s overcrowded
and not everybody has a place to sleep. There was news of four children dying of
cold in their sleep. So yes, it’s also a humanitarian issue at the same time as
being, as I said, a strong symbol.
When do you expect to arrive?
I expect to arrive… There is a bit uncertainty in this moment because yes, we
are afraid that the Turkish state will block us at the border. So right now
we’re trying to to pass them and we will see.
The idea is to coordinate with the comrades in Turkey. So we will not probably
arrive to Kobane, but we will reach the border from Turkey to Syria to be able
to put pressure and raise attention on what is happening at the border. The
Turkish border is very close to Kobane geographically. We are organising day by
day. It’s not certain who will arrive or when, it will be seen with time.
But there are also comrades that could arrive in Bakur, that is Turkish
Kurdistan by plane. So yeah, actually there’s already people that under the name
of the People’s Caravan are in Kurdistan and are, yes, documenting the
repression by the Turkish state and are bringing solidarity to the comrades
there.
How are you funded? Can you tell us more about how you’ve managed the logistics
of moving a large group of people across Europe?
Well, at the beginning it was I think mainly private money or money from the
organisations that are organised (the caravan), but I’m not sure because I
wasn’t part of the organisation in this sense. I was just doing media and also
same thing for the logistics. But what I can say is that this started from a
small group of very determined people who with this objective in 3-2 days could
organise this and also by working everyday.
So making the first step until Vienna, where there are more solidarity
structures. So that is structured in the Kurdish community centres where we
could go to eat dinner or lunch or yes, just make a break from travel. And then
from Vienna on, yes, it was planned basically day by day, finding contacts of
comrades, yes, asking for support and asking to bring cars also. And also from
Vietnam, we tried to really move as a caravan. So we decided to have the biggest
car at the beginning, at the end, so that we could really be at unity and also
from an external point of view be seen as all together and be all together.
But it was managed mainly by like pure will of doing it and also from people
coming. In the end they came also self organising.
What can people do to help and what is best way for people/our readers to
follow/contact you?
I think a lot of things are needed and a lot of different things. Yes, it is
good to donate money, but I think the best, most important thing is really in
this moment is to organise in your local place.
If you cannot or don’t want to go to to the Rojava in this time, to organise, to
mobilise the society in your place. For example, to open a group of
RiseUp4RoJava, get in contact and link with the network.
Talk with people about it to get informed. Also this is really important because
the war also is a lot on information level. There are a lot of propaganda
against the SDF, against the revolution in a lot of media. Al Jazeera for
example, there was a campaign announced by young internationalist women to
boycott Al Jazeera because it was spreading, yes, information that SDF was
attacking the population, which was not true.
Basically how to help is basically to get yourself organised because to support
the change in Roava we also have to change our our self and our surrounding,
especially with the focus of keeping attention on what is happening and
mobilising.
The best way to contact us is probably the Instagram account of the people’s
caravan. There’s also a website and there is a mail address in their website.
The post Turkey blocks People’s Caravan to Kobane appeared first on Freedom
News.
Tag - Kurdistan
TRIAL SEEN AS PART OF INCREASED BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UK AND TÜRKIYE
~ Tom Anderson ~
The trial of six members of London’s Kurdish community, charged with membership
of the proscribed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is ongoing at the Central
Criminal Court (Old Bailey) in London. They have all pleaded not guilty to the
charges of being members of the banned organisation and some face additional
allegations relating to arranging and addressing meetings in support of the PKK.
On the day hearings started (5 January), the London Kurdish Community and their
supporters demonstrated with banners outside the Old Bailey. The trial is due to
take up to three months and the defendants are Ercan Akbal (56), Ali Boyraz
(63), Agit Karatas (24), Berfin Kurban (31), Turkan Ozcan (60) and Mazlum (also
known as Mucahit) Sayak (28). The home raids and arrests coincided with a
simultaneous police raid on the Kurdish Community Centre (KCC) in Haringey,
sparking protests and hunger strikes.
A number of high profile arrests of Kurdish people had preceded this, as well as
raids on Kurdish Community Centres and media organisations across Europe during
2024. This heightened repression of Kurdish movements in Europe came at a time
when Türkiye was stepping up its air and ground assaults on the PKK in Iraqi
Kurdistan and drone attacks on North and East Syria.
The arrests also took place just two days before the 29 November assault on
Aleppo by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). Türkiye hoped to use this assault and
subsequent takeover of power from Bashar Al-Assad to strengthen their influence
in Syria and further the role of its Syrian National Army (SNA) proxies in
efforts to destroy the Rojava revolution.
