Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Russia’s reaction to America’s gunboat diplomacy in Venezuela has been rather tame by the Kremlin’s standards, with a pro forma feel to it. The foreign ministry has come out with standard language, issuing statements about “blatant neocolonial threats and external armed aggression.” To be sure, it demanded the U.S. release the captured Nicolás Maduro, and the Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev dubbed the whole business “unlawful” — but his remarks also contained a hint of admiration. Medvedev talked of U.S. President Donald Trump’s consistency and how he is forthrightly defending America’s national interests. Significantly, too, Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to comment directly on the snatching of his erstwhile ally. Nor did the Kremlin miss a beat in endorsing former Vice President Delcy Rodriguez as Venezuela’s interim leader, doing so just two days after Maduro was whisked off to a jail cell in New York. Overall, one would have expected a much bigger reaction. After all, Putin’s alliance with Venezuela stretches back to 2005, when he embraced Maduro’s boss Hugo Chávez. The two countries signed a series of cooperation agreements in 2018; Russia sold Venezuela military equipment worth billions of dollars; and the relationship warmed up with provocative joint military exercises. “The unipolar world is collapsing and finishing in all aspects, and the alliance with Russia is part of that effort to build a multipolar world,” Maduro announced at the time. From 2006 to 2019, Moscow extended $17 billion in loans and credit to Venezuela. So why the current rhetorical restraint? Seems it may all be about bargaining — at least for the Kremlin. Moscow likely has no wish to rock the boat with Washington over Venezuela while it’s actively competing with Kyiv for Trump’s good graces. Better he lose patience with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and toss him out of the boat rather than Putin. Plus, Russia probably has zero interest in advertising a hitherto successful armed intervention in Ukraine that would only highlight its own impotence in Latin America and its inability to protect its erstwhile ally. Indeed, there are grounds to suspect the Kremlin must have found Maduro’s surgically executed removal and its stunning display of U.S. hard power quite galling. As POLITICO reported last week, Russia’s ultranationalists and hard-line militarists certainly did: “All of Russia is asking itself why we don’t deal with our enemies in a similar way,” posted neo-imperialist philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, counseling Russia to do it “like Trump, do it better than Trump. And faster.” Even Kremlin mouthpiece Margarita Simonyan conceded there was reason to “be jealous.” Indeed, there are grounds to suspect the Kremlin must have found Maduro’s surgically executed removal and its stunning display of U.S. hard power quite galling. | Boris Vergara/EPA From Russia’s perspective, this is an understandable sentiment — especially considering that Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine was likely conceived as a quick decapitation mission aimed at removing Zelenskyy and installing a pro-Kremlin satrap in his place. Four years on, however, there’s no end in sight. It’s essentially a demonstration of America’s military might that highlights the limits of Russia’s military effectiveness. So, why draw attention to it? However, according to Bobo Lo — former deputy head of the Australia mission in Moscow and author of “Russia and the New World Disorder” — there are other explanations for the rhetorical restraint. “Maduro’s removal is quite embarrassing but, let’s be honest, Latin America is the least important area for Russian foreign policy,” he said. Besides, the U.S. operation has “a number of unintended but generally positive consequences for the Kremlin. It takes the attention away from the conflict in Ukraine and reduces the pressure on Putin to make any concessions whatsoever. It legitimizes the use of force in the pursuit of vital national interests or spheres of influence. And it delegitimizes the liberal notion of a rules-based international order,” he explained. Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institute who oversaw European and Russian affairs at the White House for part of Trump’s first term, echoed these thoughts: “Russia will simply exploit Trump’s use of force in Venezuela — and his determination to rule the country from afar — to argue that if America can be aggressive in its backyard, likewise for Russia in its ‘near abroad.’” Indeed, as far back as 2019, Hill told a congressional panel the Kremlin had signaled that when it comes to Venezuela and Ukraine, it would be ready to do a swap. This all sounds like two mob bosses indirectly haggling over the division of territory through their henchmen and actions. For the Kremlin, the key result of Venezuela is “not the loss of an ally but the consolidation of a new logic in U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration — one that prioritizes force and national interests over international law,” noted longtime Putin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s New Eurasian Strategies Center. “For all the reputational damage and some minor immediate economic losses, the Kremlin has reason, on balance, to be satisfied with recent developments: Through his actions, Trump has, in effect, endorsed a model of world order in which force takes precedence over international law.” And since Maduro’s ouster, Trump’s aides have only made that clearer. While explaining why the U.S. needs to own Greenland, regardless of what Greenlanders, Denmark or anyone else thinks, influential White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller told CNN: “We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.” Now that’s language Putin understands. Let the bargaining begin — starting with Iran.

While U.S. President Donald Trump brashly cited the Monroe Doctrine to explain the capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, he didn’t leave it there. He also underscored a crude tenet guiding his foreign adventures: “It’s important to make me happy,” he told reporters. Maduro had failed in that task after shunning a surrender order by Trump — hence, he was plucked in the dead of night by Delta Force commandos from his Caracas compound, and unceremoniously deposited at New York’s Metropolitan Detention Center. Yet despite the U.S. president’s admonishment about needing to be kept happy — an exhortation accompanied by teasing hints of possible future raids on the likes of Cuba, Colombia and Mexico — one continent has stood out in its readiness to defy him. Maduro’s capture has been widely denounced by African governments and the continent’s regional organizations alike. South Africa has been among the most outspoken, with its envoy to the U.N. warning that such actions left unpunished risk “a regression into a world preceding the United Nations, a world that gave us two brutal world wars, and an international system prone to severe structural instability and lawlessness.” Both the African Union, a continent-wide body comprising 54 recognized nations, and the 15-member Economic Community of West African States have categorically condemned Trump’s gunboat diplomacy as well. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni even had the temerity to issue a blunt dare to Washington: If American forces attempt the same trick in his country, he bragged, “we can defeat them” — a reversal of his 2018 bromance with the U.S. president, when he said he “loves Trump” because of his frankness. Africa’s forthrightness and unity over Maduro greatly contrasts with the more fractured response from Latin America, as well as the largely hedged responses coming from Europe, which is more focused on Trump’s coveting of Greenland.   Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni had the temerity to issue a blunt dare to Washington: If American forces attempt the same trick in his country, he bragged, “we can defeat them” | Badru Katumba/AFP via Getty Images Fearful of risking an open rift with Washington, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer waited 16 hours after Maduro and his wife were seized before gingerly stepping on a diplomatic tightrope, careful to avoid falling one way or the other. While highlighting his preference for observing international law, he said: “We shed no tears about the end of his regime.” Others similarly avoided incurring Trump’s anger, with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis flatly saying now isn’t the right time to discuss Trump’s muscular methods — a position shared by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. So, why haven’t African leaders danced to the same circumspect European tune? Partly because they have less to lose. Europe still harbors hope it can influence Trump, soften him and avoid an irreparable breach in the transatlantic alliance, especially when it comes to Greenland, suggested Tighisti Amare of Britain’s Chatham House. “With dramatic cuts in U.S. development funds to Africa already implemented by Trump, Washington’s leverage is not as strong as it once was. And the U.S. doesn’t really give much importance to Africa, unless it’s the [Democratic Republic of the Congo], where there are clear U.S. interests on critical minerals,” Amare told POLITICO. “In terms of trade volume, the EU remains the most important region for Africa, followed by China, and with the Gulf States increasingly becoming more important,” she added. Certainly, Trump hasn’t gone out of his way to make friends in Africa. Quite the reverse — he’s used the continent as a punching bag, delivering controversial remarks stretching back to his first term, when he described African nations as “shithole countries.” And there have since been rifts galore over travel bans, steep tariffs and the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is credited with saving millions of African lives over decades. U.S. President Donald Trump holds up a printed article from “American Thinker” while accusing South Africa President Cyril Ramaphosa of state-sanctioned violence against white farmers in South Africa. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images In May, Trump also lectured South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in the Oval Office over what he claimed amounted to genocide against white South Africans, at one point ordering the lights be dimmed to show clips of leaders from a South African minority party encouraging attacks on the country’s white population. Washington then boycotted the G20 summit hosted by South Africa in November, and disinvited the country from this year’s gathering, which will be hosted by the U.S. According to Amare, Africa’s denunciation of Maduro’s abduction doesn’t just display concern about Venezuela; in some part, it’s also fed by the memory of colonialism. “It’s not just about solidarity, but it’s also about safeguarding the rules that limit how powerful states can use force against more vulnerable states,” she said. African countries see Trump’s move against Maduro “as a genuine threat to international law and norms that protect the survival of the sovereignty of small states.” Indeed, African leaders might also be feeling their own collars tighten, and worrying about being in the firing line. “There’s an element of self-preservation kicking in here because some African leaders share similarities with the Maduro government,” said Oge Onubogu, director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “In some countries, people on the street and in even civil society have a different take, and actually see the removal of Maduro as a good thing.” The question is, will African leaders be wary of aligning with either Russian President Vladimir Putin or China’s Xi Jinping, now that Trump has exposed the impotence of friendship with either by deposing the Venezuelan strongman? According to Onubogu, even before Maduro’s ouster, African leaders understood the world order had changed dramatically, and that we’re back in the era of great power competition. “Individual leaders will make their own specific calculations based on what’s in their favor and their interests. I wouldn’t want to generalize and say some African countries might step back from engaging with China or Russia. They will play the game as they try to figure out how they can come out on top.”

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Former White House strategist Steve Bannon is clearly gleeful as we sit down to discuss the new U.S. National Security Strategy and the hostility it displays toward America’s supposed allies in Europe. With its brutal claim that Europe is headed for “civilizational erasure,” the document prompted gasps of horror from European capitals when it was released this month. But the MAGA firebrand — and current host of the influential “War Room” podcast — only has words of praise. “It is a shot across the bow of the EU, and even NATO,” he purred, seemingly astonished that the 33-page document ever saw the light of day in its published form without being muted by the more fainthearted Trump aides. Famously, Bannon had once claimed he wanted “to drive a stake through the Brussels vampire.” And now, he and other MAGA influencers get to sharpen their stake with the encouragement of U.S. government policy. Above all, it’s what Bannon describes as the commitment to “back resistance movements to the globalists” that thrills him most. “It was pleasantly shocking that it was so explicit,” he said of the document’s prioritization of support for so-called “patriotic European parties,” with the aim of halting the continent’s supposed slide into irreversible decline due to mass migration, falling birth rates and the dilution of national cultural identities. But while Bannon extols Trump’s foreign-policy priorities, former U.S. diplomats fret the administration may be signaling an intention to go beyond expressing its rhetorical support for MAGA’s ideological allies and browbeating their opponents. Could Washington be tempted to launch more clandestine activities? And if the continent’s current trajectory does, indeed, represent a threat to U.S. national security interests by weakening transatlantic allies — as the document claims — would that justify straying into the unsettling territory of covert action? In short, could we see a reprise of Cold War tactics of political subversion? A time that saw the CIA competing with the KGB, meddling in elections in Italy and Greece, secretly funding academic journals, magazines and think tanks across Western Europe, and disseminating black propaganda to shape public opinion and counter Soviet propaganda. “[The NSS] could just be seen as a guiding document for people who are trying, in an overt way, on behalf of the Trump administration, to exert influence over the direction of European politics,” said Jeff Rathke, head of the American-German Institute at Johns Hopkins University. But the former U.S. diplomat worries it could also entail more: “It remains unclear the degree to which other parts of the U.S. national security and foreign policy establishment might also see it as a nudge to do things that go beyond simple overt expressions of endorsement and support,” he said. “That, I think, is an interesting dimension that hasn’t really been explored in the media reporting so far.” According to Rathke, who previously served in the U.S. embassies in Dublin, Moscow and Riga, and was the deputy director of the State Department’s Office of European Security and Political Affairs, “different agencies of the U.S. government” are now probably trying to figure out how the NSS should shape their own activities. NSS documents are generally aspirational, explained former U.S. diplomat and CIA officer Ned Price. “They set out the broad parameters of what an administration hopes to achieve and act as a helpful guide. When you’re talking about something like covert action, the NSS isn’t in itself a green light to do something. That would take a presidential finding and a lot of back-and-forth between the president and the CIA director,” he told POLITICO. But while Price finds it unlikely the administration would resort to covert action, he doesn’t categorically rule it out either. “Maybe in extremes, it could go back to Cold War-era CIA activities,” he mused. “That said, there’s been a lot of rule-bending. There are a lot of