Denmark and allied countries said Wednesday they will increase their military presence in Greenland as part of expanded exercises, amid intensifying pressure from Washington over the Arctic island’s sovereignty. “Security in the Arctic is of crucial importance to the Kingdom and our Arctic allies, and it is therefore important that we, in close cooperation with allies, further strengthen our ability to operate in the region,” said Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen. “The Danish Defense Forces, together with several Arctic and European allies, will explore in the coming weeks how an increased presence and exercise activity in the Arctic can be implemented.” In a statement, Denmark’s defense ministry said additional Danish aircraft, naval assets and troops will be deployed in and around Greenland starting immediately as part of expanded training and exercise activity. The effort will include “receiving allied forces, operating fighter jets and carrying out maritime security tasks,” the ministry said. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said on X that Swedish officers are arriving in Greenland as part of a multinational allied group to help prepare upcoming phases of Denmark’s Operation Arctic Endurance exercise, following a request from Copenhagen. A European diplomat said that troops from the Netherlands, Canada and Germany were also taking part. The diplomat and another official with first-hand knowledge said France was also involved. Defense ministries in other countries did not immediately respond to requests for comment. So far, the deployment remains intergovernmental and has not been formally approved by NATO, according to two people familiar with the matter. “The goal is to show that Denmark and key allies can increase their presence in the Arctic region,” said a third person briefed on the plans, demonstrating their “ability to operate under the unique Arctic conditions and thereby strengthen the alliance’s footprint in the Arctic, benefiting both European and transatlantic security.” The announcement landed the same day U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with the Danish and Greenlandic foreign ministers in Washington, following days of rising transatlantic tensions over President Donald Trump’s bid to take over the strategic island. Trump escalated the dispute earlier Wednesday in a Truth Social post, declaring that “the United States needs Greenland for the purpose of National Security,” calling it “vital” for his planned “Golden Dome” missile defense system.  He also insisted that seizing Greenland would not destroy NATO, despite warnings from Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen that such a move would end the Atlantic alliance. “Militarily, without the vast power of the United States … NATO would not be an effective force or deterrent — Not even close!” Trump posted. “They know that, and so do I. NATO becomes far more formidable and effective with Greenland in the hands of the UNITED STATES.” Denmark and Greenland have repeatedly rejected any suggestion of a transfer of sovereignty, stressing that Greenland is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark and that its future is for Greenlanders alone to decide. Greenland’s government said it is working closely with Copenhagen to ensure local involvement and transparency, with Denmark’s Arctic Command tasked with keeping the population informed. “If we have to choose between the United States and Denmark here and now, we choose Denmark,” Jens-Frederik Nielsen, Greenland’s prime minister, said at a press conference Tuesday. In response, Trump said, “That’s their problem. I disagree with him. I don’t know who he is. Don’t know anything about him, but that’s going to be a big problem for him.”

BRUSSELS — The European Commission on Wednesday unveiled a €90 billion loan to Ukraine aimed at saving it from financial collapse as it continues to battle Russia while aid from the U.S. dries up. About one-third of the cash will be used for normal budget expenditures and the rest will go to defense — although countries still need to formally agree to what extent Ukraine can use the money to buy weapons from outside the EU. A Commission proposal gives EU defense firms preferential treatment but allows Ukraine to buy foreign weapons if they aren’t immediately available in Europe. While the loan is interest-free for Ukraine, it is forecast to cost EU taxpayers between €3 billion and €4 billion a year in borrowing costs from 2028. The EU had to resort to the loan after an earlier effort to use sanctioned Russian frozen assets ran into opposition from Belgium. The race is now on for EU lawmakers to agree on a final legal text that’ll pave the way for disbursements in April, when Ukraine’s war chest runs out. Meetings between EU treasury and defense officials are already planned for Friday. The European Parliament could fast-track the loan as early as next week. The financing package is also crucial for unlocking additional loans to Ukraine from the International Monetary Fund. The Washington-based Fund wants to ensure Kyiv’s finances aren’t overstretched, as the war enters its fifth year next month. The €90 billion will be paid out over the next two years, as Moscow shows no sign of slowing down its offensive on Ukraine despite U.S.-led efforts to agree on a ceasefire. “Russia shows no sign of abating, no sign of remorse, no sign of seeking peace,” Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told reporters after presenting the proposal. “We all want peace for Ukraine, and for that, Ukraine must be in a position of strength.” When EU leaders agreed on the loan, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the deal an “unprecedented decision, and it will also have an impact on the peace negotiations.” Adding to the pressure on the EU, the U.S. under President Donald Trump has halted new military and financial aid to Ukraine, leaving it up to Europe to ensure Kyiv can continue fighting. Once the legal text is agreed, the EU will raise joint debt to finance the initiative, although the governments in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia said they will not participate in the funding drive.  