Ed Arnold is a senior research fellow for European security at the Royal United Services Institute. Early in 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had a severe diplomatic dustup with U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance in the Oval Office. Since then, relations between Washington and Kyiv have swung up and down and back again. Europe, for its part, reacted to the diplomatic incident with increased efforts to support Ukraine and keep the U.S. onside. In March, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron announced the launch of a 34-nation “coalition of the willing” to strengthen Europe’s role in ensuring Ukraine’s future sovereignty and security. And in September, Macron announced that 26 countries committed to deploying troops on the ground as part of a Multi-National Force Ukraine “the day after the ceasefire or peace.” However, regardless of Europe’s efforts to support Ukraine, the only thing that really matters is America’s security guarantees, which Zelenskyy must now secure — even if it means concessions elsewhere. As much as Europe may like to think otherwise, Washington’s guarantees are the only viable path to peace for Ukraine. Europe can’t even deploy its multinational force without U.S. logistical support. And as 2025 draws to a close, the question of Washington’s commitment remains a fundamental factor in efforts to move Russia’s war toward its next phase and, hopefully, a durable peace. Yet, everything suggests real power lies in Russia’s hands. Ukraine’s collective memory of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum’s failures — security guarantees that were provided by the U.S., Russia and U.K. so that Ukraine would surrender its Soviet-era nuclear weapons — cast a long shadow over current negotiations. And at this truly perilous moment, Zelenskyy has several points to consider: First, the Ukrainian president is reportedly prepared to drop Ukraine’s quest for NATO membership — something the alliance had described as “irreversible” at last year’s NATO Summit — in exchange for robust security guarantees, and there are signs these could be forthcoming. So far, the U.S. has offered Ukraine “platinum standard” security guarantees, alongside the caveat that they “will not be on the table forever,” pushing Zelenskyy toward accepting the deal currently on the table. In addition, there are hopes that these guarantees would include the provision of Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers — only four U.S. allies have ever been granted Tomahawks in the past. These would allow Ukraine to strike Russia’s political and military centers, thus potentially deterring the Kremlin from resuming hostilities. But while this additional capability would certainly complicate Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision-making, it’s no silver bullet. Apart from the guarantee’s technical details, Zelenskyy rightly hopes that unlike the Budapest Memorandum, which was an executive agreement, any commitment would be legally binding, requiring ratification by the U.S. House and Senate — both of which are broadly supportive of Ukraine — and then approval by the president. Such formal ratification would put Ukraine’s guarantees on similar footing to other U.S. bilateral security treaties with countries like Japan and South Korea. Alternative vehicles like a presidential executive action, which was used for both the Paris Climate accords and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to limit Iran’s uranium enrichment, are non-binding political commitments, meaning a future president wouldn’t be bound by them. So, if formal ratification is on the table, Zelenskyy will be hoping it provides Ukraine future opportunities to influence Congress and ensure support remains strong and united. However, regardless of Europe’s efforts to support Ukraine, the only thing that really matters is America’s security guarantees, which Volodymyr Zelenskyy must now secure — even if it means concessions elsewhere. | Leszek Szymanski/EPA But even then, there are risks. While Zelenskyy has said the security guarantees “correspond to Article 5,” this core alliance commitment is fragile. On the plane to the NATO Summit in the Hague this summer, Trump mentioned: “There are numerous definitions of Article 5” — and he was right. Article 5 is open to interpretation, and was deliberately worded as such in 1949 to prevent the U.S. from being automatically pulled into a third major war on the European continent. Therefore, it isn’t just a question of the letter of the treaty but also its spirit. Of course, NATO is far more than just Article 5. Founded on the ashes of World War II, it’s also an alliance built on economic collaboration (Article 2), as well as an individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (Article 3) . But if Article 5 was easily replicable, then alliances with similar strength would be established all over the world. In reality, mutual security guarantees backed by credible military force are rare. So it’s questionable whether the U.S. would, in fact, choose to offer a guarantee that could force it to directly intervene in Ukraine, especially considering it’s provided measured support since 2014, consistently blocked the country’s path to NATO since 2022, and made it a priority to avoid getting directly involved in the war. Finally, it is a maxim of war that “the enemy gets a vote.” So, as bilateral engagements between the U.S. and Russia continue in parallel with European and Ukrainian negotiations, Putin’s position will be important, whether one likes it or not. Russia wants a far more expansive deal with the U.S. on European security — something it clearly demonstrated with its initial 28-point peace plan. And with Putin refusing to concede on his maximalist demands to date, it remains unclear what Russia will accept. Ultimately, regardless of how strong Zelenskyy believes America’s security guarantee is, its durability may still be based on Putin’s interpretation.

