President Donald Trump has linked his desire to own Greenland with the development of his nascent missile defense shield, Golden Dome. Except that he doesn’t need to seize the Danish territory to accomplish his goal. Golden Dome, Trump’s pricey vision to protect the U.S., is a multi-layered defense shield intended to block projectiles heading toward the country. The president announced a $175 billion, three-year plan last year, although gave few details about how the administration would fund it. “The United States needs Greenland for the purpose of National Security,” Trump said Wednesday in a Truth Social post. “It is vital for the Golden Dome we are building.” But the country already has the access it needs in Greenland to host interceptors that could knock down enemy missiles. And the U.S. has other locations it could place similar defense systems — think New York or Canada — if many of the interceptors are even based on land, instead of space as envisioned. “The right way for the U.S. to engage with an ally to improve our homeland defense — whether through additional radars, communication antennas or even interceptor sites — is to engage collaboratively with that ally,” said a former defense official. “If strengthening homeland defense is the actual goal, this administration is off to a truly terrible start.” Here are three reasons why Golden Dome has little to do with Trump’s desire to take Greenland: HE COULD HAVE JUST ASKED DENMARK The U.S. military’s presence in Greenland centers on Pituffik Space Base, which operates under a 1951 defense agreement with Denmark that grants the U.S. regular access to the island. The base is a key outpost for detecting threats from the Arctic, although it doesn’t host any interceptor systems. If the Pentagon wanted to station interceptors or more sensors on the island, the U.S. could simply work with Denmark to do so, according to the former official and a defense expert. Greenland has been part of the U.S. homeland missile defense and space surveillance network for decades and it would continue that role under Golden Dome, said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “We already have unfettered access to what we need for Golden Dome in Greenland, but the president talks as if he’s not aware of that,” Harrison said. “His statements about Greenland are detached from reality.” The White House, when asked for comment, pointed to Trump’s post. HE COULD CHOOSE SOMEWHERE ELSE — THAT THE U.S. OWNS Greenland could prove a good location for ground-based interceptors that block missiles launching from Russia and the Middle East towards the U.S. But the U.S. has other options for interceptor locations, and none would necessitate taking another country (a seizure that could threaten to destroy the NATO alliance). The Pentagon has examined potential locations for interceptor sites and Fort Drum, an Army base in upstate New York, has routinely survived deep dive analysis by the Missile Defense Agency, said the former defense official, who, like others interviewed, was granted anonymity to speak about internal discussions. “Compared to Fort Drum, Greenland does not appear to be a better location for such interceptors,” the person said. Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Ala.) has also said his state could play a “critical role” in housing interceptors. MUCH OF THE DEFENSE SHIELD IS SUPPOSED TO BE BASED IN SPACE Trump’s assertion about needing Greenland for Golden Dome also raises questions about what the multibillion-dollar architecture will actually look like. The Pentagon has largely avoided discussing the price tag publicly. And officials originally envisioned most of it located above the Earth. A key part of Golden Dome is space-based interceptors — weapons orbiting the planet that can shoot down incoming missiles. But moving missile defense systems to space would require fewer ground-based systems, negating the importance of acquiring more land for the effort. “If Golden Dome’s sensor network and defenses are primarily space-based — as per the current plan — Greenland might still be of value,” said a former defense official. “But less so than it would be for terrestrial architecture.”

Donald Trump wants the U.S. to own Greenland. The trouble is, Greenland already belongs to Denmark and most Greenlanders don’t want to become part of the U.S. While swooping into Greenland’s capital, Nuuk, and taking over Venezuela-style seems fanciful ― even if the military attack on Caracas seems to have provided a jolt to all sides about what the U.S. is capable of ― there’s a definite pathway. And Trump already appears to be some way along it. Worryingly for the Europeans, the strategy looks an awful lot like Vladimir Putin’s expansionist playbook. POLITICO spoke with nine EU officials, NATO insiders, defense experts and diplomats to game out how a U.S. takeover of the mineral-rich and strategically important Arctic island could play out. “It could be like five helicopters … he wouldn’t need a lot of troops,” said a Danish politician who asked for anonymity to speak freely. “There would be nothing they [Greenlanders] could do.” STEP 1: INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN TO BOOST GREENLAND’S INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT Almost immediately upon taking office, the Trump administration began talking up independence for Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. An unshackled Greenland could sign deals with the U.S., while under the status quo it needs Copenhagen’s approval. To gain independence, Greenlanders would need to vote in a referendum, then negotiate a deal that both Nuuk and Copenhagen must approve. In a 2025 opinion poll, 56 percent of Greenlanders said they would vote in favor of independence, while 28 percent said they would vote against it. Americans with ties to Trump have carried out covert influence operations in Greenland, according to Danish media reports, with Denmark’s security and intelligence service, PET, warning the territory “is the target of influence campaigns of various kinds.” Felix Kartte, a digital policy expert who has advised EU institutions and governments, pointed to Moscow’s tactics for influencing political outcomes in countries such as Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. “Russia mixes offline and online tactics,” he said. “On the ground, it works with aligned actors such as extremist parties, diaspora networks or pro-Russian oligarchs, and has been reported to pay people to attend anti-EU or anti-U.S. protests. “At the same time, it builds large networks of fake accounts and pseudo-media outlets to amplify these activities online and boost selected candidates or positions. The goal is often not to persuade voters that a pro-Russian option is better, but to make it appear larger, louder and more popular than it really is, creating a sense of inevitability.” Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff, told CNN on Monday that “nobody is going to fight the U.S. militarily over the future of Greenland.” | Joe Raedle/Getty Images On Greenland, the U.S. appears to be deploying at least some of these methods. Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff, told CNN on Monday that “nobody is going to fight the U.S. militarily over the future of Greenland.” Last month, Trump created the position of special envoy to Greenland and appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry to the role. He declared his goal was to “make Greenland a part of the U.S.”  Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, on a visit to the territory in March, said “the people of Greenland are going to have self-determination.” He added: “We hope that they choose to partner with the United States, because we’re the only nation on Earth that will respect their sovereignty and respect their security.” STEP 2: OFFER GREENLAND A SWEET DEAL Assuming its efforts to speed up Greenland’s independence referendum come to fruition, and the territory’s inhabitants vote to leave Denmark behind, the next step would be to bring it under U.S. influence. One obvious method would be to fold Greenland into the U.S. as another state — an idea those close to the president have repeatedly toyed with. Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was on Monday forced to say that “the U.S. has no right to annex” Greenland after Katie Miller — the wife of Stephen Miller — posted to social media a map of the territory draped in a U.S. flag and the word “SOON.” A direct swap of Denmark for the U.S. seems largely unpalatable to most of the population. The poll mentioned above also showed 85 percent of Greenlanders oppose the territory becoming part of the U.S., and even Trump-friendly members of the independence movement aren’t keen on the idea. But there are other options. Reports have circulated since last May that the Trump administration wants Greenland to sign a Compact of Free Association (COFA) — like those it currently has with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. Under the deals, the U.S. provides essential services, protection and free trade in exchange for its military operating without restriction on those countries’ territory. The idea resurfaced this week. Kuno Fencker, a pro-independence Greenlandic opposition MP who attended Trump’s inauguration and met with Republican Congressman Andy Ogles last year, said he tries to “explain to [the Americans] that we don’t want to be like Puerto Rico, or any other territory of the United States. But a Compact of Free Association, bilateral agreements, or even opportunities and other means which maybe I can’t imagine — let them come to the table and Greenlanders will decide in a plebiscite.” Compared to Nuuk’s deal with Copenhagen, things “can only go upwards,” he said.  Referring to Trump’s claim that the U.S. has a “need” for Greenland, Fencker added: “Denmark has never said that they ‘needed’ Greenland. Denmark has said that Greenland is an expense, and they would leave us if we become independent. So I think it’s a much more positive remark than we have ever seen from Denmark.” But Thomas Crosbie, an associate professor of military operations at the Royal Danish Defense College that provides training and education for the Danish defense forces, warned that Greenland is unlikely to get the better of Trump in a negotiation. “Trump’s primary identity as a deal-maker is someone who forces his will on the people he’s negotiating with, and someone who has a very long track record of betraying people who he’s negotiated deals with, not honoring his commitments, both in private and public life, and exploiting those around him … I really see zero benefits to Greenlandic people other than a very temporary boost to their self esteem.” And, he added, “it would be crazy to agree to something in the hope that a deal may come. I mean, if you give away your territory in the hopes that you might get a deal afterwards — that would be just really imprudent.” STEP 3: GET EUROPE ON BOARD Europe, particularly Denmark’s EU allies, would balk at any attempt to cleave Greenland away from Copenhagen. But the U.S. administration does have a trump card to play on that front: Ukraine. As peace negotiations have gathered pace, Kyiv has said that any deal with Putin must be backed by serious, long-term U.S. security guarantees. Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, on a visit to the territory in March, said “the people of Greenland are going to have self-determination.” | Pool photo by Tom Brenner vis Getty Images The Americans have prevaricated on that front, and in any case, Kyiv is skeptical about security guarantees, given those it has received from both Russia and the West in the past have amounted to nothing. One potential scenario an EU diplomat floated would be a security-for-security package deal, under which Europe gets firmer assurances from the Trump administration for Ukraine in exchange for an expanded role for the U.S. in Greenland. While that seems like a bitter pill, it could be easier to swallow than the alternative, annoying Trump, who may retaliate by imposing sanctions, pulling out of peace negotiations — or by throwing his weight behind Putin in negotiations with Ukraine. STEP 4: MILITARY INVASION But what if Greenland — or Denmark, whose “OK” Nuuk needs to secede — says no to Trump? A U.S. military takeover could be achieved without much difficulty.  Crosbie, from the Royal Danish Defense College, said Trump’s strategists are likely presenting him with various options. “The most worrisome would be a fait accompli-type strategy, which we see a lot and think about a lot in military circles, which would be simply grabbing the land the same way Putin tried to grab, to make territorial claims, over Ukraine. He could just simply put troops in the country and just say that it’s American now … the United States military is capable of landing any number of forces on Greenland, either by air or by sea, and then claiming that it’s American territory.” According to Lin Mortensgaard, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies and an expert on Greenlandic security, Washington also has around 500 military officers, including local contractors, on the ground at its northern Pituffik Space Base and just under 10 consulate staff in Nuuk. That’s alongside roughly 100 National Guard troops from New York who are usually deployed seasonally in the Arctic summer to support research missions.  Greenland, meanwhile, has few defenses. The population has no territorial army, Mortensgaard said, while Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command in the capital includes scant and out-of-date military assets, largely limited to four inspection and navy vessels, a dog-sled patrol, several helicopters and one maritime patrol aircraft. As a result, if Trump mobilizes the U.S. presence on the ground — or flies in special forces — the U.S. could seize control of Nuuk “in half an hour or less,” Mortensgaard said. “Mr. Trump says things and then he does them,” said Danish Member of European Parliament Stine Bosse. “If you were one of 60,000 people in Greenland, you would be very worried.” Any incursion would have no “legal basis” under U.S. and international law, said Romain Chuffart, who heads the Washington, D.C.-based Arctic Institute, a security think tank. Any occupation beyond 60 days would also require approval from the U.S. Congress.  Meanwhile, an invasion would “mean the end of NATO,” he said, and the “U.S. would be … shooting itself in the foot and waving goodbye to an alliance it has helped create.” Beyond that, a “loss of trust by key allies … could result in a reduction in their willingness to share intelligence with the U.S. or a reduction in access to bases across Europe,” said Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. troops in Europe. “Both of these would be severely damaging to America’s security.” Reports have circulated since last May that the Trump administration wants Greenland to sign a Compact of Free Association (COFA) — like those it currently has with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. | Joe Raedle/Getty Images NATO would be left unable to respond, given that military action must be approved unanimously and the U.S. is the key member of the alliance, but European allies could deploy troops to Greenland via other groupings such as the U.K.-Scandinavian Joint Expeditionary Force or the five-country Nordic Defence Cooperation format, said Ed Arnold, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. But for now, NATO allies remain cool-headed about an attack. “We are still far from that scenario,” said one senior alliance diplomat. “There could be some tough negotiations, but I don’t think we are close to any hostile takeover.” Max Griera, Gerardo Fortuna and Seb Starcevic contributed reporting.

