
On the slow road to peace in Ukraine
POLITICO - Wednesday, February 12, 2025Wolfgang Ischinger is a former German ambassador to the U.S. and the U.K. He is president of the Munich Security Conference Foundation, and chaired the Munich Security Conference from 2008 to 2022. He teaches at the Hertie School Berlin and the University of Tübingen.
A sigh of relief was heard in Davos recently, when U.S. President Donald Trump, on the heels of his inauguration speech, made it clear he wouldn’t be a pushover by sacrificing Ukraine. (If the sigh was a little a muted on Europe’s end, it was probably because he also made it clear to Denmark, one of NATO’s smaller partners, that he didn’t consider its sovereignty over Greenland to be absolute.)
But are we really on the fast-track to U.S.-Russia talks? Are we on the way to negotiations on a possible cease-fire, or even a peace settlement, in Ukraine, which can all be wrapped up in weeks?
Some seem to believe so. But skepticism is warranted.
The idea that establishing security guarantees for Ukraine and a cease-fire line along the current front line is all that’s needed is the West’s wishful thinking. We need to be preparing for a much longer and extraordinarily complex process that will take many months.
Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t want to give the impression that he’s dancing to Washington’s tune. The whole security situation in Europe, the lifting of sanctions, nuclear and conventional arms control, and overall strategic stability — it will all have to be discussed.
The Russian leader will demand equal footing with Trump, and he knows two things for certain: Trump will be gone for good by early 2029, and the U.S. president will want to avoid a military conflict with Russia at almost all costs. And with Europe’s united front as shaky as it is, this could be an invitation for Putin to stall.
Some initial conclusions from the various rounds of talks in Davos and the preparatory discussions for this week’s Munich Security Conference can be outlined as follows:
Firstly, the cheaper the price of a cease-fire and the less watertight it is, the more expensive the peace that follows will be. Therefore, under no circumstances should support for Ukraine be reduced — on the contrary, it should be intensified. The price for Putin must be made as high as possible.
Next, Trump must exercise restraint when considering summit encounters with Putin: An early summit would be a completely undeserved reward for the Russian leader. It should only be considered toward the end of a promising negotiation process.
Moreover, the Russian side may well be planning a surprise military attack or major offensive in order to undermine Western or Ukrainian ideas about the negotiating framework. And while the West certainly shouldn’t make things easy for Russia, there has to be room for realism.
U.S. President Donald Trump, on the heels of his inauguration speech, made it clear he wouldn’t be a pushover by sacrificing Ukraine. | Andrew Harnik/Getty ImagesTake, for example, the much-discussed idea of having European troops secure a cease-fire line. The political objective here is clear and sound: It would allow Europe to show Trump it’s prepared to do more for its own security than it has so far. But the devil is in the details.
Estimates of the number of troops required to effectively secure a 1,000-kilometer contact line vary from 50,000 to 200,000 — the latter figure came from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself. Realistically, could Europe politically or militarily manage this, while the Bundeswehr is struggling to deploy a brigade to Lithuania? Doubts can, therefore, be expressed as to whether Europe would even be capable of credibly securing a cease-fire with a large numbers of troops. And the possible involvement of troops from third countries, including for example India, should be given proper consideration.
For its part, Washington isn’t even thinking about putting “boots on the ground” — a stance which breaks the NATO principle that risks should be shared. It will also make it more difficult for European governments to get the buy-in they need from their parliaments. As seen from Germany, the slogan “in together — out together” has always been a healthy NATO principal.
It’s important we not come up with short-sighted solutions, but set long-term priorities and prepare for a difficult, painful negotiation process, which could take a long time due to its extreme complexity. Above all, we must not only continue to provide military and financial assistance to Ukraine but increase it.
This is the ideal way to achieve a successful outcome for the future of a sovereign, free and undivided Ukraine, and the restoration of Europe’s security.