PKK has been a banned organisation in the UK since 2001, when the Blair
government added it to the list of proscribed organisations following pressure
from the Turkish state. The arrests came in the wake of a meeting in London
between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and British Foreign Secretary David
Lammy, when they announced new UK/Türkiye bilateral cooperation and trade ties.
The PKK was founded in the 1970s as a Marxist-Leninist anti-colonial party
aiming to end the Turkish state’s violence, discrimination, denial of identity
and forced assimilation policies aimed at Kurdish people. In 1999, the movement
embarked on a path toward its new paradigm based on three concepts: Women’s
freedom, an ecological society and democratic confederalism, a form of stateless
direct democracy. These ideas have inspired the movement ever since, and built a
foundation for the Rojava revolution in North and East Syria, which began in
2012, and the struggle for democratic autonomy within Türkiye’s borders.
WHY NOW?
The PKK and its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan have been trying to make peace
with the Turkish state over the last year and the Party officially disbanded
itself and ceremonially destroyed some of its weapons in 2025. The movement has
never carried out any sort of armed operation on UK soil, and the
Kurdish-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces received tactical support from the UK
armed forces during their fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). In 2020, the
Belgian Supreme Court ruled that EU anti-terrorism legislation cannot be applied
to PKK.
The fact that the Crown Prosecution Service puts resources into criminalising
members of the UK’s Kurdish community can be explained, just like in the case of
last year’s proscription Palestine Action, in geopolitical terms. The complicity
of the British police with the Israeli embassy over Palestine action is well
documented, and details are still emerging. Türkiye, for its part, is a NATO
member and a key UK and EU ally, despite Erdoğan’s efforts to strip away the
vestiges of liberal democracy within Turkey and to centre authoritarian power
around himself as President.
The Turkish state wants to crush the Kurdish freedom movement, both within its
borders and across the border in North and East Syria, whereas Keir Starmer
appears to be keen to enact repressive policies at home to further what he sees
as UK foreign policy interests.
At the same time, Starmer’s Labour government has presided over a shift in the
way dissent is being dealt with in the UK. For decades euphemisms like ‘domestic
extremism’ or ‘aggravated activism’ have been used to criminalise radicals while
differentiating them from those they dub terrorists. However, since the
proscription of Palestine Action last year the state has seemed ready to
straight-up call people terrorists. Obviously, the PKK has been on the
proscribed list for a quarter of a century already, but there haven’t been many
actual prosecutions related to it. The state’s readiness to use terrorism
legislation to counter dissent is likely to have fed into the CPS decision to
prosecute.
The Kurdish People’s Assembly of the UK in a public statement is calling for
“sustained solidarity” as “a refusal of isolation and criminalisation, and an
affirmation that political identity, association, and community organisation are
not crimes.”
The post Kurdish community members plead ‘not guilty’ to PKK charges appeared
first on Freedom News.
CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AS ASSAULT ON KURDISH AUTONOMY AND RIGHTS
INTENSIFIES
~Blade Runner~
Between 20,000 and 30,000 Kurds and supporters filled the streets of London on
Sunday 25 January in solidarity with the people of Rojava. Organised by Kurdish
diaspora communities and solidarity networks, protesters gathered outside the
BBC at Broadcasting House before marching towards Downing Street, calling on
Western governments and international institutions to intervene to prevent an
unfolding assault on Kurdish autonomy and rights. Passers-by along the route
stopped to engage with the march, expressing curiosity and solidarity.
RiseUp4Rojava, Women Defend Rojava and the 183 organisations and 72 individuals
who have already endorsed the international call, urged supporters to escalate
organising — through coordinated street actions, social media mobilisation,
pressure on national governments and international bodies, and demands for
political and legal recognition of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of
North and East Syria (DAANES).
On the ground, the situation remains highly volatile. In early January 2026,
jihadist forces forming the backbone of Syria’s transitional government, backed
politically and logistically by Ankara, launched a rapid offensive across
territory previously administered by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the
military defence force of Rojava. Government-aligned forces seized cities, oil
fields and key infrastructure east of the Euphrates in a matter of days.
In the initial stages of the offensive, several tribal groups that had
previously aligned with the SDF switched sides, accelerating the loss of
territory, including in major urban centres. Amid the chaos, detainees from
facilities formerly controlled by the SDF were reportedly released before being
recaptured by Damascus-aligned forces.