In the desolate Arctic desert of Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, Europeans are building defenses against a new, up-and-coming security threat: space hacks. A Lithuanian company called Astrolight is constructing a ground station, with support from the European Space Agency, that will use laser beams to download voluminous data from satellites in a fast and secure manner, it announced last month.  It’s just one example of how Europe is moving to harden the security of its satellites, as rising geopolitical tensions and an expanding spectrum of hybrid threats are pushing space communications to the heart of the bloc’s security plans. For years, satellite infrastructure was treated by policymakers as a technical utility rather than a strategic asset. That changed in 2022, when a cyberattack on the Viasat satellite network coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.   Satellites have since become popular targets for interference, espionage and disruption. The European Commission in June warned that space was becoming “more contested,” flagging increasing cyberattacks and attempts at electronic interference targeting satellites and ground stations. Germany and the United Kingdom warned earlier this year of the growing threat posed by Russian and Chinese space satellites, which are regularly spotted spying on their satellites.  EU governments are now racing to boost their resilience and reduce reliance on foreign technology, both through regulations like the new Space Act and investments in critical infrastructure. The threat is crystal clear in Greenland, Laurynas Mačiulis, the chief executive officer of Astrolight, said. “The problem today is that around 80 percent of all the [space data] traffic is downlinked to a single location in Svalbard, which is an island shared between different countries, including Russia,” he said in an interview. Europe’s main Arctic ground station sits in Svalbard and supports both the navigation systems of Galileo and Copernicus. While the location is strategic, it is also extremely sensitive due to nearby Russian and Chinese activities. Crucially, the station relies on a single undersea cable to connect to the internet, which has been damaged several times. “In case of intentional or unintentional damage of this cable, you lose access to most of the geo-intelligence satellites, which is, of course, very critical. So our aim is to deploy a complementary satellite ground station up in Greenland,” Mačiulis said. THE MUSK OF IT ALL A centerpiece of Europe’s ambitions to have secure, European satellite communication is IRIS², a multibillion-euro secure connectivity constellation pitched in 2022 and designed to rival Elon Musk’s Starlink system. “Today, communications — for instance in Ukraine — are far too dependent on Starlink,” said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the founding chairman of political consultancy Rasmussen Global, speaking at an event in Brussels in November. “That dependence rests on the shifting ideas of an American billionaire. That’s too risky. We have to build a secure communications system that is independent of the United States.” The European system, which will consist of 18 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, aims to provide Europe with fast and encrypted communication. “Even if someone intercepts the signal [of IRIS² ], they will not be able to decrypt it,” Piero Angeletti, head of the Secure Connectivity Space Segment Office at the European Space Agency, told POLITICO. “This will allow us to have a secure system that is also certified and accredited by the national security entities.” The challenge is that IRIS² is still at least four years away from becoming operational. WHO’S IN CHARGE? While Europe beefs up its secure satellite systems, governments are still streamlining how they can coordinate cyber defenses and space security. In many cases, that falls to both space or cyber commands, which, unlike traditional military units, are relatively new and often still being built out. Clémence Poirier, a cyberdefense researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, said that EU countries must now focus on maturing them. “European states need to keep developing those commands,” she told POLITICO. “Making sure that they coordinate their action, that there are clear mandates and responsibilities when it comes to cyber security, cyber defensive operations, cyber offensive operations, and also when it comes to monitoring the threat.” Industry, too, is struggling to fill the gaps. Most cybersecurity firms do not treat space as a sector in its own right, leaving satellite operators in a blind spot. Instead, space systems are folded into other categories: Earth-observation satellites often fall under environmental services, satellite TV under media, and broadband constellations like Starlink under internet services. That fragmentation makes it harder for space companies to assess risk, update threat models or understand who they need to defend against. It also complicates incident response: while advanced tools exist for defending against cyberattacks on terrestrial networks, those tools often do not translate well to space systems. “Cybersecurity in space is a bit different,” Poirier added. “You cannot just implement whatever solution you have for your computers on Earth and just deploy that to your satellite.”

Venture capitalist Finn Murphy believes world leaders could soon resort to deflecting sunlight into space if the Earth gets unbearably hot. That’s why he’s invested more than $1 million in Stardust Solutions, a leading solar geoengineering firm that’s developing a system to reduce warming by enveloping the globe in reflective particles. Murphy isn’t rooting for climate catastrophe. But with global temperatures soaring and the political will to limit climate change waning, Stardust “can be worth tens of billions of dollars,” he said. “It would be definitely better if we lost all our money and this wasn’t necessary,” said Murphy, the 33-year-old founder of Nebular, a New York investment fund named for a vast cloud of space dust and gas. Murphy is among a new wave of investors who are putting millions of dollars into emerging companies that aim to limit the amount of sunlight reaching the Earth — while also potentially destabilizing weather patterns, food supplies and global politics. He has a degree in mathematics and mechanical engineering and views global warming not just as a human and political tragedy, but as a technical challenge with profitable solutions. Solar geoengineering investors are generally young, pragmatic and imaginative — and willing to lean into the adventurous side of venture capitalism. They often shrug off the concerns of scientists who argue it’s inherently risky to fund the development of potentially dangerous technologies through wealthy investors who could only profit if the planet-cooling systems are deployed. “If the technology works and the outcomes are positive without really catastrophic downstream impacts, these are trillion-dollar market opportunities,” said Evan Caron, a co-founder of the energy-focused venture firm Montauk Capital. “So it’s a no-brainer for an investor to take a shot at some of these.” More than 50 financial firms, wealthy individuals and government agencies have collectively provided more than $115.8 million to nine startups whose technology could be used to limit sunlight, according to interviews with VCs, tech company founders and analysts, as well as private investment data analyzed by POLITICO’s E&E News. That pool of funders includes Silicon Valley’s Sequoia Capital, one of the world’s largest venture capital firms, and four other investment groups that have more than $1 billion of assets under management. Of the total amount invested in the geoengineering sector, $75 million went to Stardust, or nearly 65 percent. The U.S.