KYIV – General Vasyl Malyuk, chief of the Security Service of Ukraine or SBU, resigned from his post on Monday. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appointed Major General Yevhen Khmara, head of the top counterintelligence agency’s special operations force Alfa, to serve as the acting head of the entire SBU, reads the decree published on Monday. “Yevhen Khmara is an experienced special forces officer who has been serving in the Special Operations Center ‘A’ of the SBU since 2011, and in 2023 was appointed head of Alfa,” the SBU press service said. Fighters of the Special Operations Center “A” of the SBU conduct unique special operations to destroy military facilities in the deep rear of Russia — airfields, weapons warehouses and arsenals, oil refineries, and factories producing bombs and drones, and other significant targets. Khmara was an architect of Ukraine’s liberation of Snake Island in the Black Sea in 2022. POLITICO first reported that Malyuk was Zelenskyy’s next target as part of an ongoing government reshuffle. But unlike other top spies, Malyuk fought to stay in the SBU, with several Ukrainian military top commanders publicly urging Zelenskyy to let him continue successful operations against Russia, claiming he was effective where he was. Zelenskyy wanted to offer him a top post either at Ukraine’s foreign intelligence service or at the national security council. However, on Monday, it was announced that Malyuk will indeed remain within the SBU but not in the very top position. “I am leaving the position of Head of the Security Service. I will remain within the SBU system to implement world-class asymmetric special operations that will continue to cause maximum damage to the enemy,” Malyuk said in a statement on Monday, refusing to specify his new position. Zelenskyy explained the need for “rotation of everybody” to strengthen the country’s negotiating stance and resilience in the face of what’s coming. “Our country has two paths. The first path is peaceful, diplomatic, and it is a priority for us today. We want to end the war. At some point, if Russia blocks it and the partners do not force Russia to stop the war, there will be another path — to defend ourselves. And at this point, fresh forces will be needed. I will go through a parallel reboot of all structures. Just in case,” Zelenskyy told reporters during a press briefing on Saturday. On Monday, Zelenskyy met with several other top SBU officials to discuss the agency’s future.

KYIV — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has appointed Chrystia Freeland, a former deputy prime minister of Canada, as his new adviser on Ukraine’s economic development, according to a presidential decree published Monday. “Chrystia is highly skilled in these matters and has extensive experience in attracting investment and implementing economic transformations,” Zelenskyy said in a post on X. Freeland will be working on a freelance basis. “Right now, Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience — both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defense if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end,” Zelenskyy added. Freeland, 57, served as deputy PM of Canada under former leader Justin Trudeau. More recently, she resigned from her post as transport and internal trade minister in Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Cabinet in September to become Canada’s special envoy on the reconstruction of Ukraine. Freeland has Ukrainian roots through her mother, Halyna Chomiak, and is a prominent pro-Ukraine advocate. Freeland has not commented publicly on the announcement. When contacted, POLITICO received an out-of-office reply, saying she would be back at work later today. Freeland’s appointment is the latest step in Zelenskyy’s reboot of his office. The president recently appointed former military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov as his new chief of staff, and former Ukrainian deputy foreign minister and long-term ambassador to the U.N. Sergiy Kyslytsya has been appointed deputy head of the president’s office. The Ukrainian leader explained the reboot was needed to strengthen the country’s negotiating stance and resilience in the face of what’s coming. “Our country has two paths. The first path is peaceful, diplomatic, and it is a priority for us today. We want to end the war. At some point, if Russia blocks it and the partners do not force Russia to stop the war, there will be another path — to defend ourselves. And at this point, fresh forces will be needed. I will go through a parallel reboot of all structures. Just in case,” Zelenskyy told reporters during a press briefing on Saturday.

