BRUSSELS — Europe’s food system depends on an endangered species: its farmers. Every year, thousands of them retire and fewer take their place. Across the countryside, barns are shuttered, land is leased to ever-larger holdings and rural schools quietly close. The result is fewer people growing food, more imports filling supermarket shelves and a profession slipping into decline. That’s the slow-moving crisis Brussels is set to confront on Tuesday, when Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen unveils the EU’s Strategy for Generational Renewal in Agriculture — a plan to keep the next generation of food producers from giving up before they’ve begun. Young farmers have been asking lawmakers to act for well over a decade, said Peter Meedendorp, the 25-year-old president of the European Council of Young Farmers, or CEJA, speaking by phone as he rushed back from his tractor on the Dutch farm he runs with his father and brothers. In the run-up to the strategy’s release, Meedendorp has been splitting his time between the fields and Brussels. While he’s eager to see what Hansen delivers, he’s also wary: “To what extent can we make all the nice recommendations reality in the field if no finance is attached?”  The European Commission wants member countries to spend 6 percent of their Common Agricultural Policy money on generational renewal — double the current level. If countries make good on that target, CEJA’s cause could be on the receiving end of over €17 billion between 2028 and 2034, a budgetary boost compared with recent years. The question is whether the plan can actually stop Europe’s farms from disappearing. PRICED OUT Over a third of farm managers in Europe are over 65, while less than one in eight are under the age of 40.  “It’s not that young people don’t want to farm — it’s that it’s nearly impossible to start,” said Sara Thill, the 21-year-old vice president of Luxembourg’s young farmers group LLJ, in an interview in Brussels last week.  Young farmers struggle to find available and affordable land to start working. One hectare of arable land in the EU costs almost €12,000. That price rises to over €90,000 on average in Meedendorp’s native Netherlands, up from €56,000 a decade ago.  “When you start, the banks ask for guarantees your parents can’t give — it’s a vicious circle,” said Florian Poncelet, a 29-year-old beef farmer who heads Belgian regional young farmers’ association FJA. Roy Meijer, chair of the Dutch young farmers farmers’ group NAJK, put it bluntly: “Banks look at young farmers as risk. If you’re 25 and want to buy land, forget it.” Across Europe, young farmers sound more impatient than nostalgic. They see agriculture not as a tradition to protect but a business to reinvent. “Young farmers aren’t waiting for subsidies,” Meijer said, pushing back against the idea that they expect easy money from Brussels. What they want, he argued, is predictability — rules that don’t change with every new reform, and recognition that they’re entrepreneurs like any others. “People my age aren’t afraid of innovation,” he added. “We want to use drones, data, AI. But to invest, we need clear, long-term rules. You can’t build a business on shifting ground.” UPPING THE ANTE Brussels has been trying to lure new farmers for decades through its CAP, with mixed results. Member countries currently dedicate 3 percent of their EU-funded farm payments to young farmer schemes — about €6.8 billion between 2023 and 2027. Now Hansen wants to up the ante. A recent draft of the strategy, obtained by POLITICO, sets a goal to double the share of EU farmers under 40 to nearly a quarter by 2040. To get there, the Commission wants countries to spend 6 percent of their CAP budgets on young farmers, limit payments to retirees and offer loans of up to €300,000 for new entrants. It also urges capitals to use tax reform and land-use policies as tools to make farming more attractive, while touting the Commission’s own plans to publish a bioeconomy strategy next month. Young farmers’ groups worry the ambition may outstrip the means. Unlike the current farm budget, which enforces the 3 percent minimum, the 6 percent target is only aspirational. That has left CEJA concerned that some governments could spend even less. Young farmers fear that generational renewal will struggle to compete against other funding priorities, and that the new strategy’s fate may hinge less on good intentions than on the next CAP itself — a reform already under fire from both farm lobbies and lawmakers. Commission officials have pushed back on those criticisms, pointing to the various funding streams young farmers could access through the new “starter pack” in the future CAP and the upcoming generational renewal strategy. The Commission has also suggested restructuring CAP payments to divert funding from large farmers to smaller — and younger — ones.  Nonetheless, “not earmarking any money for a specific group of young farmers is a signal,” Meedendorp insisted. “We have a commissioner who bills himself as a young farmer commissioner, who is also the one proposing a CAP without any earmarking for young farmers.”