-Israeli startup is developing reflective particles and the means to spray and monitor them in the stratosphere, some 11 miles above the planet’s surface. At least three other climate-intervention companies have also raked in at least $5 million. The cash infusion is a bet on planet-cooling technologies that many political leaders, investors and environmentalists still consider taboo. In addition to having unknown side effects, solar geoengineering could expose the planet to what scientists call “termination shock,” a scenario in which global temperatures soar if the cooling technologies fail or are suddenly abandoned. Still, the funding surge for geoengineering companies pales in comparison to the billions of dollars being put toward artificial intelligence. OpenAI, the maker of ChatGPT, has raised $62.5 billion in 2025 alone, according to investment data compiled by PitchBook. The investment pool for solar geoengineering startups is relatively shallow in part because governments haven’t determined how they would regulate the technology — something Stardust is lobbying to change. As a result, the emerging sector is seen as too speculative for most venture capital firms, according to Kim Zou, the CEO of Sightline Climate, a market intelligence firm. VCs mostly work on behalf of wealthy individuals, as well as pension funds, university endowments and other institutional investors. “It’s still quite a niche set of investors that are even thinking about or looking at the geoengineering space,” Zou said. “The climate tech and energy tech investors we speak to still don’t really see there being an investable opportunity there, primarily because there’s no commercial market for it today.” AEROSOLS IN THE STRATOSPHERE Stardust and its investors are banking on signing contracts with one or more governments that could deploy its solar geoengineering system as soon as the end of the decade. Those investors include Lowercarbon Capital, a climate-focused firm co-founded by billionaire VC Chris Sacca, and Exor, the holding company of an Italian industrial dynasty and perhaps the most mainstream investment group to back a sunlight reflection startup. Even Stardust’s supporters acknowledge that the company is far from a sure bet. “It’s unique in that there is not currently demand for this solution,” said Murphy, whose firm is also supporting out-there startups seeking to build robots and data centers in space. “You have to go and create the product in order to potentially facilitate the demand.” Lowercarbon partner Ryan Orbuch said the firm would see a return on its Stardust investment only “in the context of an actual customer who can actually back many years of stable, safe deployment.” Exor, another Stardust investor, didn’t respond to a request for comment. Other startups are trying to develop commercial markets for solar geoengineering. Make Sunsets, a company funded by billionaire VC Tim Draper, releases sulfate-filled weather balloons that pop when they reach the stratosphere. It sells cooling credits to individuals and corporations based on the theory that the sulfates can reliably reduce warming. There are questions, however, about the science and economics underpinning the credit system of Make Sunsets, according to the investment bank Jeffries. “A cooling credit market is unlikely to be viable,” the bank said in a May 2024 note to clients. That’s because the temperature reductions produced by sulfate aerosols vary by altitude, location and season, the note explained. And the warming impacts of carbon dioxide emissions last decades — much longer than any cooling that would be created from a balloon’s worth of sulfate. Make Sunsets didn’t respond to a request for comment. The company has previously attracted the attention of regulators in the U.S. and Mexico, who have claimed it began operating without the necessary government approvals. Draper Associates says on its website that it’s “shaping a future where the impossible becomes everyday reality.” The firm has previously backed successful consumer tech firms like Tesla, Skype and Hotmail. “It is getting hotter in the Summer everywhere,” Tim Draper said in an email. “We should be encouraging every solution. I love this team, and the science works.” THE NEXT FRONTIER One startup is pursuing space-based solar geoengineering. EarthGuard is attempting to build a series of large sunlight deflectors that would be positioned between the sun and the planet, some 932,000 miles from the Earth. The company did not respond to emailed questions. Other space companies are considering geoengineering as a side project. That includes Gama, a French startup that’s designing massive solar sails that could be used for deep space travel or as a planetary sunshade, and Ethos Space, a Los Angeles company with plans to industrialize the moon. Both companies are part of an informal research network established by the Planetary Sunshade Foundation, a nonprofit advocating for the development of a trillion-dollar parasol for the globe. The network mainly brings together collaborators on the sidelines of space industry conferences, according to Gama CEO Andrew Nutter. “We’re willing to contribute something if we realize it’s genuinely necessary and it’s a better solution than other solutions” to the climate challenge, Nutter said of the space shade concept. “But our business model does not depend on it. If you have dollar signs hanging next to something, that can bias your decisions on what’s best for the planet.” Nutter said Gama has raised about $5 million since he co-founded the company in 2020. Its investors include Possible Ventures, a German VC firm that’s also financing a nuclear fusion startup and says on its website that the firm is “relentlessly optimistic — choosing to focus on the possibilities rather than obsess over the risks.” Possible Ventures did not respond to a request for comment. Sequoia-backed Reflect Orbital is another space startup that’s exploring solar geoengineering as a potential moneymaker. The company based near Los Angeles is developing a network of satellite mirrors that would direct sunlight down to the Earth at night for lighting industrial sites or, eventually, producing solar energy. Its space mirrors, if oriented differently, could also be used for limiting the amount of sun rays that reach the planet. “It’s not so much a technological limitation as much as what has the highest, best impact. It’s more of a business decision,” said Ally Stone, Reflect Orbital’s chief strategy officer. “It’s a matter of looking at each satellite as an opportunity and whether, when it’s over a specific geography, that makes more sense to reflect sunlight towards or away from the Earth.” Reflect Orbital has raised nearly $28.7 million from investors including Lux Capital, a firm that touts its efforts to “turn sci-fi into sci-fact” and has invested in the autonomous defense systems companies Anduril and Saildrone.” Sequoia and Lux didn’t respond to requests for comment. The startup hopes to send its first satellite into space next summer, according to Stone. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, whose aerospace company already has an estimated fleet of more than 8,800 internet satellites in orbit, has also suggested using the circling network to limit sunlight. “A large solar-powered AI satellite constellation would be able to prevent global warming by making tiny adjustments in how much solar energy reached Earth,” Musk wrote on X last month. Neither he nor SpaceX responded to an emailed request for comment. DON’T CALL IT GEOENGINEERING Other sunlight-reflecting startups are entering the market — even if they’d rather not be seen as solar geoengineering companies. Arctic Reflections is a two-year-old company that wants to reduce global warming by increasing Arctic sea ice, which doesn’t absorb as much heat as open water. The Dutch startup hasn’t yet pursued outside investors. “We see this not necessarily as geo-engineering, but rather as climate adaptation,” CEO Fonger Ypma said in an email. “Just like in reforestation projects, people help nature in growing trees, our idea is that we would help nature in growing ice.” The main funder of Arctic Reflections is the British government’s independent Advanced Research and Invention Agency. In May, ARIA awarded $4.41 million to the company — more than four times what it had raised to that point. Another startup backed by ARIA is Voltitude, which is developing micro balloons to monitor geoengineering from the stratosphere. The U.K.-based company didn’t respond to a request for comment. Altogether, the British agency is supporting 22 geoengineering projects, only a handful of which involve startups. “ARIA is only funding fundamental research through this programme, and has not taken an equity stake in any geoengineering companies,” said Mark Symes, a program director at the agency. It also requires that all research it supports “must be published, including those that rule out approaches by showing they are unsafe or unworkable.” Sunscreen is a new startup that is trying to limit sunlight in localized areas. It was founded earlier this year by Stanford University graduate student Solomon Kim. “We are pioneering the use of targeted, precision interventions to mitigate the destructive impacts of heatwave on critical United States infrastructure,” Kim said in an email. But he was emphatic that “we are not geoengineering” since the cooling impacts it’s pursuing are not large scale. Kim declined to say how much had been raised by Sunscreen and from what sources. As climate change and its impacts continue to worsen, Zou of Sightline Climate expects more investors to consider solar geoengineering startups, including deep-pocketed firms and corporations interested in the technology. Without their help, the startups might not be able to develop their planet-cooling systems. “People are feeling like, well wait a second, our backs are kind of starting to get against the wall. Time is ticking, we’re not really making a ton of progress” on decarbonization, she said. “So I do think there’s a lot more questions getting asked right now in the climate tech and venture community around understanding it,” Zou said of solar geoengineering. “Some of these companies and startups and venture deals are also starting to bring more light into the space.” Karl Mathiesen contributed reporting.