The conditions on military spending are splitting EU countries. Paris is demanding strict rules to prevent money from flowing to U.S. weapons manufacturers, while Germany and other Northern European countries want to give Ukraine greater flexibility on how to spend the cash, pointing out that some key systems needed by Ukraine aren’t manufactured in Europe. MEETING HALFWAY The Commission has put forward a compromise proposal — seen by POLITICO. It gives preferential treatment to defense companies based in the EU, Ukraine and neighboring countries, including Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, but doesn’t rule out purchases from abroad. To keep the Northern European capitals happy, the Commission’s proposal allows Ukraine to buy specialized weapons produced outside the EU if they are vital for Kyiv’s defense against Russian forces. These include the U.S. Patriot long-range missile and air defense systems. The rules could be bent further in cases “where there is an urgent need for a given defense product” that can’t be delivered quickly from within Europe. Weapons aren’t considered European if more than 35 percent of their parts come from outside the continent, according to the draft. That’s in line with previous EU defense-financing initiatives, such as the €150 billion SAFE loans-for-weapons program. Two other legal texts are included in the legislative package. One proposes using the upper borrowing limit in the current budget to guarantee the loan. The other is designed to tweak the Ukraine Facility, a 2023 initiative that governs the bloc’s long-term financial support to Kyiv. The Commission will also create a new money pot to cover the borrowing costs before the new EU budget enters into force in 2028. RUSSIAN COLLATERAL Ukraine only has to repay the €90 billion loan if it receives post-war reparations from Russia — an unlikely scenario. If this doesn’t happen, the EU has left the door open to tapping frozen Russian state assets across the bloc to pay itself back. Belgium’s steadfast opposition to leveraging the frozen assets, most of which are based in the Brussels-based financial depository Euroclear, promises to make that negotiation difficult. However, the Commission can indefinitely roll over its debt by issuing eurobonds until it finds the necessary means to pay off the loan. The goal is to ensure Ukraine isn’t left holding the bill. “The Union reserves its right to use the cash balances from immobilized Russian assets held in the EU to repay the Ukraine Support Loan,” Economy Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis said alongside von der Leyen. “Supporting Ukraine is a litmus test for Europe. The outcome of Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine will determine Europe’s future.” Jacopo Barigazzi contributed to this report from Brussels.

BRUSSELS — Germany and the Netherlands are at odds with France in seeking to ensure Kyiv will be able buy U.S. weapons using the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine. EU countries agreed the crucial lifeline to Kyiv at a European Council summit in December, but the capitals will still have to negotiate the formal conditions of that financing after a European Commission proposal on Wednesday. This sets up tense negotiations with Paris, which is leading a rearguard push to prevent money flowing to Washington amid a growing rift in the transatlantic alliance. French President Emmanuel Macron is keen to give preferential treatment to EU military companies to strengthen the bloc’s defense industry — even if that means Kyiv can’t immediately buy what it needs to keep Russian forces at bay. A majority of countries, led by governments in Berlin and The Hague, respond that Kyiv must have more leeway in how it spends the EU’s financial package to help fund its defense, according to position papers seen by POLITICO. These frictions are coming to a head after years of debate over whether to include Washington in EU defense purchasing programs. Divisions have only worsened since U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration threatened a military takeover of Greenland. Critics retort France’s push to introduce a strict “Buy European” clause would tie Kyiv’s hands and limit its ability to defend itself against Russia. “Ukraine also urgently requires equipment produced by third countries, notably U.S.-produced air defense systems and interceptors, F-16 ammunition and spare parts and deep-strike capacities,” the Dutch government wrote in a letter to other EU countries seen by POLITICO. While most countries including Germany and the Netherlands support a general “Buy European” clause, only Greece and Cyprus — which currently maintains a neutral stance as it is chairing talks under its rotating presidency of the Council of the EU — are backing the French push to limit the scheme to EU firms, according to multiple diplomats with knowledge of the talks. CASH FOR KYIV EU leaders agreed last month to issue €90 billion in joint debt to support Ukraine, after Belgium and others derailed a separate plan to mobilize Russian frozen state assets. Over two-thirds of the Commission’s funding is expected to go toward military expenditure rather than ordinary budget support, according to two EU diplomats briefed on the discussions. With only a few days until the Commission formally unveils its plan, EU capitals are trying to influence its most sensitive elements. French President Emmanuel Macron is keen to give preferential treatment to EU military companies to strengthen the bloc’s defense industry. | Pool photo by Sarah Meyssonnier via AFP/Getty Images Germany broke with France by proposing to open up purchases to defense firms from non-EU countries. “Germany does not support proposals to limit third country procurement to certain products and is concerned that this would put excessive restrictions on Ukraine to defend itself,” Berlin’s government wrote in a letter sent to EU capitals on Monday and seen by POLITICO. The Netherlands suggested earmarking at least €15 billion for Ukraine to buy foreign weapons that are not immediately available in Europe.  “The EU’s defence industry is currently either unable to produce equivalent systems or to do so within the required timeframe,” the Dutch government wrote in its letter. The French counterargument is that Brussels should seek to extract maximum value from its funding to Ukraine. Critics say that boosting Ukraine’s defense against Russia should take precedence over any other goal.    “It’s very frustrating. We lose the focus on our aim, and our aim is not to do business,” said a third EU diplomat. Another diplomat said that a potential French veto can be easily overcome as the proposal can be agreed by a simple majority of member countries. GERMANY FIRST In a further point of controversy, the German government, while rejecting the EU preference sought by France, still suggested giving preferential treatment to firms from countries that provided the most financial support to Ukraine. This would play to the advantage of Berlin, which is among the country’s biggest donors. “Germany requests for the logic of rewarding strong bilateral support (as originally proposed for third countries by the Commission) to be applied to member states, too,” Berlin wrote in the letter. Diplomats see this as a workaround to boost German firms and incentivize other countries to stump up more cash for the war-torn country. Giovanna Faggionato contributed to this report.