Senior officials inside NATO and the Spanish government are not too concerned with President Donald Trump’s threats to punish the country for its perceived inadequate spending on defense. “The threat is not being taken seriously at the military level,” said a senior NATO officer at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Brussels. “Spaniards are reacting calmly.” The officer was granted anonymity to discuss internal thinking. The relative shrug comes as Trump’s rhetoric has grown increasingly hostile in recent weeks, criticizing Spain over its low spending amid the administration’s push to make European countries less reliant on the United States’ military umbrella. “You’re going to have to talk to Spain,” Trump told NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Wednesday. “Spain is not a team player.” Trump has pushed NATO members to spend at least 5 percent of their GDP on national defense. At a NATO summit in The Hague in June, most members agreed to a spending target of 5 percent of GDP — 3.5 percent on core military expenditure and 1.5 percent in defense-related areas such as military mobility by 2035. But not Spain, which asked for a carveout. Madrid has the lowest military spending of any NATO member country, allocating just 1.3 percent of its GDP to defense in 2024. And its refusal to commit to more has irked Trump, who this month said NATO should consider throwing Spain out of the alliance. The president’s anger further strains an already complex transatlantic relationship in which he has upended trade relationships, imposed new tariffs and lectured leaders on migration and climate change. European leaders, meanwhile, have worked hard to maintain a positive relationship with Trump as they hope to influence him on a range of issues, especially the war in Ukraine. Trump also suggested he’d impose new tariffs Spain, which is a member of the European Union. It’s not clear how Spain could be singled out but, for now, the Spanish don’t seem too concerned. What matters—and we should say it with pride—is that Spain is a reliable and responsible ally, that it has been in the Atlantic Alliance for 40 years, that it has paid a very high price with the lives of Spanish service members, that it is willing to take part in every mission assigned to it, and that it is making a very important effort in the Spanish and European defense industry, creating jobs and honoring commitments,” said Margarita Robles, Spain’s defense minister told reporters last week. “So, even if some do not acknowledge it, Spain is a country that delivers, and an ally respected by the other members of the Alliance.” Robles added that 2035 is a long way off and the alliance’s priority should be what is happening in Ukraine. But Trump remains focused on Spain’s refusal and is still “considering economic consequences,” said Anna Kelly, spokesperson for the White House. “President Trump always means what he says, and his actions speak for themselves,” she said. “While every other NATO ally agreed to increase its defense spending to five percent, Spain was the only country that refused.”

HOW DONALD TRUMP BECAME PRESIDENT OF EUROPE The U.S. president describes himself as the European Union’s de facto leader. Is he wrong? By NICHOLAS VINOCUR Illustration by Justin Metz for POLITICO European federalists, rejoice! The European Union finally has a bona fide president. The only problem: He lives at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., aka the White House. U.S. President Donald Trump claimed the title during one of his recent off-the-cuff Oval Office banter sessions, asserting that EU leaders refer to him as “the president of Europe.”  The comment provoked knowing snickers in Brussels, where officials assured POLITICO that nobody they knew ever referred to Trump that way. But it also captured an embarrassing reality: EU leaders have effectively offered POTUS a seat at the head of their table. From the NATO summit in June, when Trump revealed a text message in which NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte called him “daddy,” to the EU-U.S. trade accord signed in Scotland where EU leaders consented to a deal so lopsided in Washington’s favor it resembled a surrender, it looks like Trump has a point. Never since the creation of the EU has a U.S. president wielded such direct influence over European affairs. And never have the leaders of the EU’s 27 countries appeared so willing — desperate even — to hold up a U.S. president as a figure of authority to be praised, cajoled, lobbied, courted, but never openly contradicted. In off-the-record briefings, EU officials frame their deference to Trump as a necessary ploy to keep him engaged in European security and Ukraine’s future. But there’s no indication that, having supposedly done what it takes to keep the U.S. on side, Europe’s leaders are now trying to reassert their authority. On the contrary, EU leaders now appear to be offering Trump a role in their affairs even when he hasn’t asked for it. A case in point: When a group of leaders traveled to Washington this summer to urge Trump to apply pressure to Russian President Vladimir Putin (he ignored them), they also asked him to prevail on his “friend,” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, to lift his block on Ukraine’s eventual membership to the EU, per a Bloomberg report. Trump duly picked up the phone. And while there’s no suggestion Orbán changed his tune on Ukraine, the fact that EU leaders felt compelled to ask the U.S. president to unstick one of their internal conflicts only further secured his status as a de facto European powerbroker. “He may never be Europe’s president, but he can be its godfather,” said one EU diplomat who, like others in this piece, was granted anonymity to speak candidly. “The appropriate analogy is more criminal. We’re dealing with a mafia boss exerting extortionate influence over the businesses he purports to protect.” “BRUSSELS EFFECT” It was not long ago that the EU could describe itself credibly as a trade behemoth and a “regulatory superpower” able to command respect thanks to its vast consumer market and legal reach. EU leaders boasted of a “Brussels effect” that bent the behavior of corporations or foreign governments to European legal standards, even if they weren’t members of the bloc. Anthony Gardner, a former U.S. ambassador to the EU, recalls that when Washington was negotiating a trade deal with the EU known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the 2010s, the U.S. considered Europe to be an equal peer. “Since the founding of the EEC [European Economic Community], America’s position was that we want a strong Europe,” said Gardner. “And we had lots of disagreements with the EU, particularly on trade. But the way to deal with those is not through bullying.” One sign of the EU’s confidence was its willingness to take on the U.S.’s biggest companies, as it did in 2001 when