A group of 19 EU countries is pushing the European Commission to take a tougher line on migration beyond the bloc’s borders, arguing that last week’s EU deal on asylum and returns has changed the political weather in Brussels. In particular, they want the Commission to increase cooperation with non-EU countries to tackle what they see as unacceptably high levels of migration into the bloc. “The conclusion of the negotiations on the recent legislative proposals … is an important step,” the ministers of home and foreign affairs of the signatory countries write in a joint letter seen exclusively by POLITICO, adding that “the further development of a coherent EU strategy on the external dimension of migration, including new and innovative solutions, is paramount.” The reference to recent proposals refers to the package agreed on Dec. 8, which includes sweeping new rules to reform how the EU deals with migration, including setting up asylum processing centers in non-EU countries. Governments want the EU executive to put even more weight on the external dimension of migration by cooperating with countries of origin and countries they travel through to stop them reaching the EU. That means accelerating what they called “innovative solutions,” a catch-all term for measures such as so-called return hubs and new partnerships with non-EU countries, which supporters say could make EU migration policy more effective. The appeal is set to feature prominently at this week’s informal “migration breakfast” ahead of Thursday’s EU summit. The breakfasts, launched in June 2024 by Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen and the Netherlands’ Dick Schoof, have become highly influential on the narrative around migration in Brussels. In their letter, the ministers call for expanding the use of “new and innovative solutions” to counter irregular migration and for stronger cooperation among EU agencies, international organizations, and EU countries. While the letter avoids naming specific models, it references tools already embedded in EU law, such as “safe third country arrangements and return hubs,” and calls for their operationalization through partnerships along migration routes. The model of “return hubs,” to which individuals whose asylum claims have been rejected can be sent, has been championed by Italy. The country has built and operates — in a different legal context — two such facilities in Albania, which are expected to serve as the first concrete implementation of this model from mid-2026. Money is a central concern. The signatories argue that the innovative solutions will remain theoretical without clearer funding pathways. “The efficient use of financial resources is necessary for the establishment and operationalisation of innovative forms of cooperation,” the letter states, urging the Commission to issue guidelines on how existing and future EU funds can be mobilized. The ministers also want EU agencies to be more deeply involved, including a possible expansion of the role of the border agency Frontex. They call on the Commission and agencies to explore “necessary legislative and policy changes,” including, “where relevant, revision of the mandate and competences of Frontex, to ensure effective support and sufficient capacity” in cooperation with third countries. Beyond institutions and funding, the letter makes a clear political ask for a single EU voice. “A common narrative and joint diplomatic outreach by Member States and the EEAS … is necessary,” the ministers write, urging Brussels to hard-wire migration into summits and dialogues with partner countries.

LONDON — On the face of it, the new MI6 chief’s first speech featured many of the same villains and heroes as those of her predecessors. But in her first public outing Monday, Blaise Metreweli, the first female head of the U.K.’s foreign intelligence service, sent a strong signal that she intends to put her own stamp on the role – as she highlighted a wave of inter-connected threats to western democracies. Speaking at MI6’s HQ in London, Metreweli, who took over from Richard Moore in October, highlighted a confluence of geo-political and technological disruptions, warning “the frontline is everywhere” and adding “we are now operating in a space between peace and war.” In a speech shot through with references to a shifting transatlantic order and the growth of disinformation, Metreweli made noticeably scant  reference to the historically close relationship with the U.S. in intelligence gathering — the mainstay of the U.K.’s intelligence compact for decades. Instead, she highlighted that a “new bloc and identities are forming and alliances reshaping.” That will be widely seen to reflect an official acknowledgement that the second Donald Trump administration has necessitated a shift in the security services towards cultivating more multilateral relationships. By comparison with a lengthy passage on the seriousness of the Russia threat to Britain, China got away only with a light mention of its cyber attack tendencies towards the U.K. — and was referred to more flatteringly as “a country where a central transformation  is  taking place this century.” Westminster hawks will note that Metreweli — who grew up in Hong Kong and  so knows the Chinese system close-up — walked gingerly around the risk of conflict in the  South China Sea and Beijing’s espionage activities targeting British politicians – and even its royals. In a carefully-placed line, she reflected that she was  “going to break with tradition and won’t give you a global threat tour.” Moore, her predecessor, was known for that approach, which delighted those who enjoyed a plain-speaking MI6 boss giving pithy analysis of global tensions and their fallout, but frustrated some in the Foreign Office who believed the affable Moore could be too unguarded in his comments on geo-politics. The implicit suggestion from the new chief was that China needs to be handled differently to the forthright engagement with “aggressive, expansionist and revisionist” Russia. The reasons may well lie in the aftermath of a bruising argument within Whitehall about how to handle the recent case of two Britons who were arrested for spying for China, and with a growth-boosting visit to Beijing by the prime minister scheduled for 2026. Sources in the service suggest the aim of the China strategy is to avoid confrontation, the better to further intelligence-gathering and have a more productive economic relationship with Beijing. More hardline interpreters of the Secret Intelligence Service will raise eyebrows at her suggestion that the “convening power” of the service would enable it to “ defuse tensions.” But there was no doubt about Metreweli’s deep concern at the impacts of social-media disinformation and distortion, in a framing which seemed just as worried about U.S. tech titans as conventional state-run threats:  “We are being contested from battlefield to boardroom — and even our brains — as disinformation manipulates our understanding of each other.” Declaring that “some  algorithms become as powerful as states,” seemed to tilt at outfits like Elon Musk’s X and Mark Zuckerberg’s Meta-owned Facebook. Metreweli warned that “hyper personalized tools could become a new vector for conflict and control,” pushing their effects on societies and individuals  in “minutes not months – my service must operate in this new context too.” The new boss used the possessive pronoun, talking about “my service” in her speech several times – another sign that she intends to put a distinctive mark of the job, now that she has, at the age of just 48,  inherited the famous green-ink pen in which the head of the service signs correspondence.  Metreweli is experienced operator in war zones including Iraq who spent a secondment with MI5, the domestic intelligence service, and won the job in large part because of her experience in the top job via MI6’s science and technology “Q”  Branch. She clearly wants to expedite changes in the service – saying agents must be as fluent in computer coding as foreign languages. She is also expected to try and address a tendency in the service to harvest information, without a clear focus on the action that should follow – the product of a glut of intelligence gathered via digital means and AI. She  was keen to stress that the human factor is at the heart of it all — an attempt at reassurance for spies and analysts wondering if they might be replaced by AI agents as the job of gathering intelligence in the era of facial recognition and biometrics gets harder.  Armed with a steely gaze Metreweli speaks fluent human, occasionally with a small smile. She is also the first incumbent of the job to wear a very large costume jewelry beetle brooch on her sombre navy attire. No small amount of attention in Moscow and Beijing could go into decoding that.