PARIS — Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski called on the U.S. Congress to weigh in on President Donald Trump’s growing threats to seize Greenland. “The topic of territories, of war and peace, belongs to the U.S. Congress,” Sikorski said Wednesday, speaking alongside the foreign ministers of France, Germany and India. “I want to know what is the position of the U.S. Congress on Greenland.” In recent days, some U.S. lawmakers have started pushing back against Trump’s calls to take over Greenland. On Monday, a bipartisan group of U.S. representatives released a statement saying annexing Greenland would be “dangerous” and could trigger a “civil war” among NATO members. On Wednesday, Democrat Ted Lieu warned: “There is no legal justification, whatsoever, to use military force against a NATO ally like Greenland. If any military member participates in this without congressional authorization, they are following illegal orders.” Sikorski was in Paris for the visit of Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, but the meeting with his European counterparts was also an opportunity to discuss Greenland. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said the three European ministers discussed a joint European response to Trump’s threats, something that “was destined to be widened to all European partners.” “What is at stake is the question of how Europe, the EU, can be strengthened to deter threats, attempts on its security and interests,” Barrot said. “Greenland is not for sale, and it is not for taking. The age when you could buy and sell Louisiana is over, so the threats must stop,” he added, referring to France’s 1803 sale of the vast territory to the U.S. for $15 million. In recent days, Trump has reiterated his claims to Greenland — a self-ruling Danish territory — following a separate U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro last weekend. On Tuesday, eight of Europe’s top leaders insisted Greenland’s security must be ensured collectively by NATO and with full respect to the wishes of its people. Germany’s Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul is working on a plan with his counterparts that could include European deterrence in the event the U.S. tries to attack or seize Greenland. | Petras Malukas/Getty Images None of the three ministers in Paris said what options were being discussed. Officials in Berlin however said discussions on how to safeguard Greenland’s sovereignty were ongoing on Wednesday following talks on the topic between European leaders and Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen in Paris on Tuesday. Germany’s Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul is working on a plan with his counterparts that could include European deterrence in the event the U.S. tries to attack or seize Greenland, as well as increased NATO presence in Greenland’s direct vicinity, a German government spokesperson said. Last year, when Trump started to seriously raise the issue of Greenland, Barrot didn’t rule out sending French troops to the island.

U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday cast fresh doubt on NATO’s reliability, saying he was not convinced the alliance would come to Washington’s aid in a crisis, as tensions rose over the White House’s renewed push to acquire Greenland. “I DOUBT NATO WOULD BE THERE FOR US IF WE REALLY NEEDED THEM,” Trump blasted on Truth Social, while insisting the U.S. would still defend alliance members. “We will always be there for NATO, even if they won’t be there for us.” Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s collective defense clause, an attack on one member of the alliance is considered an attack on all. The provision has been formally invoked only once — in response to al-Qaida’s 9/11 terror attack against the U.S. Trump’s remarks came a day after the White House said it was not ruling out military action to acquire Greenland from Denmark, a NATO ally. Trump has repeatedly criticized the alliance and has long pressured members to boost defense spending, calling for increases from 2 percent of GDP to as much as 5 percent. His new comments follow days of escalating rhetoric over Greenland, a self-ruling Danish territory. The White House said late Tuesday that Trump was “discussing a range of options” to acquire the massive, mineral-rich Arctic island, stressing that the use of U.S. military force was not off the table. In his post, Trump said that military allies were failing to pay their fair share before his first term, while relying on the American security umbrella, and argued that without the U.S., Russia and China would “have zero fear of NATO.” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned Monday that an American attack on another NATO country would mean “everything stops, including NATO and thus the security that has been established since the end of the Second World War.” European leaders moved quickly to push back. On Tuesday, eight of Europe’s top leaders said Greenland’s security must be ensured collectively through NATO and with full respect for sovereignty and borders. On Wednesday, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said Paris was working with European partners on a joint response, while officials in Berlin confirmed discussions were underway on safeguarding Greenland’s sovereignty. In his post, using an incorrect spelling for the iconic global award, Trump added: “Without my involvement, Russia would have ALL OF UKRAINE right now. Remember, also, I single-handedly ENDED 8 WARS, and Norway, a NATO Member, foolishly chose not to give me the Noble Peace Prize. But that doesn’t matter!”

