BERLIN — Far-right German politician Ringo Mühlmann has taken a noteworthy interest in exposing information his political opponents say could be of great interest to Russian intelligence. Using the rights afforded to him as a lawmaker for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the parliament of the eastern German state of Thuringia — where the AfD is the strongest party  — Mühlmann has repeatedly asked the regional government to disclose intricate details on subjects such as local drone defenses and Western arms transports to Ukraine. “What information does the state government have about the extent of military transit transports through Thuringia since 2022 (broken down by year, type of transport [road, rail], number of transits, and known stops)?” Mühlmann asked in writing in September. One day in June, Mühlmann — who denies he is doing Russia’s bidding — filed eight inquiries related to drones and the drone defense capabilities of the region’s police, who are responsible for detecting and fending off drones deemed a spy threat. “What technical systems for drone defense are known to the Thuringian police (e.g., jammers, net launchers, electromagnetic pulse devices), and to what extent have these been tested for their usability in law enforcement?” Mühlmann asked. Such questions from AfD lawmakers on the state and federal parliaments have led German centrists to accuse the far-right party’s lawmakers of using their seats to try to expose sensitive information that Moscow could use in its war on Ukraine and to help carry out its so-called “hybrid war” against Europe. “One cannot help but get the impression that the AfD is working through a list of tasks assigned to it by the Kremlin with its inquiries,” Thuringian Interior Minister Georg Maier, a member of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), told German newspaper Handelsblatt. “What struck me was an incredible interest in critical infrastructure and the security authorities here in Thuringia, especially how they deal with hybrid threats,” Maier subsequently told POLITICO. “Suddenly, geopolitical issues are playing a role in their questions, while we in the Thuringian state parliament are not responsible for foreign policy or defense policy.”  ‘PERFIDIOUS’ INSINUATIONS AfD leaders frequently take positions favorable to the Kremlin, favoring a renewal of economic ties and gas imports and a cease of weapons aid for Ukraine. Their political opponents, however, have frequently accused them of acting not from conviction alone — but at the behest of Moscow. Greens lawmaker Irene Mihalic, for instance, last month called the party Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “trojan horse” in Germany. AfD politicians deny allegations they are using their rising parliamentary power both nationally and in Germany’s states to try to pass on sensitive information to the Kremlin. Tino Chrupalla, one of the AfD’s national leaders, strongly pushed back against the allegations his party is attempting to reveal arms supply routes to benefit the Kremlin.   “Citizens have legitimate fears about what they see and experience on the highways every evening,” he said in a talk show last month when asked about Mühlmann’s inquiries. “These are all legitimate questions from a member of parliament who is concerned and who takes the concerns and needs of citizens seriously. You are making insinuations, which is quite perfidious; you are accusing us of things that you can never prove.” Tino Chrupalla, one of the AfD’s national leaders, strongly pushed back against the allegations his party is attempting to reveal arms supply routes to benefit the Kremlin.  | Thomas Lohnes/Getty Images Mühlmann, a former police officer, speaking to POLITICO, denied that he’s following an assignment list “in the direction of Russia.” Government ministers, while obligated to answer each parliamentary inquiry, are not obliged to reveal sensitive or classified information that could endanger national security, Mühlmann also argued. “It is not up to me to limit my questions, but up to the minister to provide the answers,” he said. “If at some point such an answer poses a danger or leads to espionage, then the espionage is not my fault, but the minister’s, because he has disclosed information that he should not have disclosed.” FLOOD OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS Marc Henrichmann, a conservative lawmaker and the chairman of a special committee in Germany’s Bundestag that oversees the country’s intelligence services, said that while the government is not obliged to divulge classified or highly sensitive information in its answers to parliamentary questions, Russian intelligence services can still piece together valuable insights from the sheer volume and variety of AfD inquiries. “Apart from insignificant inquiries and sensitive inquiries, there is also a huge gray area,” Henrichmann said. “And what I have regularly heard from various ministries is that individual inquiries are not really the problem. But when you look at these individual inquiries side by side, you get a picture, for example, of travel routes, aid supplies, and military goods to or in the direction of Ukraine.” Henrichmann said AfD parliamentary questions in the Bundestag on subjects such as authorities’ knowledge of Russian sabotage and hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea region as well as of the poisoning of the late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny had caught his attention and raised concerns. “Apart from insignificant inquiries and sensitive inquiries, there is also a huge gray area,” Marc Henrichmann said. | Niklas Graeber/picture alliance via Getty Images AfD factions in German state parliaments have submitted more than 7,000 security-related inquiries since the beginning of 2020, according to a data analysis by Spiegel — more than any other party and about one-third of all security-related inquiries combined. In Thuringia — where state intelligence authorities have labelled the AfD an extremist group — the party has submitted nearly 70 percent (1,206 out of 1,738) of all questions filed this legislative period. In the Bundestag, the parties parliamentary questions account for more than 60 percent of all inquiries (636 out of 1,052). The AfD’s strategic use of parliamentary questions is nothing new, experts say. Since entering the Bundestag in 2017, the party has deployed them to flood ministries and to gather information on perceived political adversaries, experts say “From the outset, the AfD has used parliamentary questions to obstruct, paralyze, and also to monitor political enemies,” said Anna-Sophie Heinze, a researcher at the University of Trier. With regard to the flood of inquiries related to national security, the question of what is driving the AfD is largely irrelevant, Jakub Wondreys, a researcher at the Technical University Dresden who studies the AfD’s Russia policy, said. “It’s not impossible that they’re acting on behalf of Kremlin. It’s also possible that they are acting on behalf of themselves, because, of course, they are pro-Kremlin. But the end result is pretty much the same. These questions are a potential threat to national security.”