President Donald Trump intends for the U.S. to keep a bigger military presence in the Western Hemisphere going forward to battle migration, drugs and the rise of adversarial powers in the region, according to his new National Security Strategy. The 33-page document is a rare formal explanation of Trump’s foreign policy worldview by his administration. Such strategies, which presidents typically release once each term, can help shape how parts of the U.S. government allocate budgets and set policy priorities. The Trump National Security Strategy, which the White House quietly released Thursday, has some brutal words for Europe, suggesting it is in civilizational decline, and pays relatively little attention to the Middle East and Africa. It has an unusually heavy focus on the Western Hemisphere that it casts as largely about protecting the U.S. homeland. It says “border security is the primary element of national security” and makes veiled references to China’s efforts to gain footholds in America’s backyard. “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity — a condition that allows us to assert ourselves confidently where and when we need to in the region,” the document states. “The terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence — from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined.” The document describes such plans as part of a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The latter is the notion set forth by President James Monroe in 1823 that the U.S. will not tolerate malign foreign interference in its own hemisphere. Trump’s paper, as well as a partner document known as the National Defense Strategy, have faced delays in part because of debates in the administration over elements related to China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pushed for some softening of the language about Beijing, according to two people familiar with the matter who were granted anonymity to describe internal deliberations. Bessent is currently involved in sensitive U.S. trade talks with China, and Trump himself is wary of the delicate relations with Beijing. The new National Security Strategy says the U.S. has to make challenging choices in the global realm. “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests,” the document states. In an introductory note to the strategy, Trump called it a “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history, and the home of freedom on earth.” But Trump is mercurial by nature, so it’s hard to predict how closely or how long he will stick to the ideas laid out in the new strategy. A surprising global event could redirect his thinking as well, as it has done for recent presidents from George W. Bush to Joe Biden. Still, the document appears in line with many of the moves he’s taken in his second term, as well as the priorities of some of his aides. That includes deploying significantly more U.S. military prowess to the Western Hemisphere, taking numerous steps to reduce migration to America, pushing for a stronger industrial base in the U.S. and promoting “Western identity,” including in Europe. The strategy even nods to so-called traditional values at times linked to the Christian right, saying the administration wants “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health” and “an America that cherishes its past glories and its heroes.” It mentions the need to have “growing numbers of strong, traditional families that raise healthy children.” As POLITICO has reported before, the strategy spends an unusual amount of space on Latin America, the Caribbean and other U.S. neighbors. That’s a break with past administrations, who tended to prioritize other regions and other topics, such as taking on major powers like Russia and China or fighting terrorism. The Trump strategy suggests the president’s military buildup in the Western Hemisphere is not a temporary phenomenon. (That buildup, which has included controversial military strikes against boats allegedly carrying drugs, has been cast by the administration as a way to fight cartels. But the administration also hopes the buildup could help pressure Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro to step down.) The strategy also specifically calls for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.” The strategy says the U.S. should enhance its relationships with governments in Latin America, including working with them to identify strategic resources — an apparent reference to materials such as rare earth minerals. It also declares that the U.S. will partner more with the private sector to promote “strategic acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region.” Such business-related pledges, at least on a generic level, could please many Latin American governments who have long been frustrated by the lack of U.S. attention to the region. It’s unclear how such promises square with Trump’s insistence on imposing tariffs on America’s trade partners, however. The National Security Strategy spends a fair amount of time on China, though it often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S. lawmakers — on a bipartisan basis — consider an increasingly assertive China the gravest long-term threat to America’s global power. But while the language the Trump strategy uses is tough, it is careful and far from inflammatory. The administration promises to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence.” But it also says “trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors” and even calls for “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” The strategy says the U.S. wants to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific — a nod to growing tensions in the region, including between China and U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. “We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” it states. That may come as a relief to Asia watchers who worry Trump will back away from U.S. support for Taiwan as it faces ongoing threats from China. The document states that “it is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” and to mitigate the risk of Russian confrontation with other countries in Europe. But overall it pulls punches when it comes to Russia — there’s very little criticism of Moscow. Instead, it reserves some of its harshest remarks for U.S.-allied nations in Europe. In particular, the administration, in somewhat veiled terms, knocks European efforts to rein in far-right parties, calling such moves political censorship. “The Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the [Ukraine] war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition,” the strategy states. The strategy also appears to suggest that migration will fundamentally change European identity to a degree that could hurt U.S. alliances. “Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” it states. “As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” Still, the document acknowledges Europe’s economic and other strengths, as well as how America’s partnership with much of the continent has helped the U.S. “Not only can we not afford to write Europe off — doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve,” it says. “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory,” it says. Trump’s first-term National Security Strategy focused significantly on the U.S. competition with Russia and China, but the president frequently undercut it by trying to gain favor with the leaders of those nuclear powers. If this new strategy proves a better reflection of what Trump himself actually believes, it could help other parts of the U.S. government adjust, not to mention foreign governments. As Trump administration documents often do, the strategy devotes significant space to praising the commander-in-chief. It describes him as the “President of Peace” while favorably stating that he “uses unconventional diplomacy.” The strategy struggles at times to tamp down what seem like inconsistencies. It says the U.S. should have a high bar for foreign intervention, but it also says it wants to “prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.” It also essentially dismisses the ambitions of many smaller countries. “The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations,” the strategy states. The National Security Strategy is the first of several important defense and foreign policy papers the Trump administration is due to release. They include the National Defense Strategy, whose basic thrust is expected to be similar. Presidents’ early visions for what the National Security Strategy should mention have at times had to be discarded due to events. After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s first-term strategy ended up focusing heavily on battling Islamist terrorism. Biden’s team spent much of its first year working on a strategy that had to be rewritten after Russia moved toward a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

