BRUSSELS — EU leaders are scrambling to come up with a deal on Greenland’s future that would allow Donald Trump to claim victory on the issue without destroying the alliance that underpins European security.  From proposals to using NATO to bolster Arctic security to giving the U.S. concessions on mineral extraction, the bloc’s leaders are leaning heavily toward conciliation over confrontation with Trump, three diplomats and an EU official told POLITICO. The race to come up with a plan follows the U.S. president’s renewed claims that his country “needs” the island territory — and won’t rule out getting it by force. “In the end, we have always come to a common conclusion” with Washington, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said after meeting U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, adding that their talks on the Arctic territory were “encouraging.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he hopes “a mutually acceptable solution” will be found within NATO. The foreign ministers of Greenland and Denmark will meet U.S. Vice President JD Vance alongside Rubio at the White House on Wednesday. They are hoping for “an honest conversation with the administration,” according to another EU diplomat familiar with plans for the meeting. THE ART OF THE DEAL Asked to describe a possible endgame on Greenland, the first EU diplomat said it could be a deal that would give Trump a victory he could sell domestically, such as forcing European countries to invest more in Arctic security as well as a promise that the U.S. could profit from Greenland’s mineral wealth. Trump is primarily looking for a win on Greenland, the diplomat said. “If you can smartly repackage Arctic security, blend in critical minerals, put a big bow on top, there’s a chance” of getting Trump to sign on. “Past experience” — for example when EU allies pledged to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense — showed “this is always how things have gone.” On defense, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte laid the groundwork for a deal when on Monday he said countries in the alliance were discussing ways of bolstering Arctic security. While the shape of the “next steps” touted by Rutte remain to be defined, a ramped-up investment by European NATO members is one possibility that could fit with Trump’s desire to see Europe shoulder greater responsibility for its security. On mineral extraction, details are blurrier. But a deal that guarantees the U.S. a share of profits from extraction of critical raw materials is one possibility, said the EU official. For now, capacity to extract critical raw materials from Greenland is limited. Denmark has spent years seeking investment for long-term projects, with little luck as countries have preferred obtaining minerals at a much cheaper rate on global markets. The EU is planning to more than double its investment in Greenland in its next-long term budget — including funds oriented toward critical raw materials projects. This could be a hook for Trump to accept a co-investment deal. Yet, if Trump’s real aim is the island’s minerals, Danes have been offering the U.S the chance to invest in Greenland for years — an offer refused by American officials, several diplomats said. If Trump’s push on Greenland is about China and Russia, he could easily ask Copenhagen to increase the presence of U.S troops on the island, they also say. A third EU diplomat questioned whether Trump’s real aim was to get into the history books. Trump’s Make America Great Again slogan “has become a geographical concept; he wants to go down in history as the man who has made America ‘greater’ — in geographical terms,” they said. PRESERVING NATO Above all, governments are trying to avoid a military clash, the three diplomats and EU official said. A direct intervention by the U.S. on Greenland — a territory belonging to a member of the EU and NATO — would effectively spell the end of the postwar security order, leaders have warned.  “It would be an unprecedented situation in the history of NATO and any defense alliance,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Tuesday, adding that Berlin is talking with Copenhagen about the options at Europe’s disposal if the U.S. launches a takeover. EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Danish Prime Minister Mette Fredriksen both said a military intervention would be the end of NATO. “Everything would stop,” Fredriksen said. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte laid the groundwork for a deal when on Monday he said countries in the alliance were discussing ways of bolstering Arctic security. | Paul Morigi/Getty Images “No provision [in the alliance’s 1949 founding treaty] envisions an attack on one NATO ally by another one,” said a NATO diplomat, who was granted anonymity to speak freely. It would mean “the end of the alliance,” they added. Trump said “it may be a choice” for the U.S. between pursuing his ambition to take control of Greenland and keeping the alliance intact. Preserving NATO remains the bloc’s top priority, the first EU diplomat said. While both privately and publicly officials have forcefully rejected the idea Europe might “give up” Greenland to the U.S., the comments underscore how desperate governments are to avoid a direct clash with Washington. “This is serious – and Europe is scared,” said a fourth EU diplomat involved in discussions in Brussels on how the bloc responds. A fifth described the moment as “seismic,” because it signaled that the U.S. was ready to rip up a hundred years of ironclad relations.  STILL REELING While European leaders are largely on the same page that a military conflict is unconscionable, how to reach a negotiated settlement is proving thornier. Until the U.S. military strike on Venezuela on Jan. 3, and Trump’s fresh claims the U.S. needs to “have” Greenland, the Europeans were very conspicuously not working on a plan to protect Greenland from Trump — because to do so might risk making the threat real. “It’s been something we’ve anticipated as a potential risk, but something that we can do very little about,” said Thomas Crosbie, a U.S. military expert at the Royal Danish Defense College, which provides training and education for the Danish defense force. “The idea has been that the more we focus on this, and the more we create preparations around resisting this, the more we make it likely to happen. So there’s been anxiety that [by planning for a U.S. invasion] we may accidentally encourage more interest in this, and, you know, kind of escalate,” Crosbie said. But the problem was that, having spent six years studiously avoiding making a plan to respond to Trump’s threats, Europe was left scrabbling for one. Europeans are now faced with figuring out what they have in their “toolbox” to respond to Washington, a former Danish MP aware of discussions said. “The normal rulebook doesn’t work anymore.” Officials consider it the biggest challenge to Europe since the Second World War and they’re not sure what to do.  “We know how we would react if Russia started to behave this way,” the fourth diplomat said. But with the U.S, “this is simply not something we are used to.” Victor Jack, Nette Nöstlinger, Chris Lunday, Zoya Sheftalovich and Seb Starcevic contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — On Greenland’s southern tip, surrounded by snowy peaks and deep fjords, lies Kvanefjeld — a mining project that shows the giant, barren island is more than just a coveted military base. Beneath the icy ground sits a major deposit of neodymium and praseodymium, rare earth elements used to make magnets that are essential to build wind turbines, electric vehicles and high-tech military equipment. If developed, Greenland, a semi-autonomous part of Denmark, would become the first European territory to produce these key strategic metals. Energy Transition Minerals, an Australia-based, China-backed mining company, is ready to break ground. But neither Copenhagen, Brussels nor the Greenlandic government have mobilized their state power to make the project happen. In 2009, Denmark handed Greenland’s inhabitants control of their natural resources; 12 years later the Greenlandic government blocked the mine because the rare earths are mixed with radioactive uranium. Since then the project has been in limbo, bogged down in legal disputes. “Kvanefjeld illustrates how political and regulatory uncertainty — combined with geopolitics and high capital requirements — makes even strategically important projects hard to move from potential to production,” Jeppe Kofod, Denmark’s former foreign minister and now a strategic adviser to Energy Transition Minerals, told POLITICO. Kvanefjeld’s woes are emblematic of Greenland’s broader problems. Despite having enough of some rare earth elements to supply as much as 25 percent of the world’s needs — not to mention oil and gas reserves nearly as great as those of the United States, and lots of other potential clean energy metals including copper, graphite and nickel — these resources are almost entirely undeveloped. Just two small mines, extracting gold and a niche mineral called feldspar used in glassmaking and ceramics, are up and running in Greenland. And until very recently, neither Denmark nor the European Union showed much interest in changing the situation. But that was before 2023, when the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with the Greenland government to cooperate on mining projects. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed the same year, is an attempt to catch up by building new mines both in and out of the bloc that singles out Greenland’s potential. Last month, the European Commission committed to contribute financing to Greenland’s Malmbjerg molybdenum mine in a bid to shore up a supply of the metal for the EU’s defense sector.  But with United States President Donald Trump threatening to take Greenland by force, and less likely to offer the island’s inhabitants veto power over mining projects, Europe may be too late to the party. “The EU has for many years had a limited strategic engagement in Greenland’s critical raw materials, meaning that Europe today risks having arrived late, just as the United States and China have intensified their interest,” Kofod said. In a world shaped by Trump’s increasingly belligerent foreign policy and China’s hyperactive development of clean technology and mineral supply chains, Europe’s neglect of Greenland’s natural wealth is looking increasingly like a strategic blunder. With Donald Trump threatening to take Greenland by force, and less likely to offer the island’s inhabitants veto power over mining projects, Europe may be too late to the party. | Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images A HOSTILE LAND That’s not to say building mines in Greenland, with its mile-deep permanent ice sheet, would be easy. “Of all the places in the world where you could extract critical raw materials, [Greenland] is very remote and not very easily accessible,” said Ditte Brasso Sørensen, senior analyst on EU climate and industrial policy at Think Tank Europa, pointing to the territory’s “very difficult environmental circumstances.”  The tiny population — fewer than 60,000 — and a lack of infrastructure also make it hard to build mines. “This is a logistical question,” said Eldur Olafsson, CEO of Amaroq, a gold mining company running one of the two operating mines in Greenland and also exploring rare earths and copper extraction opportunities. “How do you build mines? Obviously, with capital, equipment, but also people. [And] you need to build the whole infrastructure around those people because they cannot only be Greenlandic,” he said.  Greenland also has strict environmental policies — including a landmark 2021 uranium mining ban — which restrict resource extraction because of its impact on nature and the environment. The current government, voted in last year, has not shown any signs of changing its stance on the uranium ban, according to Per Kalvig, professor emeritus at the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, a Danish government research organization. Uranium is routinely found with rare earths, meaning the ban could frustrate Greenland’s huge potential as a rare earths producer. It’s a similar story with fossil fuels. Despite a 2007 U.S. assessment that the equivalent of over 30 billion barrels in oil and natural gas lies beneath the surface of Greenland and its territorial waters — almost equal to U.S. reserves — 30 years of oil exploration efforts by a group including Chevron, Italy’s ENI and Shell came to nothing. In 2021 the then-leftist government in Greenland banned further oil exploration on environmental grounds.  Danish geologist Flemming Christiansen, who was deputy director of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland until 2020, said the failure had nothing to do with Greenland’s actual potential as an oil producer. Instead, he said, a collapse in oil prices in 2014 along with the high cost of drilling in the Arctic made the venture unprofitable. Popular opposition only complicated matters, he said. THE CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECT From the skies above Greenland Christiansen sees firsthand the dramatic effects of climate change: stretches of clear water as rising temperatures thaw the ice sheets that for centuries have made exploring the territory a cold, costly and hazardous business. “If I fly over the waters in west Greenland I can see the changes,” he said. “There’s open water for much longer periods in west Greenland, in Baffin Bay and in east Greenland.” Climate change is opening up this frozen land. Climate change is opening up this frozen land. | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images Greenland contains the largest body of ice outside Antarctica, but that ice is melting at an alarming rate. One recent study suggests the ice sheet could cease to exist by the end of the century, raising sea levels by as much as seven meters. Losing a permanent ice cap that is several hundred meters deep, though, “gradually improves the business case of resource extraction, both for … fossil fuels and also critical raw materials,” said Jakob Dreyer, a researcher at the University of Copenhagen.   But exploiting Greenland’s resources doesn’t hinge on catastrophic levels of global warming. Even without advanced climate change, Kalvig, of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, argues Greenland’s coast doesn’t differ much from that of Norway, where oil has been found and numerous excavation projects operate.     “You can’t penetrate quite as far inland as you can [in Norway], but once access is established, many places are navigable year-round,” Kalvig said. “So, in that sense, it’s not more difficult to operate mines in Greenland than it is in many parts of Norway, Canada or elsewhere — or Russia for that matter. And this has been done before, in years when conditions allowed.”    A European Commission spokesperson said the EU was now working with Greenland’s government to develop its resources, adding that Greenland’s “democratically elected authorities have long favored partnerships with the EU to develop projects beneficial to both sides.” But the spokesperson stressed: “The fate of Greenland’s raw mineral resources is up to the Greenlandic people and their representatives.” The U.S. may be less magnanimous. Washington’s recent military operation in Venezuela showed that Trump is serious about building an empire on natural resources, and is prepared to use force and break international norms in pursuit of that goal. Greenland, with its vast oil and rare earths deposits, may fit neatly into his vision. Where the Greenlandic people fit in is less clear.