In the desolate Arctic desert of Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, Europeans are building defenses against a new, up-and-coming security threat: space hacks. A Lithuanian company called Astrolight is constructing a ground station, with support from the European Space Agency, that will use laser beams to download voluminous data from satellites in a fast and secure manner, it announced last month.  It’s just one example of how Europe is moving to harden the security of its satellites, as rising geopolitical tensions and an expanding spectrum of hybrid threats are pushing space communications to the heart of the bloc’s security plans. For years, satellite infrastructure was treated by policymakers as a technical utility rather than a strategic asset. That changed in 2022, when a cyberattack on the Viasat satellite network coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.   Satellites have since become popular targets for interference, espionage and disruption. The European Commission in June warned that space was becoming “more contested,” flagging increasing cyberattacks and attempts at electronic interference targeting satellites and ground stations. Germany and the United Kingdom warned earlier this year of the growing threat posed by Russian and Chinese space satellites, which are regularly spotted spying on their satellites.  EU governments are now racing to boost their resilience and reduce reliance on foreign technology, both through regulations like the new Space Act and investments in critical infrastructure. The threat is crystal clear in Greenland, Laurynas Mačiulis, the chief executive officer of Astrolight, said. “The problem today is that around 80 percent of all the [space data] traffic is downlinked to a single location in Svalbard, which is an island shared between different countries, including Russia,” he said in an interview. Europe’s main Arctic ground station sits in Svalbard and supports both the navigation systems of Galileo and Copernicus. While the location is strategic, it is also extremely sensitive due to nearby Russian and Chinese activities. Crucially, the station relies on a single undersea cable to connect to the internet, which has been damaged several times. “In case of intentional or unintentional damage of this cable, you lose access to most of the geo-intelligence satellites, which is, of course, very critical. So our aim is to deploy a complementary satellite ground station up in Greenland,” Mačiulis said. THE MUSK OF IT ALL A centerpiece of Europe’s ambitions to have secure, European satellite communication is IRIS², a multibillion-euro secure connectivity constellation pitched in 2022 and designed to rival Elon Musk’s Starlink system. “Today, communications — for instance in Ukraine — are far too dependent on Starlink,” said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the founding chairman of political consultancy Rasmussen Global, speaking at an event in Brussels in November. “That dependence rests on the shifting ideas of an American billionaire. That’s too risky. We have to build a secure communications system that is independent of the United States.” The European system, which will consist of 18 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, aims to provide Europe with fast and encrypted communication. “Even if someone intercepts the signal [of IRIS² ], they will not be able to decrypt it,” Piero Angeletti, head of the Secure Connectivity Space Segment Office at the European Space Agency, told POLITICO. “This will allow us to have a secure system that is also certified and accredited by the national security entities.” The challenge is that IRIS² is still at least four years away from becoming operational. WHO’S IN CHARGE? While Europe beefs up its secure satellite systems, governments are still streamlining how they can coordinate cyber defenses and space security. In many cases, that falls to both space or cyber commands, which, unlike traditional military units, are relatively new and often still being built out. Clémence Poirier, a cyberdefense researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, said that EU countries must now focus on maturing them. “European states need to keep developing those commands,” she told POLITICO. “Making sure that they coordinate their action, that there are clear mandates and responsibilities when it comes to cyber security, cyber defensive operations, cyber offensive operations, and also when it comes to monitoring the threat.” Industry, too, is struggling to fill the gaps. Most cybersecurity firms do not treat space as a sector in its own right, leaving satellite operators in a blind spot. Instead, space systems are folded into other categories: Earth-observation satellites often fall under environmental services, satellite TV under media, and broadband constellations like Starlink under internet services. That fragmentation makes it harder for space companies to assess risk, update threat models or understand who they need to defend against. It also complicates incident response: while advanced tools exist for defending against cyberattacks on terrestrial networks, those tools often do not translate well to space systems. “Cybersecurity in space is a bit different,” Poirier added. “You cannot just implement whatever solution you have for your computers on Earth and just deploy that to your satellite.”