BRUSSELS — Donald Trump says he wants to reshape politics in Europe. For many voters in major European democracies, it feels like he already has. Trump’s return as U.S. president is far more significant for voters in Germany, France and the U.K. than the election of their own national leaders, according to respondents to the first international POLITICO Poll. The finding vividly illustrates the impact of Trump’s first year back in the White House on global politics, with his sway felt particularly keenly in Europe. The online survey, conducted by the independent London-based polling company Public First, also shows many Europeans share Trump’s critical assessment in a POLITICO interview earlier this week of the relative weakness of their own national leaders. The poll had more than 10,000 respondents from the U.S., Canada and the three biggest economies in Europe: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. For leaders like Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron, it makes particularly grim reading: They are seen by their own voters as having largely failed to handle the unpredictable American president effectively so far. EU leaders fared worst of all. In France, only 11 percent thought Brussels had done a good job of handling Trump, with 47 percent saying EU leadership had navigated the relationship badly. Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer gets a slightly better rating — his record on managing Trump is seen as neither good nor bad. “These results show how much Trump has shaped the last year of political conversation not just in the U.S., but globally,” said Seb Wride, head of polling at Public First. “This is true for the public as much as it is for policymakers — the fact that so many believe Trump’s election, on the other side of the world, has been more significant for their own country than their own leaders’ election lays this bare.” The polling comes at an acutely sensitive moment for transatlantic relations. A new White House National Security Strategy unveiled last week destroyed any notion of American neutrality toward its historic allies in Europe, instead launching a crusade to convert the region’s democracies to his own MAGA ideology. POLITICO on Tuesday named Trump as the most powerful person shaping European politics, at the top of its annual P28 list. The list is not an endorsement or award. It reflects, instead, each individual’s capacity to shape Europe’s politics and policies in the year ahead, as assessed by the POLITICO newsroom and the power players POLITICO’s journalists speak with. In a White House interview on Monday with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of “The Conversation,” Trump expanded on the message, saying he would endorse candidates from parties in Europe who shared his outlook — especially on shutting down immigration. ELECTIONS MATTER, BUT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS In an effort to unpack Trump’s disruptive influence on international affairs since he returned for his second term in January, Public First conducted an online survey of 10,510 adults aged 18 and over, between Dec. 5 and Dec. 9. The research found that in Germany and the U.K. over half of respondents considered Trump’s election even more important than the elections of their own leaders, even though both Merz and Starmer have only relatively recently won power themselves. In Germany, 53 percent of people thought Trump’s election was more significant for their country than the election of Merz, compared with 25 percent who thought the German election was more important. In the U.K., 54 percent said Trump’s return was more significant than Starmer’s Labour Party taking power and ending 14 years of Conservative rule, compared with 28 percent who said the change of national government last year was more important for Britain.  French voters were a little less stark in their view, but still 43 percent thought Trump’s victory was more significant, against 25 percent who believed Macron’s election had a bigger impact on France. In Canada, however, respondents were split. Mark Carney’s victory in April, on the back of a campaign promise to stand up to Trump, was viewed by 40 percent as more significant than Trump’s return to power. Only slightly more — 45 percent — said Trump’s win was more significant for Canada than Carney’s. TRANSPARENCY TRUMPS STRENGTH In his interview with POLITICO, Trump denounced European leaders as “weak,” provoking retorts from politicians across the European Union and even prompting the pope to urge him not to “break apart” the transatlantic alliance. The researchers found that Europeans broadly shared Trump’s view that their leaders were weak, at least in comparison to him. They rated Trump as more “strong and decisive” than their own leader, by 74 percent to 26 percent in Germany; 73 percent to 27 percent in France; and 69 percent to 31 percent in the U.K. Canada was again the notable exception, with 60 percent saying Carney is stronger and more decisive compared to Trump, and only 40 percent saying the reverse.  Overall, however, the quality of being a strong and decisive leader is not seen as the most desirable trait among voters questioned in the survey. Far more important across all five countries in the research, including the U.S., is being honest and transparent.  “Strength is not the most important trait for a leader, but it is clearly an area where European leaders’ approach fall short so his words in the POLITICO interview will ring true,” said Wride.  Pollsters also asked how people felt their own leaders were handling the whirlwind of geopolitical upheaval in Trump’s second term. In France and Germany, more people think their leaders handled Trump badly than approved: Only 24 percent thought Merz had done a good job, while 34 percent thought his handling of Trump had been bad.  In France, Macron fared even worse. Just 16 percent of respondents said he had done well compared to 39 percent who thought he had done badly at managing relations with the White House. The verdict on Starmer was mixed: 29 percent thought he was handling Trump well, the same proportion as said he was doing badly. That represents an underwhelming verdict on a prime minister who has made a priority of maintaining a warm and effective alliance with the U.S. president.  RESISTANCE VS. STANDING UP TO TRUMP The research found that people in Europe wanted their leaders to stand up to Trump and challenge him, rather than prioritize getting along with him. However, when asked how their own particular national leaders should behave, Europeans took the opposite view, saying collaboration was more important than challenging the president.  Canadians remained punchy regardless, with a slight preference for Carney to confront Trump.  “Perhaps the only opportunity Trump has offered national leaders is the opportunity to stand up to him, something which we find tends to improve perceptions of them,” said Wride, from Public First. “Having fallen short on this, from the public’s perspective, leaders are seen to have largely failed to respond for the last year.” This edition of The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Dec. 5 to Dec. 9, surveying 10,510 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error. The survey is an ongoing project from POLITICO and Public First, an independent polling company headquartered in London, to measure public opinion across a broad range of policy areas. You can find new surveys and analysis each month at politico.com/poll. Have questions or comments? Ideas for future surveys? Email us at poll@politico.com.