BRUSSELS — European governments have launched a two-pronged diplomatic offensive to convince Donald Trump to back away from his claims on Greenland: by lobbying in Washington and pressing NATO to allay the U.S. president’s security concerns. The latest moves mark an abrupt change in Europe’s response to Trump’s threats, which are fast escalating into a crisis and have sent officials in Brussels, Berlin and Paris scrambling to sketch out an urgent way forward. Until now they have attempted to play down the seriousness of Trump’s ideas, fearing it would only add credence to what they hoped was mere rhetoric, but officials involved in the discussions say that has now changed. As if to underscore the shift, French President Emmanuel Macron became the most powerful European leader so far to starkly set out the challenges facing the continent. “The United States is an established power that is gradually turning away from some of its allies and breaking free from the international rules that it used to promote,” Macron said in his annual foreign policy address in Paris on Thursday. Trump ratcheted up his rhetoric this week, telling reporters on Sunday night “we need Greenland from the standpoint of national security.” The president has repeatedly refused to rule out military intervention, something Denmark has said would spell the end of NATO ― an alliance of 32 countries, including the U.S., which has its largest military force. Greenland is not in the EU but is a semi-autonomous territory in the Kingdom of Denmark, which is an EU member. Most of the diplomacy remains behind closed doors. The Danish ambassador to the U.S., Jesper Møller Sørensen, and the Greenlandic representative in Washington, Jacob Isbosethsen, held intensive talks with lawmakers on Capitol Hill. The two envoys are attempting to persuade as many of them as possible that Greenland does not want to be bought by the U.S. and that Denmark has no interest in such a deal, an EU diplomat told POLITICO. In an unusual show of dissent, some Trump allies this week publicly objected to the president’s proposal to take Greenland by military force. Danish officials are expected to provide a formal briefing and update on the situation at a meeting of EU ambassadors on Friday, two EU diplomats said. RUSSIAN, CHINESE INFLUENCE At a closed-door meeting in Brussels on Thursday, NATO ambassadors agreed the organization should reinforce the Arctic region, according to three NATO diplomats, all of whom were granted anonymity to talk about the sensitive discussions. Trump claimed the Danish territory is exposed to Russian and Chinese influence, and cited an alleged swarm of threatening ships near Greenland as a reason behind Washington’s latest campaign to control the territory. Experts largely dispute those claims, with Moscow and Beijing mostly focusing their defense efforts — including joint patrols and military investment — in the eastern Arctic. But U.S. Vice President JD Vance told reporters Thursday that Trump wants Europe to take Greenland’s security “more seriously,” or else “the United States is going to have to do something about it.” Europeans see finding a compromise with Trump as the first and preferred option. A boosted NATO presence on the Arctic island might convince the U.S. president that there is no need to own Greenland for security reasons. The Danish ambassador to the US and the Greenlandic representative in Washington held intensive talks with lawmakers on Capitol Hill. | Kevin Carter/Getty Images The NATO envoys meeting Thursday floated leveraging intelligence capabilities to better monitor the territory, stepping up defense spending to the Arctic, shifting more military equipment to the region, and holding more military exercises in the vicinity.  The request for proposals just days after the White House’s latest broadside reflects how seriously Europe is taking the ultimatum and the existential risk any incursion into Greenland would have on the alliance and transatlantic ties. NATO’s civil servants are now expected to come up with options for envoys, the alliance diplomats said. Thursday’s meeting of 32 envoys veered away from direct confrontation, the three NATO diplomats said, with one calling the mood in the room “productive” and “constructive.” Denmark’s ambassador, who spoke first, said the dispute was a bilateral issue and instead focused on the recent successes of NATO’s Arctic strategy and the need for more work in the region, the diplomats said — a statement that received widespread support. The Greenland issue was also raised at a closed-door meeting of EU defense and foreign policy ambassadors on Thursday even though it wasn’t on the formal agenda, the two EU diplomats said. The bloc’s capitals expressed solidarity with Denmark, they added. Jacopo Barigazzi contributed reporting.

BRUSSELS — NATO countries asked the alliance to beef up its presence in the Arctic after the U.S. ramped up threats to seize Greenland, three NATO diplomats told POLITICO. At a closed-door meeting in Brussels on Thursday, the alliance’s ambassadors agreed the organization should reinforce its Arctic flank, according to the diplomats, all of whom were granted anonymity to talk about the sensitive discussions. U.S. President Donald Trump has claimed the Danish territory is exposed to Russian and Chinese influence. Envoys floated leveraging intelligence capabilities to better monitor the territory, stepping up defense spending to the Arctic, shifting more military equipment to the region, and holding more military exercises in the vicinity.  The flurry of ideas underscores a growing European concern around U.S. intentions on Greenland. This week, the White House ratcheted up its claims on Greenland, and repeatedly refused to rule out a military takeover.  Europe is scrambling to placate the latest Trump threats and avoid a military intervention that Denmark has said would mean the end of the alliance. A compromise with the U.S. president is seen as the first and preferred option. The request for proposals just days after the White House’s latest broadside reflects how seriously Europe is taking the ultimatum and the existential risk any incursion onto Greenland would be on the alliance and transatlantic ties. NATO’s civil servants are now expected to come up with options for envoys, the alliance diplomats said. Alongside its wealth of raw material and oil deposits, Trump has cited an alleged swarm of threatening Russian and Chinese ships near Greenland as a reason behind Washington’s latest campaign to control the territory.  Experts largely dispute those claims, with Moscow and Beijing mostly focusing their defense efforts — including joint patrols and military investment — in the eastern Arctic. Thursday’s meeting of 32 envoys veered away from direct confrontation, the three NATO diplomats said, with one calling the mood in the room “productive” and “constructive.” Denmark’s ambassador, who spoke first, said the dispute was a bilateral issue and instead focused on recent successes of NATO’s Arctic strategy and the need for more work in the region, the diplomats said — a statement that received widespread support. The Greenland issue was also raised at a closed-door meeting of EU defense and foreign policy ambassadors on Thursday, despite it not being on the formal agenda, two EU diplomats said. The bloc’s capitals then expressed their solidarity for Denmark, they added. Denmark is expected to provide a formal briefing and update at a meeting of EU envoys on Friday, the same diplomats said. Zoya Sheftalovich contributed to this report.