norms being broken. I don’t want to be too precious and say this administration couldn’t do such a thing — but it would be highly risky.” Above all, it’s what Bannon describes as the commitment to “back resistance movements to the globalists” that thrills him most. | Shannon Finney/Getty Images for Semafor Bannon, for his part, pooh-poohs the idea that the administration would organize clandestine operations against European liberals and centrists. “Even if Trump ordered it, there would be zero chance his instructions would be executed — particularly by the intelligence agencies,” he scoffed. As far as he sees it, they’re all “deep state” enemies of MAGA. Plus, why would you need covert action when you have the MAGA movement and deep-pocketed tech billionaires like Elon Musk promoting far-right European figures and parties? However, Washington’s muscular efforts to bully the EU into curtailing its landmark Digital Services Act (DSA) with visa bans and threats of punitive tariffs could, for example, read as overt covert action. Trump aides like Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Sarah Rogers say they oppose the DSA, which aims to block harmful speech and disinformation, because it amounts to foreign influence over online speech, stifles the free speech of Americans, and imposes costs on U.S. tech companies. But European MAGA allies have lobbied Washington hard to help them push back against the legislation, which, they say, is largely aimed at silencing them. The Department of State declined a POLITICO interview request with Rogers, referring us to the White House. The NSS will now likely turbocharge these transatlantic activities, and we’ll no doubt see the administration give even more love and attention to their “ideological allies in Europe,” said Price. “Instead of hosting the German chancellor, maybe we’ll see the hosting of the AfD head in the Oval Office.” For Europe’s ultraconservatives and populists, the document serves as an invitation to double their efforts to gain MAGA blessings as they try to reforge their politics in Trump’s image, hoping that what’s worked for him in America will work for them in Europe. “I think, in the past it was a big mistake that conservative forces were just focused on their own countries,” explained Markus Frohnmaier, an Alternative for Germany (AfD) lawmaker who sits on the Bundestag’s foreign affairs committee. For Europe’s ultraconservatives and populists, the document serves as an invitation to double their efforts to gain MAGA blessings as they try to reforge their politics in Trump’s image, hoping that what’s worked for him in America will work for them in Europe. | Adam Gray/Getty Images Frohnmaier is among the AfD politicians flocking to the U.S. to meet with Trump officials and attend MAGA events. Earlier this month, he was the guest of honor at a gala hosted by New York’s Young Republicans Club, where he was awarded a prize in memory of founding CIA director Allen Dulles, who had overseen the agency’s massive operation to manipulate Italy’s 1948 election and ensure a Soviet-backed Popular Front didn’t win. “What we’re trying to do is something new, with conservatives starting to interact and network seriously to try to help each other with tactics and messaging and to spotlight the issues important for us,” he told POLITICO. Among the key issues for Frohnmaier is Germany’s firewall (brandmauer), which excludes the AfD from participating in coalition governments at the federal and state levels. He and other AfD politicians have discussed this with MAGA figures and Trump officials, urging them to spotlight it as “undemocratic” and help them smash it. But Bannon hopes it isn’t just the firewall that cracks — and he’s clearly relishing upcoming opportunities to amplify the radical populist message across Europe. “I think MAGA will be much more aggressive in Europe because President Trump has given a green light with the national security memo, which is very powerful,” he said. And he’s brimming with iconoclastic schemes to smash the bloc’s liberal hegemony and augment the Trump administration’s efforts. Interestingly, first up is Ireland. “I’m spending a ton of time behind the scenes on the Irish situation to help form an Irish national party,” Bannon told POLITICO. At first glance, Ireland wouldn’t seem the most promising territory for MAGA. Last year, none of the far-right candidates came anywhere near winning a seat in the Dáil, and this year, professional mixed martial arts fighter and MAGA favorite Conor McGregor had to drop out of Ireland’s presidential race, despite endorsements from both Trump and Musk. None of that’s deterring Bannon, though. “They’re going to have an Irish MAGA, and we’re going to have an Irish Trump. That’s all going to come together, no doubt. That country is right on the edge thanks to mass migration,” he said definitively. Of course, Britain, France and Germany figure prominently in future MAGA plans too: “MAGA thinks the European governments, by and large, are deadbeats. They love AfD. They love what National Rally is doing. They love Nigel Farage,” he said.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Russia’s war on Ukraine seems likely to end next year — and on terms highly unfavorable for Kyiv. Why the prediction? Because of the EU’s failure last week to agree to use Russia’s money — €210 billion in frozen assets — to keep Ukraine solvent and able to finance its war effort. The felling of the “reparations loan” proposal, which would have recycled Russian assets that are mostly frozen in a clearing bank in Belgium, deprives Ukraine of guaranteed funding for the next two years. It was Belgium’s legal anxieties over the loan, along with French President Emmanuel Macron’s and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s reluctance to join German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in championing the proposal, that doomed it. And all that, despite weeks of wrangling and overblown expectations by the plan’s advocates, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Fortunately, the EU will still provide a sizable funding package for Ukraine, after agreeing to jointly borrow  €90 billion from capital markets secured against the EU’s budget, and lend it on a no-interest basis. But while this will prevent the country from running out of money early next year, the package is meant to be spread out over two years, and that won’t be sufficient to keep Ukraine in the fight. According to projections by the International Monetary Fund, due to the reduction in U.S. financial support, Ukraine’s budgetary shortfall over the next two years will be closer to $160 billion. Simply put, Ukraine will need much more from Europe — and that’s going to be increasingly difficult for the bloc to come up with. Still, many European leaders were rather optimistic once the funding deal was struck last week. Finnish President Alexander Stubb noted on Sunday that the agreed package would still be linked to the immobilized Russian assets, as the scheme envisions that Kyiv will use them to repay the loan once the war ends. “The immobilized Russian assets will stay immobilized … and the union reserves its right to make use of the immobilized assets to repay this loan,” he posted on X. Plus, the thinking goes, a subsequent loan could be added on and indirectly linked to the Russian assets. And maybe so. But this could also be construed as counting one’s chickens before they’re hatched, as everything depends on what kind of deal is struck to end the war. In the meantime, securing another loan won’t be so simple once Ukraine’s coffers empty again. Three countries — Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic — already opted out of last week’s joint-borrowing scheme. It isn’t a stretch to imagine others will join them either, balking at the very notion of yet another multi-billion-euro package in 2027, which is an important election year for both France and Germany. Also, Trump will still be in the White House — so, no point in looking to Washington for the additional cash. Angelos Tzortzinis/AFP via Getty Images And yet, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever still described last week’s deal, reached after almost 17 hours of negotiations, as a “victory for Ukraine, a victory for financial stability … and a victory for the EU.” However, that’s not how Russian President Vladimir Putin will see it. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had noted while seeking to persuade European leaders to back the reparations loan: “If Putin knows, that we can stay resilient for at least a few more years, then his reason to drag out this war becomes much weaker.” But that’s not what happened. And after last Friday’s debacle highlighted the division among Europe’s leaders, surely that’s not the lesson Putin will be taking home. Rather, it will only have confirmed that time is on his side. That if he waits just a bit longer, the 28-point plan that his aides crafted with Trump’s obliging Special Envoy Steve Witkoff can be revived, leaving Ukraine and Europe to flounder — a dream outcome for the Kremlin. Putin can also read opinion polls, and see European voters’ growing impatience with the war in some of the continent’s biggest economies. For example, published last week, a POLITICO Poll of 10,000 found respondents in Germany and France even more reluctant to keep financing Ukraine than those in the U.S. In Germany, 45 percent said they would support cutting financial aid to Ukraine, while just 20 percent said they wanted to increase financial assistance. In France, 37 percent wanted to give less, while only 24 percent preferred giving more. In the run-up to last week’s European Council meeting, Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal had told POLITICO that European leaders were being handed an opportunity to rebut Trump’s claim that they’re weak. That by inking a deal to unlock hundreds of billions in frozen Russian assets, they would also be answering the U.S. president’s branding of Europe as a “decaying group of nations.” That, they failed to do.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Over the past few days, Ukraine has been hitting Russia back as hard as it can with long-range drone strikes, and it has three objectives in mind: lifting Ukrainian spirits as the country suffers blackouts from Russia’s relentless air attacks; demonstrating to Western allies that it has plenty of fight left; and, finally, cajoling Moscow into being serious about peace negotiations and offering concessions. However, the latter is likely to be a forlorn endeavor. And at any rate, amid the ongoing diplomatic chaos, which negotiations are they aiming for? U.S. President Donald Trump’s negotiators have been talking up the prospects of a peace deal — or at least being closer to one than at any time since Russia’s invasion began nearly four years ago. But few in either Kyiv or Europe’s other capitals are persuaded the Kremlin is negotiating in good faith and wants a peace deal that will stick. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz certainly doesn’t think so. Last week, he argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin is just spinning things out, “clearly playing for time.” Many Ukrainian politicians are also of a similar mind, including Yehor Cherniev, deputy chairman of the Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence of Ukraine’s Rada: “We see all the signals they’re preparing to continue the war, increasing arms production, intensifying their strikes on our energy infrastructure,” he told POLITICO.  “When it comes to the talks, I think the Russians are doing as much as they can to avoid irritating Donald Trump, so he won’t impose more sanctions on them,” he added. Indeed, according to fresh calculations by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs’ Janis Kluge, Russia has increased its military spending by another 30 percent year-on-year, reaching a record $149 billion in the first nine months of 2025. The war effort is now eating up about 44 percent of all Russian federal tax revenue — a record high. And as social programs are gutted to keep up, some Western optimists believe that Russia’s anemic growing economy and the staggering cost of war mean Putin soon won’t have any realistic option but to strike an agreement. But predictions of economic ruin forcing Putin’s hand have been made before. And arguably, Russia’s war economy abruptly unwinding may pose greater political and social risks to his regime than continuing his war of attrition, as Russian beneficiaries — including major business groups, security services and military combatants — would suffer a serious loss of income while seeking to adapt to a postwar economy. The war also has the added bonus of justifying domestic political repression. War isn’t only a means but an end in itself for Putin, and patriotism can be a helpful tool in undermining dissent. Nonetheless, the introduction of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner as a key negotiator is significant — he is “Trump’s closer” after all, and his full engagement suggests Washington does think it can clinch a deal with one last heave. Earlier this month, U.S. Special Envoy Gen. Keith Kellogg had indicated a deal was “really close,” with a final resolution hanging on just two key issues: the future of the Donbas and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The negotiations are in the “last 10 meters,” he said. But again, which negotiations? Those between Washington and Moscow? Or those between Washington and Kyiv and the leaders of Europe’s coalition of the willing? Either way, both have work to do if there is to be an end to the war. Putin has refused to negotiate with Kyiv and Europe directly, in effect dispatching Trump to wring out concessions from them. And no movement Trump’s negotiators secure seems to satisfy a Kremlin that’s adept at dangling the carrot — namely, a possible deal to burnish the U.S. president’s self-cherished reputation as a great dealmaker, getting him ever closer to that coveted Nobel Peace Prize. Of course, for Putin, it all has the added benefit of straining the Western alliance, exploiting the rifts between Washington and Europe and widening them. All the frenzied diplomacy underway now seems more about appeasing Trump and avoiding the blame for failed negotiations or for striking a deal that doesn’t stick — like the Minsk agreements. For example, longtime Putin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s New Eurasian Strategies Center believes the Russian president remains “convinced that Russia retains an advantage on the battlefield,” and therefore “sees no need to offer concessions.” “He prefers a combination of military action and diplomatic pressure — a tactic that, in the Kremlin’s view, the West is no longer able to resist. At the same time, any peace agreement that meets Russia’s conditions would set the stage for a renewed conflict. Ukraine’s ability to defend itself would be weakened as a result of the inevitable political crisis triggered by territorial concessions, and the transatlantic security system would be undermined. This would create an environment that is less predictable and more conducive to further Russian pressure,” they conclude. Indeed, the only deal that might satisfy Putin would be one that, in effect, represents Ukrainian capitulation — no NATO membership, a cap on the size of Ukraine’s postwar armed forces, the loss of all of the Donbas, recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and no binding security guarantees. But this isn’t a deal Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy can ink — or if he did, it would throw Ukraine into existential political turmoil. “I don’t see the Parliament ever passing anything like that,” opposition lawmaker Oleksandra Ustinova told POLITICO. And if it did, “it might lead to a civil war” with many patriots who have fought, seeing it as a great betrayal, she added. “Everybody understands, and everybody supports Zelenskyy in doing what he’s doing in these negotiations because we understand if he gives up, we’re done for.” Not that she thinks he will. So, don’t expect any breakthroughs in the so-called peace talks this week. Putin will maintain his maximalist demands while sorrowfully suggesting a deal could be struck if only Zelenskyy would be realistic, while the Ukrainian leader and his European backers will do their best to counter. And they will all be performing to try and stay in Trump’s good books.  