BERLIN — It was a beating hot summer day and Gregor was dressed in the formal uniform of the German army: a sky-blue shirt and navy trousers, which he had received that week, the fabric still stiff. The 39-year-old office manager had never been patriotic, and like many liberal-leaning Germans his feelings toward the military for most of his life had been ambivalent at best. When he was 18 he’d even turned down the option of doing a year of military service, believing it was a waste of time. Now, two decades later, life had taken an unexpected turn. As a steel band played, he marched in time alongside 17 others dressed in the same freshly pressed outfits into an open square at Germany’s Ministry of Defense, a towering grey neoclassical building in western Berlin, following the commands they had learned just a few days earlier. They were all there to do the same thing: take the oath required of all new recruits to the German armed forces. Afterward, they would begin their official training as reserve officers, learning the basic skills needed to defend against a military invasion. Everything had changed for Gregor on Feb. 24, 2022, when news broke that Russia had invaded Ukraine. Suddenly, the peace he had always taken for granted in Europe didn’t seem so guaranteed. “I was watching videos of Ukrainian civilians joining soldiers to fight off Russian tanks as they rolled toward their towns,” he said. “I thought to myself: ‘If something like that happened here, I wouldn’t have any practical skills to help.’” It was a fitting day to take the oath: July 20, 2024, the 80th anniversary of the so-called Operation Valkyrie, when a group of German soldiers plotted, and failed, to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Usually oath ceremonies are low-key affairs, carried out at barracks with a few family members present — the close associations between the military and Germany’s dark history means servicemen are not celebrated with the pomp and pageantry they are in other countries. But in honor of the special date, around 400 other recruits from various divisions from all over Germany were gathered in the same square, ready to take their pledge. The country’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius from the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), gave a short speech, telling the recruits that the prospect of defending Germany’s democracy had “become more real after Putin’s attack on Ukraine.” Then a lieutenant colonel shouted out the words of the oath, as the group repeated them back: “I pledge to loyally serve the Federal Republic of Germany and to courageously defend the right and liberty of the German people.” As he repeated the words of the oath, Gregor felt an unexpected swell of emotion. “I realized this is going to be a big part of my life now,” he said. “I’m going to be dedicating a lot of my time to it, and I’m going to have to explain to people why I’m doing it.” His mother remarked afterward that she also experienced surprising feelings while watching from the benches. “That was the first time I ever heard the national anthem being sung and felt like I actually wanted to join in,” she told him. Across Germany, both politicians and members of the public have been going through a similar transformation. The country’s army, officially named the Bundeswehr — which translates as “federal defense” — was established by the United States during the Cold War. It was designed to support NATO rather than ever lead a conflict, for fear that a German military could be misused as it was during World War II. This supporting role suited Germany’s leaders: Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the country’s politicians carefully shaped an image of a peaceful nation that prefers influencing global politics through trade and diplomacy. After the end of the Cold War the Bundeswehr began scaling down, with military spending falling from a high of 4.9 percent of GDP in 1963 to just 1.1 percent in 2005. But in the months following the Russian invasion, then-chancellor Olaf Scholz surprised the world by announcing a radical change in German foreign policy, including a €100 billion ($116 billion) plan to beef up its army. Then in early 2025, five days after the February election of new chancellor Friedrich Merz of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU), Donald Trump invited Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky into the Oval Office for a browbeating broadcast around the world that signaled his lack of interest in standing up to Russia. A shocked Merz, who had campaigned on a platform of low taxes and low spending, immediately agreed with Scholz to work together to reform the country’s strict borrowing laws — which were embedded in the constitution — and build up its defense capabilities as quickly as possible with a €1 trillion loan, which amounts to about 25 percent of the country’s GDP. According to Lorenzo Scarazzato, a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this type of defense spending was previously unheard of during peacetime. “Countries that spend this much are usually those at war, or autocratic states that don’t have democratic oversight,” he said. The following month, Germany’s lawmakers voted to back the plan, setting the country’s military on track to be the best-funded in Europe and the fourth-biggest in the world. In Merz’s view, Europe didn’t just need to arm itself against Russian aggression, but also “achieve independence from the USA.” Later in the year, NATO members would agree to raise their defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, at Trump’s behest. It marks a huge shift not just from how Germany manages its finances but how it perceives both itself and its place in the world. “After World War II, the allies did a tremendous job of re-educating the German population,” said Carsten Breuer, the Bundeswehr’s highest serving general. “This led to a society which I would say is peace-minded, and of course there’s nothing wrong with that. But it is also non-military.” So far, committing resources to the military has been fairly easy for the German government. But now it needs to convince thousands of people to do the same as Gregor and dedicate themselves to military service. After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the government began scaling down the Bundeswehr from 500,000 soldiers to the current 180,000. The country’s national service, in which young men had to choose between serving in the army or undertaking another type of civil service, was scrapped in 2011. Now, General Breuer estimates the total personnel needs to rise to 460,000, including both full-time staff and reservists. Bundeswehr applications are up 20 percent this year, though not everyone will make it through the physical and security tests. Even then, that still isn’t enough to plug the gaps, and it is likely that conscription of some kind will return. Breuer believes the German public is softening up to the military after decades of standoffishness. The war on Ukraine, as well as the Covid-19 pandemic and the