Alexander Lukashenko’s stubborn grip on the Belarusian economy plunged the potato-happy country into a spud shortage this spring. Critics of the authoritarian ruler, who in January grabbed a seventh term in power, say he has warped the economy with strict price controls on staples like potatoes — while encouraging citizens to snitch on grocery stores that flout regime rules.  The limits, launched by Lukashenko in October 2022 as he aimed to keep prices low and stave off inflation, instead made potatoes far less profitable for farmers to produce.  Opponents say that decisions made by Lukashenko’s team stunted production last year and pushed many cash-strapped farmers to sell their produce to neighboring Russia, humiliating the Minsk regime and crippling grocery stores expected to sell potatoes on the cheap. Paltry potato price increases weren’t keeping up with rising costs for farmers and retailers, and the country’s demotivated farmers in turn planted fewer potatoes. Belarus harvested 3.1 million tons of potatoes in 2024, down from more than 4 million a year prior. “If you know from the history of the Soviet Union, when people don’t have motivation, you cannot really force them to do work very well,” said Lev Lvovskiy, academic director at the flagship Belarusian BEROC economic think tank. The irony: Lukashenko himself once led a collective farm in Gorodets, in the east of modern-day Belarus, during the twilight years of Soviet communism. The price controls instituted by Minsk made selling to Russia a highly profitable proposition. Potatoes cost over twice as much in Russia as in Belarus in March, according to BEROC data. And Belarus exported about 200,000 tons of potatoes to Russia in 2024, making it the No. 1 supplier of the staple crop to its neighbor.  The financial incentives of trade with Russia aren’t lost on the government. Lukashenko himself has implored farmers to produce enough potatoes to feed both Minsk and Moscow. “We need to help our Russian kinfolk. And besides, we will earn good money from it,” he said in May. ROTTEN POTATOES Due to the resulting shortage, however, the regime temporarily banned the export of potatoes — including to Russia — absent a license beginning in December 2024. Many farmers have responded to the restrictions by labeling healthy potatoes as spoiled, and continued to funnel them to Russia, Lvovskiy told POLITICO.  The result of the upheaval: Small, scarce and sometimes rotten potatoes in Belarusian grocery stores, a phenomenon that escalated in March and April. This shows how “Lukashenko and his administration can artificially create deficits of goods that were in enormous numbers before,” said Aleś Alachnovič, economic adviser to exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. The irony: Lukashenko himself once led a collective farm in Gorodets, in the east of modern-day Belarus, during the twilight years of Soviet communism. | Belarus president press service That’s not the regime’s line.  “We made adjustments to the government resolution several times based on the reality on the ground. Thus, all negative trends in trade and in manufacturing were nipped in the bud. Price regulation did not cause any imbalances. There is a sufficient amount of goods on the shelves at reasonable prices,” Ivan Vezhnovets, first deputy minister of antimonopoly regulation and trade, said in a statement in March. In a sign of just how much the market moves in accordance with Lukashenko’s wishes, so-called washed potatoes — better-quality spuds not under the price controls — remained on shelves but at significantly higher prices. To incentivize farmers to grow more and sell domestically, officials jacked up the maximum price of the regular potatoes in April. And in late May, the state reversed a ban on imports of certain foodstuffs, including potatoes, from European Union countries classed as “unfriendly,” to try to address the self-inflicted shortage. “Now, [availability is] getting better,” Lvovskiy told POLITICO.  But apart from massaging international trade, Minsk’s solution to the crisis in supermarkets has been to assert even more control.  Lukashenko in June suggested that unnamed “certain individuals” had manufactured the shortage to punish the government’s economic policy. “There were plenty of potatoes. But the supply was limited in order to demonstrate the adverse effects of the president interfering with pricing practices. But when [the State Control Committee] showed up with handcuffs and placed them on the table, potatoes became available,” he said at a government conference. In early May, the regime’s State Control Committee launched a hotline for shoppers to report grocery stores that either weren’t selling potatoes or charged too much. “Part of the strategy is just to harass all these retail chains in [the] hope that they would be so afraid of prison that they would come up with potatoes from pure air,” Lvovskiy said. It isn’t exactly a foolproof plan. “We believe that it proves, once again, the inefficiency of the policies that Lukashenko is pursuing, definitely,” said Vladzimir Astapenka, the Brussels-based representative for international and European cooperation in Tsikhanouskaya’s United Transitional Cabinet in exile. “But he tries to survive. He tries to stay afloat.”