As a frontline NATO heavyweight, Poland is seething at being relegated to the diplomatic sidelines on a potential peace deal in Ukraine. When leaders from the U.K., France, Germany and Ukraine gathered in London this week to align their stances on Washington’s fast-moving push for a peace deal, Poland wasn’t to be found on the guest list. It was the second snub in as many months, after Warsaw also missed an invitation to a crunch peace summit in Geneva on Nov. 23. Poland’s exclusion from the top table is a bitter blow for a country that has taken one of the EU’s most active positions on Ukraine — and the right-wing nationalist camp around President Karol Nawrocki has wasted no time in blaming liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk for the flop. “Poland’s absence in London is yet another example of Donald Tusk’s incompetence,” Marek Pęk, a senator from the nationalist Law and Justice party, raged after the Downing Street meeting, calling Tusk “a second-tier politician in Europe.” The reasons for Polish frustration are clear. Poland not only hosts 1 million Ukrainian refugees and acts as the key supply hub for Ukraine, but Warsaw also plays a pivotal role in pressing Europe toward rearmament. Poland is NATO’s highest per capita spender on defense and wants to more than double its military — already the alliance’s third biggest — to 500,000 personnel. TUSK ON THE MARGINS Tusk has also betrayed some frustration at Poland’s exile to the diplomatic margins. After the meeting in Geneva, he asked to be added to the joint European communiqué — a face-saving request that Warsaw commentators said merely underlined Poland’s absence. Donald Tusk has betrayed some frustration at Poland’s exile to the diplomatic margins. | Halil Sagirkaya/Anadolu via Getty Images In Berlin last week, standing beside German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Tusk tried to defuse the awkwardness over the diplomatic rebuff to Poland with a touch of irony. “I don’t want to stir emotions, but let’s say this plainly: Not everyone in Washington — and certainly no one in Moscow — wants Poland to be present everywhere,” he said, before adding that he took this banishment — presumably a reflection of Poland’s dogged defense of Ukraine — “as a compliment.” The government insists nothing unusual occurred in London. The format “was proposed by Prime Minister [Keir] Starmer,” government spokesperson Adam Szłapka said, arguing that “there are dozens of such formats, and they change constantly. Not every format produces results, and Poland does not have to — and should not — participate in all of them.”  He noted that Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski had joined a call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Starmer after the meeting — proof, he said, that Poland “remains fully engaged.” Polish officials are also quick to point out there are no actual peace negotiations with Russia, at least for now. “These are snapshots, not the architecture,” one diplomat said of Warsaw’s absences. “It’s too early for hysteria.” The diplomat, like others in this story, was granted anonymity to speak freely on a topic of political sensitivity. FROM PLAYMAKER TO BYSTANDER In the early years of the war, Poland was impossible to ignore. It sent much of its arsenal to Ukraine, cajoled Berlin into sending Leopard tanks to Kyiv, and served as NATO’s indispensable logistics hub, most notably from an airbase near the city of Rzeszów. President Karol Nawrocki has been busy building up his own foreign-policy credentials. | Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images But much of that leverage has faded. Poland’s Soviet-era weapons stocks are depleted and its vast rearmament drive won’t free up anything it can spare abroad for years. Meanwhile, France, Germany and the U.K. are now promising new air-defense systems, long-range missiles and — crucially — are willing to contribute troops to any future monitoring or peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. Even if they are just that — promises — Poland has already ruled that out. In discussions now centered on cease-fire enforcement and security guarantees, past support matters less than deployable assets, and Kyiv has adjusted accordingly. Zelenskyy is now leaning heavily on capitals that can bring something new to the table. “Americans don’t want us, European leaders don’t want us, Kyiv doesn’t want us — so who does?” former Prime Minister Leszek Miller said after the London talks. “Something unpleasant is happening, and we should stop pretending otherwise.” Former President Bronisław Komorowski, a political ally of Tusk, argued that Poland’s absence reflected geopolitical realities, not diplomatic failure.  