disaster response to devastating floods, have put many people in closer touch with the Bundeswehr, he says. “When I was talking to my soldiers in the early 2000s, they would always ask, ‘Why isn’t it like the U.S. here, where people thank you for your service?’” he said. “Nowadays, we’re starting to see this in Germany.” He recounted a recent moment when he was waiting for a flight in the city of Dusseldorf and an elderly man tapped him on the shoulder to offer his thanks. However, for many people, any glorification of the German military will always have uncomfortable associations with the country’s dark history: Neo-Nazi groups still use German military symbols and history as part of their recruitment propaganda, and the Bundeswehr has been plagued by far-right scandals in recent years. For some, the government’s push to embrace the army is one more sign of a dangerous transformation in the country’s political sentiments: The far-right AfD is currently second in the polls, and the ruling CDU has shed former leader Angela Merkel’s liberal image in favor of a harsh anti-immigration stance. And as welfare, social services and climate protection face possible cuts to support military spending, Germany’s politicians face a challenge in seeing how long they can keep the newfound support going. “When you have a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail, and you forget the rest of the toolkit, which includes diplomacy and cooperation,” said Scarazzato from SIPRI. “Military gives some level of deterrence, but engaging with the other side is perhaps what prevents escalation.” He warns that a beefed-up army “is not necessarily a panacea for whatever issue you are facing.” The Heuberg training ground in Baden-Württemberg has a long and dark history. Nestled in the southwestern part of Germany near the Swiss border, it was originally built as a base for the German Imperial Army, which existed from 1871 to 1919 and fought in World War I. Some timber-framed buildings and stables from this time still exist, many crumbling and disused. In early 1933 it became one of the country’s first concentration camps, housing 2,000 political opponents, before it was used as a base for the SS, the Nazis’ violent paramilitary group. Now, it is where the next generation of German military reserves come to train. This past June, I watched 18 people struggling through the same type of training Gregor undertook a year earlier. Heuberg serves as the anchor for recruits hailing from Baden-Württemberg, with each region of the country playing host to its own reserves trainings. The one I observed at Heuberg takes 17 days in total, spread out over long weekends throughout the summer. None of the recruits, including Gregor, can share their surnames for security reasons — the Bundeswehr says its soldiers have been targeted by foreign intelligence and been subject to identify theft. The lieutenant colonel leading the training, Stefan, told me that the sessions cover the most basic skills, meaning these recruits will know how to defend a barracks if Germany were attacked by a foreign power. They can then continue regular training as part of local defense units, learning how to secure critical infrastructure. The recruits range in age from their 20s to 60s, with most in their 30s and 40s, and work a variety of jobs. There’s a forester, a teacher, a chemical engineer and even an ex-journalist, although only three of them are women. Everyone mentioned the war on Ukraine as the catalyst that got them interested in the military. A German army spokesperson said a total of 3,000 untrained citizens have expressed interest in joining the reserve over the past five years, with a major peak just after the invasion of Ukraine and another in early 2025 following the U.S. election. The training is not for the faint-hearted. Recruits must learn to fire an 11-pound rifle, hike around the base in the soaring heat while carrying their 33-pound backpacks, and practice running and doing push-ups in their gas masks and protective clothing, which restricts their breathing. They will also learn orienteering and radio communication, with the 17 days eventually culminating in a simulation of a Russian attack, during which recruits will be fed information through their radios and organize themselves to defend the barracks. Stefan, who served in NATO missions in the former Yugoslavia, Mali and Afghanistan, explained that several people had dropped out already. “That’s normal, it’s not for everyone,” he said. As well as the physical strain, recruits often struggle with the emotional aspect of learning to fire guns. “I tell them, at the end of the day, you’re a soldier — it’s part of your job.” Kevin, 29, works as a banker. “In school, my best friend wanted to join the army, and I remember telling him he would be wasting his life,” he said. His father also had to do compulsory military service, “and he told me no one wanted to be there, it was so uncomfortable because you were reminded of history the whole time.” After the invasion of Ukraine, he remembers sitting in his office watching the price of commodities skyrocket. “We all watched Biden’s speech about the start of the war, and it really felt like a turning point in history,” he said. After many hours of running, shooting and hastily learning new commands, the recruits — many slightly red-faced — finish the day by learning to clean their guns, pushing strings down the barrel and out the other end. Some get stuck, prompting some awkward tugging. The commando deputy, Col. Markus Vollmann, looked on admiringly. “They are all quite extraordinary, how motivated they are,” he said. “They’re only a minority though.” So far, 45 percent of Germans say they are in favor of the country’s new 5 percent defense spending target, with 37 percent against and 18 percent undecided. It’s a marked difference from the days of the Afghan war, when two-thirds of the country wanted German troops to be withdrawn. Military sociologist Timo Graf says this fits with how most Germans have consistently viewed the Bundeswehr: The majority say its main role should be defense of the country rather than interventionist missions abroad. At Heuberg, Vollmann is nervous about how long support for military spending will be maintained once people see other services being cut around them. Germany is able to borrow much more than its European neighbors due to its low debt levels, but Merz is sticking to his low-tax-low-spend ideology with planned cuts to welfare spending. “We need to communicate better with the public about what we are doing and why it is necessary, but without scaring them,” he said, adding that debt-averse Germany needs better investment in all industry and infrastructure. “There’s no point having the most expensive tanks if, once you drive them out of the barracks, the roads are all potholed and the bridges are crumbling.” Stefan, the training manager, believes the many years of peace have left Germany ill-prepared to potentially face Russian aggression head-on. “We have too many soldiers who have never seen war,” he said. “If