the European Commission blocked a planned $42 billion acquisition of Honeywell by General Electric. That was the beginning of more than a decade of assertive competition policy, with the bloc’s heavyweight officials like former antitrust czar Margrethe Vestager grandstanding in front of the world’s press and threatening to break up Google on antitrust grounds, or forcing Apple to pay back an eye-watering €13 billion over its tax arrangements in Ireland. Compare that to last week, when the Commission was expected to fine Google for its search advertising practices. The decision was at first delayed at the request of EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, then quietly publicized via a press release and an explanatory video on Friday afternoon that did not feature the commissioner in charge, Teresa Ribera. (Neither move prevented Trump from announcing in a Truth Social post that his “Administration will NOT allow these discriminatory actions to stand.”) “I’ve never seen anything like this in my entire career at the Commission,” said a senior Commission official. “Trump is inside the machine at this point.” Since Trump’s reelection, EU leaders have been exceptionally careful in how they speak about the U.S. president, with two options seemingly available: Silence, or praise. “At this moment, Estonia and many European countries support what Trump is doing,” Estonian President Alar Karis said in a recent POLITICO interview, referring to the U.S. president’s efforts to push Putin toward a peace with Ukraine. Never mind the fact that the Pentagon recently axed security funding for countries like his and is expected to follow up by reducing U.S. troop numbers there too. It became fashionable among the cognoscenti ahead of the NATO summit in June to claim that the U.S. president had done Europe a favor by casting doubt on his commitment to the military alliance. Only by Trump’s cold kiss, the thinking went, would this Sleeping Beauty of a continent ever “wake up.” As for Mark Rutte’s “Daddy” comment — humiliatingly leaked from a private text message exchange by Trump himself — it was a clever ploy to appeal to the U.S. president’s ego. Unfortunately for EU leaders, the pretense that Trump somehow has Europe’s interests in mind and was merely doling out “tough love” was dispelled just a few months later when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signed the EU-U.S. trade deal in Turnberry, Scotland. This time, there was no disguising the true nature of what had transpired between Europe and the U.S.  The wolfish grins of Trump White House bigwigs Stephen Miller and Howard Lutnick on the official signing photograph told the whole story: Trump had laid down brutal, humiliating terms. Europe had effectively surrendered. Many in Brussels interpreted the deal in the same way.  “You won’t hear me use that word [negotiation]” to describe what transpired between Europe and the U.S., veteran EU trade negotiator Sabine Weyand told a recent panel. BLAME GAME As EU officials settle in for la rentrée, the shock of these past few months has led to finger-pointing: Does the blame for this double whammy of subjugation lie with the European Commission, or with the EU’s 27 heads of state and government? It’s tempting to point to the Commission, which, after all, has an exclusive mandate to negotiate trade deals on behalf of all EU countries. In the days leading up to Turnberry, von der Leyen and her top trade official, Šefčovič, could theoretically have taken a page from China’s playbook and struck back at the U.S. threat of 15 percent tariffs with tariffs of their own. Indeed, the EU’s trade arsenal is fully stocked with the means to do so, not least via the Anti-Coercion Instrument designed for precisely such situations. But to heap all the blame on the doorstep of the Berlaymont isn’t fair, argues Gardner, the former U.S. ambassador to the EU. The real architects of Europe’s summer of humiliation are the leaders who prevailed on the Commission to go along with Trump’s demands, whatever the cost. “What I am saying is that the member states have shown a lack of solidarity at a crucial moment,” said Gardner. The consequences of this collective failure, he warns, may reverberate for years, if not decades: “The first message here is that the most effective way for big trading blocs to win over Europe is to ruthlessly use leverage to divide the European Union. The second message, which maybe wasn’t fully taken into account: Member states may be asking themselves: What is the EU good for if it can’t provide a shield on trade?” The same goes for regulation: Trump’s repeated threates of tariffs if the bloc dares to test his patience reveal the limits of EU sovereignty when it comes to the so-called “Brussels effect.” And that leaves the bloc in desperate need of a new narrative about its role on the world stage. The reasons why EU leaders decided to fold, rather than fight, are plain to see. They were laid bare in a recent speech by António Costa, who as president of the European Council convenes the EU leaders in their summits. “Escalating tensions with a key ally over tariffs, while our eastern border is under threat, would have been an imprudent risk,” Costa said. But none of this answers the question: What now?  If Europe has already ceded so much to Trump, is the entire bloc condemned to vassalhood or, as some commentators have prophesied, a “century of humiliation” on par with the fate of the Qing dynasty following China’s Opium Wars with Britain? Possibly — though a century seems like a long time.  Among the steaming heaps of garbage, there are a few green shoots. To wit: The fact that polls indicate that the average European wants a tougher, more sovereign Europe and blames leaders rather than “the EU” for failing to deliver faster on benchmarks like a “European Defense Union.” Europe’s current leaders (with a few exceptions, such as Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen) may be united in their embrace of Trump as Europe’s Godfather. But there is one Cassandra-like figure who refuses to let them off the hook for failing to deliver a more sovereign EU — former Italian prime minister and European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi. Author of the “Draghi Report,” a tome of recommendations on how Europe can pull itself back up by the bootstraps, the 78-year-old is refusing to go quietly into retirement. On the contrary, in one speech after another, he’s reminding EU leaders that they were the ones to ask for the report they are now ignoring. Speaking in Rimini, Italy, last month, Europe’s Cassandra summed up the challenge facing the Old World: In the past, he said, “the EU could act primarily as a regulator and arbiter, avoiding the harder question of political integration.” “To face today’s challenges, the European Union must transform itself from a spectator — or at best a supporting actor — into a protagonist.”