BRUSSELS — The EU has struck a political agreement to overhaul the bloc’s foreign direct investment screening rules, the Council of the EU announced on Thursday, in a move to prevent strategic technology and critical infrastructure from falling into the hands of hostile powers. The updated rules — the first major plank of European Commission President’s Ursula von der Leyen’s economic security strategy — would require all EU countries to systematically monitor investments and further harmonize the way those are screened within the bloc. The agreement comes just over a week after Brussels unveiled a new economic security package. Under the new rules, EU countries would be required to screen investments in dual-use items and military equipment; technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and semiconductors; raw materials; energy, transport and digital infrastructure; and election infrastructure, such as voting systems and databases. As previously reported by POLITICO, foreign entities investing into specific financial services must also be subject to screening by EU capitals. “We achieved a balanced and proportionate framework, focused on the most sensitive technologies and infrastructures, respectful of national prerogatives and efficient for authorities and businesses alike,” said Morten Bødskov, Denmark’s minister for industry, business and financial affairs. It took three round of political talks between the three institutions to seal the update, which was a key priority for the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU. One contentious question was which technologies and sectors should be subject to mandatory screening. Another was how capitals and the European Commission should coordinate — and who gets the final say — when a deal raises red flags. Despite a request from the European Parliament, the Commission will not get the authority to arbitrate disputes between EU countries on specific investment cases. Screening decisions will remain firmly in the purview of national governments. “We’re making progress. The result of our negotiations clearly strengthens the EU’s security while also making life easier for investors by harmonising the Member States’ screening mechanism,” said the lead lawmaker on the file, French S&D Raphaël Glucksmann. “Yet more remains to be done to ensure that investments bring real added value to the EU, so that our market does not become a playground for foreign companies exploiting our dependence on their technology. The Commission has committed to take an initiative; it must now act quickly,” he said in a statement to POLITICO. This story has been updated.

When the Franco-German summit concluded in Berlin, Europe’s leaders issued a declaration with a clear ambition: strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty in an open, collaborative way. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for “Europe’s Independence Moment” captures the urgency, but independence isn’t declared — it’s designed. The pandemic exposed this truth. When Covid-19 struck, Europe initially scrambled for vaccines and facemasks, hampered by fragmented responses and overreliance on a few external suppliers. That vulnerability must never be repeated. True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. > True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. Diversity doesn’t mean pulling every factory back to Europe or building walls around markets. Many industries depend on expertise and resources beyond our borders. The answer is optionality, never putting all our eggs in one basket. Europe must enable choice and work with trusted partners to build capabilities. This risk-based approach ensures we’re not hostage to single suppliers or overexposed to nations that don’t share our values. Look at the energy crisis after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas left economies vulnerable. The solution wasn’t isolation, it was diversification: boosting domestic production from alternative energy sources while sourcing from multiple markets. Optionality is power. It lets Europe pivot when shocks hit, whether in energy, technology, or raw materials. Resilience is the art of prediction. Every system inevitably has vulnerabilities. The key is pre-empting, planning, testing and knowing how to recover quickly. Just as banks undergo stress tests, Europe needs similar rigor across physical and digital infrastructure. That also means promoting interoperability between networks, redundant connectivity links (including space and subsea cables), stockpiling critical components, and contingency plans. Resilience isn’t theoretical. It’s operational readiness. Finally, Europe must exercise authority through robust frameworks, such as authorization schemes, local licensing and governance rooted in EU law. The question is how and where to apply this control. On sensitive data, for example, sovereignty means ensuring it’s held in Europe under European jurisdiction, without replacing every underlying technology component. Sovereign solutions shouldn’t shut out global players. Instead, they should guarantee that critical decisions and compliance remain under European authority. Autonomy is empowerment, limiting external interference or denial of service while keeping systems secure and accountable. But let’s be clear: Europe cannot replicate world-leading technologies, platforms or critical components overnight. While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. > While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen > significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. For example, building fully European alternatives in cloud and AI would take decades and billions of euros, and even then, we’d struggle to match Silicon Valley or Shenzhen. Worse, turning inward with protectionist policies would only weaken the foundations that we now seek to strengthen. “Old wines in new bottles” — import substitution, isolationism, picking winners — won’t deliver competitiveness or security. Contrast that with the much-debated US Inflation Reduction Act. Its incentives and subsidies were open to EU companies, provided they invest locally, develop local talent and build within the US market. It’s not about flags, it’s about pragmatism: attracting global investments, creating jobs and driving innovation-led growth. So what’s the practical path? Europe must embrace ‘sovereignty done right’, weaving diversity, resilience and autonomy into the fabric of its policies. That means risk-based safeguards, strategic partnerships and investment in European capabilities while staying open to global innovation. Trusted European operators can play a key role: managing encryption, access control and critical operations within EU jurisdiction, while enabling managed access to global technologies. To avoid ‘sovereignty washing’, eligibility should be based on rigorous, transparent assessments, not blanket bans. The Berlin summit’s new working group should start with a common EU-wide framework defining levels of data, operational and technological sovereignty. Providers claiming sovereign services can use this framework to transparently demonstrate which levels they meet. Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. Independence should be dynamic, not defensive — empowering innovation, securing prosperity and protecting freedoms. > Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right > will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. That’s how Europe can build resilience, competitiveness and true strategic autonomy in a vibrant global digital ecosystem.