Clashes intensified around Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah, before
Damascus and the SDF agreed a fragile ceasefire in mid-January. Under the terms
announced, the SDF is to be integrated into Syrian state structures, with
control of border crossings, energy infrastructure and Islamic State detention
facilities transferred to the central government. The ceasefire was reportedly
violated almost immediately, though harsh winter conditions and tactical
regrouping by SDF forces appear to have slowed the pace of the assault.
The truce was brokered by international mediators, particularly the United
States and France. Washington is reported to be seeking additional time to
organise the transfer of thousands of detained ISIS fighters and their families
out of the region.
Kurdish-majority cities are currently under blockade, enforced by Turkish-backed
militias, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Islamic State cells. Displacement into
remaining Kurdish-held areas is placing further strain on already fragile
infrastructure and aid capacity as humanitarian conditions deteriorate rapidly.
In the encircled city of Kobane, water and electricity supplies have been cut,
forcing displaced families into public buildings without heating or basic
services. Local sources report that at least five children have already died due
to cold conditions, as tens of thousands of civilians flee ongoing bombardment
and insecurity across the region. Borders with Turkey, Iraq and Iran have seen
increased crossings by Kurds preparing for what many fear could become a
decisive confrontation with Damascus and its allies.
Organisers highlighted upcoming international days of action, including 26
January, marking the anniversary of the 2015 liberation of Kobane from Islamic
State, and 31 January, a global mobilisation under the slogan “Women Defend
Rojava“, calling on women and democratic forces to defend what supporters
describe as Rojava’s women-led social revolution.
Solidarity actions have been taking place internationally, including protests
across Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and South America, as Kurdish
communities and allied organisations seek to apply pressure on governments in an
effort to avert what many fear could become a genocidal assault on north-east
Syria. International networks have also coordinated several convoys from Europe,
with additional groups reportedly travelling from Iraq, Iran and Turkey to
deliver humanitarian aid or join the defence of the region.
The post Thousands march for Rojava in London appeared first on Freedom News.
ISLAMIST ATTACKS AND GREAT-POWER MANOEUVRES PLACE THE REVOLUTION IN EXISTENTIAL
THREAT
~ Blade Runner ~
Recent weeks’ clashes between Syrian state forces and Kurdish groups forces have
developed into a multi-front assault on Rojava, threatening open war as a means
of forcing it to integrate into an Islamist state structure. Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF) are resisting sustained attacks using drones and heavy weapons by
Damascus-affiliated militias in Hasakeh and Raqqa, including near two prisons
housing thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters. SDF confirmed that repeated
assaults on al-Shaddadi prison were initially repelled at heavy cost before the
facility ultimately fell with thousands of ISIS fighters escaping, despite its
proximity to a US-led coalition base that did not intervene.
> The SDF has lost significant territory over the past week, including large
> areas it previously controlled east of the Euphrates. Grassroots channels
> report Islamist forces attacking Kobane, a city pressed against the Turkish
> border to the north. Northeast Syria’s ruling Democratic Union Party (PYD) has
> called on “Kurdistani forces to declare a general mobilisation,” warning that
> “Kurds in Rojava face the threat of extermination.”
The ceasefire declared on Sunday 18 January is being widely ignored on the
ground by the coalition of Islamist forces — described in much of the mainstream
media as the “Syrian government forces” — with attacks on SDF and YPJ (Women’s
Protection Units) positions and civilian areas continuing. Reports include
femicides in Raqqa, executions of captured fighters, and assaults on residents
attempting to prevent kidnappings. This escalation follows a wider wave of
massacres across Syria, which the SDF, YPJ and Internal Security Forces have
been attempting to contain.
SDF leadership confirmed that following a meeting with the leader of Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and de facto Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa, alongside US
envoy Tom Barrack, on 18 January, a 14-point agreement was signed under which
its forces would begin pulling back from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The SDF stated
that agreeing to the ceasefire was necessary to avoid open civil war and to
limit civilian bloodshed, as the Islamist coalition advanced west of the
Euphrates into areas previously under SDF control, pursuing confrontation marked
by severe violence and displacement.
A Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) unit in Hesekê (al-Hasakah) in northeastern
Syria.
Under the agreement, SDF fighters are expected to be merged individually into
Syria’s defence and interior ministries. Control of border crossings, oil and
gas fields — including the al-Omar field, where Shell moved to exit just as
Damascus control was being consolidated — and detention sites holding Islamic
State prisoners is set to transfer to Damascus. Limited concessions allow the
SDF to nominate some officials for central government roles, and Hasakeh
province is expected to receive a consensus-appointed governor. The agreement
also requires the expulsion of foreign members linked to the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK), which fought a decades-long insurgency in Turkey.