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. It was hardly the kind of peace and cheer one hopes to see leading up to Christmas. But on Dec. 7, the second Sunday of Advent, a collection of telecoms masts in Sweden were the site of a strange scene, as a foreign citizen turned up and began taking photographs. The case became widely known two days later, when the CEO of Teracom, a state-owned Swedish telecom and data services provider, posted an unusual update on LinkedIn: Company employees and contracted security had helped detain a foreign citizen, CEO Johan Petersson reported. They had spotted the foreigner taking pictures of a group of Teracom masts, which are sensitive installations clearly marked with “no trespassing” signs. After being alerted by the employees, police had arrested the intruder. “Fast, resolute and completely in line with the operative capabilities required to protect Sweden’s critical infrastructure,” Petersson wrote. But his post didn’t end there: “Teracom continually experiences similar events,” he noted. “We don’t just deliver robust nets — we take full responsibility for keeping them secure and accessible around the clock. This is total defense in practice.” That’s a lot of troubling news in one message: a foreign citizen intruding into an area closed to the public to take photos of crucial communications masts, and the fact that this isn’t a unique occurrence. Indeed, earlier this year, Swedish authorities announced they had discovered a string of some 30 cases of sabotage against telecoms and data masts in the country. How many more potential saboteurs haven’t been caught? It’s a frightening question and, naturally, one we don’t have an answer to. It’s not just communications masts that are being targeted. In the past couple years, there have been fires set in shopping malls and warehouses in big cities. There have been suspicious drone sightings near defense manufacturing sites and, infamously, airports. Between January and Nov. 19 of this year, there were more than 1,072 incidents involving 1,955 drones in Europe, and as a group of German journalism students have established, some of those drones were launched from Russian-linked ships. And of course, there has been suspicious damage to undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Taiwan. I’ve written before in this publication that Russia’s goal with such subversive operations may be to bleed our companies dry, and that China seems to be pursuing the same objective vis-à-vis certain countries. But when it comes to critical national infrastructure — in which I could include institutions like supermarkets — we need them to work no matter what. Imagine going a day or two or three without being able to buy food, and you’ll see what I mean. The upside to Teracom’s most recent scare was that the company was prepared and ultimately lost no money. Because its staff and security guards were alert, the company prevented any damage to their masts and operations. In fact, with the perpetrator arrested — whether prosecutors will decide to charge him remains to be seen — Teracom’s staff may well have averted possible damage to other businesses too. Moving forward, companies would do well to train their staff to be similarly alert when it comes to saboteurs and reconnaissance operators in different guises. We can’t know exactly what kind of subversive activities will be directed against our societies, but companies can teach their employees what to look for. If someone suddenly starts taking pictures of something only a saboteur would be interested in, that’s a red flag. Indeed, boards could also start requiring company staff to become more vigilant. If alertness can make the difference between relatively smooth sailing and considerable losses — or intense tangling with insurers — in these geopolitically turbulent times, few boards would ignore it. And being able to demonstrate such preparedness is something companies could highlight in speeches, media interviews and, naturally, their annual reports. Insurers, in turn, could start requiring such training for these very reasons. After serious cyberattacks first took off, insurers paid out on their policies for a long time, until they realized they should start obliging the organizations they insure to demonstrate serious protections in order to qualify for insurance. Insurers may soon decide to introduce such conditions for coverage of physical attacks too. Even without pressure from boards or insurers, considering the risk of sabotage directed at companies, it would be positively negligent not to train one’s staff accordingly. Meanwhile, some governments have understandably introduced resilience requirements for companies that operate crucial national infrastructure. Under Finland’s CER Act, for instance, “critical entities must carry out a risk assessment, draw up a resilience plan and take any necessary measures.” The social contract in liberal democracies is that we willingly give up some of our power to those we elect to govern us. These representatives are ultimately in charge of the state apparatus, and in exchange, we pay taxes and obey the law. But that social contract doesn’t completely absolve us from our responsibility toward the greater good. That’s why an increasing number of European countries are obliging 19-year-olds to do military service. When crises approach, we all still have a part to play. Helping spot incidents and alerting the authorities is everyone’s responsibility. Because the current geopolitical turbulence has followed such a long period of harmony, it’s hard to crank up the gears of societal responsibility again. And truthfully, in some countries, those gears never worked particularly well to begin with. But for companies, however, stepping up to the plate isn’t just a matter of doing the right thing — it’s a matter of helping themselves. Back in the day, the saying went that what was good for Volvo was good for Sweden, and what was good for General Motors was good for the U.S. Today, when companies do the right thing for their home countries, they similarly benefit too. Now, let’s get those alertness courses going.