High energy prices, risks on CBAM enforcement and promotion of lead markets, as well as increasing carbon costs are hampering domestic and export competitiveness with non-EU producers. The cement industry is fundamental to Europe’s construction value chain, which represents about 9 percent of the EU’s GDP. Its hard-to-abate production processes are also currently responsible for 4 percent of EU emissions, and it is investing heavily in measures aimed at achieving full climate neutrality by 2050, in line with the European Green Deal. Marcel Cobuz, CEO, TITAN Group  “We should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry in EU stays competitive domestically and its export market shares are maintained.” However, the industry’s efforts to comply with EU environmental regulations, along with other factors, make it less competitive than more carbon-intensive producers from outside Europe. Industry body Cement Europe recently stated that, “without a competitive business model, the very viability of the cement industry and its prospects for industrial decarbonization are at risk.” Marcel Cobuz, member of the Board of the Global Cement and Concrete Association and CEO of TITAN Group, one of Europe’s leading producers, spoke with POLITICO Studio about the vital need for a clear policy partnership with Brussels to establish a predictable regulatory and financing framework to match the industry’s decarbonization ambitions and investment efforts to stay competitive in the long-term. POLITICO Studio: Why is the cement industry important to the EU economy?  Marcel Cobuz: Just look around and you will see how important it is. Cement helped to build the homes that we live in and the hospitals that care for us. It’s critical for our transport and energy infrastructure, for defense and increasingly for the physical assets supporting the digital economy. There are more than 200 cement plants across Europe, supporting nearby communities with high-quality jobs. The cement industry is also key to the wider construction industry, which employs 14.5 million people across the EU. At the same time, cement manufacturers from nine countries compete in the international export markets. PS: What differentiates Titan within the industry?  MC: We have very strong European roots, with a presence in 10 European countries. Sustainability is very much part of our DNA, so decarbonizing profitably is a key objective for us. We’ve reduced our CO2 footprint by nearly 25 percent since 1990, and we recently announced that we are targeting a similar reduction by 2030 compared to 2020. We are picking up pace in reducing emissions both by using conventional methods, like the use of alternative sources of low-carbon energy and raw materials, and advanced technologies. TITAN/photo© Nikos Daniilidis We have a large plant in Europe where we are exploring building one of the largest carbon capture projects on the continent, with support from the Innovation Fund, capturing close to two million tons of CO2 and producing close to three million tons of zero-carbon cement for the benefit of all European markets. On top of that, we have a corporate venture capital fund, which partners with startups from Europe to produce the materials of tomorrow with  very low or zero carbon. That will help not only TITAN but the whole industry to accelerate its way towards the use of new high-performance materials with a smaller carbon footprint. PS: What are the main challenges for the EU cement industry today?  MC: Several factors are making us less competitive than companies from outside the EU. Firstly, Europe is an expensive place when it comes to energy prices. Since 2021, prices have risen by close to 65 percent, and this has a huge impact on cement producers, 60 percent of whose costs are energy-related. And this level of costs is two to three times higher than those of our neighbors. We also face regulatory complexity compared to our outside competitors, and the cost of compliance is high. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) cost for the cement sector is estimated at €97 billion to €162 billion between 2023 and 2034. Then there is the need for low-carbon products to be promoted ― uptake is still at a very low level, which leads to an investment risk around new decarbonization technologies. > We should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry in the EU > stays competitive domestically and its export market shares are maintained.” All in all, the playing field is far from level. Imports of cement into the EU have increased by 500 percent since 2016. Exports have halved ― a loss of value of one billion euros. The industry is reducing its cost to manufacture and to replace fossil fuels, using the waste of other industries, digitalizing its operations, and premiumizing its offers. But this is not always enough. Friendly policies and the predictability of a regulatory framework should accompany the effort. PS: In January 2026, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will be fully implemented, aimed at ensuring that importers pay the same carbon price as domestic producers. Will this not help to level the playing field? MC: This move is crucial, and it can help in dealing with the increasing carbon cost. However, I believe we already see a couple of challenges regarding the CBAM. One is around self-declaration: importers declare the carbon footprint of their materials, so how do we avoid errors or misrepresentations? In time there should be audits of the importers’ industrial installations and co-operation with the authorities at source to ensure the data flow is accurate and constant. It really needs to be watertight, and the authorities need to be fully mobilized to make sure the real cost of carbon is charged to the importers. Also, and very importantly, we need to ensure that CBAM does not apply to exports from the EU to third countries, as carbon costs are increasingly a major factor making us uncompetitive outside the EU, in markets where we were present for more than 20 years. > CBAM really needs to be watertight, and the authorities need to be fully > mobilized to make sure the real cost of carbon is charged to the importers.” PS: In what ways can the EU support the European cement industry and help it to be more competitive? MC: By simplifying legislation and making it more predictable so we can plan our investments for the long term. More specifically, I’m talking about the revamping of the ETS, which in its current form implies a phase-down of CO2 rights over the next decade. First, we should take a longer view and ensure that the cement industry stays competitive and its export market shares are maintained, so a policy of more for longer should accompany the new ETS. > In export markets, the policy needs to ensure a level playing field for > European suppliers competing in international destination markets, through a > system of free allowances or CBAM certificates, which will enable exports to > continue.” We should look at it as a way of funding decarbonization. We could front-load part of ETS revenues in a fund that would support the development of technologies such as low-carbon materials development and CCS. The roll-out of Infrastructure for carbon capture projects such as transport or storage should also be accelerated, and the uptake of low-carbon products should be incentivized. More specifically on export markets, the policy needs to ensure a level playing field for European suppliers competing in international destination markets, through a system of free allowances or CBAM certificates, which will enable exports to continue. PS: Are you optimistic about the future of your industry in Europe?  MC: I think with the current system of phasing out CO2 rights, and if the CBAM is not watertight, and if energy prices remain several times higher than in neighboring countries, and if investment costs, particularly for innovating new technologies, are not going to be financed through ETS revenues, then there is an existential risk for at least part of the industry. Having said that, I’m optimistic that, working together with the European Commission we can identify the right policy making solutions to ensure our viability as a strategic industry for Europe. And if we are successful, it will benefit everyone in Europe, not least by guaranteeing more high-quality jobs and affordable and more energy-efficient materials for housing ― and a more sustainable and durable infrastructure in the decades ahead. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Titan Group * The advertisement is linked to policy advocacy around industrial competitiveness, carbon pricing, and decarbonization in the EU cement and construction sectors, including the EU’s CBAM legislation, the Green Deal, and the proposed revision of the ETS. More information here.