In return, Damascus has offered concessions on language recognition and
citizenship rights for Kurds, framed as steps toward national reconciliation.
Kurdish political forces have rejected these measures as attempts to hollow out
the autonomy project while delegitimising Rojava’s self-defence structures and
collective institutions that guarantee safety and freedom for all ethnic and
religious communities.
The timeline for implementation remains unclear, but mainstream coverage
increasingly presents a Syrian government portrayed as sufficiently consolidated
to impose an impossible strategic choice on Rojava — a trajectory that could
effectively terminate the revolutionary project. SDF leadership reportedly
confirmed a further meeting with al-Sharaa in Damascus on Monday 19 January,
after which additional details were to be be made public.
The SDF confirmed withdrawal from Deir ez-Zor — Syria’s main oil and wheat
region — and from Raqqa, home to major hydroelectric infrastructure, abandoning
border crossings and its main base in the area and redeploying to rearward
positions.
https://cdn.freedomnews.org.uk/news/2026/01/Screen-Recording-2026-01-18-095854.mp4
Earlier in Aleppo, the self-administered Kurdish neighbourhoods — long a refuge
for persecuted minorities — came under sustained attack by jihadist forces,
resulting in heavy civilian casualties and mass displacement. SDF units withdrew
alongside thousands of residents to avoid escalation into urban warfare.
Subsequent advances pushed toward the surrounding countryside and the Euphrates
corridor previously under SDF control.
Alongside frontline fighting, autonomous sources reported attempts to
destabilise the administration from within, including counter-insurgency
agitation in Raqqa and around Hasakeh linked to entrenched tribal power
structures. These networks, rooted in patriarchal clan authority and local
economic control, have historically functioned as mechanisms of social
discipline, suppressing women and exploiting precarious labour, and are
reportedly being mobilised to undermine self-administration.
State-aligned outlets circulated footage videos showing the destruction of a
statue of a woman YPJ fighter — a symbol of women’s resistance against ISIS. The
political symbolism is unmistakable: misogynistic violence remains embedded
within forces now being quietly rehabilitated as state authority.
Around the Tishreen dam, SDF forces resisted Turkish-backed Islamist attacks,
with armed groups repositioning in nearby villages after tactical withdrawals.
In Raqqa, SDF units detonated bridges across the Euphrates to slow advancing
forces, while clashes continued inside and around the city. SDF and YPJ units
reported ambushes and sniper operations against Islamist formations, including
former ISIS sleeper cells. At the same time, mainstream media adopted narratives
highlighting “crowds celebrating the city’s liberation.”
The new agreement builds on an earlier draft signed in March 2025 that vaguely
outlined integration into a unified Syrian nation-state — a framework
fundamentally incompatible with Rojava’s confederal administration and the
region’s multi-ethnic reality. Rojava has consistently proposed a horizontal,
decentralised confederal model for Syria, which the US, Turkey and other major
powers have declined to support.
Women fighters from the YPJ in Derik (northeastern Syria)
Turkish forces have meanwhile remained heavily mobilised along the border,
signalling readiness for further escalation to compel integration. Kurdish
organisations interpret US-brokered talks between Israel and Damascus on 5
January as part of a broader attempt to formalise informal zones of influence,
with Israeli consolidation expanding in the south and northwest and Turkish
pressure intensifying against Rojava under tacit international consent.
The current regime in Damascus is openly backed by Ankara, which has pursued the
elimination of Kurdish autonomy for decades as a long-term strategic priority.
Kurdish self-administration in Syria and Iraq has also shaped political
expectations among Kurdish populations in Iran, deepening Ankara’s anxiety over
regional continuity of Kurdish autonomy and the possibility of a fourth Kurdish
zone emerging within Turkey itself — a development incompatible with both
Turkish state doctrine and western models of centralised state stability.
According to PYD representatives, the new Syrian regime increasingly functions
as an Islamist caliphate imposing religious governance while drawing on networks
of former jihadist fighters and dormant ISIS cells assembled during the
post-Assad transition. Remzi Kartal, co-chair of People’s Congress of Kurdistan
or Kongra-Gel (KGK), reiterated that any arrangement imposed on Rojava that
excludes democratic autonomy “will not be accepted,” warning that the military
balance in Rojava would not mirror the collapses seen in Tabqa or Aleppo. The
Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) likewise called for mobilisation and
resistance, invoking the historic siege of Kobanê and urging that “the spirit of
resistance of Kobanê must rise.”