ATHENS — The European Commission has hit Greece with a fine of nearly €400 million for mismanaging EU farm funding and inadequate controls. Brussels has ordered Athens to to forfeit €392.2 in EU funding due to systemic failings in its management of EU farm subsidies between 2016 and 2023. The Greek agency responsible for overseeing EU farm payments is also accused of making payments without sufficient checks or on-site inspections. The fine follows a mammoth Greek farm fraud scandal that is being probed by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and was the subject of a POLITICO investigation earlier this year. EPPO is pursuing dozens of cases in which Greek citizens received EU agricultural funds for pastureland they did not own or had not leased, or for agricultural work they never did, depriving real farmers of the cash they deserved. Last month, the Greek government announced it would shut down OPEKEPE, the state agency under investigation. European Chief Prosecutor Laura Kövesi, in comments to POLITICO, vowed to press ahead with an inquiry into the fraud scheme despite what she described as “attacks” and “intimidation” against her staff. “The vilification of our country continues and its credibility vis-à-vis the European institutions is plummeting,” Greece’s main opposition leader Nikos Androulakis said in a statement. According to the decision, dated June 11, the European Commission has imposed a flat-rate correction of 5 percent on all Greek direct subsidies over a lack of effective supervision. For specific categories such as young farmer schemes from 2018 to 2020, that correction rises to 10 percent. The two largest annual penalties, €79 million and €76 million, target area-based payments made in 2021 and 2022 respectively. The fines affect several different subsidies, including direct payments, small farmer schemes, eco-schemes, and voluntary coupled support measures. All were found to suffer from insufficient compliance with EU criteria. Greece was expected to receive some €1.9 billion in direct payments from the EU next year, but around a quarter of that will now be cut, due to the fine. Last March the General Court of the European Union dismissed a Greek appeal against a similar set of sanctions, upholding the European Commission’s findings and ordering Greece to pay court costs. The current decision is not directly involved to the investigations into fraudulent pastureland claims. According to Greek agriculture officials, more fines are expected to follow.

BRUSSELS — When Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the conclusions of her Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture last month, it looked like a PR coup. The seven-month forum on agri-food policy had calmed both riotous farmers and outraged NGOs, while yielding an apparently balanced report that she could loot for legislative ideas. Yet that success may be short-lived. Copa-Cogeca — Europe’s largest and most influential agricultural lobby — is hardening its position, POLITICO has learned. The group’s national members were outraged by some of the dialogue’s final recommendations, particularly the need to promote plant-based diets. After a raucous month in which members repeatedly blasted the Copa-Cogeca presidency — at a farm event in Hungary, in emails to its Brussels office and at the Copa presidium on Sept. 26 — the umbrella group wants to beef up its bargaining power at the European Board on Agri-Food (EBAF), the proposed successor to the Strategic Dialogue. “In the Strategic Dialogue, just five out of 29 participants were farmers,” Copa-Cogeca wrote in a Sept. 20 letter to the Commission, obtained by POLITICO. “At least half of the Board should be composed of participants representing the farming world, and Copa and Cogeca … should be granted a stronger presence in comparison to other actors.” The group also called for the inclusion of bodies representing “livestock and crops sectorial organisations, inputs [and] agriculture machinery,” as well as a shift from the fast-paced, confidential and person-to-person talks towards a slower, more transparent, and organization-based format.  “What we really need to focus on is making it work for farmers because that, from my point of view, was the initial objective of the dialogue: it was a reaction to farmers’ protest,” said Jan Doležal, the president of the Czech AKČR agrarian chamber. Looking forward, “we’ll work to improve our negotiation position,” he told POLITICO. That’s going to be a problem as von der Leyen seeks to convert the conclusions of the dialogue into a “Vision” for the future of EU agriculture — one of several action plans she has promised to deliver within 100 days of her new Commission being sworn in. The 29-stakeholder dialogue sought to overcome the extreme polarization of von der Leyen’s first term, encouraging compromise and trust between a motley crew of agricultural associations, food manufacturers and retailers, environmentalists, academics, and financiers. Participants mostly came alone, ate together, and shared stories about themselves and their families. Stacking the EBAF with farmers will likely be seen as a unilateral power grab, breaking the tentative cease-fire and tipping Europe’s agri-food sector into turbulence once more. Likewise, converting the nimble talks into rigid meetings, where envoys run every suggestion through their bulky membership lists, will kill the goose that laid the golden egg.  