TURKEY’S ERDOĞAN BETS BIG WITH HIGH-STAKES KURDISH GAMBLE As the president’s traditional support wanes, he is seeking a risky deal with the Kurds to buy a political lifeline. But is there too much mutual mistrust for a deal? By ELÇIN POYRAZLAR Photo-illustrations by Tarini Sharma for POLITICO Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is making the biggest gamble of his career to save his political skin, just as popular opinion — even in traditionalist, conservative strongholds — swings sharply against him.  His goal? To bring the large Kurdish minority onto his side by ending Turkey’s most intractable political and military conflict that has killed some 40,000 people over four decades and has brutally scarred national life. His move? To give a place in Turkish politics to Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK, an organization long proscribed as terrorists by Ankara, the U.S. and EU. It is a sign of Erdoğan’s plummeting fortunes that he is even contemplating such a radical step to keep his grip over the NATO heavyweight of 85 million people. But the Islamist populist knows this is his moment to try to consolidate his position as president — potentially for life — or risk being wiped off the political scene. Advertisement Since suffering crushing defeats at the hands of the secular opposition in the municipal elections of 2024 — most significantly in conservative bastions — Erdoğan has made an increasingly desperate lurch toward full authoritarianism. Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu has been thrown in jail and the security services have launched a nationwide crackdown to arrest opposition mayors. The allies who supported Erdoğan on his rise to power have largely deserted him.   While the need for a new support base helps explain Erdoğan’s Kurdish gambit, it’s a high-risk move with no guarantee of success. Mainstream Turkish opinion is very wary of the PKK, and the Kurds themselves are extremely nervous about trusting the Turkish authorities. This deal is far from an easy sell. Some initial progress is expected on Friday with a first batch of PKK weapons to be handed over in northern Iraq, probably in the predominantly Kurdish province of Sulaymaniyah. Erdoğan is widely seen as the engineer of the Kurdish rapprochement when his regional diplomacy is also enjoying success. . | Mustafa Kamaci/Anadolu via Getty Images While publicly proclaiming the importance of his “terror-free Turkey” project for reconciliation with the Kurds, Erdoğan is also showing he is wide awake to the risks. He has conceded his project faces “sabotage” from within Turkey, and from within the ranks of the PKK. Sensing some of the potential hostility to his PKK deal, in an address to parliament on Wednesday, the president was careful to pre-empt any attacks from political adversaries that an accord could dishonor veterans or other casualties of the conflict. “Nowhere in the efforts for a terror-free Turkey is there, nor can there be, a step that will tarnish the memory of our martyrs or injure their spirits,” he said. “Guided by the values for which our martyrs made their sacrifices, God willing, we are saving Turkey from a half-century-long calamity and completely removing this bloody shackle that has been placed upon our country.”  Advertisement The jailed Öcalan, speaking in his first video since 1999, said on Wednesday that the PKK movement and its previous quest for a separate Kurdish nation-state were now at an end, as its core demand — the recognition of Kurdish existence — has been met. “Existence has been recognized and therefore the primary objective has been achieved. In this sense, it is outdated … This is a voluntary transition from the phase of armed struggle to the phase of democratic politics and law. This is not a loss, but should be seen as a historic achievement,” he said in his video. ISLAND PRISON No issue in Turkish politics is more bitter than the Kurdish conflict. Some Kurds describe themselves as the most numerous stateless people in the world — there are millions in neighboring Iraq, Iran and Syria, and in Turkey they account for approximately 15 to 20 percent of the population. Many Kurds say they have been denied their rights since the formation of the Turkish republic just over a century ago and have long been oppressed. In turn, many Turks see the PKK, which long waged war against the Turkish state, as a terrorist group — and its leader Öcalan, who has been confined to a prison island all this century, as a murderer. Given the explosive range of feelings about Öcalan, it is remarkable that such a personality will prove so central to securing Erdoğan’s deal.   Öcalan, center, calls on the organization to disarm, in a video recorded in prison and published Wednesday. | Tunahan Turhan/LightRocket via Getty Images Known as “Apo,” he is serving a life sentence for treason and separatism on the island of İmralı in the Sea of Marmara. Notorious in part due to the movie “Midnight Express,” İmralı is referred to as “Turkey’s Alcatraz” and has held Öcalan, for several years as its sole inmate, since 1999. He is no longer alone. During the peace process between 2013 and 2015, a number of PKK prisoners were transferred to İmralı to serve as part of Öcalan’s unofficial secretariat. While the Kurdish policy of Erdoğan and his AK Party has oscillated between crackdowns and conciliation during their 22 years in power, Turkey’s hard-line nationalists have long denounced the PKK as a threat and had little time for Kurdish rights. Perhaps the most outspoken enemy of Öcalan has been a veteran politician called Devlet Bahçeli, an ultranationalist leader, who is now Erdoğan’s main ally, helping him pad out his parliamentary majority.  