As fighting, ceasefire manoeuvres and diplomacy unfold in parallel, the struggle
over Rojava is also being fought in how the conflict itself is framed.
Mainstream outlets such as Reuters, AP, BBC and the Guardian present the
situation primarily as a problem of territorial stabilisation, sectarian rivalry
and nation-state restoration. This framing obscures a deeper political
confrontation between authoritarian Islamist consolidation and a long-running
experiment in communalist, feminist and multi-ethnic self-administration. The
information war surrounding Rojava forms part of a broader effort to contain and
neutralise the social revolution while legitimising the ultra-authoritarian
forces now being rehabilitated as Syria’s governing authority — threatening
communities with renewed repression, gendered violence and ethnic cleansing.
The post State integration forced on Rojava appeared first on Freedom News.
THE MOVE REFLECTS A BROADER STRATEGIC VISION EMBRACING GENDER LIBERATION,
PLURALISM, AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY
~ Blade Runner ~
The formal announcement of the PKK’s dissolution has sparked mixed reactions
among Turkey’s Kurds and international supporters. However, it has been years in
the making and comes as no surprise to long-term observers of the Kurdish
movement and readers of Abdullah Öcalan‘s theory of Democratic Confederalism.
The shift had been indicated months earlier and signifies a strategic
transformation aligned with a broader vision of autonomy beyond the state, the
party, and the armed struggle.
The PKK was founded in 1978 and launched an armed struggle in 1984, demanding
Kurdish autonomy. Turkey responded with harsh military repression, and the two
sides became entangled in a bloody conflict that lasted for decades. Over the
course of this war, between 40,000 and 50,000 people were killed, including
civilians, PKK fighters, Turkish soldiers, police, and village guards. The 1990s
were particularly brutal, marked by widespread village burnings, forced
displacements affecting up to 3 million people, and systemic human rights
abuses. Despite several attempts at ceasefires and peace talks, the violence
periodically escalated—especially after the collapse of negotiations in 2015,
when renewed urban warfare brought heavy casualties to cities like Cizre and
Sur.
Since Öcalan’s capture in 1999, the Kurdish freedom movement has gradually
shifted away from traditional models of armed vanguardism, nationalist statism
and Stalinist rigidity. While the PKK maintained its armed forces—particularly
in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan—its ideological orientation increasingly
prioritised social transformation over military confrontation.
This shift found structural expression in the formation of the Kurdistan
Communities Union (KCK) in the early 2000s: an umbrella of organisations with a
decentralised and horizontal character. The KCK encompasses a wide array of
communities, political parties, citizen initiatives, committees, and grassroots
institutions across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. It represents a deliberate
move away from the rigid, centralised model of the vanguard party, in favour of
a networked configuration grounded in direct participation and local autonomy.
In Turkey, the KCK has been politically active in coordinating cultural, social,
and municipalist initiatives. It has succeeded in winning local councils and
electing candidates to mayoral positions. The Turkish state has responded with
sustained repression, including mass arrests of alleged “KCK members” over the
past decade.
In this new worldview, the space for a hierarchical party structure like the PKK
has been steadily shrinking. Öcalan’s February 2025 call for the PKK to formally
dissolve was met with support from officials within Kongra-Gel, the legislative
body of the KCK that claimed that this step “marks the beginning of a broader
democracy movement—one that includes women, workers, and environmental
activists”, thus being more aligned with the framework of Democratic Modernity.
Democratic confederalism was first articulated within the PKK and then fully
implemented—most visibly—in Rojava. Where the PKK once contributed to ethnic
polarisation within Turkey and even among Kurds, the Rojava model now emphasises
the transition to plurality, feminism, and decentralisation. For over a decade,
the region has resisted Turkish invasions, ISIS offensives, regime hostility,
and international neglect, all while pushing the social and political
revolution. Like the Zapatistas—whose influence is evident across the
movement—Kurdish cadres have redefined and demystified the idea of armed
struggle. Central to this paradigm is Jineology—the “science of women”—which
frames women’s liberation as the foundation of any meaningful revolutionary
process.