Factor in grumpy European lawmakers and capitals, both upset at being excluded from the process, and the results of von der Leyen’s unorthodox farm talks could end up having a short shelf life. MEXICAN STANDOFF IN BRUSSELS Since its announcement in January, the Strategic Dialogue had ticked along nicely. With its members sworn to secrecy, it was hard to gauge how things were going, but everyone seemed reasonably satisfied. There were no major leaks and participants praised the constructive atmosphere and optimistic outlooks.   By late August, negotiations had entered the final phase and people started to sweat. The dialogue’s conclusions were meant to be unanimous and Peter Strohschneider, the German historian who moderated the debate, began to apply pressure to reluctant delegates. He told one group of holdouts that he would keep on chairing meetings for as long as it took, recalled one participant. When Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the conclusions of her Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture last month, it looked like a PR coup. | Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images When the 100-page report was published on Sept. 4, everyone scrambled to claim victory. NGOs trumpeted how it supported the EU’s recently-adopted nature restoration law. Consumer groups celebrated its food labeling and fair pricing sections. Young, organic and smallholder farmers highlighted the bits on reforming the EU farm budget, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Copa-Cogeca, the traditional behemoth of Brussels agri-food, struggled to sell it across the bloc though. “Really dangerous” is how Coldiretti, Italy’s largest farmer union, judged the recommendation for the CAP to prioritize smaller farmers. “I don’t like that at all,” said the head of the Dutch LTO on the need to decarbonize diets. Overall, the text “falls well short of expectations,” sniffed the president of the German Farmers’ Association (DBV). France’s FNSEA remained silent. Neither the organization nor its outspoken president, Arnaud Rousseau, posted a word about the report on its website or X account. That was despite the fact its former president is Christiane Lambert, one of the three Copa-Cogeca leaders who signed the conclusions and who uploaded a mass of posts about it on social media.  That week, most Copa member representatives were in Budapest for a farm conference. “This was our first chance to discuss it together,” said one participant, granted anonymity to speak freely. “There was unhappiness at part of it, particularly in relation to diets and consideration of alternative diets and plant proteins … anything essentially that would go against our position on livestock.” Two days after the report’s publication, four Copa members from the Visegrad countries — Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary — shot a highly critical letter at the secretariat. It demanded Copa-Cogeca retrospectively reject the report’s conclusions and withdraw from the Strategic Dialogue entirely.  “After 20 years of membership of the European Union and of the Copa-Cogeca family, we thought that our differences would be understood and safeguarded,” the four wrote in the letter obtained by POLITICO. “We expected the Copa-Cogeca Secretariat and Presidents to take a more cautious position and to insist on discussing the very sensitive and often controversial conclusions” with members, they complained: “The process was very non-transparent, especially in the last three days of the negotiations, when we had zero opportunity to intervene.” The group’s leadership tried to smooth things over. At the Copa presidium on Sept. 26, they assured unions the document was just a starting point. Some were assuaged. “I think people have accepted it with caveats, people are willing to move on,” said the participant present in Budapest.    Others were not. POLITICO spoke to one attendee who argued the lobby showed a lack of courage during the dialogue and its endorsement is not easily reversible. Von der Leyen wants the report to guide future legislation and has explicitly tasked her designated agriculture commissioner, Christophe Hansen, with following up on its proposals. WHAT HAPPENS NOW There’s disagreement over whether Copa-Cogeca could still withdraw from future talks. In a statement to POLITICO, the secretariat said that “the Strategic Dialogue is a report, not a legally binding agreement, so the question of a general withdrawal doesn’t apply.”  Both Doležal, the Czech farm boss, and the representative present in Budapest agreed with that idea, though for different reasons. Doležal, one of the four signatories of the Visegrad letter, told POLITICO that “I don’t think this will be on the table actually,” since Copa-Cogeca’s subsequent letter to the Commission has appeased him. The representative from Budapest was more pragmatic. “We’ve got a new secretary-general, Ellie Tsiforou: I don’t think it will be in her interests after her first couple of weeks … to announce that the farmers are” out, and risk immediately alienating von der Leyen, they reflected.  The dialogue’s conclusions were meant to be unanimous and Peter Strohschneider began to apply pressure to reluctant delegates. | Nicolas Tucat Not everyone got the memo though.  Any breach of the principle of consensus — such as signing a trade deal with South America or proposing a new pesticide reduction law — would mean trouble, warned José María Castilla, the head of Spain’s largest farmer union Asaja. “If [the EU] doesn’t comply with the agreement, we will be back on the streets,” he told POLITICO.