Disclaimer: POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Polish Electricity Association (PKEE) * The advertisement is linked to policy advocacy on energy transition, electricity market design, and industrial competitiveness in the EU. More information here The European Union is entering a decisive decade for its energy transformation. With the international race for clean technologies accelerating, geopolitical tensions reshaping markets and competition from other major global economies intensifying, how the EU approaches the transition will determine its economic future. If managed strategically, the EU can drive competitiveness, growth and resilience. If mismanaged, Europe risks losing its industrial base, jobs and global influence.  > If managed strategically, the EU can drive competitiveness, growth and > resilience. If mismanaged, Europe risks losing its industrial base, jobs and > global influence. This message resonated strongly during PKEE Energy Day 2025, held in Brussels on October 14, which brought together more than 350 European policymakers, industry leaders and experts under the theme “Secure, competitive and clean: is Europe delivering on its energy promise?”. One conclusion was clear: the energy transition must serve the economy, not the other way around.  Laurent Louis Photography for PKEE The power sector: the backbone of Europe’s industrial future  The future of European competitiveness will be shaped by its power sector. Without a successful transformation of electricity generation and distribution, other sectors — from steel and chemicals to mobility and digital — will fail to decarbonize. This point was emphasized by Konrad Wojnarowski, Poland’s deputy minister of energy, who described electricity as “vital to development and competitiveness.”  “Transforming Poland’s energy sector is a major technological and financial challenge — but we are on the right track,” he said. “Success depends on maintaining the right pace of change and providing strong support for innovation.” Wojnarowski also underlined that only close cooperation between governments, industry and academia can create the conditions for a secure, competitive and sustainable energy future.  Flexibility: the strategic enabler  The shift to a renewables-based system requires more than capacity additions — it demands a fundamental redesign of how electricity is produced, managed and consumed. Dariusz Marzec, president of the Polish Electricity Association (PKEE) and CEO of PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna, called flexibility “the Holy Grail of the power sector.”  Speaking at the event, Marzec also stated “It’s not about generating electricity continuously, regardless of demand. It’s about generating it when it’s needed and making the price attractive. Our mission, as part of the European economy, is to strengthen competitiveness and ensure energy security for all consumers – not just to pursue climate goals for their own sake. Without a responsible approach to the transition, many industries could relocate outside Europe.”  The message is clear: the clean energy shift must balance environmental ambition with economic reality. Europe cannot afford to treat decarbonization as an isolated goal — it must integrate it into a broader industrial strategy.  > The message is clear: the clean energy shift must balance environmental > ambition with economic reality. The next decade will define success  While Europe’s climate neutrality target for 2050 remains a cornerstone of EU policy, the next five to ten years will determine whether the continent remains globally competitive. Grzegorz Lot, CEO of TAURON Polska Energia and vice-president of PKEE, warned that technology is advancing too quickly for policymakers to rely solely on long-term milestones.  “Technology is evolving too fast to think of the transition only in terms of 2050. Our strategy is to act now — over the next year, five years, or decade,” Lot said. He pointed to the expected sharp decline in coal consumption over the next three years and called for immediate investment in proven technologies, particularly onshore wind.  Lot also raised concerns about structural barriers. “Today, around 30 percent of the price of electricity is made up of taxes. If we want affordable energy and a competitive economy, this must change,” he argued.  Consumers and regulation: the overlooked pillars  A successful energy transition cannot rely solely on investment and infrastructure. It also depends on regulatory stability and consumer participation. “Maintaining competitiveness requires not only investment in green technologies but also a stable regulatory environment and active consumer engagement,” Lot said.  He highlighted the potential of dynamic tariffs, which incentivize demand-side flexibility. “Customers who adjust their consumption to market conditions can pay below the regulated price level. If we want cheap energy, we must learn to follow nature — consuming and storing electricity when the sun shines or the wind blows.”  Strategic investments for resilience  The energy transition is more than a climate necessity. It is a strategic requirement for Europe’s security and economic autonomy. Marek Lelątko, vice-president of Enea, stressed that customer- and market-oriented investment is essential. “We are investing in renewables, modern gas-fired units and energy storage because they allow us to ensure supply stability, affordable prices and greater energy security,” he said.  Grzegorz Kinelski, CEO of Enea and vice-president of PKEE, added: “We must stay on the fast track we are already on. Investments in renewables, storage and CCGT [combined cycle gas turbine] units will not only enhance energy security but also support economic growth and help keep energy prices affordable for Polish consumers.”  The power sector must now be recognized as a strategic enabler of Europe’s industrial future — on par with semiconductors, critical raw materials and defense. As Dariusz Marzec puts it: “The energy transition is not a choice — it is a necessity. But its success will determine more than whether we meet climate targets. It will decide whether Europe remains competitive, prosperous and economically independent in a rapidly changing world.”  > The power sector must now be recognized as a strategic enabler of Europe’s > industrial future — on par with semiconductors, critical raw materials and > defense. Measurable progress, but more is needed  Progress is visible. The power sector accounts for around 30 percent of EU emissions but has already delivered 75 percent of all Emissions Trading System reductions. By 2025, 72 percent of Europe’s electricity will come from low-carbon sources, while fossil fuels will fall to a historic low of 28 percent. And in Poland, in June, renewable energy generation overtook coal for the first time in history.  Still, ambition alone is not enough. In his closing remarks, Marcin Laskowski, vice-president of PKEE and executive vice-president for regulatory affairs at PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna, stressed the link between the power sector and Europe’s broader economic transformation. “The EU’s economic transformation will only succeed if the energy transition succeeds — safely, sustainably and with attractive investment conditions,” he said. “It is the power sector that must deliver solutions to decarbonize industries such as steel, chemicals and food production.”  A collective European project  The event in Brussels — with the participation of many high-level speakers, including Mechthild Wörsdörfer, deputy director general of DG ENER; Tsvetelina Penkova, member of the European Parliament and vice-chair of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy; Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, member of the European Parliament; Catherine MacGregor; CEO of ENGIE and vice-president of Eurelectric; and Claude Turmes, former minister of energy of Luxembourg — highlighted a common understanding: the energy transition is not an isolated environmental policy, it is a strategic industrial project. Its success will depend on coordinated action across EU institutions, national governments and industry, as well as predictable regulation and financing.  Europe’s ability to remain competitive, resilient and prosperous will hinge on whether its power sector is treated not as a cost to be managed, but as a foundation to be strengthened. The next decade is a window of opportunity — and the choices made today will shape Europe’s economic landscape for decades to come. 