LONDON — In February Britain’s cash-strapped Labour government cut international development spending — and barely anyone made a noise. The center-left party announced it would slice the country’s spending on aid down to only 0.3 percent of gross domestic income — from 0.5 percent — in order to fund a hike in defense spending. MPs, aid experts and officials have told POLITICO that the scale of the cuts is on a par with — or even exceeding — those of both the previous center-right Conservative government or the United States under Donald Trump. This leaves Britain’s development arm, once globally envied as a vehicle for poverty alleviation, a shadow of its former self. The move — prompted by U.S. demands to up its NATO spending, and mirroring the Trump administration’s move to gut its own USAID development budget — shocked Labour’s progressive MPs, supporters and backers in the aid sector. But unlike attempted cuts to British welfare spending, the real-world backlash was muted, with the resignation of Britain’s development minister prompting little further dissent or change in policy. There was no mutiny in parliament, and only limited domestic and international condemnation outside of an aid sector torn between making their voices heard — and keeping in Whitehall’s good books over slices of the shrinking pie. Some fear a return grab over the aid budget could still be on the cards — but that the government will find that there is little left to cut. Gideon Rabinowitz, director of policy and advocacy at Bond, the U.K. network for NGOs, warned that, instead of “reversing the cuts by the previous Conservative government, Labour has compounded them, and lives will be lost as a result.” “These cuts will further tarnish the U.K.’s reputation as it continues to be known as an unreliable global partner, breaking Labour’s manifesto commitment,” he warned. “The Conservatives started the fire, but instead of putting it out, this Labour government threw petrol on it.” ‘IT WAS THE PERFECT TIME TO DO IT’ When Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the cut to international aid — a bid to save over £6 billion by 2027 — Labour MPs, including those who worked in the sector before being elected, were notably silent. The move followed a 2021 Conservative cut to aid spending — from 0.7 percent in the Tory brand-rebuilding David Cameron years down to 0.5 percent. At the time, Labour MPs had met that Tory cut with howls of outrage. This time it was different. Some were genuinely shocked, while others feared retribution from a Downing Street that had flexed its muscles at MPs who rebelled on what they saw as points of conscience. “No one was expecting it, so there was no opportunity to campaign around it,” said one Labour MP. “Literally none of us had any idea it was coming.” Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as the World Bank. | Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images The same MP noted that there are around 50 Labour MPs from the new 2024 intake who had some form of development background before coming into parliament. Yet they were put “completely under the cosh” by Downing Street and government whips. “It was the perfect time to do it,” the MP said. A number of MPs who might have been vocal have since been made parliamentary private secretaries — the most junior government role. “They have basically gagged the people who would be most likely to be outspoken on it,” the MP above said. The department’s ministerial team is now more likely to be loyal to the Starmer project. “I just felt hurt, and wounded. We were stunned. None of us saw it coming,” said one MP from the 2024 cohort, adding: “They priced in that backlash wouldn’t come.” But they added: “If we were culpable so were NGOs, too inward-looking and focused on peripheral issues.” The lack of outcry from MPs would, however, seem to put them largely in step with the wider British public. Polling and focus groups from think tank More in Common suggest that despite the majority of voters thinking spending on international aid is the right thing to do in a variety of circumstances, only around 20 percent of the public think the budget was cut too much.  The second new-intake Labour MP quoted above said the policy was therefore an “easy thing to sell on the doorstep,” and “in my area, there’s not going to be shouting from the rooftops to spend more money on aid.” DIMINISHED AND DEMORALIZED The cuts to aid come at a time when Britain’s Foreign Office is undergoing a radical overhaul. While the department describes its plans as “more agile,” staff, programs and entire areas of focus are all ripe for cuts to save money. The department is looking to make redundancies for around 25 percent of staff based in the U.K. MPs have voiced concern that development staff will be among the first to make the jump due to the government’s shift away from aid. The department insists that no final decisions have been taken over the size and shape of the organization. Major cuts are expected across work on education, conflict, and WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene.) The government’s Integrated Security Fund — which funds key counter-terror programs abroad — is also looking to scale back work abroad which does not have a clear link to Britain’s national security. The British Council — a key soft-power organization viewed as helping combat Chinese and Russian reach across the world — told MPs it is in “real financial peril” and would be cutting its presence in 35 of the 97 countries it operates. The BBC’s World Service is seeing similar cuts to its global reach. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), the watchdog for aid spending, is also not safe from the ax as the government continues its bonfire of regulators. The FCDO did not refute the expected pathway of cuts. Published breakdowns of spending allocations for the next three years are due to be published in the coming months, an official said. A review of Britain’s development and diplomacy policies conducted by economist Minouche Shafik — who has since been moved into Downing Street — sits discarded in the department. The government refuses to publish its findings. Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a second bite. | Pool Photo by Adrian Dennis via Getty Images The second 2024 intake MP quoted earlier in the piece said that following the U.S. decisions on aid and foreign policy “there was an expectation that the U.K., as a responsible international partner, as a leader on a lot of this stuff, would fill the gap to some extent, and then take more of a leadership role on it, and we’ve done the opposite.” NOTHING LEFT TO CUT Aid spending was spared a repeat visit by Chancellor Rachel Reeves in her government-wide budget last month — but that hasn’t stopped MPs worrying about a second bite. While few MPs or those in the aid sector feel Britain will ever return to the lofty heights of its 0.7 percent commitment, they predict there will be harder resistance if the government comes back for more. “I don’t think they’re going to try and do it again, as there’s no money left,” the second 2024 intake MP said. But they pointed out that a large portion of the remaining aid budget is spent on in-country costs such as accommodation for asylum seekers. Savings identified from the asylum budget would be sent back to the Treasury, rather than put back into the aid budget, they noted. Remaining spending is largely mandatory contributions to organizations such as the World Bank or the United Nations and would, they warned, involve “getting rid of international agreements and chopping up longstanding influence at big international institutions that we are one of the leading people in.” The United Nations is already facing its own funding crisis as it struggles to adjust to the global downturn in aid spending. British diplomat Tom Fletcher — who leads the UN’s humanitarian response — said earlier this year that the organization has been “forced into a triage of human survival,” adding: “The math is cruel, and the consequences are heartbreaking.” The government still has a commitment to returning to 0.7 percent of GNI “as soon as the fiscal circumstances allow.” The tests for this ramp back up were set out four years ago. Britain must not be borrowing for day-to-day spending and underlying debt must be falling. The last two budgets have forecast that the government will not meet these tests in this parliament. FARAGE CIRCLES In the meantime, Labour’s opponents feel emboldened to go further. Both the Conservatives and Reform UK have said that they would further cut the aid budget. The Tories have vowed to slice it down to 0.1 percent of GNI, while Nigel Farage’s Reform UK is eyeing fresh cuts of at least by £7-8 billion a year. A third 2024 Labour MP said that there was a degree of pressure among some colleagues to match the Conservatives’ 0.1 percent pledge. Though no country has gone as far as Uganda’s Idi Amin in setting up a “save Britain fund” for its “former colonial masters,” Britain’s departure on international aid gives space for other countries wanting to step up to further their own foreign policy aims. The space vacated by Britain and America has prompted warnings that China will step in, while countries newer to international development such as Gulf states could try and fill the void. Many of these nations are unlikely to ever fund the same projects as the U.K. and the U.S., forcing NGOs to look to alternate donors such as philanthropists to fund their work. “There’ll be a big, big gap, and it won’t be completely filled,” the second new intake MP said. An FCDO spokesperson said the department was undergoing “an unprecedented transformation,” and added: “We remain resolutely committed to international development and have been clear we must modernize our approach to development to reflect the changing global context. We will bring U.K. expertise and investment to where it is needed most, including global health solutions and humanitarian support.”