KYIV — For Ukrainians, the shattered eastern city of Pokrovsk — where troops are locked in battle with the Russians this Christmas — conjures up associations with one of their country’s most enduring cultural legacies: the Carol of the Bells. Western audiences may know the haunting, repeated melody from the Hollywood film Home Alone and the TV series Ted Lasso, but there are more poignant and political resonances for Ukrainians this winter as Pokrovsk is so closely connected with the carol’s composer, Mykola Leontovych. Leontovych did not — as widely believed — compose the carol in Pokrovsk but the city played a crucial role in the development of both his music and the patriotic Ukrainian politics that led to his persecution by the Russians and ultimately his murder by Soviet agents in 1921. Leontovych was based in Pokrovsk in the first decade of the 20th century, teaching at a music school and running a railway workers’ choir. He drew inspiration there from distinctively Ukrainian folk traditions, and he would later base the Carol of the Bells on a seasonal chant called Shchedryk. (Pokrovsk is dubbed the hometown of Shchedryk.) “Leontovych came to Pokrovsk with only the bag on his back, but it was there that he developed as a composer, and caught the attention of gendarmes as he stood up for the rights of workers. He even sang the Marseillaise with the local choir that he ran,” said Larysa Semenko, author of the book “Our Silent Genius, Leontovych.” Semenko was also quick to point out that the Ukrainian political dimension to the Carol of the Bells was nothing new. “It was never just a Christmas song, but a Ukrainian cultural message to the world, a greeting card of the nation’s deep-rooted spirituality and resilience in the face of threat. The same threat our nation is fighting today,” she said. SONG OF AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE Leontovych is widely seen as a hero who took on Russia with his music a century ago, just as Ukrainians today are turning to guns, shells and drones to preserve their national identity from devastation by Moscow. As soon as Leontovych’s version of Shchedryk premiered in Kyiv in 1916, it was spotted as a potential hit by the leaders of the Ukrainian National Republic, the country’s short-lived attempt to break free from Moscow after World War I. The new government decided to send a national choir on tour across Europe with Leontovych’s choral songs in 1919 to promote recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic. The world did not recognize the new nation, but Shchedryk won it a place in global culture. “Even before the translation, it was a hit. In Paris, in Prague, all around Europe, princes and kings were fascinated to find out such a rich and old culture existed on their continent,” Semenko said. Before the European tour, the singers from the Ukrainian choir had to evacuate to the West of Ukraine as Bolsheviks overran Kyiv. After their European success, they went to Canada and the United States, already as the Ukrainian National Chorus, bringing Shchedryk to the North America in 1922. As soon as Leontovych’s version of Shchedryk premiered in Kyiv in 1916, it was spotted as a potential hit by the leaders of the Ukrainian National Republic. | Kostiantyn Liberov/Libkos/Getty Images “Shchedryk, which was a hit and always played as an encore, enchanted Europe and America, and helped Ukrainians to declare their nation and state to the world, said Anatoliy Paladiychuk, researcher and author of the project “Kamianets Notes and Wings of Shchedryk.” In 1936, the American composer Peter J. Wilhousky wrote English lyrics, adapting Shchedryk into the version familiar in West as the Carol of the Bells for an NBC radio performance. Leontovych did not live to see this worldwide success. Under the pretext that they were fighting bandits, the Soviet secret service killed him in January 1921 in his parents’ house in the western region of Vinnytsia. Ukrainians only learned the truth about his death after the opening of Soviet archives in the 1990s. “Just like they do in occupied territories of Ukraine now, Russian authorities saw a threat in Ukrainian culture. That was the start of great terror against Ukrainian freedom fighters, politicians, and educators. Leontovych was one of many who were killed,” Semenko said. HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF Almost 105 years after Leontovych’s death, Russia is once again trying to snuff out Ukrainian nationhood. While fighting has raged over Pokrovsk for more than 18 months, Moscow now claims it has occupied it. The Ukrainian army insists its forces are back in parts of Pokrovsk after withdrawal in November. Kyiv also says small groups of Russian soldiers are infiltrating to pose for pictures with flags for propaganda purposes, but don’t fully control the ruins. The Ukrainian army insists its forces are back in parts of Pokrovsk after withdrawal in November. | Ukrinform/NurPhoto via Getty Images “Our active operations in the Pokrovsko-Myrnoрrad agglomeration area continue. In Pokrovsk itself, in the past few weeks, we were able to regain control of about 16 square kilometers in the northern part of the city,” Ukrainian Army Commander Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi said in a post on Telegram. Syrskyi vowed Ukraine would continue to fight for Pokrovsk and bolster its forces in the ruined city against hundreds of thousands of Kremlin soldiers. American historian Timothy Snyder — a leading expert on Ukraine — also drew on the Carol of the Bells to stress the continuity between Russian colonialism a century ago and President Vladimir Putin’s onslaught against the country. “Ukrainian culture is very significant in our world, but our awareness of it is minimal: the assassination of Leontovych and the transformation of Shchedryk is just one minor example of this colonial history, one that is continued during Russia’s present invasion of Ukraine,” Snyder said in a post on Substack on Dec 14.