Advertisement In 2007, Bahçeli had even called for Öcalan to be executed. Ten years ago he lashed out at Erdoğan over one of his sporadic attempts to negotiate with the PKK. But last October, in one of the sudden shake-ups that intermittently convulse politics in Turkey, Bahçeli suggested Öcalan could address parliament — as long as he dissolved the PKK. The significance of the volte-face can hardly be overstated — it was almost as if Benjamin Netanyahu had extended an invitation to Hamas — and behind it all was Erdoğan. The effect was dramatic. On Feb. 27, Öcalan sent a public message from his prison, calling for the PKK to give up its arms and terminate itself. Öcalan credited both Bahçeli’s call, and Erdoğan’s willpower, for helping “create an environment” for the group to disarm. “I take on the historical responsibility of this call,” he added. “Convene your congress and make a decision: All groups must lay down their arms and the PKK must dissolve itself,” he added.  The PKK Congress duly declared the end of the armed struggle on May 12, adding the group had “fulfilled its historical mission” and that, as Öcalan had instructed, “all activities conducted under the PKK name have therefore been concluded.” The statement was welcomed in Ankara, but so far, the gambit by Bahçeli and Erdoğan has yet to fully pay off. There is clearly more work to do. And sure enough, after the watershed statement from Öcalan in February, the prisoner gained more staff on İmralı. According to politicians from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party who spoke to POLITICO, three more prisoners were sent to expand the team available for striking a grand bargain. LITTLE TRUST Nurcan Baysal, a Kurdish human rights campaigner and author of the book “We Exist: Being Kurdish In Turkey,” said many Kurds remained wary of the government. “The government is presenting this as a ‘terror-free Turkey’ process and is trying to limit it to just the PKK laying down its weapons and dissolving itself. This is not peace!” she told POLITICO. Baysal said Öcalan’s declaration in February to dissolve the PKK was also met with disappointment among Kurds because he didn’t say anything about the Kurds’ cultural, linguistic, administrative rights and freedoms. Öcalan, flanked by masked officers on a flight from Kenya to Turkey, in 1999. | Hurriyet Ho via Getty Images “This is felt in all Kurdish cities. There is not the slightest enthusiasm about the process. A serious reason for this is that the Kurds do not trust [Erdoğan’s] AK Party government,” she continued. This mutual mistrust is partially the legacy of the failed initiatives of the past, and the fact that Erdoğan’s deal comes amid a major clampdown on the opposition. İpek Özbey, a political commentator for the secularist channel Sözcü TV, reckoned the Turkish government’s apparent moves toward a Kurdish rapprochement were neither sincere nor promising. Advertisement “We cannot talk about democracy in an environment where elected officials are in prison … and the independence of the judiciary is so much under discussion,” she said. “If there is no democracy, how will we democratize?” During the reporting of this article, several government-allied figures also made clear their unease with Erdoğan’s Kurdish initiative, describing the issue as explosive or signaling their own lack of belief in the process, but declined to talk on the record. ONLY ERDOĞAN From the government camp, Harun Armağan, the AK Party’s vice chair of foreign affairs, conceded that Turkish public opinion remained cautious about the PKK deal, but cast Erdoğan as the only man who could pull it off. He told POLITICO that the PKK reached the stage of laying down arms 10 years ago but “due to changing dynamics in Syria [where allied Kurdish fighters were on the rise], they thought investing in war rather than peace would put them in a more advantageous position. “Ten years later, they have realized how gravely mistaken that was,” Armağan continued. “Whether the PKK will truly disarm and dismantle itself is something we will all see together … Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the only leader in Türkiye who could initiate such a process.” Erdoğan has already served three terms as president. To remain in office he may need to change the constitution. | Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images “The only promise made by the government is to completely rid Türkiye of terrorism and to build a future in which all 85 million citizens can live in peace, prosperity, and freedom to the fullest,” he added. Erdoğan is indeed widely seen as the engineer of the Kurdish rapprochement when his regional diplomacy is also enjoying success.  He has been hailed by U.S. President Donald Trump as the main winner from the fall of Bashar Assad in Syria, where the new government has strong ties to Ankara. Erdoğan is trying to take advantage of his clout by severing ties between Syrian Kurdish groups and the PKK. Advertisement Baysal, the Kurdish human rights campaigner, reckoned the change of events in Syria is the main reason why the Turkish government initiated its Kurdish outreach. But Armağan, the AK Party official, insisted the two processes were distinct. “This [Syrian] process is entirely different from our own process of eliminating terrorism,” he said.  “The Syrian government has already called on all armed groups to join a central army, and the SDF [a prominent Syrian Kurdish group] has signed an agreement to this effect. These are promising developments,” he said. PRESIDENT FOR LIFE Some observers think Erdoğan, a formidable political operator, is using the Kurdish process inside and outside the country to extend his stay in power, trying to recruit Kurdish parliamentarians into his camp. That’s certainly the view of DEM Party Group Deputy Chair Sezai Temelli. But he’s cautious about whether it will work, given broader democratic backsliding. He argued the arrest of Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu, Erdoğan’s rival, was hurting this fragile process and that the “Kurdish democratic solution and the Turkish democratization process have a symbiotic relationship.” He added he would not be surprised to see Erdoğan seeking to capitalize on the process to stay in power, but noted that the CHP, Turkey’s main opposition party, had also pledged to resolve the Kurdish issue if it wins the next election. No issue in Turkish politics is more bitter than the Kurdish conflict. Some Kurds describe themselves as the most numerous stateless people in the world. | Tunahan Turhan/LightRocket via Getty Images “‘Who is not using it? Some use it [the Kurdish issue] to come to power, some use it to stay in power,” Temelli said. “But we say this could only be solved independently of election and power calculations.” Erdoğan has already served three terms as president. To remain in office he may need to change the constitution. Despite the support of Bahçeli, the president’s coalition does not have a sufficient majority for constitutional change so Erdoğan may be counting on the support of Kurdish members of parliament. He has already started speaking openly about a new constitution to replace Turkey’s 1980 charter, which was drawn up by a military regime after a bloody coup.  