BERLIN — German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he is mentally preparing for a long war in Ukraine — but wouldn’t be drawn on whether Berlin will deploy peacekeeping troops should there be a ceasefire. In a televised interview on Sunday he also said that if he hadn’t decided to alter Germany’s debt rules to allow it to massively invest in defense, the NATO alliance would probably have disintegrated in June. “I’m mentally preparing myself for the fact that this war could drag on for a long time,” he told ZDF when asked if he was hopeful that a ceasefire could be reached next year. “We’re trying to end it as quickly as possible, but certainly not at the price of Ukraine’s capitulation.” Last week Merz had expressed skepticism that U.S. President Donald Trump’s ongoing peace push with Russian President Vladimir Putin would yield results. “I would like the United States of America to work with us to solve this problem for as long as possible,” Merz said. “Diplomacy isn’t about flipping a switch overnight and then everything will be fine again. It’s a lengthy process.” Asked about security guarantees — intended to protect Ukraine from another Russian attack in case of a peace agreement — Merz said: “The number one priority is supporting the Ukrainian army so that they can defend this country in the long term. That is the absolute priority, and we will begin doing that now.” When pressed as to whether Germany would be ready to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire, Merz stressed that every foreign troop deployment required Bundestag approval. He did not specify what a German deployment could look like or whether he supported such a step. Despite a huge expansion in military spending, Germany has struggled to recruit and train battle-ready soldiers, with troop levels flatlining at around 182,000 despite significant efforts to grow the force. Germany has struggled to recruit and train battle-ready soldiers. | Pool Photo by Daniel Bockwoldt via EPA During Sunday’s interview Merz defended his coalition’s historic decision to loosen the debt brake on defense spending — made possible by an unexpected U-turn by Merz’s conservatives right after the election — and even went so far as to link it to NATO’s survival. “We were essentially able to preserve NATO with our decision,” he said. “I was at the NATO summit in The Hague [June 24-25]. If we hadn’t changed the constitution and we hadn’t been willing to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to spend 3.5 percent on defense plus 1.5 percent on the necessary infrastructure, then NATO would probably have disintegrated that day. We prevented that.”

Growing international instability is prompting France and Germany to break a decades-old taboo by opening talks on how France’s nuclear deterrent could underpin Europe’s security. “France and Germany underline … that France’s independent strategic nuclear forces contribute significantly to the overall security of the alliance,” reads a five-page document outlining the conclusions of Friday’s Franco-German Defense and Security Council in Toulon. “France and Germany will start a strategic dialogue, led by the French Presidency and the German Chancellery.”  France is the EU’s only country with nuclear weapons. Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine and U.S. President Donald Trump’s unpredictability, President Emmanuel Macron has offered to start talks with European countries to discuss how France’s nuclear deterrent can contribute to the continent’s security.  German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on the campaign trail he was open to the idea — a major about-face for Germany, as Berlin had repeatedly refused similar offers in past decades.  Under France’s nuclear doctrine, there is a “European dimension” to the country’s so-called vital interests — which the weapons are designed to protect. However, what exactly that European dimension entails, and in which circumstances France might deploy its nuclear capacity beyond its own borders, is left purposefully vague. Unlike the United Kingdom, France is not a member of NATO’s nuclear planning group. In Friday’s conclusions, France and Germany also pledged to implement decisions taken at this year’s NATO summit, meaning boosting defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2030 and increasing weapons arsenals.  Paris and Berlin announced a new Franco-German initiative to develop a European early-warning system: “Space-based missile early warning system based on ODIN’s EYE project and a network of ground-based radars.” It’s dubbed JEWEL and open to other European countries. France and Germany also used Friday’s council to push for a stronger EU role in Ukraine — and in Europe’s defense more broadly. On Ukraine, Berlin and Paris pledged fresh air defense support, promised to buy more arms from Ukrainian factories, and backed Kyiv’s integration into EU defense programs.  The two also called for more joint EU financing of military aid, explicitly linking it to building up Europe’s defense industry. They also backed joint projects with Kyiv under new EU investment schemes like EDIP and SAFE. They vowed tougher sanctions enforcement — targeting Russia’s “shadow fleet” used for oil exports and third-country suppliers of key goods used by the Kremlin’s war machine — and stressed the need for credible long-term security guarantees.  Hans von der Burchard contributed to this report from Toulon. 

President Donald Trump, appearing fed up, accused the Russian President Vladimir Putin of spouting “bullshit” and said he was “very strongly” considering supporting a punishing sanctions bill to bring Russia to heel. The legislation, which has broad bipartisan support, would impose high tariffs on countries that import Russian energy and implement secondary sanctions on foreign firms that support Russian energy production. While the legislation has for some time had the votes to pass in both chambers of Congress, Republican leadership has not brought it to the floor, waiting for a signal from Trump. “I’m looking at. It’s an optional bill,” Trump said during a Tuesday Cabinet meeting. “It’s totally at my option. They pass it totally at my option, and to terminate totally at my option. And I’m looking at it very strongly.” Trump hastold allies privately that he doesn’t believe sanctions would be effective in deterring Putin; and, during a meeting last month with Germany’s chancellor, he criticized the legislation as “a harsh bill, very harsh.” But his comments during the Cabinet meeting signaled that he could be changing his mind, or at the very least encouraging the Senate to send the bill to his desk while stopping short of committing to signing it into law — a means, said one person familiar with the administration’s thinking and granted anonymity to discuss it, of increasing the president’s options and leverage over Putin. Trump’s comments are the latest signal of a broadening rift between him and Putin, who the president once hoped would help him quickly end the war in Ukraine. Trump has noticeably cooled toward Putin since the Russian leader refused to attend a summit in Istanbul that the U.S. organized in an effort to wind down hostilities in Ukraine. Putin, instead, has intensified attacks on Kyiv and other population centers. “I don’t know what the hell happened to Putin,” Trump said in May, before posting on social media, “He has gone absolutely CRAZY.” At last month’s NATO summit in the Netherlands, Trump was chummy with allies, supportive of the alliance and held a long meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Trump reiterated Tuesday that he was “very unhappy” with Putin, with whom he spoke for more than an hour last Thursday. “We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin, [if] you want to know the truth,” Trump said. Trump’s remarks come less than 24 hours after he said that he intended to restart weapons shipments to Ukraine, which were halted last week following a Pentagon review that cited concerns about munitions shortages potentially impacting American military readiness. Although the White House insisted that the review hadn’t come as a surprise to the president, Trump on Tuesday claimed not to know who at the Pentagon oversaw the review and decided to pause Ukraine aid. “I don’t know,” he replied. “You tell me.”