An emerging U.S.-China detente gives European leaders breathing room to find a strategy on trade, raw materials and the war in Ukraine — but the thaw between the two great powers risks pushing European interests to the side.   President Donald Trump and his counterpart Xi Jinping agreed to a significant de-escalation in their trade spat during a head-to-head Thursday in South Korea, pausing export controls on rare earth magnets and other critical raw materials for 12 months.   While the move is good news for European companies that have been caught in the crossfire, other sticking points in the Europe-China relationship will be harder to resolve, even with the gift of time.  Brussels, under pressure from Trump and in pursuit of its own strategic interests, is trying — without notable success — to sway Beijing from supporting Russia in its war on Ukraine.   At the same time the EU is doing its best to keep the temperature down in its longstanding trade standoff with China, whose intensity has ratcheted up recently with the imposition of limits on exports of critical raw materials and microchips. Both measures have had an immediate negative impact on European industry, particularly automakers which were already struggling prior to the restrictions.  Fears of lasting, irreversible damage to Europe’s industries have led the EU to take a more conciliatory stance in its trade standoff, emphasizing engagement and dialogue rather than punitive measures.  Yet Chinese officials have balked at the slow and uncoordinated pace of discussions with the EU, leading Beijing to drop Europe down its list of priorities, according to Jeremy Chan, a senior analyst at Eurasia Group.  “The EU is a secondary at best, maybe a tertiary or a non-consideration for both Washington and Beijing in these negotiations,” Chan told POLITICO.  ‘LET THEM FIGHT’ The top political priority for the EU is ending the war in Ukraine — something that Trump while on the campaign trail promised to do within his first 24 hours in office. Almost a year into his term, the fighting continues, aided by China propping up Russia’s economy through investments and oil purchases.  At the urging of the White House, the EU included Chinese banks and refineries in its two latest rounds of sanctions targeting Russia, arguing the entities were helping Moscow evade sanctions. This prompted an angry response from top Chinese officials including Prime Minister Li Qiang, who branded the sanctions “unacceptable” during a meeting with European Council President Antonio Costa in Asia this week, per an EU official.  European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the bloc’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, have both called out Beijing’s support for Moscow in explicit terms, with the former saying in July that it has a “direct and dangerous impact on European security.”  The EU’s latest sanctions prompted an angry response from top Chinese officials including Prime Minister Li Qiang, who branded them “unacceptable” at a meeting with European Council President Antonio Costa, per an EU official. | Pool photo by Vincent Thian via AFP/Getty Images Ukraine had hoped Trump would pressure Beijing to stop buying Russian oil, but the American president told media on Air Force One that the issue was not on the table — although he did say the war in Ukraine “came up very strongly,” with both sides hoping to find an end to the fighting.   “He’s going to help us and we’re going to work together on Ukraine,” Trump said, referring to the Chinese president. INDUSTRIES HELD HOSTAGE While China’s export controls were not directed at the EU, the bloc’s companies faced long delays and sharp price hikes in contending with the subsequent shortage of raw materials and magnets. China accounts for 98 percent of the EU’s rare earth permanent magnets.  The geopolitical firestorm sent the European Commission into overdrive to secure its own supplies of the magnets and launch a plan to diversify Europe’s supply chain by the end of the year.   But the EU has been here before. Just two years ago it passed the Critical Raw Materials Act to solve this exact problem, and yet all the deals that have been signed have failed to deliver actual products. Its latest scheme is big on ideas and short on specifics.   The one-year pause on export controls agreed between Trump and Xi affords the EU some time to put that plan into action and leverage its other alliances — including efforts unfolding at the G7 this week with Canada, along with the U.K., Italy, France and Germany seeking to diversify away from China’s grip.  But for companies looking for clarity, the catch is that none of the agreements made between Trump and Xi are binding.  “As long as we don’t see any details hammered out and put on paper it leaves a lot of room for both sides backtracking and applying various other conditions, so I don’t think that this is really settled,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.  SECURITY CONCERNS  In the U.K., pressure is expected to build for policymakers to use the temporary U.S. truce to minimize the risks from China.  British PM Keir Starmer has thus far failed to resolve longstanding tensions between “securocrats” in parliament and Whitehall, who want to see a tougher stance toward Beijing, and those who argue for a closer embrace in order to boost inward investment. Prominent members of the government have traveled to Beijing in pursuit of strengthened ties since Starmer took office, despite his overriding foreign policy aim of cleaving close to Trump.  China has become a particular sore point for Starmer in recent weeks due to the collapse of the prosecution of two men accused of spying for Beijing, while ministers have yet to decide the fate of a planned Chinese “super-embassy” in London.  Back in the EU, divisions among member countries over how to counter China’s power — and any subsequent retribution — make a unified stance toward Beijing on trade or dumping measures unlikely.   Brussels got a glimpse of its internal factions when it slapped duties on made-in-China electric vehicles following an anti-subsidy investigation. Automakers and their political benefactors fear Chinese brands will dump their overcapacity in the European market, bringing a severe price war to Europe’s shores.   Yet for all the handwringing over how to protect domestic automakers, the votes of EU capitals on the duties revealed how economically exposed each is to China, with Germany launching a last-minute appeal to stop the duties.  The Netherlands is the latest EU member on the outs with China after Dutch authorities seized control of chipmaker Nexperia, prompting Beijing to hit back with export controls on Nexperia’s Chinese-produced chips. The shortage could halt production lines across Europe in less than a week, showcasing just how economically dependent Europe has become on China.  LET’S BE FRIENDS From the jump, Trump framed his sojourn to Asia as a “G2” summit, stoking fears that any deal would sideline other countries or that “British and European trade priorities could be overlooked or traded away without consultation,” said David Taylor, director of policy and programs at Asia House.  Sensing its declining influence in the Trump-Xi bromance, the EU is looking to bolster its trade ties elsewhere.  Trade chief Maroš Šefčovič is traveling to Australia in late November to chair an inaugural dialogue between the EU and the 12 members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership bloc, two diplomats told POLITICO. The dialogue is meant to deepen economic and political ties between the EU and countries keen to maintain established global trade rules.  Brussels, under pressure from Donald Trump and in pursuit of its own strategic interests, is trying to sway Beijing from supporting Russia in its war on Ukraine. | Jim Watson/Getty Images Brussels will have a chance to do just that when it hosts a delegation of high-level Chinese officials on Friday. They’re expected to meet with the Commission’s trade deputy-director general, Denis Redonnet, and other senior officials.  Experts caution that Europe will need to maintain pressure on Beijing to get any movement on its priorities.   “Europe cannot just simply be waiting to see what happens on talks between [the] United States and China,” said Ignacio Garcia Bercero, a former director at the Commission’s trade department. “It needs to develop its own channel of dialogue with China.” 