The discussion surrounding the digital euro is strategically important to Europe. On Dec. 12, the EU finance ministers are aiming to agree on a general approach regarding the dossier. This sets out the European Council’s official position and thus represents a major political milestone for the European Council ahead of the trilogue negotiations. We want to be sure that, in this process, the project will be subject to critical analysis that is objective and nuanced and takes account of the long-term interests of Europe and its people. > We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question > but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can > be seized. We regard the following points as particularly important: * maintaining European sovereignty at the customer interface; * avoiding a parallel infrastructure that inhibits innovation; and * safeguarding the stability of the financial markets by imposing clear holding limits. We do not want the debate to fundamentally call the digital euro into question but rather to refine the specific details in such a way that opportunities can be seized and, at the same time, risks can be avoided. Opportunities of the digital euro:  1. European resilience and sovereignty in payments processing: as a public-sector means of payment that is accepted across Europe, the digital euro can reduce reliance on non-European card systems and big-tech wallets, provided that a firmly European design is adopted and it is embedded in the existing structures of banks and savings banks and can thus be directly linked to customers’ existing accounts. 2. Supplement to cash and private-sector digital payments: as a central bank digital currency, the digital euro can offer an additional, state-backed payment option, especially when it is held in a digital wallet and can also be used for e-commerce use cases (a compromise proposed by the European Parliament’s main rapporteur for the digital euro, Fernando Navarrete). This would further strengthen people’s freedom of choice in the payment sphere. 3. Catalyst for innovation in the European market: if integrated into banking apps and designed in accordance with the compromises proposed by Navarrete (see point 2), the digital euro can promote innovation in retail payments, support new European payment ecosystems, and simplify cross-border payments. > The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital > euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. Risks of the current configuration: 1. Risk of creating a gateway for US providers: in the configuration currently planned, the digital euro provides US and other non-European tech and payment companies with access to the customer interface, customer data and payment infrastructure without any of the regulatory obligations and costs that only European providers face. This goes against the objective of digital sovereignty. 2. State parallel infrastructures weaken the market and innovation: the European Central Bank (ECB) is planning not just two new sets of infrastructure but also its own product for end customers (through an app). An administrative body has neither the market experience nor the customer access that banks and payment providers do. At the same time, the ECB is removing the tried-and-tested allocation of roles between the central bank and private sector. Furthermore, the Eurosystem’s digital euro project will tie up urgently required development capacity for many years and thereby further exacerbate Europe’s competitive disadvantage. The burden of investment and the risk resulting from introducing the digital euro will be disproportionately borne by banks and savings banks. In any case, the banks and savings banks have already developed a European market solution, Wero, which is currently coming onto the market. The digital euro needs to strengthen rather than weaken this European-led payment method. 3. Risks for financial stability and lending: without clear holding limits, there is a risk of uncontrolled transfers of deposits from banks and savings banks into holdings of digital euros. Deposits are the backbone of lending; large-scale outflows would weaken both the funding of the real economy – especially small and medium-sized enterprises – and the stability of the system. Holding limits must therefore be based on usual payment needs and be subject to binding regulations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany * The ultimate controlling entity is Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. , Schellingstraße 4, 10785 Berlin, Germany More information here.

Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

After more than three decades in the pharmaceutical industry, I know one thing: science transforms lives, but policy determines whether innovation thrives or stalls. That reality shapes outcomes for patients — and for Europe’s competitiveness. Today, Europeans stand at a defining moment. The choices we make now will determine whether Europe remains a global leader in life sciences or we watch that leadership slip away. It’s worth reminding ourselves of the true value of Europe’s life sciences industry and the power we have as a united bloc to protect it as a European good. Europe has an illustrious track record in medical discovery, from the first antibiotics to the discovery of DNA and today’s advanced biologics. Still today, our region remains an engine of medical breakthroughs, powered by an extraordinary ecosystem of innovators in the form of start-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises, academic labs, and university hospitals. This strength benefits patients through access to clinical trials and cutting-edge treatments. It also makes life sciences a strategic pillar of Europe’s economy. The economic stakes Life sciences is not just another industry for Europe. It’s a growth engine, a source of resilience and a driver of scientific sovereignty. The EU is already home to some of the world’s most talented scientists, thriving academic institutions and research clusters, and a social model built on universal access to healthcare. These assets are powerful, yet they only translate into future success if supported by a legislative environment that rewards innovation. > Life sciences is not just another industry for Europe. It’s a growth engine, a > source of resilience and a driver of scientific sovereignty. This is also an industry that supports 2.3 million jobs and contributes over €200 billion to the EU economy each year — more than any other sector. EU pharmaceutical research and development spending grew from €27.8 billion in 2010 to €46.2 billion in 2022, an average annual increase of 4.4 percent. A success story, yes — but one under pressure. While Europe debates, others act Over the past two decades, Europe has lost a quarter of its share of global investment to other regions. This year — for the first time — China overtook both the United States and Europe in the number of new molecules discovered. China has doubled its share of industry sponsored clinical trials, while Europe’s share has halved, leaving 60,000 European patients without the opportunity to participate in trials of the next generation of treatments. Why does this matter? Because every clinical trial site that moves elsewhere means a patient in Europe waits longer for the next treatment — and an ecosystem slowly loses competitiveness. Policy determines whether innovation can take root. The United States and Asia are streamlining regulation, accelerating approvals and attracting capital at unprecedented scale. While Europe debates these matters, others act. A world moving faster And now, global dynamics are shifting in unprecedented ways. The United States’ administration’s renewed push for a Most Favored Nation drug pricing policy — designed to tie domestic prices to the lowest paid in developed markets — combined with the potential removal of long-standing tariff exemptions for medicines exported from Europe, marks a historic turning point. A fundamental reordering of the pharmaceutical landscape is underway. The message is clear: innovation competitiveness is now a geopolitical priority. Europe must treat it as such. A once-in-a-generation reset The timing couldn’t be better. As we speak, Europe is rewriting the pharmaceutical legislation that will define the next 20 years of innovation. This is a rare opportunity, but only if reforms strengthen, rather than weaken, Europe’s ability to compete in life sciences. To lead globally, Europe must make choices and act decisively. A triple A framework — attract, accelerate, access — makes the priorities clear: * Attract global investment by ensuring strong intellectual property protection, predictable regulation and competitive incentives — the foundations of a world-class innovation ecosystem. * Accelerate the path from science to patients. Europe’s regulatory system must match the speed of scientific progress, ensuring that breakthroughs reach patients sooner. * Ensure equitable and timely access for all European patients. No innovation should remain inaccessible because of administrative delays or fragmented decision-making across 27 systems. These priorities reinforce each other, creating a virtuous cycle that strengthens competitiveness, improves health outcomes and drives sustainable growth. > Europe has everything required to shape the future of medicine: world-class > science, exceptional talent, a 500-million-strong market and one of the most > sophisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing bases in the world. Despite flat or declining public investment in new medicines across most member states over the past 20 years, the research-based pharmaceutical industry has stepped up, doubling its contributions to public pharmaceutical expenditure from 12 percent to 24 percent between 2018 and 2023. In effect, we have financed our own innovation. No other sector has done this at such scale. But this model is not sustainable. Pharmaceutical innovation must be treated not as a cost to contain, but as a strategic investment in Europe’s future. The choice before us Europe has everything required to shape the future of medicine: world-class science, exceptional talent, a 500-million-strong market and one of the most sophisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing bases in the world. What we need now is an ambition equal to those assets. If we choose innovation, we secure Europe’s jobs, research and competitiveness — and ensure European patients benefit first from the next generation of medical breakthroughs. A wrong call will be felt for decades. The next chapter for Europe is being written now. Let us choose the path that keeps Europe leading, competing and innovating: for our economies, our societies and, above all, our patients. Choose Europe. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) * The ultimate controlling entity is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) * The political advertisement is linked to the Critical Medicines Act. More information here.