you have never smelt burning flesh or seen spilled blood everywhere, then you cannot understand how to make decisions in that environment. You can’t train adequately.” Just one week after the NATO conference sparked headlines around the world in July, I arrived at Germany’s Ministry of Defense to speak to Breuer, the highest serving general in the Bundeswehr. The building in western Berlin, also known as the Bendlerblock, was the home of the Nazi’s supreme military command and their intelligence agency, as well as the headquarters of the resistance soldiers who carried out the failed July 20 coup attempt. Breuer became a familiar face to Germans during the pandemic, as the head of the military’s Covid-19 task force. When we met, he was warm and jovial in his everyday combat uniform, rather than the formal jacket adorned with medals that he sports in his TV appearances. He is beaming about the budget increases, which he believes are long overdue. Following Germany’s post-Cold War disarmament, spending on everything from clothing to ammunition to helicopters was reduced — some argue by too much, leaving soldiers with out-of-date helmets and 30-year-old radio equipment. Breuer is particularly critical of how German troops were sent to support NATO missions abroad — most notably in Afghanistan — without adequate equipment. “It was clear to me that if you are sending soldiers on operations, risking their life and their health, then you have to give them everything they need,” he said. A total of 59 German soldiers were killed in the conflict. “We are now moving from a war of choice to a war of necessity,” he explained. From security analysis he believes Russia will be capable of attacking NATO territory by 2029, with the caveat that this depends on the outcome in Ukraine and whether the war exhausts the Kremlin. “Russia is producing around 1,500 battle tanks every year,” he said. In comparison, Germany currently produces 300. “And it is also building up its military structures facing West.” He says his main priorities are ramping up air defense, procuring battle tanks and drones, expanding homeland security, and beefing up the personnel that enables combat missions, such as engineers and logisticians. But tanks and drones don’t amount to much if the country can’t enlist and train to its goal of 460,000 personnel. German media is currently full of near-daily headlines about how this personnel target might be reached. Defense Minister Pistorius has proposed a hybrid voluntary draft, inspired by Sweden’s new model, in which all 18-year-old men will be sent a questionnaire. Only the most physically able will then be invited for service. However, if that fails to get the numbers needed, he has warned some kind of compulsory draft will be created. The country is already facing a massive skilled labor shortage and the Bundeswehr struggles to offer competitive salaries in fields such as IT. Business leaders such as Steffen Kampeter of the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations have claimed the German economy cannot cope with young people delaying their careers through serving in the army. One solution would be for service to be combined with vocational training, and Pistorius also wants to increase Bundeswehr salaries to make them more attractive. Breuer says he has no opinion on what system would be preferable for meeting the recruitment goals, explaining this is an issue for politicians to decide. “My military advice is: This is the number we need,” he said. At the same time as equipment and staff need to be beefed up, Breuer says administration and bureaucracy must be scaled down. Germany’s procurement offices have become so bloated over the past 30 years that multiple reports of their comical inefficiency can be found, such as parachutists having to wait over a decade for new, safer helmets that U.S. soldiers have already worn for years. Germany is also entering its third consecutive year of recession, and its heavy industries that are struggling to stay competitive are now hoping the defense spending will give them a boost: Shares in the steel sector have shot up since the announcements. However, the years of restricted budgets mean the country is starting the sudden ramp-up on the back foot. It is unlikely that industry can meet the targets in such a short space of time, meaning a large amount of equipment is likely to be purchased from U.S. companies, perhaps undermining the goal of European independence. “The fact is, once you buy the more complex weapons from the U.S., you become somewhat dependent on their systems,” said Scarazzato, the SIPRI researcher. “It would make more sense to be very deliberate in how the money is spent in order to avoid finding ourselves in the same position in 10 years’ time.” “For me it’s not about companies, it’s about capabilities,” confirmed Breuer. “This means that in a lot of cases we will have to buy off the shelf. We can’t afford the time you need to develop new items, new systems and new platforms.” With the rush across Europe to procure weapons and soldiers, Scarazzato warns that leaders should be careful not to “put all their eggs in one basket, which is the military.” Arms races also lead to issues such as price gouging and oversight processes potentially being circumvented. “You risk a race to the bottom,” he said. I asked Breuer if he had anything to say to people who are still skeptical about the need for rearmament. “I would like to take them with me on one of my visits to Ukraine.” How powerful the Bundeswehr should be, and even whether it should exist at all, has been fiercely debated ever since it was founded. As an institution, it has only existed since 1955 and was preceded by the Nazi-era Wehrmacht (1935 to 1945), the Weimar Republic’s Reichswehr (1919 to 1935) and, before that, the Imperial German Army. When the United States and its allies took control of Germany after the end of World War II, they dissolved the Wehrmacht and banned German military uniforms and symbols. As part of a larger “denazification” process, the country was prohibited from having an army in case it could be misused in the same way as the Wehrmacht. This changed as the Cold War intensified. After the 1950 North Korea invasion of South Korea, the United States urged its NATO partners to rearm Germany and admit it to the alliance. The country’s first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, believed it could be an opportunity for the young democracy to regain its sovereignty and establish itself as an equal partner amongst allies, and on Nov. 12, 1955, the first 100 volunteers joined the Bundeswehr. “The country had to answer the question of how to create an army that could integrate into a democracy and could follow the constitution,” said Thorsten Loch, a Bundeswehr officer and military historian. The founding officers decided to construct the new army around a concept known as “Innere Führung,” or “inner leadership,” meaning soldiers must think for themselves and not follow orders blindly. They decided soldiers should be “citizens in uniform,” with national