Halted shipments of some American military aid to Ukraine could resume after a series of high-level meetings in Italy and Ukraine over the coming week, according to two people familiar with the planning. These meetings could be the key to resuming some of the aid, which POLITICO first reported were paused earlier this month. President Donald Trump’s Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg will meet with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov in Rome at an international aid conference followed by a meeting in Kyiv this week and next, with the issue of aid sure to be at the top of the agenda. The Ukrainian government sees the resumption of air defense and precision munitions as critical to its war effort, as Russia has hit civilian targets hard in some of the largest drone and missile strikes of the war over the last two weeks. The U.S. has indicated to Kyiv that deliveries of engineering equipment and some armored vehicles will resume soon, though no timeline has been given yet, according to the people, who were granted anonymity to share details of ongoing discussions. The Pentagon did not respond to a request for comment. The Kyiv meeting between Kellogg and Umerov was not originally intended to address U.S. military aid, and was “set up before news of the arms pause came to light last week,” Kellogg spokesperson Morgan Murphy said in response to a request for comment about the meetings. The Pentagon’s abrupt halt of missile defense and precision-guided munitions for Ukraine last week came as a shock to Ukraine and caught many lawmakers and Trump allies off guard. It also raised new questions among U.S. allies across the Atlantic about whether America was more broadly stepping back from military support for Kyiv. The munitions pause appeared counter to comments Trump made last month after meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the NATO summit in The Hague, where he indicated he was willing to step up the shipment of air defense systems to Ukraine. “They do want to have the anti-missile missiles, as they call them, and we’re going to see if we can make some available,” Trump said. “They’re very hard to get.” Trump discussed the aid pause on a call Friday with Zelenskyy, and also addressed a potential ceasefire agreement with Russia. The Ukrainian president said it was “probably the best conversation we have had during this whole time, the most productive.” That call came a day after Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin, a conversation Trump indicated did not go well. He was “very unhappy” with the Putin call, he told reporters over the weekend. “It just seems like he wants to go all the way and just keep killing people. It’s not good. I wasn’t happy with it.” In contrast, he indicated that the call with Zelenskyy was more productive, and suggested that more weapons could soon be on the way. When asked about supplying more Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine — which were stopped under orders from the Pentagon — Trump replied, “Yeah, we might … they’re going to need something because they’re being hit pretty hard.” On Monday, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt indicated that the aid stoppage wasn’t permanent, portraying it as “a pause, to review, to ensure that everything the Pentagon is pushing out there is in the best interests of our military and our men and women in uniform.” Some of the weapons denied to Ukraine included 8,400 155mm artillery rounds, 142 Hellfire missiles and 252 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System missiles, which can precisely hit targets up to 50 miles away. Most significantly, the halted shipment also included 30 Patriot missiles used for shooting down Russian missiles and drones, which have been pounding apartment buildings and other civilian infrastructure in Kyiv. “The air defense munitions — the Patriots — are obviously the big one because Russia is producing so many UAVs that are becoming harder to hit with Ukraine’s mobile air defenses,” said Rob Lee, who studies the Russia-Ukraine war for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Russia is actually targeting the defense industry, and sometimes they have success and they destroy factories, so providing air defense systems is important because it also helps Ukraine produce its own munitions so it can sustain the fight itself,” Lee added. The stepped-up Russian attacks killed at least 11 civilians and injured more than 80 others, including children, Ukrainian officials said Monday. Over the past week, Russia launched at least 1,270 drones, 39 missiles and 1,000 glide bombs at different areas of Ukraine, Zelenskyy said Monday. Eli Stokols contributed reporting.