BRUSSELS — In the midst of a geopolitical storm, Brussels is racing to put together a new plan by the end of this year to diversify European supply of so-called critical raw materials — such as lithium and copper — away from China.  The thing is: We’ve been here before. So far, the European Commission has provided few details on its new plan, beyond that it would touch upon joint purchasing, stockpiling, recycling of resources and new partnerships. It already addressed those measures two years ago in its first initiative on the issue, the Critical Raw Materials Act.  Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen has been forced to act by Beijing’s expansion and tightening of export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals this month, as trade tensions with Washington escalated. Europe was caught in the crossfire — China accounts for 99 percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, and 98 percent of its rare earth permanent magnets. The new “RESourceEU” plan is expected to follow a similar model to the REPowerEU plan, under which the Commission in 2022 proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.  That has European industry daring to hope that Brussels will do more than just recycle an old initiative and address the main obstacles to diversifying the bloc’s supply chains of minerals it needs for everything from renewable energy to defense applications. The biggest of them all? A lack of cash to back new mining, processing and manufacturing initiatives, both within and outside the EU. “It’s all still very much in its infancy,” said Florian Anderhuber, deputy director general of lobby group Euromines. “We hope that there will be a bigger push that goes beyond the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act,” he added. “It doesn’t help anyone if this is just a label for things that are already in the pipeline.” CODEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP The EU should not count on any trade reprieve that may result from U.S. President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Thursday. After all, Beijing has shown time and again that it has no reservations about weaponizing economic dependencies. The key question is whether, this time around, pressure will remain high enough for the EU to mobilize brainpower and assets at the kind of scale it did when it sought to break the bloc’s decades-old reliance on Russian oil and gas. “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. “We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials. So it is time to speed up and take the action that is needed.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. | Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images In the here and now, the EU wants to persuade a visiting Chinese delegation at talks in Brussels on Friday to speed up export approvals for its top raw materials importers. In parallel, energy and environment ministers from the G7 group of industrialized nations are slated to wargame how to de-risk their mineral supply chains in Toronto, Canada, on Thursday and Friday. MONEY, MONEY, MONEY When the Commission unveiled its first grand plan to break over-reliance on China in 2023 — the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) — industry leaders and analysts mostly lamented one thing: a lack of funding on the table.  “Money has been a real bottleneck for Europe’s raw materials agenda,” said Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Mining, processing, recycling, and stockpiling all need serious financing.” If the EU fails to free up more resources, experts warn that it is bound to fall short of the goal set in the CRMA, of extracting at least 10 percent of its annual consumption of select minerals by the end of the decade, with no more than 65 percent of some raw materials coming from a single country. It’s a steep target — especially for rare earths, where Beijing has over decades built up a de facto monopoly. While the EU executive has selected strategic projects both within and outside the EU that should benefit from faster permitting than their usual lead times of 10 to 15 years to production, those efforts are yet to bear fruit. “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report, calling for a “permanent European Minerals Investment Network.”  “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report. | Aris Oikonomou/AFP via Getty Images The REPowerEU plan — a package of documents, including legal acts, recommendations, guidelines and strategies — was mostly financed by loans left over from the bloc’s pandemic recovery program. Similarly, RESourceEU must become “resource strategy backed by real funding,” said Hildegard Bentele, a member of the European Parliament who’s been working on critical minerals for years.  “This requires a European Raw Materials Fund, modelled on successful instruments in several Member States, to support strategic projects across the entire value chain, from extraction to recycling,” the German Christian Democrat said. THAT’LL COST YOU It’s about more than just throwing money at the problem: The Commission’s haste in rolling out its plan is raising doubts that it will meet the needs of a highly complex market — along with concerns that environmental safeguards will be neglected. “As long as European industries can buy cheaper materials from China, other producers do not stand a chance,” warned Gehrke.  In Toronto, G7 ministers will launch a new Critical Minerals Production Alliance (CMPA), a Canadian-led initiative that seeks to secure “transparent, democratic, and environmentally responsible critical minerals,” and also to counter market manipulation of supply chains, said a senior Canadian government official.  This would suggest creating so-called standards-based markets that are ring-fenced to protect critical minerals produced responsibly, to agreed environmental and social standards. A price floor would be set within that market, while minerals produced elsewhere — at lower prices but also lower standards — would face a tariff.  Beyond the immediate funding issues, ramping up mining in the EU and its neighbourhood also comes at a high societal cost. With local resistance to new mines, usually linked to environmental and social concerns, being one of the key obstacles to new projects, investors are often hesitant to pour money into a project that risks being derailed shortly after. “The EU is choosing geopolitical expediency over human rights and ecological integrity, sacrificing frontline communities for a strategy that is neither sustainable nor just, instead of building a durable and values-based autonomy that invests in systemic circularity and rights-based partnerships,” said Diego Marin, a senior policy officer for raw materials and resource justice at the European Environmental Bureau, an NGO.  Jakob Weizman and Camille Gijs contributed reporting from Brussels. Zi-Ann Lum contributed reporting from Toronto, Canada.