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “It must be a policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,” said former U.S. President Harry Truman during a speech to Congress in 1947. The Truman Doctrine, as this approach became known, saw the defense of democracy abroad as of vital interest to the U.S. — but that’s not a view shared by President Donald Trump and his acolytes. If anyone had any doubts about this — or harbored any lingering hopes that Vice President JD Vance was speaking out of turn when he launched a blistering attack on Europe at the Munich Security Conference earlier this this year — then Washington’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) should settle the matter. All U.S. presidents release such a strategy early in their terms to outline their foreign policy thinking and priorities, which in turn shapes how the Pentagon’s budget is allocated. And with all 33 pages of this NSS, the world’s despots have much to celebrate, while democrats have plenty to be anxious about — especially in Europe. Fleshing out what the Trump administration means by “America First,” the new security strategy represents an emphatic break with Truman and the post-1945 order shaped by successive U.S. presidents. It is all about gaining a mercantilist advantage, and its guiding principle is might is right. Moving forward, Trump’s foreign policy won’t be “grounded in traditional, political ideology” but guided by “what works for America.” And apparently what works for America is to go easy on autocrats, whether theocratic or secular, and to turn on traditional allies in a startling familial betrayal. Of course, the hostility this NSS displays toward Europe shouldn’t come as a surprise — Trump’s top aides have barely disguised their contempt for the EU, while the president has said he believes the bloc was formed to “screw” the U.S. But that doesn’t dull the sting. Over the weekend, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas sought to present a brave face despite the excoriating language the NSS reserves for European allies, telling international leaders at the Doha Forum: “We haven’t always seen eye-to-eye on different topics. But the overall principle is still there: We are the biggest allies, and we should stick together.” But other seasoned European hands recognize that this NSS marks a significant departure from what has come before. “The only part of the world where the new security strategy sees any threat to democracy seems to be Europe. Bizarre,” said former Swedish Prime Minister and European Council on Foreign Relations co-chair Carl Bildt. He’s right. As Bildt noted, the NSS includes no mention, let alone criticism, of the authoritarian behavior of the “axis of autocracy” — China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. It also rejects interventionist approaches to autocracies or cajoling them to adopt “democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories.” For example, the 2017 NSS framed China as a systemic global challenger in very hostile terms. “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region,” that document noted. But the latest version contains no such language amid clear signs that Trump wants to deescalate tensions; the new paramount objective is to secure a “mutually advantageous economic relationship.” All should be well as long as China stays away from the Western Hemisphere, which is the preserve of the U.S. — although it must also ditch any idea of invading Taiwan. “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority” the NSS reads. Likewise, much to Moscow’s evident satisfaction, the document doesn’t even cast Russia as an adversary — in stark contrast with the 2017 strategy, which described it as a chief geopolitical rival. No wonder Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov welcomed the NSS as a “positive step” and “largely consistent” with Russia’s vision. “Overall, these messages certainly contrast with the approaches of previous administrations,” he purred. While Beijing and Moscow appear delighted with the NSS, the document reserves its harshest language and sharpest barbs for America’s traditional allies in Europe. “The core problem of the European continent, according to the NSS, is a neglect of ‘Western’ values (understood as nationalist conservative values) and a ‘loss of national identities’ due to immigration and ‘cratering birthrates,’” noted Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The alleged result is economic stagnation, military weakness and civilizational erasure.” The new strategy also lambasts America’s European allies for their alleged “anti-democratic” practices,accusing them of censorship and suppressing political opposition in a dilation of Vance’s Munich criticism. Ominously, the NSS talks about cultivating resistance within European nations by endorsing “patriotic” parties — a threat that caused much consternation when Vance made it, but is now laid out as the administration’s official policy. Regime change for Europe but not for autocracies is cause for great alarm. So how will Europe react? Flatter Trump as “daddy,” like NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte did in June? Pretend the U.S. administration isn’t serious, and muddle through while overlooking slights? Take the punishment and button up as it did over higher tariffs? Or toughen up, and get serious about strategic autonomy? Europe has once again been put on the spot to make some fundamental choices — and quickly. But doing anything quickly isn’t Europe’s strong point. Admittedly, that’s no easy task for a bloc that makes decisions by consensus in a process designed to be agonizingly slow. Nor will it be an easy road at the national level, with all 27 countries facing critical economic challenges and profound political divisions that Washington has been seeking to roil. With the assistance of Trump’s ideological bedfellows like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, the impasse will only intensify in the coming months. Trump 2.0 is clearly a disorienting step change from the president’s first term — far more triumphalist, confident, uncompromisingly mercantilist; and determined to ignore guardrails; and more revolutionary in how it implements its “America First” agenda. The NSS just makes this clearer, and the howls of disapproval from critics will merely embolden an administration that sees protest as evidence it’s on the right track. Europe’s leaders have had plenty of warnings, but apart from eye-rolling, hand-wringing and wishful thinking they failed to agree on a plan. However, trying to ride things out isn’t going to work this time around — and efforts to foist a very unfavorable “peace” deal on Ukraine may finally the trigger the great unraveling of the Western alliance. The bloc’s options are stark, to be sure. Whether it kowtows or pushes back, it’s going to cost Europe one way or another.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. “These are the times that try men’s souls,” wrote pamphleteer Thomas Paine in the dark days of December 1776, as America’s war to free itself of the British seemed doomed. In a bid to lift flagging spirits, he continued: “Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.” That victory was sorely in doubt for much of the war, but the revolutionaries persevered, and with French assistance — which has often been downplayed since — they triumphed after eight years of brutish conflict. Ukraine’s struggle has been longer. In effect, the country has been fighting to be free of Russia since 2014, and right now, these times are, indeed, trying Ukrainian souls. As it stands, there is scant grounds for optimism that, for all its heroism, Ukraine can turn things around. The country is unlikely to emerge from its most perilous winter of the war in a stronger position, better able to withstand what’s being foisted upon it. In fact, it could be in a much weaker state — on the battlefield, the home front, and in terms of its internal politics. Indeed, as it tries to navigate its way through America’s divisive “peace plan,” this might be the best Ukraine can hope for — or at least some variation that doesn’t entail withdrawing from the territory in eastern Ukraine it has managed to retain. On the battlefield, Ukraine’s forces are currently hard pressed and numerically disadvantaged. Or, as lawmaker Mariana Bezuhla recently argued: “Ukrainian commanders simply can’t keep up” and are “being jerked around within a framework set by the enemy.” Meanwhile, on the home front, pummeling Russian drone attacks and airstrikes are degrading the country’s power system and wrecking its natural gas infrastructure, which keeps 60 percent of Ukrainians warm during the frigid winter months. The country is also running out of money. It’s hard to see a Europe mired in debt providing the $250 billion Kyiv will need in cash and arms to sustain the fight for another four years — and that’s on top of the $140 billion reparations loan that might be offered if Belgium lifts its veto on using Russia’s immobilized assets held in Brussels. If all that weren’t enough, Ukraine is being roiled by a massive corruption scandal that appears to implicate Ukrainian presidential insiders, sapping the confidence of allies and Ukrainians alike. It’s also providing those in the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and the MAGA movement with ammunition to argue that Washington should be done with Ukraine. And now, of course, Kyiv is having to cope with a contentious U.S. effort to end Russia’s war, which has been advanced in such a chaotic diplomatic process that it wouldn’t be out of place in an episode of “The West Wing.” At times, negotiations have descended into farce, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio forswearing the original peace plan one minute, saying it came from Russia and not a Trump administration proposal, only to swiftly backtrack. And earlier this week, a Reuters report suggested the 28-point plan was, in fact, modeled on a Russian proposal that Kremlin officials shared with their U.S. counterparts in mid-October. Meanwhile, on the home front, pummeling Russian drone attacks and airstrikes are degrading the country’s power system and wrecking its natural gas infrastructure. | Mykola Tys/EPA But for all the buffoonery — including reports that Special Envoy Steve Witkoff coached high-ranking Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov on how Russian President Vladimir Putin should speak to Trump — a tweaked 19-point version of the “peace plan” may well be the best Ukraine can realistically expect, even though it heavily favors Russia. As this column has argued before, a Ukrainian triumph was always unlikely — that is if by triumph one means the restoration of the country’s 1991 borders and NATO membership. This isn’t through any fault of Ukraine, the David in the fight against Goliath, but rather that of Kyiv’s Western allies, who were never clear-sighted or practical in their thinking, let alone ready to do what was necessary to defeat Russia’s revanchism and vanquish a Putin regime heedless of the death toll of even its own troops. Despite their high-blown rhetoric, at no stage in the conflict have Ukraine’s allies agreed on any clear war aims. Some pressed for a debate, among them former Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who was worried about a mismatch between Western magniloquence and what the U.S. and Europe were actually prepared to do and give. “We talk about victory, and we talk about standing with Ukraine to the very end — but let’s also talk about this,” he told POLITICO in a 2023 interview. But that debate never happened because of fears it would disunite allies. Nonetheless, Western leaders continued to characterize the war as a contest between good and evil, with huge stakes for democracy. They cast it as a struggle not only for territory but between liberal and autocratic values, and as one with global consequences. But in that case, why be restrained in what you supply? Why hold back on long-range munitions and tanks? Why delay supplying F-16s? And why prevent Ukraine from using Western-supplied long-range missiles to strike deeper into Russia? Or, as Ukraine’s former top commander Gen. Valery Zaluzhny fumed in the Washington Post: “To save my people, why do I have to ask someone for permission what to do on enemy territory?” For former Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba, for all its talk of standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes, the West never really grasped the war’s importance or consequences: “You cannot win a war where Russia clearly knows what its strategic goal is in every detail; [where] Ukraine knows what its strategic goal is in every detail; but [where] the West, without whom Ukraine cannot win, does not know what it is fighting for,” he told POLITICO last year. “This is the real tragedy of this war.” At times, negotiations have descended into farce, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio forswearing the original peace plan one minute, saying it came from Russia and not a Trump administration proposal, only to swiftly backtrack. | Martial Trezzini/EPA The currently discussed 19-point plan is, of course, an improvement on the original 28-point plan — nonetheless, it is an ugly and shameful one. But this is what happens if you run down your military forces and arms production for decades, fail to draw enforceable red lines and don’t ask hard questions before making grand promises. For Ukraine, such a poor deal that leaves it with weak security guarantees, without 20 percent of its territory and prohibits it from joining NATO, will have great domestic consequences and carry the high likelihood of civil strife. It isn’t hard to see how the army and its veterans might react. Many of them will see it as a stab in the back, an enraging betrayal that needs to be punished. It will also mean rewarding Putin’s thuggishness and no real accountability for the bestial nature of his army’s atrocious behavior or the unlawful, detestable deportations from occupied parts of Ukraine to Russia. And it will, no doubt, embolden the axis of autocrats. The American Revolution had lasting global consequences — so, too, will this war.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. As Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, then head of Ukraine’s state-owned national power company Ukrenergo, was scrambling to keep the lights on. Somehow, he succeeded and continued to do so every year, earning the respect of energy executives worldwide by ensuring the country was able to withstand Russian missile and drone strikes on its power grid and avoid catastrophic blackouts — until he was abruptly forced to resign in 2024, that is. Kudrytskyi’s dismissal was decried by many in the energy industry and also prompted alarm in Brussels. At the time, Kudrytskyi told POLITICO he was the victim of the relentless centralization of authority that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his powerful head of office Andriy Yermak often pursue. He said he feared “corrupt individuals” would end up taking over the state-owned company. According to his supporters, it is that kind of talk — and his refusal to remain silent — that explains why Kudrytskyi ended up in a glass-enclosed cubicle in a downtown Kyiv courtroom last week, where he was arraigned on embezzlement charges. Now, opposition lawmakers and civil society activists are up in arms, labeling this yet another example of Ukraine’s leadership using lawfare to intimidate opponents and silence critics by accusing them of corruption or of collaboration with Russia. Zelenskyy’s office declined to comment. Others who have received the same treatment include Zelenskyy’s predecessor in office, Petro Poroshenko, who was sanctioned and arraigned on corruption charges this year — a move that could prevent him from standing in a future election. Sanctions have frequently been threatened or used against opponents, effectively freezing assets and blocking the sanctioned person from conducting any financial transactions, including using credit cards or accessing bank accounts. Poroshenko has since accused Zelenskyy of creeping “authoritarianism,” and seeking to “remove any competitor from the political landscape.” That may also explain why Kudrytskyi has been arraigned, according to opposition lawmaker Mykola Knyazhitskiy, who believes the use of lawfare to discredit opponents is only going to get worse as the presidential office prepares for a possible election next year in the event there’s a ceasefire. They are using the courts “to clear the field of competitors” to shape a dishonest election, he fears. Others, including prominent Ukrainian activist and head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center Daria Kaleniuk, argue the president and his coterie are using the war to monopolize power to such a degree that it threatens the country’s democracy. Kaleniuk was in the courtroom for Kudrytskyi’s two-hour arraignment, and echoes the former energy boss’s claim that the prosecution is “political.” According to Kaleniuk, the case doesn’t make any legal sense, and she said it all sounded “even stranger” as the prosecutor detailed the charges against Kudrytskyi: “He failed to show that he had materially benefited in any way” from an infrastructure contract that, in the end, wasn’t completed, she explained. The case in question is related to a contract Kudrytskyi authorized seven years ago as Ukrenergo’s then-deputy director for investments. But the subcontractor didn’t even begin work on the assigned infrastructure improvements, and Ukrenergo was able to claw back an advance payment that was made. Kaleniuk’s disquiet is also echoed by opposition lawmaker Inna Sovsun, who told POLITICO, “there’s no evidence that [Kudrytskyi] enriched himself.” “There was no damage done. I can’t help but think that this is all politically motivated,” she said. Sovsun turned up to the arraignment to offer herself as a bail guarantor if needed — two other lawmakers offered to act as guarantors as well, but the judge instead decided on another procedure to set Kudrytskyi free from pre-trial detention by requiring the payment of bail bond of $325,000.   One senior Ukrainian adviser, who asked not to be identified so they could speak about the case, dismissed the defense’s description of the case against Kudrytskyi as being politically motivated and claiming there was no substance to the embezzlement allegations. “People should wait on this case until the full hearing,” he added. But for former Deputy Prime Minister Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, the case “doesn’t look good from any angle — either domestically or when it comes to international partners.” The timing, she said, is unhelpful for Ukraine, as it coincides with Kyiv’s ongoing appeal for more European energy assistance ahead of what’s likely to be the war’s most perilous winter. With Russia mounting missile and drone strikes on a far larger scale than before, Ukraine’s energy challenge is likely to be even more formidable. And unlike previous winters, Russia’s attacks have been targeting Ukraine’s drilling, storage and distribution facilities for natural gas in addition to its electrical power grid. Sixty percent of Ukrainians currently rely on natural gas to keep their homes warm. Some Ukrainian energy executives also fear Kudrytskyi’s prosecution may be part of a preemptive scapegoating tactic to shift blame in the event that the country’s energy system can no longer withstand Russian attacks. Citing unnamed sources, two weeks ago Ukrainian media outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported that former energy executives fear they are being lined up to be faulted for failing to do enough to boost the energy infrastructure’s resilience and harden facilities. “They need a scapegoat now,” a foreign policy expert who has counseled the Ukrainian government told POLITICO. “There are parts of Ukraine that probably won’t have any electricity until the spring. It’s already 10 degrees Celsius in Kyiv apartments now, and the city could well have extended blackouts. People are already pissed off about this, so the president’s office needs scapegoats,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the matter freely. “The opposition is going to accuse Zelenskyy of failing Ukraine, and argue he should have already had contingencies to prevent prolonged blackouts or a big freeze, they will argue,” he added. Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Battleground Ukraine” Adrian Karatnycky also worries about the direction of political travel. “While he’s an inspirational and brave wartime leader, there are, indeed, worrying elements to Zelenskyy’s rule,” he said.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. When U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled his 20-point Gaza peace plan, diplomats and commentators noted echoes of another deal former British Prime Minister Tony Blair had a hand in — the Good Friday Agreement. It was this landmark document, signed in 1998, that started the process that would end three decades of sectarian strife in Northern Ireland, known as the Troubles. The similarities between the two immediately struck academic David Mitchell, a Trinity College professor of reconciliation and peace studies. Several phrases appeared to be “lifted from the Good Friday Agreement — or at least inspired by it,” he told POLITICO, particularly those about a “process of demilitarization,” the “decommissioning” of weapons and “placing weapons permanently beyond use.” According to Mitchell, “the word ‘decommissioning’ wasn’t much in use until the Good Friday Agreement; people hadn’t really heard it before. I guess [it] was to try to take the sting out of disarmament, and maybe make it look less like a defeat for the paramilitaries.” No doubt this approach helped the Irish Republican Army’s pro-agreement camp eventually sell the landmark deal to the movement’s reluctant hard men. Nonetheless, it took nearly nine years to get Northern Ireland’s IRA to fully disarm and bring the conflict, which saw around 3,500 killed and 50,000 injured, to an end. So how long before Hamas disarms? The fact that the Good Friday Agreement — some of its core assumptions and the overall design of its confidence-building steps — served as a model for Gaza is hardly surprising. After all, Trump tapped Blair to help oversee postwar Gaza’s governance. The former prime minister also worked on the plan during the last six months of the previous U.S. administration, and subsequently with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff when it was revived by the current administration. And as it was in Northern Ireland, disarmament is shaping up to be the Gaza plan’s most likely stumbling stone, particularly as it moves from its fairly simple transactional first phase of hostage–prisoner swaps and the cessation of hostilities to its second phase, which will see Hamas and allied Palestinian militant groups in the enclave lay down their arms. Phase three — if we ever get there — envisions the reconstruction of civil governance and the rebuilding of Gaza, which will of course take years. But so too will disarmament — if what unfolded in Northern Ireland is a guide. On Tuesday, after Hamas was accused of launching an attack on Israeli forces in the Rafah area, an impatient Trump warned the group to disarm or face a “FAST, FURIOUS, & BRUTAL!” end. But so far, the only disarmament that has taken place involves a family-based clan in Khan Yunis handing over its weapons to Hamas, as the militant group began a campaign of violence against clan-based opponents and Gazans it claims collaborated with Israel during the war. The main lesson from the Northern Ireland peace process, which came close to unraveling several times over disarmament, is that even with the strongest will in the world, it’s going to take considerable time — something that will give the deal’s opponents, whether Israeli or Palestinian, plenty of opportunity to throw a spanner in the works. The Good Friday Agreement was among Blair’s finest moments, and one he proudly argues remains an example to the world: “You had leaders who were prepared even at personal political risk to face down the recalcitrant elements in their own parties and move forwards,” he said on the 25th anniversary of its signing. “That’s why it’s a lesson for peace processes everywhere.” And moving forward, Blair will no doubt remind us that patience will be vital — something U.S. Vice President JD Vance already hinted at during his remarks in Israel on Tuesday. While echoing Trump and warning that “if Hamas does not co-operate, it will be obliterated,” Vance also stressed it would take “a very, very long time” to implement the 20-point plan and declined to set a deadline or timetable for Hamas to disarm. Drawing further parallels, Mitchell observed that after the Good Friday Agreement was signed, “decommissioning was immediately the most important issue.” It “dominated the whole peace process until 2007 and took on massive symbolic importance. There was some devolution and power-sharing, but it kept collapsing because Unionists didn’t have confidence [in] the IRA’s seriousness about disarmament,” he said. Hamas claims it has redeployed its gunmen only to ensure the enclave doesn’t plunge into anarchy. | Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images “As a militant group, your weapons are absolutely essential to your identity, which I assume is the case with Hamas. So, you don’t want to give them up lightly,” he added. Indeed, not. Once the ceasefire took effect, Hamas wasted no time, openly reappearing in areas the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had just vacated and reasserting control over a chunk of the enclave. One Hamas officer told Qatar’s Al-Araby TV that redeployed gunmen would confiscate weapons from “fugitives” — a catch-all term for Palestinians opposing the group. And not long after, a video posted on Gaza-based social media networks showed an armed masked man shooting a Palestinian in the leg — a punishment often used by the militants against suspected collaborators. There have been more such shootings and executions since. Hamas claims it has redeployed its gunmen only to ensure the enclave doesn’t plunge into anarchy. But when it comes to eventual disarmament, it has only issued opaque statements, with a senior Hamas official telling Reuters earlier this week that he couldn’t commit to the group’s disarming. Asked if Hamas would lay down its arms, a member of the group’s politburo, Mohammed Nazzal, said: “I can’t answer with a yes or no. Frankly, it depends on the nature of the project. The disarmament project you’re talking about, what does it mean? To whom will the weapons be handed over?” He has a point: When it comes to the mechanics of decommissioning weapons, nothing is in place yet; there’s no one to receive them or monitor their destruction. Hamas is hardly going to hand over its arms to the IDF — much as the IRA didn’t hand theirs to the British army or the province’s police force, then known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary — as it would certainly get pushback from the hard men. Instead, Mitchell explained, it was two churchmen, a Methodist and a Catholic, who monitored the IRA destroying its weapons caches. “Basically, they were driven around the countryside inspecting the destruction of the weapons. It was all very secretive. Then they came back to the media and said: ‘We have seen the full and complete disarmament of the IRA.” Those arsenals were much smaller, though, and it’s difficult to imagine the likes of Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir or Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich agreeing to such a stealthy process, taking the word of a pair of independent monitors that weapons have been placed beyond use. They will want total evidence and will be keen to rub Hamas’ nose in defeat. The most obvious solution here is for Hamas to hand its weapons over to an international stabilization force, which Vance said is still in the early stages of planning. He did not, however, directly link the actual mechanics of Hamas’ disarmament with the deployment of a stabilization force. That begs the question of Hamas’ intentions — including whether there’s a single chain of command or if splits will emerge within the militant group. “Is Hamas going to give up the weapons? Are they going to give up power? Even in recent days, we’ve seen that militants in Gaza aren’t entirely a monolith. To what extent does Hamas have operational control over all these elements?” asked Ned Price, a former U.S. diplomat who had worked with Blair and former Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the peace plan during the previous administration. For Mitchell, there’s one huge difference between the Good Friday Agreement and the Gaza plan: The former had the carrot of a political settlement, whereas Trump’s plan has no clear path to a two-state solution. “Northern Ireland’s peace process was linked with political progress, whereas in this agreement, there’s no linkage,” he said. That might prove to be the fatal flaw.