When the Franco-German summit concluded in Berlin, Europe’s leaders issued a declaration with a clear ambition: strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty in an open, collaborative way. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for “Europe’s Independence Moment” captures the urgency, but independence isn’t declared — it’s designed. The pandemic exposed this truth. When Covid-19 struck, Europe initially scrambled for vaccines and facemasks, hampered by fragmented responses and overreliance on a few external suppliers. That vulnerability must never be repeated. True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. > True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. Diversity doesn’t mean pulling every factory back to Europe or building walls around markets. Many industries depend on expertise and resources beyond our borders. The answer is optionality, never putting all our eggs in one basket. Europe must enable choice and work with trusted partners to build capabilities. This risk-based approach ensures we’re not hostage to single suppliers or overexposed to nations that don’t share our values. Look at the energy crisis after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas left economies vulnerable. The solution wasn’t isolation, it was diversification: boosting domestic production from alternative energy sources while sourcing from multiple markets. Optionality is power. It lets Europe pivot when shocks hit, whether in energy, technology, or raw materials. Resilience is the art of prediction. Every system inevitably has vulnerabilities. The key is pre-empting, planning, testing and knowing how to recover quickly. Just as banks undergo stress tests, Europe needs similar rigor across physical and digital infrastructure. That also means promoting interoperability between networks, redundant connectivity links (including space and subsea cables), stockpiling critical components, and contingency plans. Resilience isn’t theoretical. It’s operational readiness. Finally, Europe must exercise authority through robust frameworks, such as authorization schemes, local licensing and governance rooted in EU law. The question is how and where to apply this control. On sensitive data, for example, sovereignty means ensuring it’s held in Europe under European jurisdiction, without replacing every underlying technology component. Sovereign solutions shouldn’t shut out global players. Instead, they should guarantee that critical decisions and compliance remain under European authority. Autonomy is empowerment, limiting external interference or denial of service while keeping systems secure and accountable. But let’s be clear: Europe cannot replicate world-leading technologies, platforms or critical components overnight. While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. > While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen > significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. For example, building fully European alternatives in cloud and AI would take decades and billions of euros, and even then, we’d struggle to match Silicon Valley or Shenzhen. Worse, turning inward with protectionist policies would only weaken the foundations that we now seek to strengthen. “Old wines in new bottles” — import substitution, isolationism, picking winners — won’t deliver competitiveness or security. Contrast that with the much-debated US Inflation Reduction Act. Its incentives and subsidies were open to EU companies, provided they invest locally, develop local talent and build within the US market. It’s not about flags, it’s about pragmatism: attracting global investments, creating jobs and driving innovation-led growth. So what’s the practical path? Europe must embrace ‘sovereignty done right’, weaving diversity, resilience and autonomy into the fabric of its policies. That means risk-based safeguards, strategic partnerships and investment in European capabilities while staying open to global innovation. Trusted European operators can play a key role: managing encryption, access control and critical operations within EU jurisdiction, while enabling managed access to global technologies. To avoid ‘sovereignty washing’, eligibility should be based on rigorous, transparent assessments, not blanket bans. The Berlin summit’s new working group should start with a common EU-wide framework defining levels of data, operational and technological sovereignty. Providers claiming sovereign services can use this framework to transparently demonstrate which levels they meet. Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. Independence should be dynamic, not defensive — empowering innovation, securing prosperity and protecting freedoms. > Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right > will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. That’s how Europe can build resilience, competitiveness and true strategic autonomy in a vibrant global digital ecosystem.

European Council President António Costa intends to summon EU leaders to an informal retreat in rural Belgium next February to discuss Europe’s competitiveness. The meeting of the bloc’s heads of state and government will take place on Feb. 12 at Alden Biesen Castle, a XVI century moated complex in the eastern Belgian region of Limburg, Costa said in an interview with Portuguese daily Expresso. The informal summit on competitiveness will take place just a few months after the leaders debated the European Commission’s proposal to foster a pan-European industrial revival by merging cash for research, defense and innovation in the EU’s 2028-2035 budget. Shortly before taking office a year ago, the Council president said he wanted to organize periodic, informal meetings of EU leaders where they could discuss broad, strategic topics without the need to reach definitive conclusions. The objective was to create space for the kinds of debates that regularly derailed official summits chaired by Costa’s predecessor, Charles Michel. Although Costa wanted to hold the retreats outside the Belgian capital, security concerns obliged him to hold the first of these events in Brussels’ central Egmont Palace last February. During that session, EU leaders discussed issues related to the wider topic of European defense. Last week the bloc’s leaders attended an informal meeting in Luanda, Angola, where talks focused on the ongoing efforts to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine. During the wide-ranging interview with Expresso, which marked his first year in the Council presidency, Costa said the greatest challenge he has faced was that of stabilizing relations between the EU and U.S. President Donald Trump. That goal, he said, had been achieved, but he acknowledged that the dynamics between Brussels and Washington are “different” than they once were. Costa said it was essential for the EU to “remain calm, serene, and continue to strive to be constructive” when dealing with Trump, and noted that the relationship between Brussels and Washington is not “between equals.” The EU, he noted, is made up of 27 member countries “each with its own policies and interests,” while the U.S. operates as a single, federal entity.