conscription designed to keep the forces rooted within society. Parliament wields huge powers over the army, and its stated mission is supporting other NATO forces rather than leading battles itself. Germany’s constitution has strict rules about how and when the military can be deployed — for example, reserves can only be called up if another nation declares war on Germany. When it came to staffing the new army, however, making a complete break from the Wehrmacht was more complicated. As Loch points out, any army that needed to pose a serious threat to the Soviet Union couldn’t be staffed by 12-year-olds. Chancellor Adenauer declared in 1952 that anyone who had fought “honorably” in the Wehrmacht — that is, those who had not committed any war crimes — would be welcome in the new army. “The officers ‘cleaned’ themselves,” explained Loch. “I believe they knew amongst themselves who had committed crimes.” They are likely to have also had input from the British, French and American intelligence services. In comparison, communist East Germany opted to staff its Volksarmee (people’s army) with younger, inexperienced soldiers in order to avoid former Nazis. Whether this “self-cleaning” was effective is a point of contention. Only a tiny number of Wehrmacht officers were ever tried for war crimes, and the concept of “honorable” soldiers has led to what many perceive as a whitewashing of the Nazi-era army, often referred to as “the myth of the clean Wehrmacht.” “The narrative was born that it was the Nazi Party who committed the atrocities, not the Wehrmacht soldiers,” said Loch. “And of course this isn’t true, as things are more complicated in reality.” Some of those early Bundeswehr officers still have questions over their heads as to what they did in World War II. The first director of operations was Lt. Col. Karl-Theodor Molinari, who resigned in 1970 after it became public that he might have been involved in the shooting of 105 French resistance soldiers, although the allegations were never proven. And while care was taken to strip away the most obvious signs, symbols and rituals of the Wehrmacht, some remain, such as military music, which also pre-dates the Nazi era. Barracks were renamed after resistance figures but were not demolished. This is one of the reasons that German rearmament was unpopular with the public at the time, and the purpose — and even existence — of an army remains a divisive topic. There continues to be a push-pull between those who say the Bundeswehr must do more to fully break with its past, and those who argue the Wehrmacht is a part of military history that cannot just be ignored. On Sunday, June 15, around 1,000 people had decided to forgo summer picnics in the park to gather outside Germany’s Reichstag for the country’s first-ever Veterans’ Day celebration. After many years of campaigning by the Association of German Deployment Veterans the government finally decided to make the celebration official in 2025, symbolizing a major shift in how politicians seek to position the Bundeswehr in society. A German language EDM band blared loudly over speakers next to stalls selling beers and bratwursts, while children petted a military donkey. The turn-out was not huge: There was no line to enter, and the dancefloor in front of the stage was largely empty. All attendees I spoke to were from military families, rather than curious civilians. “We would like to build up a veterans’ culture like they have in the USA,” said Ralph Bartsch, who runs a veterans’ motorcycle club. “It’s an absolutely overdue event,” agreed another soldier, who was dressed in civilian clothes and did not want to give his name. “It makes the Bundeswehr stronger in our society.” Not everyone is so eager to see societal norms change. The day before, in the Berlin neighborhood of Kreuzberg, I watched as Kai Krieger, 40, and his companion demonstrated how they switch out bus stop posters for those of their own design. After unscrewing the case at the bottom, rolling up the existing poster and tucking it behind the frame — essential for ensuring they are not committing any crimes — they then unrolled a doctored Bundeswehr recruitment advertisement in its place. “German mix: Nazis, cartridges, isolated cases” it reads, alongside a banner, “No to veterans’ day.” It’s a reference to a series of scandals from recent years. In 2022, Franco Albrecht, a 33-year-old first lieutenant with far-right views, was found guilty of plotting terror attacks that he hoped would be blamed on refugees. Several members of the elite KSK — Germany’s equivalent of the Navy SEALs — were found to have been stockpiling weapons and Nazi memorabilia, and members were reported to have made Hitler salutes and played extremist music at gatherings. This led a parliamentary panel to determine in 2020 that “networks” of far-right extremists had established themselves in the Bundeswehr. Ex-military personnel were also involved in a bizarre 2022 foiled plot to overthrow the German state and replace it with a far-right monarchy. “I do think it’s possible for armies to not be fascist or far-right influenced, but the German army is so toxic to the country’s history that I don’t see how that can happen here,” Kai said. He would go as far as saying that Germany should not have an army at all, because “the history is just too heavy. … They say all these nice-sounding things about defending democracy, but then the nasty things always seem to come to the surface.” Despite the Bundeswehr’s efforts to emphasize its historical connections to resistance fighters and position itself as a defender of liberal values, Germany’s far-right groups continue to view the country’s military as their own. In 2019, the German office for the protection of the constitution reported that neo-Nazi groups were organizing lectures with former Wehrmacht soldiers around the country, in which speakers would praise the SS and deny or trivialize the Holocaust. Kai’s group posted around 100 of their posters across the city that weekend, but anti-military activism doesn’t currently have much momentum behind it. Outside the Veteran’s Day celebrations, only a mere cluster of protesters were holding signs and singing anti-war songs. It’s a far cry from the 1980s when the German peace movement was a major civic force, with four million people signing a petition that the West German government withdraw its promise to allow medium-range ballistic missiles to be stationed in the country. Kai doesn’t hold back on the reasons for the movement’s unpopularity. “Our organizations talk a lot of bullshit,” he said. According to him, many of his fellow peace activists “don’t agree that Vladimir Putin is conducting an illegal war in Ukraine. … They’ll say it’s NATO’s fault,” he added, rolling his eyes. While pacifism was long associated with the left, this has shifted in recent years as various far-right movements aligned themselves with Russia. The AfD opposed military aid for Ukraine and expanding the Bundeswehr, and peace marches have become associated with cranks and conspiracy theorists. The Bundeswehr’s recent