404Media is reporting (alternate link) that a cyber-weapons arms manufacturer is exploiting a vulnerability in iOS to bypass its automatic reboot security feature. This is the feature that automatically puts an iPhone into a more secure state if it hasn’t been used for 72 hours. > The new technology to get around inactivity reboot was developed by Magnet > Forensics, the company behind GrayKey, a popular tool sold to law enforcement > agencies that allows them to unlock and access data stored in iPhones and > Android smartphones. Magnet has developed a new device called GrayKey Preserve > and a feature for its regular GrayKey devices called Evidence Preservation > Mode, according to the video...

From an Anthropic blog post: > In a recent evaluation of AI models’ cyber capabilities, current Claude models > can now succeed at multistage attacks on networks with dozens of hosts using > only standard, open-source tools, instead of the custom tools needed by > previous generations. This illustrates how barriers to the use of AI in > relatively autonomous cyber workflows are rapidly coming down, and highlights > the importance of security fundamentals like promptly patching known > vulnerabilities. > > […] > > A notable development during the testing of Claude Sonnet 4.5 is that the > model can now succeed on a minority of the networks without the custom cyber > toolkit needed by previous generations. In particular, Sonnet 4.5 can now > exfiltrate all of the (simulated) personal information in a high-fidelity > simulation of the Equifax data breach—one of the costliest cyber attacks in > history­­using only a Bash shell on a widely-available Kali Linux host > (standard, open-source tools for penetration testing; not a custom toolkit). > Sonnet 4.5 accomplishes this by instantly recognizing a publicized CVE and > writing code to exploit it without needing to look it up or iterate on it. > Recalling that the original Equifax breach happened by exploiting a publicized > CVE that had not yet been patched, the prospect of highly competent and fast > AI agents leveraging this approach underscores the pressing need for security > best practices like prompt updates and patches...

Really interesting blog post from Anthropic: > In a recent evaluation of AI models’ cyber capabilities, current Claude models > can now succeed at multistage attacks on networks with dozens of hosts using > only standard, open-source tools, instead of the custom tools needed by > previous generations. This illustrates how barriers to the use of AI in > relatively autonomous cyber workflows are rapidly coming down, and highlights > the importance of security fundamentals like promptly patching known > vulnerabilities. > > […] > > A notable development during the testing of Claude Sonnet 4.5 is that the > model can now succeed on a minority of the networks without the custom cyber > toolkit needed by previous generations. In particular, Sonnet 4.5 can now > exfiltrate all of the (simulated) personal information in a high-fidelity > simulation of the Equifax data breach—­one of the costliest cyber attacks in > history—­using only a Bash shell on a widely-available Kali Linux host > (standard, open-source tools for penetration testing; not a custom toolkit). > Sonnet 4.5 accomplishes this by instantly recognizing a publicized CVE and > writing code to exploit it without needing to look it up or iterate on it. > Recalling that the original Equifax breach happened by exploiting a publicized > CVE that had not yet been patched, the prospect of highly competent and fast > AI agents leveraging this approach underscores the pressing need for security > best practices like prompt updates and patches. ...

This isn’t good: > We discovered a critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-21858, CVSS 10.0) in n8n that > enables attackers to take over locally deployed instances, impacting an > estimated 100,000 servers globally. No official workarounds are available for > this vulnerability. Users should upgrade to version 1.121.0 or later to > remediate the vulnerability. Three technical links and two news links.

Kendra Albert gave an excellent talk at USENIX Security this year, pointing out that the legal agreements surrounding vulnerability disclosure muzzle researchers while allowing companies to not fix the vulnerabilities—exactly the opposite of what the responsible disclosure movement of the early 2000s was supposed to prevent. This is the talk. > Thirty years ago, a debate raged over whether vulnerability disclosure was > good for computer security. On one side, full disclosure advocates argued that > software bugs weren’t getting fixed and wouldn’t get fixed if companies that > made insecure software wasn’t called out publicly. On the other side, > companies argued that full disclosure led to exploitation of unpatched > vulnerabilities, especially if they were hard to fix. After blog posts, public > debates, and countless mailing list flame wars, there emerged a compromise > solution: coordinated vulnerability disclosure, where vulnerabilities were > disclosed after a period of confidentiality where vendors can attempt to fix > things. Although full disclosure fell out of fashion, disclosure won and > security through obscurity lost. We’ve lived happily ever after since...

This is bad: > F5, a Seattle-based maker of networking software, disclosed the breach on > Wednesday. F5 said a “sophisticated” threat group working for an undisclosed > nation-state government had surreptitiously and persistently dwelled in its > network over a “long-term.” Security researchers who have responded to similar > intrusions in the past took the language to mean the hackers were inside the > F5 network for years. > > During that time, F5 said, the hackers took control of the network segment the > company uses to create and distribute updates for BIG IP, a line of server > appliances that F5 ...

Apple is now offering a $2M bounty for a zero-click exploit. According to the Apple website: > Today we’re announcing the next major chapter for Apple Security Bounty, > featuring the industry’s highest rewards, expanded research categories, and a > flag system for researchers to objectively demonstrate vulnerabilities and > obtain accelerated awards. > > 1. We’re doubling our top award to $2 million for exploit chains that can > achieve similar goals as sophisticated mercenary spyware attacks. This is > an unprecedented amount in the industry and the largest payout offered by > any bounty program we’re aware of ­ and our bonus system, providing > additional rewards for Lockdown Mode bypasses and vulnerabilities > discovered in beta software, can more than double this reward, with a > maximum payout in excess of $5 million. We’re also doubling or > significantly increasing rewards in many other categories to encourage > more intensive research. This includes $100,000 for a complete Gatekeeper > bypass, and $1 million for broad unauthorized iCloud access, as no > successful exploit has been demonstrated to date in either category. ...

AI agents are now hacking computers. They’re getting better at all phases of cyberattacks, faster than most of us expected. They can chain together different aspects of a cyber operation, and hack autonomously, at computer speeds and scale. This is going to change everything. Over the summer, hackers proved the concept, industry institutionalized it, and criminals operationalized it. In June, AI company XBOW took the top spot on HackerOne’s US leaderboard after submitting over 1,000 new vulnerabilities in just a few months. In August, the seven teams competing in DARPA’s AI Cyber Challenge ...

Attaullah Baig, WhatsApp’s former head of security, has filed a whistleblower lawsuit alleging that Facebook deliberately failed to fix a bunch of security flaws, in violation of its 2019 settlement agreement with the Federal Trade Commission. > The lawsuit, alleging violations of the whistleblower protection provision of > the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002, said that in 2022, roughly 100,000 > WhatsApp users had their accounts hacked every day. By last year, the > complaint alleged, as many as 400,000 WhatsApp users were getting locked out > of their accounts each day as a result of such account takeovers...

They’re interesting: > Tracked as CVE-2025-5054 and CVE-2025-4598, both vulnerabilities are race > condition bugs that could enable a local attacker to obtain access to access > sensitive information. Tools like Apport and systemd-coredump are designed to > handle crash reporting and core dumps in Linux systems. > > […] > > “This means that if a local attacker manages to induce a crash in a privileged > process and quickly replaces it with another one with the same process ID that > resides inside a mount and pid namespace, apport will attempt to forward the > core dump (which might contain sensitive information belonging to the > original, privileged process) into the namespace.”...