London brought together “the three strongest European countries” — politically, militarily and economically — the ones contributing the most to Ukraine’s war effort, he said. Poland, he added, “is simply weaker,” and while Europe values Warsaw’s role, it must be “in line with its real weight.” SPLIT-SCREEN DIPLOMACY Poland’s quest for diplomatic heft is hardly helped by its difficulties speaking with one voice abroad. As Tusk focuses on European coordination efforts, nationalist opposition-backed President Nawrocki has been busy building up his own foreign-policy credentials, jetting off to Washington, cultivating contacts around Donald Trump’s administration, and speaking publicly about Poland’s “independent voice.”  The two sides exchange frequent jabs. Tusk recently reminded Nawrocki that the Polish constitution entrusts foreign policy to the government, not to the presidency. Despite the theatrics, both camps share the same hard line on Russia. What they don’t share is a strategy for navigating Washington. Government officials acknowledge Nawrocki currently has more direct access to the White House.  His senior foreign policy adviser, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, puts it bluntly: “Trump will never meet Tusk. He will meet the president. Thanks to him, Poland still has a channel to Washington.” Nawrocki’s circle argues this gives him leverage Tusk can’t match. Without access to Trump, Tusk “adds nothing distinctive” to high-level Western conversations, Saryusz-Wolski told POLITICO. In his view, unless someone with the president’s standing asserts Poland’s interests at the highest level, the country will simply follow whatever compromise Paris, Berlin and London shape with Washington. Officials concede privately that a channel to Washington matters — and for now, Nawrocki has it. Still, they also warn that betting everything on a single, unpredictable U.S. president is risky, especially after the new U.S. security strategy openly signaled that Europe must take far greater responsibility for its own defense. The consequence of Nawrocki handling diplomacy with Trump while Tusk deals with Europe is that it can look like two foreign policies at once. “The problem is not Poland’s position,” said a senior Western European diplomat, referring to the country’s pro-Ukraine stance. “The problem is knowing who speaks for Poland.” If it’s any consolation to Tusk, Germany’s Merz insists that he is taking Warsaw’s position into account. “My position toward Poland is very clear: We do nothing without close coordination with Poland,” the chancellor told Tusk last week.

BRUSSELS — The EU’s top defense official issued an unusually sharp warning on Wednesday, arguing that the new U.S. National Security Strategy “surprises by its clear antagonism towards the European Union” and amounts to a geopolitical play to prevent Europe from ever becoming a unified power. In a strongly worded blog post published just days after Washington released its 2025 NSS, EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius argued that Washington’s framing of Europe’s supposed “civilizational erasure” is not rooted in genuine concerns about values or democracy, but in hard-edged U.S. geopolitical calculations.  “EU unity is against USA interests,” Kubilius wrote, summarizing the logic he said underpins the Trump administration’s document. He pointed to passages in the strategy urging Washington to “cultivate resistance” inside European countries and to work with nationalist parties opposed to deeper integration, language he interpreted as evidence the U.S. is ready “to fight against the European Union, against our strength through unity.” Trump’s view on Europe was underlined in an interview with POLITICO where he denounced European leaders as “weak” and that he would endorse candidates in European elections, even at the risk of offending local sensitivities. Kubilius wrote that the U.S. now sees a more cohesive EU as a potential challenger to American influence. “The US National Security Strategy’s antagonistic language on the European Union comes not from American sentimental emotions about ‘good old Europe,’ but from deep strategic considerations,” he wrote. Kubilius linked the strategy’s worldview to the ideas of Elbridge Colby — now a senior Pentagon official — whose book “The Strategy of Denial” argues that the U.S. must prevent any region from forming a dominant power capable of constraining American access to markets.  Kubilius noted that Colby identifies “the European Union or a more cohesive entity emerging from it” as being “capable of establishing regional hegemony and unduly burdening or even excluding US trade and engagement.” Kubilius argued that this strategic perspective, rather than ideological disagreements, explain the NSS’s unusually hostile tone toward Brussels. “Let’s hope,” he concluded, there “will be enough prudence on American soil not to fight against the emerging power of European unity.”