LONDON — At least he’s outlasted Liz Truss.  Britain’s embattled Prime Minister Keir Starmer swept into office on a landslide a year ago this Saturday. Turns out that was the easy part — and the Labour leader’s No.10 tenure seems to have only continued the volatile trend of British politics over the past decade. As the big anniversary approaches, let POLITICO take you on a stroll down memory lane. JULY 2024 Starmer enjoyed a blink-and-you ’ll-miss-it honeymoon. After winning that landslide victory, the newly-minted prime minister promised a “mission of national renewal” and an end to “self-serving and self-obsessed” politics. It worked — briefly. The PM got to stride the world stage at the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C. and got going with a king’s speech packed full of policies.  But this month also sowed the seeds for trouble to come — particularly on the social security front. The government removed the whip from seven Labour MPs who backed an end to Britain’s two-child welfare cap. More significantly still, Chancellor Rachel Reeves moved to restrict winter fuel payments to only the poorest pensioners — blaming a £22 billion black hole in the public finances left by the Tories. Success rating: 6/10. A confident-seeming start — but slashing winter fuel funding would only come back to haunt Starmer. AUGUST 2024 Starmer cancelled his summer holiday as Britain was hit by far-right rioting. It erupted after the murder of three schoolgirls. The PM’s tough crackdown — pulling on his record as the top prosecutor for England and Wales to deploy specialist police officers who quickly arrested and charged perpetrators — was largely commended, even if it triggered Elon Musk. Much less praised was “Freebiegate” — Labour’s first real ethics scandal, which saw heavy scrutiny of gifts and perks to ministers from Labour donors. Starmer then tried to buoy spirits with a … depressing speech in the Downing Street rose garden saying the pain would get worse. He later regretted that the speech had “squeezed the hope out.” You don’t say. The PM endured the treasury minister Tulip Siddiq resigning amid a Bangladesh corruption probe, and he got a threat from Liz Truss, who insisted she’d get the lawyers in if he kept saying she crashed the economy. | Andy Rain/EPA Success rating: 5/10. A decisive response to rioting soon got overshadowed by a sleaze row. SEPTEMBER 2024 In a bid to maintain support for Ukraine, Starmer went to Washington pleading for then-U.S. president Joe Biden to let Kyiv use Storm Shadow missiles to strike inside Russia. The PM came away empty-handed — but did at least get to dine with Donald Trump. That turned out to be a shrewd move. Starmer made an erm, interesting intervention in another seemingly intractable overseas conflict by … demanding the “return of the [Israeli] sausages” during his speech at Labour conference. Success rating: 6/10. Starmer’s unfortunate gaffe aside, building the Trump link early certainly did him no harm. OCTOBER 2024 Now for the proper drama. No. 10 was thrown into fresh turmoil when Sue Gray quit as Starmer’s chief of staff after just three months.  A former civil service big beast, Gray’s position became untenable after multiple briefings against her. Elections guru Morgan McSweeney succeeded Gray. He would quickly run into his own problems in managing No. 10 effectively. The PM at least got to flee to Samoa for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting with King Charles. He then flew back into a major economic moment as Reeves gave her first budget, which changed farming inheritance tax rules, hiked national insurance contributions and saw £40 billion in tax rises. It got a mixed verdict, with Labour MPs happy with more health, education and defense funding, plus a boost to the minimum wage. Reeves’ decisions were the clearest indication the Labour administration would be different from the Tories. Success rating: 5/10. No.10 in turmoil, but hey, I got to hang out with the king. NOVEMBER 2024 Donald Trump decisively won a second term as U.S. president — forcing world leaders everywhere to adapt to the new reality. Starmer rang Trump the very same day. In a bid to maintain support for Ukraine, Starmer went to Washington pleading for then-U.S. president Joe Biden to let Kyiv use Storm Shadow missiles to strike inside Russia. | Leszek Szymanski/EPA The PM, meanwhile, authorized Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles targeted at Russia. He met Chinese leader Xi Jinping for the first time at the G20 in Brazil — and insisted human rights issues were raised. The month also saw Starmer’s first cabinet resignation when Louise Haigh quit as transport secretary over a historic fraud conviction. The swift change of personnel was brutal — showing Starmer can be ruthless when he wants to be. Success rating: 7/10. Starmer seemed more decisive at home and abroad. DECEMBER 2024 Six months in? Time for a “don’t call it a reset” reset speech.  Alongside five missions and three foundations, the PM gave a speech unveiling six milestones on which voters should judge him. He promised higher disposable income, more police and making children “school-ready.” No pressure. Starmer also started to generate “air miles Keir” headlines with overseas trips to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Norway and Estonia. The PM also managed his first holiday since the general election, heading to Madeira with his family. Success rating: 7/10. No massive drama here — and a break must have been nice. JANUARY 2025 A new year dawned, but the challenges kept piling up. X owner and then-Trump ally Elon Musk launched a tirade against Starmer’s government for perceived inaction on grooming gangs responsible for child sexual exploitation. Though Starmer commissioned an audit, the PM lambasted what he called a “far-right bandwagon” jumping on events for their own gain. That position would look shaky later. The PM endured the treasury