far-right scandals give potential reserve volunteers pause for thought. Burak, 38, opted out of military service back when he was 18, but in February 2025 he withdrew his conscientious-objector status. “It took me two whole years to decide if I really wanted to do that,” he said. As someone of Turkish heritage, he is still worried about whether it will be “a safe environment” for him. Burak has been involved with the country’s Green Party for many years, and during the Covid-19 pandemic he began looking into the possibility of training in disaster relief. Then when the invasion of Ukraine happened, he considered the military for the first time in two decades. “I feel like this is going to be another burden on younger people, along with things like climate change,” he said. “My generation had the privilege to say that we didn’t want to do this.” Michael, who is 50, spent his youth in Berlin’s left-wing punk scene, putting on anti-fascist gigs in abandoned buildings, and still sports the tattoos and gauged ear piercings. The invasion of Ukraine “shocked me to my core,” he said. “I am an anti-fascist, and to me, the biggest fascist project in Europe right now is Russia,” he explained. “The whole symbol of Europe is under attack.” He added that he also wants “to know where I stand” if tanks ever did roll into Germany one day. “I don’t want to be sitting there thinking, ‘Do I flee or not?’” he said. “I don’t think we should allow the Bundeswehr to just be staffed by nationalists,” he continued, when I ask how it fits with his leftist politics. “We need to think: What brought the Third Reich down? What brought liberty to Europe? It wasn’t talking with Hitler for 10 years.” A year after Gregor completed his basic training, his life looks quite different. At home, he has three huge boxes of uniforms, gas masks and helmets that his girlfriend begrudgingly agreed could be stored in their apartment, as long as he kept them tidy. Other hobbies have had to make way for his continued service, which he now dedicates around 50 days a year to. With his defense unit he practices handling weapons and understanding the logistics of how to protect Berlin’s critical infrastructure and clear paths for military transport. “We learn about the motorways and railway network, and how troops can move through them without the risk of sabotage,” he said. As a major urban center, his Berlin unit would probably be one of the first to be called up if an invasion ever happened. His company, a Berlin-based tech startup, has been understanding of his time off: “My bosses said a war would be bad for business, so they’re happy I’m doing this.” Some of his closest friends are now those he went through training with. “You’re paired with everyone in the platoon for exercises at some point,” he said, which enables deep bonds. Whenever people struggled, the others rallied around them, invested in getting the whole team past the finish line. If someone got nervous learning how to handle rifles, the others were there to calm them down. Even when he’s not training, he’ll often spend his evenings mentoring others who want to join the reserves, talking them through the process. He wears his military uniform travelling to and from training, sometimes encountering people who thank him, other times being pestered by kids who want to try on his backpack. He often has conversations with friends who don’t understand why he is doing this, or who are politically opposed to the idea of a German military. “I have realized since I joined that people in the German military do tend to be more on the conservative side,” he said. “I would like to see more left-leaning people, to balance it out and make it more reflective of society.” He thinks some form of conscription would be a good idea, to help people understand what the army involves, and that there’s much more to it than frontline conflict. “But you need to make it meaningful to their lives. There’s no point in people feeling like they’ve been forced, or that they’ve wasted a year.” The idea of serving his country still makes him feel uncomfortable. “I don’t really like the term patriotism as it’s too closely associated with nationalism for me,” he said. “But I think about the things in my country that I like, such as free education and affordable health care, and how I want kids in the future to enjoy those, too. And I think that is worth defending.”

BRUSSELS — The EU unveiled a new Black Sea strategy on Wednesday that will allow the region to better transport heavy military gear as the Russian threat looms over Eastern Europe.  “Security in the Black Sea is vital also to European security,” EU top diplomat Kaja Kallas said at a press conference, adding that it is currently being undermined by the Kremlin’s all-out war in Ukraine and hybrid attacks on maritime infrastructure. The strategy is also a response to “geopolitical challenges” in a world where “dependencies are being weaponized,” said Marta Kos, commissioner for EU enlargement. The Black Sea is a bridge to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and a vital artery for energy and food trade, she said.  The Black Sea region has been destabilized by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the large-scale use of mines and military actions hindered the flow of goods. Separately, Eastern European countries fear further aggression from Moscow beyond Ukraine, and want to ramp up their defensive capabilities.  Romania and Bulgaria are the EU countries on the Black Sea coast and the bloc will invest in upgrading regional infrastructure, such as ports, railways and airports, to handle heavy military equipment. This will help to ensure “troops can be where they are needed when they are needed,” Kallas said. Previously, European Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas said it would cost around €75 billion to upgrade transport infrastructure for military use across Europe.  The EU also plans to establish a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub, which will serve as Europe’s early warning system in the region. Kallas said the hub will raise situational awareness and help the EU protect its critical infrastructure. The location of the hub, its operational model and costs are still to be determined, she added.  Another security move is an increased monitoring of foreign ownership of ports and other key facilities, Kallas said. On trade, the EU will develop new energy corridors, transport links and digital infrastructure with regional partners, according to Kos. The bloc will also invest in the preparedness of coastal communities and the marine economy to deal with war-related environmental damage and respond to climate change risks.  “Around the world, countries are now looking for cooperation with the reliable and predictable partners, which the EU is,” Kos said. “Such partnerships will make us collectively more secure and create business opportunities for everyone.” The Commission underlined Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan as partners it wants to forge closer ties with through the new strategy. 