When the Franco-German summit concluded in Berlin, Europe’s leaders issued a declaration with a clear ambition: strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty in an open, collaborative way. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for “Europe’s Independence Moment” captures the urgency, but independence isn’t declared — it’s designed. The pandemic exposed this truth. When Covid-19 struck, Europe initially scrambled for vaccines and facemasks, hampered by fragmented responses and overreliance on a few external suppliers. That vulnerability must never be repeated. True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. > True sovereignty rests on three pillars: diversity, resilience and autonomy. Diversity doesn’t mean pulling every factory back to Europe or building walls around markets. Many industries depend on expertise and resources beyond our borders. The answer is optionality, never putting all our eggs in one basket. Europe must enable choice and work with trusted partners to build capabilities. This risk-based approach ensures we’re not hostage to single suppliers or overexposed to nations that don’t share our values. Look at the energy crisis after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas left economies vulnerable. The solution wasn’t isolation, it was diversification: boosting domestic production from alternative energy sources while sourcing from multiple markets. Optionality is power. It lets Europe pivot when shocks hit, whether in energy, technology, or raw materials. Resilience is the art of prediction. Every system inevitably has vulnerabilities. The key is pre-empting, planning, testing and knowing how to recover quickly. Just as banks undergo stress tests, Europe needs similar rigor across physical and digital infrastructure. That also means promoting interoperability between networks, redundant connectivity links (including space and subsea cables), stockpiling critical components, and contingency plans. Resilience isn’t theoretical. It’s operational readiness. Finally, Europe must exercise authority through robust frameworks, such as authorization schemes, local licensing and governance rooted in EU law. The question is how and where to apply this control. On sensitive data, for example, sovereignty means ensuring it’s held in Europe under European jurisdiction, without replacing every underlying technology component. Sovereign solutions shouldn’t shut out global players. Instead, they should guarantee that critical decisions and compliance remain under European authority. Autonomy is empowerment, limiting external interference or denial of service while keeping systems secure and accountable. But let’s be clear: Europe cannot replicate world-leading technologies, platforms or critical components overnight. While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. > While we have the talent, innovation and leading industries, Europe has fallen > significantly behind in a range of key emerging technologies. For example, building fully European alternatives in cloud and AI would take decades and billions of euros, and even then, we’d struggle to match Silicon Valley or Shenzhen. Worse, turning inward with protectionist policies would only weaken the foundations that we now seek to strengthen. “Old wines in new bottles” — import substitution, isolationism, picking winners — won’t deliver competitiveness or security. Contrast that with the much-debated US Inflation Reduction Act. Its incentives and subsidies were open to EU companies, provided they invest locally, develop local talent and build within the US market. It’s not about flags, it’s about pragmatism: attracting global investments, creating jobs and driving innovation-led growth. So what’s the practical path? Europe must embrace ‘sovereignty done right’, weaving diversity, resilience and autonomy into the fabric of its policies. That means risk-based safeguards, strategic partnerships and investment in European capabilities while staying open to global innovation. Trusted European operators can play a key role: managing encryption, access control and critical operations within EU jurisdiction, while enabling managed access to global technologies. To avoid ‘sovereignty washing’, eligibility should be based on rigorous, transparent assessments, not blanket bans. The Berlin summit’s new working group should start with a common EU-wide framework defining levels of data, operational and technological sovereignty. Providers claiming sovereign services can use this framework to transparently demonstrate which levels they meet. Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. Independence should be dynamic, not defensive — empowering innovation, securing prosperity and protecting freedoms. > Europe’s sovereignty will not come from closing doors. Sovereignty done right > will come from opening the right ones, on Europe’s terms. That’s how Europe can build resilience, competitiveness and true strategic autonomy in a vibrant global digital ecosystem.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.