Tag - operational security

IACR Nullifies Election Because of Lost Decryption Key
The International Association of Cryptologic Research—the academic cryptography association that’s been putting conferences like Crypto (back when “crypto” meant “cryptography”) and Eurocrypt since the 1980s—had to nullify an online election when trustee Moti Yung lost his decryption key. > For this election and in accordance with the bylaws of the IACR, the three > members of the IACR 2025 Election Committee acted as independent trustees, > each holding a portion of the cryptographic key material required to jointly > decrypt the results. This aspect of Helios’ design ensures that no two > trustees could collude to determine the outcome of an election or the contents > of individual votes on their own: all trustees must provide their decryption > shares...
Uncategorized
encryption
voting
keys
operational security
Louvre Jewel Heist
I assume I don’t have to explain last week’s Louvre jewel heist. I love a good caper, and have (like many others) eagerly followed the details. An electric ladder to a second-floor window, an angle grinder to get into the room and the display cases, security guards there more to protect patrons than valuables—seven minutes, in and out. There were security lapses: > The Louvre, it turns out—at least certain nooks of the ancient former > palace—is something like an anopticon: a place where no one is observed. The > world now knows what the four thieves (two burglars and two accomplices) > realized as recently as last week: The museum’s Apollo Gallery, which housed > the stolen items, was monitored by a single outdoor camera angled away from > its only exterior point of entry, a balcony. In other words, a free-roaming > Roomba could have provided the world’s most famous museum with more > information about the interior of this space. There is no surveillance footage > of the break-in...
Uncategorized
France
theft
operational security
Cell Phone OPSEC for Border Crossings
I have heard stories of more aggressive interrogation of electronic devices at US border crossings. I know a lot about securing computers, but very little about securing phones. Are there easy ways to delete data—files, photos, etc.—on phones so it can’t be recovered? Does resetting a phone to factory defaults erase data, or is it still recoverable? That is, does the reset erase the old encryption key, or just sever the password that access that key? When the phone is rebooted, are deleted files still available? We need answers for both iPhones and Android phones. And it’s not just the US; the world is going to become a more dangerous place to oppose state power...
Uncategorized
borders
cell phones
operational security