It’s March 22, 2030. In the early spring mist, the roar of tank engines rips through the air. Overhead, missiles and fighter jets scream toward their targets, artillery thunders in the distance, and swarms of drones rise into the sky. Lithuania’s Šiauliai Air Base erupts in flames. Warheads slam into Poland’s 22nd Air Base in Malbork. At the Rūdninkai military complex in Lithuania, German troops scramble for cover. The Russians are on the move. Smashing east from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and west from Moscow’s satellite of Belarus, they hammer NATO defenses along the Suwałki Gap — the thin strip of land along the Polish and Lithuanian border. While NATO forces in Lithuania and Poland struggle to hold back the Russians, allied countries rush to respond. Armies in Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries mobilize — but there is one stark absence. Leaders and soldiers alike look westward, to the ocean, hoping for the warships that have always come to Europe’s rescue over the past century. But the sea offers only silence. The Americans aren’t coming. Donald Trump’s second presidency has ended the United States’ commitment to European defense. The continent stands alone — which turns out to be a massive problem when it comes to reinforcing the embattled troops holding the line in Lithuania. Ever since NATO was founded in 1949, one of the key roles of the alliance’s European members has been to resist an invasion while the U.S. gathered its immense power and sent troops, equipment and supplies across the Atlantic to win the longer war. Ports like Rotterdam and Antwerp were supposed to disembark the men and materiel and then allow them to use roads and rail to head toward the fighting. But planners never envisioned a NATO without the United States, and for decades, Europe’s military logistics have been built on the assumption of American support. Much of the continent’s transport infrastructure — constructed or upgraded during the Cold War — still runs west to east, shaped by the expectation that U.S. reinforcements would arrive from across the Atlantic. Some of the continent’s most strategic corridors are NATO-led efforts, including the most developed, which stretches from the Dutch coast to the Polish side of the Suwałki Gap. “These corridors are critical because they allow NATO and our allies to reach the eastern flank faster,” Lithuanian Deputy Defense Minister Tomas Godliauskas told POLITICO in a phone interview. Both legacy and new military mobility projects rest on the premise that the Americans will come. | Robert Ghement/EPA-EFE Both legacy and new military mobility projects rest on the premise that the Americans will come — a belief that remains largely unchallenged, even as the U.S. political commitment to Europe shows increasing signs of strain. “Whether or not the United States stays involved in NATO or Europe is a legitimate question,” former U.S. Army Europe Commander Ben Hodges told POLITICO. “I worry about that. I hope like hell that we don’t significantly change our commitment to Europe. It would be a terrible mistake for the United States.” But what happens if America abandons Europe? The uncomfortable reality is that without U.S. support, moving troops across Europe would be slower, costlier and hampered by a patchwork of logistical bottlenecks. In a real crisis, that might not just be inefficient — it could be fatal. GOING IT ALONE European leaders have long debated strategic autonomy, but they’ve done so within a system where Washington still controls the core tools of military mobility — the aircraft, ships, fuel lines, satellites, cyber defenses and interoperability standards that hold it all together. “There are important capabilities, which we are depending on the U.S. for,” said Kimberley Kruijver, a researcher at Dutch consultancy TNO. Europe lacks heavy transport aircraft, military cargo ships and the specialized vehicles required to move tanks and armored units. “We can move lighter vehicles, but not the heavier stuff,” Kruijver said. Jannik Hartmann, a fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, confirmed that a U.S. pullback — from Germany’s Ramstein Air Base, for instance — would leave Europe without basic loading gear like ramps and flatbed wagons. Europe also has few forward stockpiles of military hardware, whereas the U.S. has pre-positioned supplies across Germany, Poland and the Netherlands, Kruijver said. Air-to-air refueling — essential in contested airspace — is still largely a U.S. domain. Europe’s defense of its eastern flank relies on American-financed NATO fuel networks stretching across the continent. If Washington retreats, countries like France and Germany would scramble to fill the gap, Hartmann wrote in a LinkedIn post. The dependence extends beyond logistics: Europe also relies on U.S. intelligence, cyber defenses and hybrid threat detection. “If the U.S. pulls back, real-time intelligence and satellite surveillance will be the first to suffer,” said Simon Van Hoeymissen, a researcher at the Brussels-based Royal Higher Institute for Defense. U.S. cybersecurity capabilities play a crucial role in defending Europe’s military networks. Without them, the continent’s infrastructure would become an easy target for cyberattacks, sabotage and disinformation campaigns. Even with increased investment, Europe would struggle to replace these capabilities in the short term, Hartmann noted. BLOCKED ROADS But even assuming Europe could procure its own assets, moving troops, tanks and fuel across the continent — and not necessarily along the old west-to-east pathway traditional to NATO — would be a challenge. Hodges called European infrastructure “one of the greatest challenges” to military mobility. Most of today’s European infrastructure was never intended for military use | Valda Kalnina/EPA-EFE “If you put a Patriot launcher on a rail car, is it going to fit through every tunnel? If they’re in a convoy, can they get under every bridge safely?” he asked. “Can the bridges in Eastern and Southern Europe hold the weight of a 70- to 75-ton tank?” The answer, usually, is no. Europe’s rail network is not designed for large-scale rapid military movements, wrote Sergei Boeke, political adviser at NATO’s European Joint Support and Enabling Command in a paper on European military mobility. Weak bridges, sharp curves, narrow tunnels and poorly placed signs make it difficult to move heavy armor quickly by rail — and the roads aren’t much better. Yellow bridge classification signs, which indicate how much weight a bridge can carry, have become rare in many countries. And unlike Cold War-era designs, most of today’s infrastructure was never intended for military use. While hardware is an obvious issue, another less visible — but arguably more dangerous — weakness lies in coordination. In peacetime, bureaucracy hinders mobility: Permits, national regulations and siloed procedures slow everything down. In wartime, such red tape would likely be brushed aside, but removing the paperwork doesn’t fix the deeper problem of who actually coordinates the movement. The only body that arguably holds a full picture of military mobility in Europe isn’t housed in the glass towers of NATO’s HQ in Brussels — it’s based on a military compound in Ulm, Germany. That’s where JSEC operates. Tasked with overseeing routes, choke points and movement planning under NATO’s Reinforcement and Sustainment Network, JSEC maps critical nodes, plans for emergencies, and monitors the strategic corridors linking key allies — from the Netherlands to Poland, and from