This is a problem: > Any open model whose weights have been edited can carry a backdoor, whether > it’s a task-specific fine-tune, a merged adapter or an abliterated build. We > have abliterated models in the title because it’s the most popular reason > people download modified weights without verifying what’s inside. Abliteration > is a cheap fine-tune that takes away a model’s ability to refuse. You find the > direction in the weights that carries “no” and subtract it. The model then > answers things a safety-tuned version would turn down. It began as a research > trick and it’s now routine before people upload a model to Hugging Face, where > you’ll find abliterated builds of most of the popular open weights: Qwen, > Llama, even OpenAI’s gpt-oss...

Hackers associated with the Chinese government used a Trojaned version of Notepad++ to deliver malware to selected users. > Notepad++ said that officials with the unnamed provider hosting the update > infrastructure consulted with incident responders and found that it remained > compromised until September 2. Even then, the attackers maintained credentials > to the internal services until December 2, a capability that allowed them to > continue redirecting selected update traffic to malicious servers. The threat > actor “specifically targeted Notepad++ domain with the goal of exploiting > insufficient update verification controls that existed in older versions of > Notepad++.” Event logs indicate that the hackers tried to re-exploit one of > the weaknesses after it was fixed but that the attempt failed...

Here’s a supply-chain attack just waiting to happen. A group of researchers searched for, and then registered, abandoned Amazon S3 buckets for about $400. These buckets contained software libraries that are still used. Presumably the projects don’t realize that they have been abandoned, and still ping them for patches, updates, and etc. > The TL;DR is that this time, we ended up discovering ~150 Amazon S3 buckets > that had previously been used across commercial and open source software > products, governments, and infrastructure deployment/update pipelines—and then > abandoned...

Last week, we saw a supply-chain attack against the Ultralytics AI library on GitHub. A quick summary: > On December 4, a malicious version 8.3.41 of the popular AI library > ultralytics ­—which has almost 60 million downloads—was published to the > Python Package Index (PyPI) package repository. The package contained > downloader code that was downloading the XMRig coinminer. The compromise of > the project’s build environment was achieved by exploiting a known and > previously reported GitHub Actions script injection. Lots more details at that link. Also ...