BRUSSELS — Donald Trump’s barrage of attacks on the European Union is forcing its leaders to confront the unthinkable: a future in which America is no longer their primary security guarantor and Europe has to organize its own defense far sooner than anyone imagined. In anticipation of a reduced American role, EU leaders are already road-testing a Europe-led security order. Many of the most important decisions regarding Ukraine are being hammered out in a loose “coalition of the willing,” which is led by the U.K. and France and also includes Germany.  Meanwhile, EU policymakers are exploring deeper coordination through the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force or by pushing for a stronger “European pillar” inside NATO — an idea long backed by Paris and now gaining traction in Berlin. A senior defense official from a mid-sized European country said that conversations about security guarantees for Ukraine with American officials had grown “awkward.” More significantly, the official said, so had discussions about Article 5 — the clause in the NATO treaty that requires allies to come to each other’s defense if one is attacked. “The uncertainty” on how the U.S. would behave in the event of an attack on a frontline state “is just too high,” said the official. OPEN QUESTION Other current and former security officials said the key question was no longer if Europe would take over primary responsibility for its defense and security, but when. The absence of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a recent meeting of NATO foreign ministers — something that has happened only a handful of times in alliance history — sparked concern among EU and former NATO officials. That grew to alarm after his deputy Christopher Landau berated EU countries for prioritizing their own defense industries instead of continuing to buy from the U.S. The efforts to carve out new forums, independent of Washington, got a new push last week with the publication of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy.  “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” reads the document. “Wealthy, sophisticated nations … must assume primary responsibility for their regions.” In Europe, the document argued, mass migration is “transforming the continent and creating strife.” “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” If NATO allies become majority non-European, it continued, “it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, said he wants to use the coming year to flesh out provisions in the clause to spell out what actions countries would take to defend one another. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images In an interview Monday, Trump doubled down on the idea that a Europe subjected to “mass migration” is “decaying” and aimless. The bloc’s “weak” leaders simply “don’t know what to do,” he told POLITICO’s Dasha Burns for a special episode of The Conversation.  “The people coming in have a totally different ideology,” he added. “They’ll be much weaker, and they’ll be much different.” NEW EUROPEAN ORDER In the face of relentless attacks from the Trump administration, the European Union is quietly working on establishing new security guarantees in case the NATO one proves unreliable. “The question is whether we need to have some kind of additional security guarantees and institutional arrangements in order to be ready — in case Article 5 suddenly is not implemented,” EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius told POLITICO at the end of November. Even so, “we should always count on Article 5,” he added.   One legal basis for such a guarantee can be found in the EU’s common defense clause, Article 42.7, which was born after the Kosovo war of the late 1990s when then-French and British leaders Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair jointly pushed for Europe to take defense into its own hands. Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, added that he wants to use the coming year to flesh out provisions in the clause to spell out what actions countries would take to defend one another. He pointed to recent comments by U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker suggesting that Germany should take over NATO’s top military job from an American.  The comment “is a signal that really Americans are asking us to take care about European defense.” END OF AN ERA With European military chiefs and intelligence agencies warning that an attack from Russia could come as early as 2028, traditional European attitudes toward defense — and reliance on the United States — are quickly shifting. Until recently, Germany has been unwavering in its support for a U.S.-led NATO. But under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Berlin is now holding talks with Paris about how the French nuclear deterrent could contribute to Europe’s security. At the same time, Merz has shown a growing willingness to differ from Washington on the subject of Ukraine and Europe’s security architecture. Parts of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy were “unacceptable,” the conservative leader said on Tuesday. The document confirmed Merz’s view that “we in Europe, and therefore in Germany, must become much more independent of the United States in security policy.” The shift reflects changing dynamics within Germany’s security establishment. In a statement, Roderich Kiesewetter, a former German army general staff officer and a conservative lawmaker in the Bundestag, called Trump’s security strategy a “slap in the face.” “Anyone who writes about partners in this way won’t defend them when it really counts,” he wrote. “What does that mean? The era of the ‘security guarantee’ is over.” CAPABILITY GAPS The challenge for Europe is how to move from rhetoric to action. The stakes are huge — not least because embracing continental defense would involve major tradeoffs on welfare spending, which in turn could topple governments. Another obstacle is institutional. Given that the United States is the biggest partner inside NATO, the alliance is not a place where allies can plan for any sort of post-American future. “That would defeat the very purpose of NATO,” said one senior alliance diplomat. Inside the alliance there is no contingency planning for a NATO without the U.S., according to three NATO diplomats. They interpret the signals from Washington not as a prelude to U.S. withdrawal from the alliance but as a powerful wakeup call for Europe as Washington refocuses on the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific. “The United States and NATO allies take our Article 5 commitments … very seriously,” Whitaker, the U.S. ambassador, said last week. “Article 5 is ironclad.” “But we have expectations,” he said at the Doha Forum in Qatar, namely “[Europeans] picking up the conventional defense of the European continent.” A third and particularly daunting task for Europeans would be to replicate or replace military capacities currently provided by the U.S. Europeans provide up to 60 percent of capabilities in some domains, said Oana Lungescu, a former NATO spokesperson who is now a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank. But in others — such as intelligence, heavy airlift and deep strikes — the United States typically provides an outsized share. “It would be very hard for Europeans to fill some of those capability gaps, certainly within a year or two,” Lungescu said. Some officials pointed to the fact that even if the Trump administration wants to leave NATO, the U.S. Congress might stand in the way. Indeed, U.S. defense legislation set for a vote as soon as this week would place new restrictions on reducing troop levels in Europe, a bipartisan rebuke of the Trump administration’s strategy. Anthony Gardner, a former U.S. ambassador to the EU, said the NSS was nothing less than a “betrayal of 80 years of U.S. bipartisan policy.” For many Europeans, the message is clear. The Trump administration has laid out its position. More than ever, Europe is listening — and taking action.