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor and a foreign affairs columnist at POLITICO Europe. Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had hoped to capitalize on his warming relations with U.S. President Donald Trump to secure a supply of U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles — weapons Kyiv believes could be a game-changer and deliver a decisive blow to the Kremlin’s war economy. Fresh off successfully brokering a ceasefire in Gaza, surely Trump would have the appetite to give Ukraine what it needs to force Russian President Vladimir Putin into getting serious about negotiations. But that isn’t what happened. Zelenskyy’s meeting in the White House was perfectly cordial — Trump used that word himself to characterize their encounter. There was no frostiness, and no return to the nastiness of last February’s now infamous Oval Office brawl. Zelenskyy learned his lesson thoroughly on that score and now knows deference is obligatory when approaching “daddy” Trump. The meeting was, however, fluffed, mainly because Ukraine was in too much of a hurry. “It wasn’t a bad meeting, just a victim of poor timing and inflated expectations,” said one Republican foreign-policy insider who was granted anonymity to speak candidly. But it could have been much more productive if Zelenskyy had readjusted his thinking and rejigged his agenda after the lengthy phone call Trump had with Putin the day before. During that two-and-a-half hour call, Trump teased Putin with the prospects of supplying Ukraine with Tomahawks: “I did actually say, would you mind if I gave a couple of thousand Tomahawks to your opposition? I did say that,” the U.S. president told reporters. “He didn’t like the idea.” And the outcome was an agreement to meet at another summit — this time in Budapest — with Trump once again seemingly persuaded that Putin might be ready to end the war. The Ukrainian leader doesn’t believe “Putin is ready just to finish this war,” as he told NBC’s “Meet the Press” in an interview Sunday. Nonetheless, Putin’s call should have prompted Zelenskyy and his team to recalibrate, dial down their expectations and, above all, downgrade their push for Cruise missiles, said the insider. “There was no way Trump was going to agree to Tomahawk acquisitions ahead of his meeting with Putin in Budapest.” The Ukrainian leader doesn’t believe “Putin is ready just to finish this war,” as he told NBC’s “Meet the Press” | Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post via Getty Images But Ukraine ignored the counsel of its Republican friends in Washington — many of whom are skeptical Trump will agree to give Ukraine Tomahawks under any circumstances, for fear of escalation and drawing the U.S. deeper into the war. That’s not even considering the Pentagon’s worries about the U.S.’s own stockpiles, which Trump himself mentioned to reporters on Friday. By failing to drop the Tomahawk request, Ukraine squandered an opportunity to focus on a slew of other crucial items — foremost among them, air-to-air missiles for their F-16 and MiG warplanes and surface-to-air interceptor missiles for Patriot air-defense systems. Both are needed to shoot down drones and ballistic missiles, and Ukraine is desperately short of them because of the record airstrikes Russia is now mounting. The focus on Tomahawks also distracted from other key asks, such as getting Trump’s approval for the use of immobilized Russian sovereign assets to fund Ukraine’s defense. For his part, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is in favor of this proposal. The U.S. only holds $7 billion in Russian assets, but the EU’s big three in the G7 — Germany, France and Italy — want Japan and America actively involved, as they worry that tapping into the €140 billion in Russian assets held in Europe could undermine the euro’s global credibility. If Washington and Tokyo were to take similar action, their fears would be allayed. There was also only limited progress on discussions about Ukraine importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S., now that Russian airstrikes on Ukraine’s natural gas infrastructure have increased in both intensity and frequency. So far, Ukraine’s state oil and gas firm Naftogaz has bought around 0.5 billion cubic meters of U.S. LNG, but more will be needed if the country is to endure the winter. And earlier this month, Ukrainian Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk said Kyiv was aiming to increase its overall gas imports by 30 percent. Along these lines, the country’s Minister of Economy Oleksii Sobolev noted last week that Ukraine was “considering mechanisms to finance the purchase of American LNG and compressor equipment.” But according to an official from America’s export credit agency the Export-Import Bank, who asked to remain anonymous as they’re not authorized to speak with the media, these discussions are now bogged down because Ukraine is objecting to the rather restrictive loan terms being offered. And the bank has only limited legal maneuver to amend the terms. In fact, the huge delegation of Ukrainian ministers and officials — including Zelenskyy’s powerful Chief-of-Staff Andriy Yermak and Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko — sent to Washington ahead of Friday’s White House meeting struck out across the board, failing to finalize several major agreements involving both the U.S. government and the private sector.  “The idea was that there would be massive things readied, including some agreements with major U.S. defense companies and energy players, all to be inked during the White House meeting,” said the Republican insider. But in the end, nothing was oven-ready. “Unfortunately, nothing really concrete was agreed during the entire week,” another Republican foreign-policy adviser concurred. He also said the misguided focus on Tomahawks was only part of the problem — the other was the timing of Zelenskyy’s visit and the overall Ukrainian lobbying push in Washington. The focus on Tomahawks distracted from other key asks. | Smith Collection/Gado/Getty Images “We had urged them to delay,” he said. It was important that Svyrydenko and the economy officials were in Washington because of the annual IMF and World Bank meetings, but the rest of the lobbying effort should have been delayed for a week or so. And certainly, Zelenskyy’s offer of exchanging Ukrainian drone technology for Tomahawks was far too premature. For one, the Trump administration was still very much focused on the Middle East. Plus, with the government shutdown and the blame game over the budgetary battle between Democrats and Republicans, there wasn’t enough oxygen for Ukraine. In their defense, the adviser added, there’s rising alarm in Kyiv about how Ukraine will make it through this winter — likely the worst of the war so far. Zelenskyy hinted at this worry on Sunday, telling NBC that because Russia isn’t winning on the battlefield, it’s escalating airstrikes on infrastructure. “He’s using missiles and drones on our — he wants disaster — energy disaster during this winter by attacking us, each day [with] 500 Iranian drones and 20-30 missiles,” he said. And the Republican adviser agrees: “There’s a real danger is that Ukraine is headed for an energy catastrophe if the Russian strikes on the energy infrastructure persist.”