minister Tulip Siddiq resigning amid a Bangladesh corruption probe, and he got a threat from Liz Truss, who insisted she’d get the lawyers in if he kept saying she crashed the economy. The remainder of the short-serving Tory former PM’s legacy won’t have done him much harm. Success rating: 5/10. The world’s richest man swept into British politics to Starmer’s detriment and upended the news agenda. The grooming gangs issue would not go away. Expectations for Keir Starmer’s first meeting with Donald Trump in the White House were pretty low. | Pool Photo by Ludovic Marin via EPA FEBRUARY 2025 Expectations for Starmer’s first meeting with Trump in the White House were pretty low. The center-left legal eagle and the brash Republican game show host are not natural allies. But the PM managed to play the game deftly, offering the U.S. president a second state visit invite from King Charles himself. Trump, in turn, praised Starmer’s “beautiful accent” and insisted he could work out any trade differences with the U.K. Starmer even managed to shut opinionated Vice President JD Vance up for a bit. The PM pre-empted the trip with a Trump-pleasing vow to hike defense spending. However, that came with a cost — development minister Anneliese Dodds quit, warning that funding the pledge by cutting overseas aid would cause real harm to the most vulnerable.  Success rating: 7/10. Starmer defied expectations to storm his Oval Office meeting — but lost a government ally. MARCH 2025 Just a day after Starmer’s own visit, Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy had a nightmare encounter in the Oval Office as he was publicly belittled by Trump and Vance. While other world leaders tweeted their concern, the PM literally hugged Zelenskyy close, hosting a London Summit about Ukraine’s future and helping gin up a “coalition of the willing” to guarantee peace after any deal with Russia. A lack of any U.S. buy-in for this one means the jury is very much still out, although Starmer managed to move without enraging the White House. Far trickier for Starmer this month was the unveiling of a host of welfare cuts. The measures were initially announced in Reeves’ spring statement — and an impact assessment laid bare the potential impact on families, storing up huge problems for later. Success rating: 5/10. International wins — but big domestic trouble brewing. APRIL 2025 The special relationship didn’t shield Britain from Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs. The U.K. still faced the brunt of the U.S. president’s trade levies (even if Starmer later bagged carve-outs that would elude the EU). In one of the most dramatic moments of his premiership so far, parliament was also recalled for a rare Saturday sitting as it approved rapid-fire legislation effectively nationalizing a key steel plant in Scunthorpe. It was a decisive moment that has saved jobs — even if big questions remain about the site’s future. Success rating: 8/10. Starmer got through the tariff troubles and protected a key domestic industry. A dreadful set of local elections saw Labour lose hundreds of councillors and Nigel Farage’s Reform U.K. win many councils. | Neil Hall/EPA MAY 2025 A dreadful set of local elections saw Labour lose hundreds of councillors and Nigel Farage’s Reform U.K. win many councils. It set off soul-searching in the Labour ranks and made clear Farage is now the biggest rival to Labour. Sensing the threat, Starmer gave a speech about controlling migration which warned of a Britain becoming an “island of strangers.” The PM later said he “deeply regrets” using the term. On overseas affairs, Starmer had some wins: a long-coveted trade agreement with India (complete with a row about tax on Indian workers), a decently-received “reset” with the EU, and a much-hyped trade deal with the U.S. that got Trump purring but which left plenty of holes to be filled in. The controversial agreement to hand over control of the Chagos Islands was also signed — angering figures on the right but at least without triggering Team Trump. Success rating: 4/10. Labour got a decisive thumbs down from voters, which is hard to offset with some trade deal progress. JUNE 2025 Starmer was allowed a small cheer when Scottish Labour unexpectedly won a Holyrood by-election. But that was as good as it got. A flurry of defense, national security and China reviews allowed Starmer to highlight challenges Britain faced — while fears of a huge flare-up in the Middle East haven’t yet come to fruition after Trump deployed U.S. bombers in Iran. But June will forever be the month of U-turns. Reeves confirmed that far more pensioners will get winter fuel payments after a major voter backlash. Starmer also announced a national grooming gang inquiry — and made huge welfare concessions when more than 100 Labour MPs made clear they couldn’t support the proposals. Even that wasn’t enough (see next month). After a bitter battle, Labour MP Kim Leadbeater’s bill paving the way for assisted dying passing the Commons. It’s a change Starmer has long personally backed. Success rating: 5/10. Few remember reviews. Everyone remembers U-turns. JULY 2025 Arguably Starmer’s worst month to date — and it isn’t even five days old. The £5 billion Rachel Reeves was hoping to save from welfare vanished into thin air just an hour before the package was voted on, as the government filleted its own bill in the wake of a major rebellion. It raised huge questions about Starmer’s judgment and the make up of his top team. The £5 billion Rachel Reeves was hoping to save from welfare vanished into thin air just an hour before the package was voted on. | Will Oliver/EPA Markets wobbled the next day as Chancellor Rachel Reeves cried in the House of Commons over a “personal issue” — and Starmer declined to give her his long-term backing before fulsomely doing so in a mop-up interview later that night. Just another normal day. Success rating: 2/10. At least parliamentary recess is coming up.