Greece to Romania. JSEC falls under the authority of NATO’s supreme allied commander Europe — a position always held by an American general, Hartmann noted — meaning that the leadership of Europe’s most comprehensive effort at coordinated, continent-wide mobility still runs through Washington. The Trump administration is reportedly contemplating handing that role to a European for the first time since the alliance was founded, underlining America’s dwindling interest in European defense. Moreover, according to Van Hoeymissen, coordination and information-sharing between JSEC and the European Union remains patchy, due largely to diverging memberships and political tensions among member countries. PREPARING FOR WAR These coordination challenges can be mitigated by military exercises among EU member countries, but there are growing concerns the U.S. may scale down its participation in European exercises beyond those already scheduled for this year, Hartmann warned. “If confirmed, it would be a significant blow,” he said. One of the few ways to mitigate these coordination issues is through military exercises. | Toms Kalnins/EPA-EFE Efforts are being made to improve the situation. JSEC Commander Lt. Gen. Kai Rohrschneider told POLITICO that his command is engaging with countries to assess and refine “minimum operational requirements” for the transport network. This process involves identifying critical infrastructure and logistical nodes, understanding who operates and supports them, and encouraging nations to adopt a more flexible military mobility system. Regarding Europe’s efforts to gain strategic independence, Rohrschneider emphasized the continent’s key role in strengthening military mobility. “From an enablement perspective, it is fundamentally a European effort that needs to be reinforced,” he said, adding the impression is that “Europe is indeed working very hard to achieve it.” JSEC is collaborating closely with the European Commission and its transport division, DG MOVE, maintaining what Rohrschneider described as a “permanent exchange” with EU institutions. The EU is working to get its act together. A new military mobility communication is expected in the second half of 2025, targeting infrastructure bottlenecks and regulatory red tape, with the topic of military mobility already featured in the ReArm Europe package and the EU’s white paper on defense. Speaking before the European Parliament on April 2, Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas announced that the Commission is drafting a new plan to streamline rules on hazardous goods, lift outdated weight restrictions, and remove bureaucratic choke points. “Within the corridors, we have a list of around 500 military mobility ‘hot spot’ projects,” he said, citing input from both national defense ministries and NATO. “Short-term, quick-win investments will reinforce road and railway bridges, widen tunnels, expand port infrastructure and lay railway sidings to increase capacity.” His head of cabinet, Anna Panagopoulou, on April 9 also flagged an upcoming European ports strategy to ensure the continent’s harbors can absorb the logistical demands of war. Member countries are also taking the initiative and looking to Brussels for extra cash. “Lithuania hopes to secure EU funding for the [Suwałki Gap] project,” Godliauskas said. However, all of those plans still rely on the old model of building up west-east infrastructure based on an alliance with the U.S. — an assumption that is increasingly in doubt. If the Americans don’t ultimately show up, none of it — neither the corridors, the ports, nor the meticulously crafted logistics — may stand a chance, because the ships and planes they count on could remain parked thousands of miles away. By investing heavily in a war strategy built on U.S. support that may never materialize, Europe risks preparing for the wrong conflict — one where ports and beaches stay empty, while the European factories building tanks and the bases training troops are severed from the front. Yet few experts — or policymakers — seem willing to confront that possibility. If the Americans step back, “the [Russian] threat will only get worse,” Hodges said. “If the Russians think the United States won’t stay committed, the risk of them making a terrible decision increases,” he explained, meaning that “the problem [of military mobility] has got to be solved — regardless of whether the U.S. is there or not.”

The European Parliament on Wednesday accused the Trump administration of “blackmailing” Ukraine’s leadership into capitulating to Russia with a forced ceasefire, and denounced Washington’s decision to leave the European Union out of negotiations. More than 440 lawmakers in the 720-seat Parliament approved a joint declaration that “strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrender to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a so-called ‘peace deal’.” The statement also condemned as “counterproductive and dangerous” the current attempts by the Trump administration “to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement with Russia over the heads of Ukraine and other European states.” Russian President Vladimir Putin, they added, was being “rewarded” for Moscow’s ongoing three-year invasion of Ukraine. Signatories to the statement included members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from both sides of the aisle, including the Greens, Socialists & Democrats, liberals, Christian Democrats and the hard right. Moreover, the lawmakers added, the U.S. foreign policy shift means EU member countries have become Ukraine’s primary allies and must therefore increase military aid. With U.S. President Donald Trump having aligned his country with Russia, the EU is facing its single most existential threat since World War II. MEPs in Strasbourg on Wednesday laid out how Europe can fortify itself. In a separate non-binding resolution on European defense, which passed by a margin of 419 votes to 204 with 46 abstentions, the Parliament demanded that member countries and the European Commission beef up the bloc’s defense capabilities amid Trump’s continuous threats to diminish U.S. engagement with NATO. Since the start of his second term on Jan. 20 Trump has pressured Ukraine to engage in peace talks, among other things by suspending military aid and intelligence sharing. The U.S. president agreed to resume both after Ukraine on Tuesday agreed to a 30-day ceasefire; Russia has yet to respond to the deal. To counter the Trump administration’s threats, MEPs on Tuesday pushed in the non-binding resolution for a “fully capable European Pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever needed.” That would mean using NATO’s command structures to run operations among European member countries without U.S. involvement, leading Socialist MEP Sven Mixer argued. Among other initiatives, the non-binding resolution proposed an “EU crisis response air fleet,” managed from Brussels and comprising military transport aircraft available to member countries for the transport and deployment of troops and equipment. Some hard-right factions in the Parliament asked that the vote on the resolution be postponed to account for the latest ceasefire proposal between the U.S. and Ukraine, but were not successful. The current wording of the resolution “is not up to date and can only serve to unleash hatred against Trump and the US rather than favoring the Ukrainian cause,” the chair of the hard-right European Conservatives and Reformists argued in the hemicycle. Ultimately, some ECR MEPs voted in favor of the resolution.