MONS, Belgium — Fewer American troops in Europe will not strain the continent’s defenses, said NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, brushing off unease around U.S. commitment to the alliance. “I am confident in the capabilities” of Europe and Canada, the four-star U.S. general said at the alliance’s sprawling military operational command in southern Belgium. “We’re ready today to meet any crisis or contingency.” Grynkewich’s comments come amid concerns around an anticipated pullback ofAmerican troops from Europe resulting from President Donald Trump’s upcoming defense strategy. The so-called posture review is widely expected to involve a redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. That shift has already begun, with the U.S. pulling 800 troops out of Romania last month — a decision Bucharest called on Washington to overturn. The worry about a reduction in the 85,000 U.S. troops in Europe also reflects a broader debate around Washington’s commitment to the alliance under Trump. Trump has praised the promise by NATO allies to ramp up defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 but previously questioned the alliance’s collective defense pledge, equivocated over a recent Russian drone incursion into Poland, and repeatedly pressured European allies to step up.  Earlier this year, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: “Now [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has started making incursions into the NATO borders. The one thing I can tell you is the U.S. is not going to get involved with troops or any of that.” Alexus G. Grynkewich insisted that any political tensions related to peace talks have had “no impact … in terms of the ability to accomplish our mission from a NATO perspective.” | Wohlfart/Getty Images European leaders are privately worried about a Trump-backed effort to end the war in Ukraine that some see as currently favoring Russia, with French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly warning in a leaked call that the U.S. could be about to “betray” Ukraine. That tumultuous relationship was on display again this week after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio skipped a meeting of NATO foreign ministers — something that has almost never happened since NATO’s founding in 1949. Meanwhile, his deputy berated allies in a closed-door meeting for prioritizing their own arms industries instead of continuing to spend on U.S. kit. Almost two-thirds of European defense spending goes to the U.S., but the EU is trying to change that with programs aimed at boosting local production. In private some European allies are worried about the U.S., but in public they insist that NATO is still a force to be reckoned with. “All the processes of NATO are functioning flawlessly,” Polish Deputy Defense Minister Paweł Zalewski told POLITICO. “In a practical sense, the Americans are fulfilling their obligations very well.” NEW NORMAL Grynkewich insisted that any political tensions related to peace talks have had “no impact … in terms of the ability to accomplish our mission from a NATO perspective.” Vows by the allies to ramp up their defense spending, he added, means NATO will “be more ready tomorrow and we’ll be more ready the day after that” to stand up to Russia and respond to any further troop withdrawals. Last month the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, raised eyebrows when he said he “look[ed] forward to the day when Germany … says that ‘we’re ready to take over the Supreme Allied Commander position,’” in a yet another example of Washington’s push for European allies to do more while the U.S. hints it could step back.  The Trump administration reportedly mulled not appointing an American general as Supreme Allied Commander Europe earlier this year, before nominating Grynkewich. The SACEUR has always been a U.S. officer as the post commands all allied troops in Europe and oversees the American nuclear deterrent on the continent. “There’s always rebalancing amongst the positions that different nations fill across the alliance,” Grynkewich said, adding that “it’s natural that some of that will happen … over the course of the next several months [and] several years.” That tumultuous relationship was on display again this week after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio skipped a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. | Win McNamee/Getty Images “As far as who holds the SACEUR position,” he told reporters, “I’d rather just leave it to politicians to make those judgments.” Europe’s disquiet over the reliability of its alliance with the U.S. comes as the full-scale war in Ukraine nears its fourth year, intelligence assessments warn of Russia being ready for an attack on a NATO country by the end of the decade, and Russian-linked hybrid attacks ramp up across the continent. Putin said this week he was “ready” for war with Europe. Grynkewich said he had “concern” that Russia may test NATO’s collective defense in the “near term” — as well as in the “mid term and in clearly [the] long term.”  Russia’s hybrid attacks are a “real issue,” the air force pilot said, and echoed a call by several European capitals to respond more forcefully to hybrid activities. “We also do think about being proactive,” he said, declining to give further details. “If Russia is attempting to provide dilemmas to us, then maybe there are ways that we could provide dilemmas to them.” Jan Cienski contributed reporting.