Advertisement “Türkiye for the first time in its history, has a real opportunity to draft its first civilian constitution. This is a significant opportunity for all of us to build a more prosperous, just, and secure country,” Armağan said. Not everybody agrees. Some look back at past constitutional changes under Erdoğan and say the main purpose of further revision to the charter would be, as in the past, to further the president’s political ambitions. Soner Çağaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Erdoğan was acting like a “parallel computer,” executing opposing political strategies — cracking down on the main opposition, while reaching out to the Kurds whose support he needs to stay in office — without the two competing policies tripping over each other. “He will do anything to get one more term as president and then basically install himself as president for life,” Çağaptay told POLITICO. Erdoğan’s Kurdish gambit is a high-risk move with no guarantee of success. | Adem Altan/AFP via Getty Images But Baysal observed not everything relied on Erdoğan’s ambitions. “Erdoğan is a politician who has the potential to use every issue for his own benefit, and he will not hesitate to instrumentalize the Kurdish issue. He will definitely want to use this to extend his presidency,” she said.  But it is not just the president who will decide, she said. Ultimately, whether Turkey’s tragic Kurdish conflict is consigned to history — and whether Erdoğan reaps the benefit — will depend in large part on the Kurds themselves. “I think the real issue here is not whether he wants it,” said Baysal, referring to Erdoğan, “but whether the Kurds want it.” Advertisement

Catalans have had a heck of a ride the last decade. The Spanish region caught the world’s attention in 2017 when its politicians attempted to stage an illegal independence referendum. The national government in Madrid responded with a tough crackdown that saw half of the region’s leaders imprisoned and the rest fleeing to self-declared exile in Belgium and Switzerland. Years of protests, judicial proceedings and political flare-ups followed. But Europe’s favorite secessionist telenovela appears to have come to an end — at least for now. Last May, nationalist parties failed to secure a majority in Catalonia’s regional parliament for the first time in 30 years. Instead, voters backed 58-year-old Salvador Illa, a pro-unionist socialist politician who campaigned on social issues instead of separatism. The bespectacled and soft-spoken Illa, who served as Spain’s health minister during the Covid crisis and is close to Spanish PM Pedro Sánchez, is often cast as a boring technocrat. “What I want is to govern,” Illa said in an interview with POLITICO on his first trip to Brussels since his election. By “governing,” the socialist leader said he meant shifting the focus in Catalonia away from the independence movement that has monopolized the political scene for decades, and instead focusing on straightforward policies to improve the quality of life in one of Spain’s most prosperous regions. Illa stressed that he firmly defends “self-government for Catalonia,” but added that this should happen within a “plural and diverse Spain.” By working with the national government in Madrid, he believes he can improve the region’s public-health system, railway infrastructure, public services and employment opportunities — issues he stresses are important to all of the region’s residents, regardless of their views on Catalan independence. His objective is to “unite [and] pursue what unites Catalans,” he said. BALANCING ACT But Illa may have trouble achieving his goals. His minority government — which was sworn in the same day separatist leader Carles Puigdemont staged a dramatic return to Barcelona before returning to exile in August — is weak and depends on the support of one of the main independence parties, the Catalan Republican Left. Separatist leader Carles Puigdemont staged a dramatic return to Barcelona before returning to exile in August | Manaure Quintero/AFP via Getty Images While secessionist parties no longer have a majority in the regional parliament, the Socialist leader knows well that independence remains popular in Catalonia. But the movement is fragmented and plagued by infighting, allowing Illa to secure the support of one of the main independence parties — fracturing the movement’s common front. Illa believes that closer collaboration with the EU can help dispel isolationist tendencies within the region. To that end, he’s keen to redefine Catalonia’s presence in Brussels. Since 2004 the regional government has maintained a delegation just steps from the headquarters of the European Commission. During the past decade the space operated as a sort of embassy for the secessionist movement and promoted the pro-independence cause beyond Spain’s borders. “There was not … the participation that I believe Catalonia should have,” he said, adding he now wants the territory to play an active role in EU institutions like the Committee of the Regions, which gives them a voice on the bloc’s big issues. In a bid to change Catalonia’s image in Brussels, Illa recruited the seniormost Catalan official he could find in the EU institutions to lead the government’s foreign and EU department: Jaume Duch, former spokesperson and head of communications at the European Parliament. “Catalonia does not want to present itself to Europe as a problem,” he said, but instead to make “positive contributions” in Brussels.