TURNING POINT
The decision to end the cycle of armed polarisation with the Turkish state could
signal a turn toward a more contemporary revolutionary horizon—one grounded not
in elite substitution, but in mass participation. Rojava, too, is entering a new
phase. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have signed an initial agreement with
Syria’s central government to initiate negotiations for formal recognition of
the region’s autonomous status—not as an independent nation-state, but as a
decentralised component of a reimagined Syrian polity. Though past efforts were
blocked under Assad, shifting power dynamics have reopened the possibility of
dialogue. The ideas of confederalism and gender liberation may now be closer
than ever to broader realisation and territorial grounding. Despite the grave
dangers from negotiating with the jihadist Syrian regime, the Kurdish
administration continues to push forward, seeking recognition as a
self-governing entity within a fractured and centralised region.
This evolution naturally coincides with the PKK’s disbandment. In Turkey, these
developments may challenge the regime’s foundational narrative. For decades,
Ankara has used the PKK’s designation as a terrorist organisation to justify
military operations, political repression, and the targeting of Kurdish
organisations, journalists, and international allies. It has claimed that all
Kurdish structures—from the PYD to the YPG/YPJ and the SDF—are fronts for the
PKK. With the PKK now dissolved, the legal rationale for this strategy is
weakened. Though state discourse may persist, its credibility—especially
internationally—could erode. This could offer Erdoğan the opportunity to pivot
toward a political approach that acknowledges Kurdish autonomy in exchange for
domestic stability and constitutional leverage. Ankara’s recent pledges of
financial support to Kurdish-majority regions—which comprise roughly 15–20% of
Turkey’s territory and are home to an estimated 12–17 million people—may be
signs of this shift.
The big question is whether the Turkish authoritarian regime will allow such a
democratic approach, or whether it will force the Kurdish movement back into
armed insurgency. In the past, the PKK attempted several times to withdraw its
forces from Turkey, but each time the process was disrupted by the Turkish
state.
What comes next is uncertain. The history of betrayal runs deep, and the risks
of co-optation or renewed repression remain. Yet the Kurdish movement has
demonstrated extraordinary adaptability, rooted in lived resistance and
revolutionary imagination. If this is the end of the party, it may well mark the
beginning of something deeper: a stateless alternative struggling to survive
amid the ruins of the patriarchal nation-state.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Image: Montecruz Foto CC BY-SA 3.0
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Freedom News.
ITEMS DISCUSSED IN THIS PROGRAM: VALENCIA ANGER AFTER FLOODING • FIRST CONTACT
WITH OCALAN IN ALMOST 4 YEARS • TRUMP VICTORY AND THE ‘FAR RIGHT INTERNATIONAL’
• UK AT CLIMATE SUMMIT • AI JOB LOSSES
The post Freedom News Review – November 12 appeared first on Freedom News.
SUPPORTERS HAIL PRISON VISIT A STEP TOWARDS A POLITICAL RESOLUTION TO THE
KURDISH QUESTION
~ Alisa-Ece Tohumcu ~
Supporters of incarcerated Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan have made a
significant political breakthrough as Turkish authorities permitted his first
face-to-face meeting with a family member for almost four years.
The Kurdish National Congress (KNK) reported on 24 October that Öcalan met with
his nephew, Turkish parliamentarian Omer Öcalan, on Imrali Island, where he has
been held in isolation since 1999. This meeting, facilitated after years of
sustained international pressure, represents a symbolic moment in the ongoing
efforts to end Öcalan’s solitary confinement and secure a political resolution
to the Kurdish question.
“If conditions are favourable, I have both the theoretical and practical
authority to transition this process from conflict and violence to legal and
political grounds”, Öcalan stated in a message relayed through his nephew.
Öcalan, the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is considered a
terrorist by Turkish authorities and media but regarded by many Kurds as a
political visionary. His writings from prison have since shaped a wide-reaching
ideological framework known as “Democratic Confederalism”, which emphasises
grassroots democracy and coexistence, am dos particularly influential among
Kurdish communities in Rojava, northern Syria, as well as Turkey and Iraq.
Öcalan’s first direct contact in 43 months follows international protests and
appeals to the European Court of Human Rights, which has condemned Öcalan’s
isolation as inhumane.
The timing, however, coincides with heightened military activity by Turkey in
Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Turkish army has expanded its presence under the
pretext of creating a “buffer zone” to counter PKK influence. Since June,
airstrikes and military incursions have displaced thousands of people and
endangered hundreds of villages. The establishment of bases and checkpoints
suggests Turkey envisages a sustained military presence in the Kurdish region.
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Photo: Kurdistan 24
The post First contact with Abdullah Öcalan in years as conflict escalates in
Iraqi Kurdistan appeared first on Freedom News.