BRUSSELS — The European Union is striving to project unity as it races to negotiate a high-stakes trade deal with Washington, but backstage, national divisions threaten to weaken its negotiating hand. “Nobody in Europe wants to escalate,” European Council President António Costa said last weekend. “Nobody wants a conflict.“ That’s also a message EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič will be keen to convey as he meets with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on Thursday for a potentially decisive round of talks. It will be the last chance to clinch an initial political agreement before a July 8 deadline set by President Donald Trump to do a deal or face 50 percent “reciprocal” tariffs.  Away from the diplomatic dance, however, EU countries don’t always see eye-to-eye on how best to deal with the White House. And as so often, the diversity of views held by the bloc’s 27 national leaders — all catering to domestic interest groups and voters — is making it difficult for Šefčovič to drive a hard bargain. The Commission is set to brief EU ambassadors on the talks on Friday. Whether it can quickly announce a breakthrough will depend largely on their feedback. On the final stretch, Brussels continues to push to lower the baseline 10 percent tariff that Trump imposed on most U.S. trading partners in April. It has, however, signaled it could be ready to accept 10 percent should other conditions be met, such as providing immediate relief for specific industries. “There are some differences emerging, which I think should be discussed and composed quickly, because it’s a problem,” Brando Benifei, a senior lawmaker who chairs the European Parliament’s delegation to the United States, told POLITICO in an interview. “This emergence of diverging views from those that seem willing to accept the 10 percent as part of an agreement that would counter the rest, and those that are saying that such a high base tariff is so far from what we do on our side — it is something that should never be accepted,” added the Italian Social Democrat. “I agree with the second camp.” A Commission trade spokesperson pushed back against that characterization of the debate. “There has been a far higher than usual level of consultation with our member states, which is why we have had this very striking level of unity all along,” they told reporters in Brussels on Wednesday. HEAVYWEIGHTS CLASH German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni are the most vocal proponents of a fast deal — even at the price of greater concessions to the White House.  At a summit of EU leaders last week, Merz argued that “it’s better to act quickly and simply than slowly and in a highly complicated way.” During the discussion, he “pointed out individual industries … in Germany — the chemical industry, the pharmaceutical industry, mechanical engineering, steel, aluminum, the automotive industry — [that] are all currently being burdened with such high tariffs that it is really putting companies at risk.” Meloni — a Trump ally — has described the 10 percent U.S. tariff as “not particularly impactful for us.” One EU diplomat, granted anonymity to speak candidly, described Rome as “quite keen to maintain good relationships and willing to accept a lot” in talks about the tariffs. The German chancellor has mostly been pushing for lower rates for specific sectors, such as the powerful car industry that drives its export-led economy. That has gone down well in Washington, with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick observing last month that “Germany would like to make a deal — but they’re not allowed.”  That may not be in the wider European interest, argues David Kleimann, a senior trade expert at the ODI think tank in Brussels.  “The Commission has so far — fortunately — pushed back against the most immediate German instincts,” Kleimann said. “At the same time, the Commission now appears to be willing to accept an agreement — with a landing zone involving sectoral carve-outs from a 10 percent U.S. baseline tariff — that would …  erode fundamental principles of the rules-based trading system and undermine EU strategic autonomy.” SYMMETRY IN ASYMMETRY At the other end of the spectrum are Paris and Madrid, which want to resist the U.S. president’s roughhouse negotiating tactics, according to two EU diplomats who were granted anonymity to discuss the closed-door trade talks. At last week’s summit, French President Emmanuel Macron — who has been pushing for weeks for Trump to remove all tariffs — initially argued against rushing to accept an “asymmetrical” agreement just to meet Trump’s deadline. At the end of the meeting, however, he indicated he might be willing to accept a 10 percent tariff under certain conditions. “It would be best to have the lowest tariff possible, zero percent is the best. But if it’s 10 percent, it’ll be 10 percent,” he said. “If the American choice falls on 10 percent, there will be a compensation on goods sold by the United States. The levy will result in the same levy on U.S. goods.” Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, meanwhile, has tasted Trump’s anger: The U.S. president threatened new tariffs against Madrid last week after Sánchez refused to increase defense spending in line with other allies at a NATO summit — even though that wouldn’t be doable as the EU’s members operate as a trade bloc. To add spice to the mix, smaller countries are also bringing their own demands to the table — all keen to shield their own sensitive industries. Some, whose trade with the U.S. is balanced, are reluctant to take the heat for the bloc’s overall trade surplus with the U.S., for which a handful of countries led by Germany are responsible. Giorgia Meloni — a Trump ally — has described the 10 percent U.S. tariff as “not particularly impactful for us.” | Giuseppe Lami/EPA The split also impacts the EU’s retaliation playbook, which the Commission is preparing in order to be ready to fire back quickly if needed. In addition to initial retaliation measures — approved but not yet implemented — targeting €21 billion in U.S. exports in response to Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs, the Commission has proposed another €95 billion package over his reciprocal and car tariffs.  Special pleading by member countries would reduce the impact to €25 billion, the executive warned last month. Should this week’s talks fail, that discord threatens to undermine the bloc’s ability to impose significant pain on the U.S. economy when EU trade ministers meet on July 14 to take a final decision on the retaliation measures. “Although some member states signal that they could live with the 10 percent if the rest is solved, I still think it’s not a good idea,” said Benifei, the Italian MEP. “You should have countermeasures if we end up in the deal with the 10 percent.”

The International Criminal Court (ICC) said it was hit by a “sophisticated and targeted” cyberattack as NATO leaders gathered in The Hague for a summit last week. The ICC, which is based in The Hague, said it detected the incident “late last week” and had contained the threat. “A Court-wide impact analysis is being carried out, and steps are already being taken to mitigate any effects of the incident,” the court said in a statement on Monday. The Hague was the scene of the NATO Summit early last week. Dutch cybersecurity authorities reported a series of cyberattacks known as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against local governments and other institutions in the run-up and during the summit. Those attacks, limited in impact, were claimed by known pro-Russian hacktivist groups online. A power outage also caused massive disruption to train traffic in the country last Tuesday. Dutch authorities said they were investigating the incident and the country’s justice minister said he couldn’t rule out sabotage as a possible cause. The ICC in 2023 also reported a hack of its computer systems it believed was an attempt to spy on the institution. The global tribunal has recently come under scrutiny after it issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former defense minister, Yoav Gallant, over Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. The U.S. Trump administration has slapped sanctions on the court’s Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan in response to the arrest warrants. Khan also lost access to his email provided by Microsoft in May, in an incident that has galvanized a political push in Europe to wean off American technology for critical communications.